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I. INTRODUCTION
As is well known, the International Law Commission (ILC)
decided in 1976 to include an article in its Draft Articles on State
Responsibility that makes a distinction between normal international
wrongful acts, which it called delicts, on the one hand, and exceptionally
grave breaches of international law which it called international crimes, on
the other hand. Thus, the ILC followed a suggestion made by its then
Special Rapporteur, Roberto Ago, who, as soon as 1939, suggested such a
distinction.
The ILC maintained this distinction when it completed the first
reading of its draft last year, in spite of strong (and probably growing) and
passionate opposition, as this evening's debate will probably show.
However, it is my deep conviction that:
1. the distinction between what are called delicts and
what are called crimes answers an indisputable
need and must be maintained;
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2. the definition of crimes given in Article 19 of the
ILC draft articles is acceptable, although perhaps
unduly sophisticated;
3. the legal regime of these crimes as envisaged by
the ILC is debatable since the method adopted to
establish it has been grossly unsatisfactory; and
4. by way of conclusion, the word crime might be
misleading, but the concept is indispensable in
contemporary international law.
Let me take each of these four arguments separately.
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DELICTS AND CRIMES ANSWERS AN
INDISPUTABLE NEED
Although part of the doctrine, lawyers (especially French
international lawyers) and some States (including France) challenge this
definition, the definition of responsibility deriving from Articles 1 and 3 of
the ILC draft can hardly be challenged. In the modern, post-Ago, meaning
of the term, responsibility is the situation resulting from an international
wrongful act committed by a subject of international law or attributable
(imputable if you prefer) to it.
Now, if this is so, it implies a differentiation in the legal regime of
responsibility. It is absolutely unacceptable to assimilate purely and simply
a genocide and an ordinary breach of international law, say a breach of
bilateral-trade agreement. Both are, indeed, international wrongful acts,
and both entail, therefore, the responsibility of their author. But it seems
obvious, evident, necessary, and indispensable that the consequences
deriving from each be clearly differentiated. And this is the case for a
very good reason. The breach of the trade agreement, even though
regrettable as any other violation of international law, only concerns the
relations between the two (or more) State parties to the treaties, while
genocide threatens international society as a whole, the very basis of the
still fragile international community.
If this is so, international lawyers will immediately have in mind
the celebrated dictum of the International Court of Justice in its famous
1970 Judgment in the Barcelona Traction case:
An essential distinction should be drawn between the
obligations of States towards the international community
as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State in the
field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the
former are the concern of all States. In view of the
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importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to
have a legal interest; they are obligations erga omnes.'
Can we infer from this that a crime is a violation of an obligation
erga omnes? Probably not, and this leads us to my second proposition.
III. THE DEFINITION OF CRIMES GIVEN IN ARTICLE 19, PARAGRAPH
2, OF THE ILC DRAFT IS ACCEPTABLE, ALTHOUGH PROBABLY TOO
SOPHISTICATED
I recall this definition: An international wrongful act which results
from the breach by a State of an obligation so essential for the protection
of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is
recognized as crime by that community as a whole constitutes an
international crime.
This definition involves clearly three elements: First, a crime is an
international wrongful act; on this, we all agree. Second, this
internationally wrongful act results from the breach of an international
obligation which is essential for the protection of fundamental interests of
the international community. Third, it must be recognized as a crime by
that community as a whole.
It is this last point which has attracted the biggest number of
opponents. To say so would make the whole notion uncertain and
subjective, all the more so as the very notion of international community
would itself be subject to uncertainty. With respect, this is simply rubbish.
Those who negate the concept of crime do not, as far as I know, contend
that custom does not exist or should not exist. However, custom can
hardly be said to be more precisely defined than crimes. It is, just to recall
the widely accepted formula of Article 38, paragraph l(b), of the Statute of
the ICJ evidence of a general practice accepted as law. This does not even
tell us who must accept the practice. At least Article 19 of the ILC draft
tries to give a precision; the international community as a whole must give
recognition.
And the formula is not that new. It has already been accepted in
Article 53 of the Vienna 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
defines jus cogens and only gives a supplementary precision by indicating
that the international community is the international community of states; if
this can help, let's include this in the second draft reading.
Now, does this mean that a crime is a breach of a peremptory
norm of general international law? In 1976, the ILC, still in accordance
with its Special Rapporteur, denied it for rather obscure theoretical
1. Barcelona Traction, I.C.J. 32 (1970).
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reasons. I would rather suggest that the real reasons for that were
prudential and political. Ago and the Commission were probably afraid
that affirming bluntly that a crime is a violation of a norm of jus cogens
would prevent wide acceptance of the concept of crime as a consequence of
the defiance against jus cogens in some circles and from certain States
(among which France was certainly the most decided opponent and is still
the most persistent objector).
More than twenty years later (and thirty years or so after the
drafting of the Vienna Convention), this caution seems no longer
necessary. If you leave Asterix (France) aside, no one seriously contests
anymore that norms of jus cogens have a real specificity among
international law rules and the past objections against the concept have
proved unfounded. The feared abuses have not occurred and, as has been
aptly written about peremptory norms, "the vehicle does not often leave
the garage. "'
I, therefore, urge that it would be easier and more convenient to
define an international crime as a breach of a norm of jus cogens. Indeed,
this would not, in fact, change the existing definition since all three
elements that I have noted would still exist:
1) a crime would still be an international wrongful act (a
breach);
2) the breach would still be of an essential obligation towards
the international community as a whole; and
3) the subjective (or psychological) element would still be
present since, according to the very definition of jus cogens, a
peremptory norm of general international law must be recognized
as such by the international community of States as a whole.
Let me open a parenthesis here. Bob Rosenstock has complained
in a recent interesting and most debatable article appearing in the ILC
book, published as a contribution to the United Nations decade for
international law that "the acceptance of the notion of jus cogens was
conditioned on . . . express acceptance of the role of the International
Court of Justice, while there is no comparable institution for denominating
certain actions as criminal. " 3 Very well. This is precisely why, at my
suggestion, the Commission sought to include an article in the draft which
would have been copied on Article 66 of the Vienna Convention of the
Law of Treaties and would have provided for the compulsory jurisdiction
2. IAN BROWNLIE, CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 10 (1988)
3. International Law on the Eve of the twenty-first Century-Views from the International
Law Commission, U.N. Doc. EIF97.V4272 (1997) ElF 97.V4, 272 (1997).
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of an arbitral tribunal or the ICJ in case of a dispute concerning the
existence of a crime. For obscure reasons, the Commission, while not
rejecting the proposal, has decided not to include it in the first draft and to
come back to it during its second reading. Curiously enough, I understand
(I was absent from the debate) that my friend, Bob Rosenstock, was among
the firmer opponents to such a provision.
One last word on this second point: if it is accepted that a crime is
a breach of a norm or jus cogens, couldn't it be said as well that it is a
breach of an erga omnes obligation? It might help in the sense that erga
omnes obligations are less contested than peremptory norms. However, I
have strong doubts since if all norms of jus cogens certainly are erga
omnes, there is no reciprocity, and one can think of many obligation erga
omnes, which could hardly be seen as deriving from peremptory norms.
Just to give an example, this is the case of the right of passage in
international straits or international canals.
This draws attention on something very important, which is,
exactly like peremptory norms, that crimes are to be extremely rare in the
present state of the world; the international community does exist, but the
solidarity on which it is based is still limited, which means that obligations
essential for the protection of its fundamental interests are unavoidably
very limited both in number and in scope. And in this respect, paragraph
3 of Article 19 of the ILC draft is far from convincing.
Paragraph 3 is the provision in which the ILC has endeavored to
give examples of crimes. I have no time to enter into a lengthy discussion
on this provision. Suffice it to say that: first, it is a bad method of
codification to give examples in a codification instrument; second, this
partial enumeration is all the more regrettable since it fixes rules which are
and must stay in constant evolution; and third, and above all, the examples
given are themselves highly debatable or, at least, too wide and imprecise.
But if there are grounds to delete this list of examples, this would not be a
reason to throw the baby out with the bath-water.
IV. THE LEGAL REGIME OF CRIMES ESTABLISHED BY ARTICLES 51 TO
53 OF THE ILC DRAFT IS UNCONVINCING (TO SAY THE LEAST)
I now come to my third proposition. Here again, I have no time to
explain in detail why the legal regime of crimes contemplated by the ILC
draft is subject to criticism. I have done it unfortunately in French, in my
own contribution to the ILC book for the United Nations decade of
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international law that I have just mentioned.' The main weaknesses of the
draft in this respect are twofold: on the one hand, the special
consequences attached to the commission of a crime are very limited and
cast doubt on the usefulness of the very notion of crimes itself; but, on the
other hand, the general consequences that the draft attaches to the delicts
are themselves too wide and include elements which should be limited to
the crimes.
Apparently these two criticisms are mutually exclusive. In fact
these defects are cumulative here and this is a result of the wrong method
followed by the ILC and its Special Rapporteur; Professor Arangio-Ruiz.
Let me explain briefly.
When he assumed his functions of Special Rapporteur, Professor
Arangio-Ruiz kept saying that he did not know what crimes could be and
he proposed, in his first report on the subject, in 1988, to focus on the
consequences of delicts, leaving for a later stage the codification of the
consequences of a crime. However, at the same time and very
unfortunately, the Special Rapporteur has drafted his reports as if the
distinction did not exist, taking his examples more than not in the field not
of delicts, but of crimes, and particularly studying the consequences of the
illegal use of force, a crime par excellence. In spite of some protests
(mainly from myself), the Commission has followed his suggestion and has
not challenged the examples he has given.
As a result, the consequences of an international wrongful act (that
is, in fact, of delicts) exposed in Articles 41 to 46 of the draft include
several consequences which are (or should be) limited to crimes, such as
punitive damages in Articles 42, paragraph 2, and 45, paragraph 2 (c) or
the obligation for the State which has committed the international wrongful
act to give assurances or guarantees of non-repetition contemplated in
Article 46. This is even more true for the rules applying to counter-
measures in Articles 47 to 50. They are well fitted to crimes but
absolutely unacceptable as far as simple delicts are concerned since they
facilitate much too much recourse to counter-measures, a means of
reacting to internationally wrongful acts, which, by the nature of things, is
reserved to powerful States. I can understand that the United States (and
my friend Bob Rosenstock) are very enthusiastic about them; Chad is not;
nor am I!
A consequence of this excessive severity against simple delicts is
that, when the Commission arrives, at last, at the consequences of crimes,
which, as the Commission rightly says in Article 51, must be added to all
4. ALLAIN PELLET, VIVE LE CRIME! REMARQUES SUR LES DEGRES DEL'ILLICITE EN
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 287-315.
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the other consequences of any other internationally wrongful act, not much
can be added, and this explains the poor content of Articles 52 and 53.
However, this certainly does not mean that the concept of crime is
an empty shell. In the first place, as I have just tried to explain, several
consequences that the Commission draws from all 'international wrongful
acts should certainly be reserved to the sole crimes and do not apply to
simple delicts. In the second place, some very important consequences of
crimes have unfortunately been omitted from the draft. At least one of
these is what I would call the transparency of the State having committed a
crime. This means that when an international crime is committed, not only
the State itself is responsible, but also the natural persons who have
decided, committed, planned, directed, incited, etc. such a crime.
An important warning is necessary here. I do not mean that a
crime by a State and a crime against peace and security of mankind are a
sole and unique notion. What I mean is, simply, that when a crime in the
meaning of Article 19 of the draft on State responsibility is committed,
then, and only then, can the individual responsibility of the individuals
concerned be entailed. This explains why, according to Article 7 for the
draft Code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind, the official
position of an individual who commits a crime against the peace and
security of mankind, even if he acted as head of State or Government, does
not relieve him of criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment.
Now, the responsibility of the individual through whom the State
has committed the crime is obviously a penal or criminal responsibility,
but what about the responsibility of the State itself? To answer this
question, I come to my fourth and last proposition.
V. THE WORD CRIME MIGHT BE MISLEADING, EVEN THOUGH THE
CONCEPT IS DEFINITELY INDISPENSABLE IN CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In order not to exceed my time too much, I'll try to make my point
briefly.
I am among those who think that States can be held criminal in a
sense which is close to the penal meaning of the term. Nazi Germany or
Sadam Hussein's Iraq can be called criminal States and have been treated
as such by the international community.
This being said, I am also among those who think that, in
international law, analogies with domestic law are rarely helpful and
usually misleading. International responsibility is neither civil nor penal; it
is simply international. It is the least penal of all since, within the State,
penal responsibility presupposes the existence of tribunals, which have
1998]
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jurisdiction to establish it, a condition which is not fulfilled in international
law. Hence, my firm conviction that the word delict to designate simple
international wrongful acts is particularly inappropriate.
Now, what about the word crime? For the reasons I have just
explained, it seems less shocking than the word delicts. After all, when a
State breaches an international obligation essential for the interests of the
international community as a whole, it never acts by chance or
unintentionally. Therefore, the elements of intent and fault, which are not
necessarily present in other international wrongful acts, are part of the
crimes exactly as they are part of penal infractions in domestic laws.
Moreover, even without a judge, the reactions of the international
community to a crime clearly include punitive aspects.
However, this is not terribly important for me. The word crime is
defensible as it has acquired its legitimacy since 1976 and is very widely
used. Now if the analogy with domestic law seems really excessive and
repulsive, it may be abandoned. But the reality will remain, as I said at
the beginning of this statement, a genocide cannot be compared with a
breach of a trade agreement; it is different in kind, by its very nature. Call
it breach of peremptory norm or violation of an essential obligation, or call
it butterfly or abomination. The fact remains, we need a concept and a
name for this concept!
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TIME TO TRY MEDIATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
Harold L Abramson"
How many attorneys in the audience have ever participated in a
domestic mediation? I see the hands of about four out of about a hundred
people in attendance. How many attorneys in the audience have ever
participated in an international mediation? I see two people raising their
hands. This is a larger percentage of people than I had anticipated!
(laughter)
This unscientific survey provides a segue for me to cite an amazing
fact about international mediation: despite the fact that mediation works and
that mechanisms for handling international mediations are in place,
mediation is rarely used.
Mediation has proven itself as an extraordinarily successful
settlement process when conducted by a skilled mediator. The impressive
settlement record of domestic mediations has been documented. Disputes
channeled into mediation settle at a very high overall rate of about seventy
percent.'
Mediation is much different from the more familiar settlement
conferences conducted by judges. Mediation is a structured negotiation
conducted by a specially trained expert known as a mediator. The mediator
brings to the structured negotiation critical skills for managing the process,
including the ability to diagnose impasses as the structured negotiation
unfolds. The mediator guides the parties and their attorneys through each
distinct stage in the mediation. Every step by the mediator has a purpose,
beginning when the mediator requests each party to prepare a position
paper,2 a paper that is designed to orient the parties toward settlement. At
* The author is a Professor of Law at Touro Law Center who writes, teaches and
practices in the fields of dispute resolution and international business. He is currently working
on a textbook on international dispute resolution.
1. See, e.g., Jeanne M.Brett, Zoe I. Barsness, & Stephen B. Goldberg, The Effectiveness
of Mediation: An Independent Analysis of Cases Handled by Four Major Service Providers NEG.
J., 259, 261 (July 1996) (overall settlement rate of 78%); Robert C. Meade & Philip Ferrara,
Ph.D, An Evaluation of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Program of the Commercial Division:
Survey Results and Recommendations, 4-5 (July 1997) (overall settlement rate of close to 70%
for the Alternative Dispute Resolution Program of the Commercial Division of the Supreme
Court, Civil Branch, New York County, New York State).
2. Information to be included in a position paper can vary. The type of information
requested may include a party's definition of the critical factual and legal issues in dispute, a
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the mediation, a mediator usually starts the session with an opening
statement that is geared toward shaping the expectations of the disputants.
The mediator then manages a structured discussion that encourages the
disputants to collaborate in settling the dispute. The mediator guides the
disputants by posing open-ended and focused questions, re-framing issues,
and using strategies to defuse tensions and overcome impasses. The
mediator may use private caucuses and brainstorming. The more skilled
mediators will also assist parties in designing processes to resolve any
unsettled issues.
For international mediations, a mechanism for conducting the
process is in place. Virtually every major international arbitration
organization offers the option of mediation. Each organization offers
mediation rules, procedures for selecting mediators, and administrative
support for conducting mediations. These organizations are very well
known and well established. They include the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), American Arbitration Association (AAA), International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Center for Public
Resources (CPR), China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (CIETAC), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
Commercial Arbitration and Mediation Center of the Americas (CAMCA),
and more. For non-administered international dispute resolution processes,
even United Nations Commission on International Trade Law has issued
(UNCITRAL) conciliation rules.
One important explanation for the little use of international
mediation is that parties and attorneys without experience in mediation are
reluctant to use it. In contrast, people with experience in mediation are
much more receptive to trying mediation. Only when disputants gain more
experience will we see greater use of mediation. The challenge is to break
the cycle of no experience, no use. I hope that this panel today on
international mediation will give attorneys a little more confidence to give
mediation a try.
The propitious moment for discussing mediation is before you need
it. Any experienced international business lawyer knows that the best time
to discuss dispute resolution options is when parties are negotiating the
business deal. Everyone is forward thinking and optimistic. However, this
does not mean that parties want to discuss dispute resolution methods. They
are not usually in the mood to think about what to do if the deal goes sour.
Yet, deals go bad. Economic and political circumstances change.
Personality conflicts emerge. Joint ventures are especially notorious for
their short lives. Over fifty per cent of joint ventures terminate within five
years, and most terminate within ten years.
description of any previous offers and counter-offers, and an explanation of why the case has not
yet settled.
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In international business, it is especially important to negotiate a
dispute resolution clause. Without the clause, parties must rely on the
uncertainties of transnational litigation in foreign national courts. At least
when a clause is omitted in a domestic business deal the court alternative is
very much a known and stable method of dispute resolution. International
litigation, in contrast, is fraught with uncertainties about procedure,
substantive law, and enforcement, uncertainties that fortunately can be
minimized with a well-crafted dispute resolution clause.
The most widely adopted method of international dispute resolution
is arbitration. However, international arbitration is not viewed as an
alternative dispute resolution process (ADR)? Instead, international lawyers
and arbitrators view arbitration for international disputes as attorneys view
courts for domestic disputes. International arbitration appears to be the
equivalent of going to court for domestic disputes, with many of the same
advantages and disadvantages. As with domestic courts, international
arbitration is expensive, lengthy, formal and adversarial. So what is ADR in
the international arena? It is not arbitration. One ADR method is surely the
use of mediation, which is informal, quicker, less costly, and gives the
parties control over the outcome of the process.
What should be included in a mediation clause? There are a number
of key features that should be addressed in a mediation clause. Today, I will
consider five provisions.
First, the definition of mediation should be given special attention in
order to avoid a cross-cultural misunderstanding. Parties from different
countries may envision different variations of mediation. This is a familiar
problem in domestic mediations where many variations also can be found.
However, much effort is being made these days to draw sharper distinctions
among different styles of domestic mediation. Different styles have been
labeled as facilitative, evaluative, transformative, bargaining, therapeutic
and non-caucus.4 All these styles at least fall within a range of familiar
possibilities. In international mediations, more commonly referred to as
conciliations, the ranges of possibilities are broader and less familiar. One
unusual variation envisions each party appointing a conciliator and the
conciliators meeting to negotiate a settlement. As international norms of
dispute resolution evolve, the risk of parties discovering a startling variation
3. CHRISTIAN BUHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 141-42 (1996) (survey of practitioners with extensive experience in international
business disputes - respondents consisted of arbitrators, attorneys, and in-house counsel from 17
countries).
4. See S. Silbey & S. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POLICY 7 (1986);
L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES 111 (1994);
R. BARUCH BUSH & J. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT
THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994).
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is falling. Nevertheless, it is prudent to discuss the style of mediation
envisioned when drafting an international mediation clause.
Second, parties should establish a clear obligation to try mediation
before resorting to an adjudicatory option such as arbitration. This provision
should be drafted in a way to guard against at least two problems: a reluctant
party who is trying to avoid mediation and a party using mediation to unduly
delay resorting to adjudication. One approach is to draft an obligation
clause with clear, objective benchmarks against which it is easy to assess
compliance. The provision also should be designed to promote meaningful
participation without unduly delaying the arbitration. One obvious solution,
to agree to participate in good faith, will likely generate collateral litigation
over whether a party acted in good faith. Instead, other devices should be
considered. For example, a clause could establish a clear and complete
procedure for selecting a mediator; each party could agree to participate in at
least one mediation session; each institutional party could agree to select a
client representative with settlement authority; a timetable could be
established for initiating and completing the mediation process; and clear
consequences for breach should be formulated such as a liquidated damage
clause and recovery of legal fees.
Third, parties should consider whether the mediator can also serve
as an arbitrator in the same dispute. International mediation rules generally
prohibit mediators from serving as arbitrators in the same dispute unless the
parties agree to this arrangement. This is a complicated issue because the
function of a mediator is radically different from the function of an
arbitrator. The concern is that when the same person serves both roles, the
third-party neutral may not be able to keep the two roles separate, making it
difficult for the neutral to maintain the integrity of each process. The
parties' confidence in the neutral also may be undermined by the confusion
created by the same person switching between two different roles. On the
other hand, a more efficient process may be possible when the same person
moves from one role to the other instead of the parties losing time and
momentum in retaining and educating a second person. Two of the other
panelists will elaborate on the risks and opportunities offered by the same
person serving as mediator and arbitrator.
Fourth, parties are prudent to study and adapt an off the shelf set of
mediation rules to serve the needs of the parties. One of the advantages of
creating your own private dispute resolution system is the opportunity it
gives you to create a system that best suits your needs. However, starting
from scratch can take an enormous amount of time and effort to end up
creating a private system which others have already done and tested. It is
more efficient to select a pre-packaged process and then adapt it to your
special needs. The parties also may want to select an institution to
administer the process to ensure the smooth running of the mediation.
[Vol. 4:323
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Fifth, a mediation provision should be part of a broader dispute
resolution clause that includes a compulsory back up dispute resolution
process. This is important in order to assist parties in enforcing a settlement
agreement. When arbitration is the back up, the settlement agreement can be
incorporated into a "consent arbitration award" which can then be enforced
under the relatively reliable New York Convention which establishes
procedures for enforcing arbital awards in foreign courts. The back-up
system is also needed in case the mediation does not settle all the issues.
Your private dispute resolution system needs to establish the next step in the
process of dispute resolution.
In conclusion, mediation works. I tried today to present the
contours of a path to greater use of mediation. This session did not provide
sufficient time to illuminate the full path. However, I hope we were able to
shed enough light on the path to encourage attorneys to give mediation a try.
You might even like it!
5. The New York Convention is formally the United Nations Convention on Recognition
and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In international commercial arbitration, some disputes cry out for
informal resolution by the parties themselves. In assessing their response,
parties, arbitrators and arbital institutions must have in mind fundamental,
practical and ethical considerations. This paper addresses some of the
practical and provocative issues raised in these circumstances.
II. SOME QUESTIONS
An immediately apparent, practical question in international
commercial arbitration concerns the role the arbitrator may play in
assisting the parties to resolve their dispute by way of settlement
discussions. Often, the parties have not considered, much less agreed,
* David W. Plant is an Attorney at Fish & Neave, New York, New York.
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what the arbitrator's role should be in this regard. This question gives rise
to further questions, viz.
1) Is the arbitrator's sole responsibility to assure that the
arbital process results in an enforceable award arrived at in a fair,
efficient and expeditious way?
2) Does the arbitrator's responsibility extend to assisting
parties to arrive at the most equitable resolution of their differences
at the earliest, practicable time in the most efficient and effective
way?
3) Does the arbitrator have a responsibility to assure that
arbitration in general, as an institution, provides the parties a menu
of processes that may assist the parties in resolving their disputes
in the most efficient and effective way?
4) If it is appropriate for an arbitrator to suggest, or to
participate in, settlement discussions, what is the appropriate
degree of participation, in what kinds of cases, when, and subject
to what ground rules?
5) Will the availability of mediation on some basis assist in
de-escalating contentiousness and over-lawyering in international
commercial arbitration?
It will come as no surprise to some that this paper favors
permitting, indeed encouraging, arbitrators to suggest and to participate in
settlement discussions between the parties under appropriate
circumstances. It is to some of those circumstances that the balance of this
paper is devoted.'
III. SOME OBSERVATIONS
Regardless of the provisions of (or practices under) specific arbital
rules,2 some practitioners have asserted that arbitrators should never
1. A comprehensive and thoroughly instructive discussion of this subject appears in
Christian Buhring-Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Arbitration, KLU. L. INT'L
(1996). This paper draws primarily on my own experience, but it clearly benefits from some of
the thoughts in Buhring-Uhle's excellent treatise.
2. One way or another, rules of international arbitration are often viewed as discouraging
participation by arbitrators as mediators, conciliators or amiable compositeurs (e.g.,
UNICITRAL Conciliation Rules art. 19, but cf. art. 1(2) (1980)); ICC Rules of Arbitration art.
17(3) (1998); ICC Rules of Conciliation art. 10 (1998); WIPO Mediation Rules art. 13 (1994);
WIPO Arbitration Rules arts. 59(a) and 65(a) (1994)); AAA Rules of International Arbitration
art. 28(3) (1997). Other rules that plainly contemplate a more pro-active role of arbitrators and
mediators or conciliators are the CIETAC and the Hong Kong rules of arbitration. Also,
German arbitrators may feel entirely comfortable in participating relatively thoroughly in
settlement discussions in light of the practice of judges in German courts (cf. GERMAN CODE OF
Civ. P. § 279). Swiss and French arbitrators may feel a similar level of comfort.
[Vol. 4:329330
1998]
participate in settlement discussions between the parties. But all rules have
exceptions, and all absolute rules absolutely have exceptions, as we shall
see below.
Before turning to that discussion, I believe that it will be useful to
settle an issue of vocabulary. Because mediation, conciliation and
facilitation are likely to mean different things to different people, thus
engendering confusion, I shall attempt to discuss the issues posed here in
terms of the kind and degree of participation by the arbitrator in settlement
discussions. This may assist in reducing miscommunication and in
enhancing understanding among practitioners, whether from the same or
different cultural and experiential backgrounds.
III. SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Dilemma
One fundamental issue is whether, and if so how, an arbitrator can
effectively participate in settlement discussions and at the same time
preserve the integrity of the arbital process.
Stated differently, the question is how can an arbitrator be
transformed into a participant in off the record settlement discussions and
then back into an arbitrator.
B. The Kind of Dispute
If the arbitration looks backward (e.g., who breached a contract in
the past?) and the settlement discussions look forward (e.g., can a
relationship be preserved or reformulated in the future?), an arbitrator may
find it entirely appropriate to participate in settlement discussions.
On the other hand, if both the arbitration and the settlement
discussions look in the same direction (e.g., quantum of past damages,
quantum of future lost profits, schedule of future payments), it may be less
appropriate, or more difficult, for an arbitrator to participate in settlement
discussions.
The reasons for the foregoing distinction are relatively
straightforward. If the settlement discussions can be separated in time or
subject matter from the issues in the arbitration, the arbitrator is much less
likely to be infected from the settlement discussions with off the record
information or impressions that may affect the arbitrator's view of the
merits of the issues being arbitrated on the record. Concomitantly, the
larger the overlap between the subject of the settlement discussions and the
issues being arbitrated, the greater the likelihood of the arbitrator's being
affected by what the arbitrator sees or hears in the settlement discussions.
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However, even where both the settlement discussions and the
arbitration look in the same direction, if the parties expressly agree with
each other and with the arbitrator on specific ground rules, it may be
perfectly acceptable for the arbitrator to participate in the settlement
discussions, e.g., infra Section V.
C. Cultural and Experiential Factors
The cultural, business, legal, and other experiences of parties,
counsel and arbitrators (and of the arbital institution, if there is one) are
important.
The synopsis of the selected rules and practices appearing in
footnote two above demonstrates the wide difference in approaches among
arbital institutions and practitioners. These differences will materially
affect the willingness and ability of parties, counsel and arbitrators to
consider, to say nothing of arranging for, an arbitrator's participation in
settlement discussions.
Such differences in personal backgrounds will also affect the kind
and degree of participation that may be agreed upon among counsel and
arbitrators. And those differences will affect the conduct of the arbitrators
in connection with settlement discussions.
In fact, those differences may clearly, and not unexpectedly,
emerge in different arbitrations under the same arbital rules - simply
because different cultures and experiences are represented on different
arbital tribunals operating under identical institutional rules, most notably
with respect to the chairs of three person tribunals.
D. Timing
A substantial number of international commercial arbitrations settle
before an award is rendered. As in litigation, the likelihood of settlement
increases as the arbital proceedings evolve.
It is reasonable to assume that if settlement talks were facilitated
earlier rather than later in arbitration, in some cases settlement might occur
earlier. This seems to be a sufficiently real possibility to encourage
arbitrators (and arbital institutions) to make available facilities for enabling
settlement discussions to commence and to continue at all stages of an
arbitration.
Some will argue on the basis of experience that an arbitration, like
a lawsuit, may have to proceed through an irreducible number of discrete
stages before the environment becomes conducive to settlement.
Nevertheless, that environment may be rendered more hospitable if a
facility is available from the beginning to enable settlement discussions to
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commence with ease.
E. What Is an Appropriate Role for an Arbitrator in Settlement
Discussions?
It is probably fair to assume that under any regime, an arbitrator
may inquire as to whether or not the parties have engaged in settlement
discussions. This calls only for a yes or no answer, does not compel the
parties to disclose what in fact has occurred, and does not compel the
parties to pursue settlement discussions.
Further inquiry or participation by an arbitrator raises the kinds of
issues already alluded to. For example, can an arbitrator explore the status
of past or current settlement discussions? Inquire as to what next is
expected to occur in settlement discussions? Participate in such
discussions? Communicate with parties and counsel in joint sessions?
Conduct ex parte discussions with one party and its counsel? Hint at a
probable outcome in the arbitration? Render an evaluation of the issues on
the basis of information available to the arbitrator from the arbital record?
Propose a settlement formula?
And with a three-person arbital tribunal comprising party-
appointed arbitrators and a chair, should all three arbitrators meet with the
parties jointly? May the chair meet with a party and its counsel on an ex
parte basis? May a party-appointed arbitrator meet ex parte with the party
who appointed that arbitrator? May that arbitrator meet ex parte with a
party that did not appoint that arbitrator?
These are illustrative of questions the parties and their arbitrator
should ponder before the arbitrator engages in settlement discussions.
F. What Is Going on in an Arbitration, Anyway?
In those arbitrations where the parties are quarreling over who
breached a joint development, partnership, construction, licensing, or other
arrangement in which the parties were not acting entirely at arms length, it
is frequently apparent to the arbitrator that the arbitrator is not hearing the
full story, and it is destructive and wasteful for the parties to be
challenging each other's conduct and bona fides rather than working on
repairing or restructuring their relationship. If either or both of these
impressions of the arbitrator is consistent with the facts, the arbitrator may
well ask whether or not he or she ought to be performing another role, viz.
facilitating the repair or restructuring of the relationship.
The arbitrator often does not know the full story because what the
arbitrator hears is defined by the pleadings, terms of reference, evidence
the parties elect to adduce and the relevant legal principles. This
1998] 333
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constricted formal framework within which the issue of who breached what
and how many times seldom permits the real interests and needs of the
parties in connection with the dispute to be revealed. This may concern an
arbitrator who senses that regardless of the arbitrator's ultimate resolution
of the issues in the arbitration, there may be no winner in the sense that the
relationship between the parties may be destroyed, and with it, the
possibility of creating value if the relationship is preserved or
reformulated. Thus, for the arbitrator who is sensitive to this situation,
there may well be a compelling (and justifiable) motive to inquire about, if
not participate in, forward looking settlement discussions between the
parties.
G. Two Illustrative Situations
Two recent international commercial arbitrations may serve to
illustrate some of these concerns.
In an ICC arbitration, the three arbitrators participated in
settlement discussions between the parties. The arbitration arose out of the
breach of a development contract. Claimant claimed substantial damages,
injunctive relief, and specific performance. During the evidentiary
hearings on liability, it became apparent that the arbitration was backward
looking, and if any settlement discussions were to occur at that stage they
would be forward looking, for example, directed to preserving the parties'
relationship in order to create value. The arbitrators were unaware of any
settlement discussions, and the arbitrators did not participate in any at that
stage.
After three weeks of evidence and two interim awards on liability,
and during a fourth week of evidence on relief (including quantum), the
parties agreed that the three arbitrators would participate in settlement
discussions. After preliminary ex parte meetings with parties and their
counsel (party appointed arbitrators conferred with their respective
parties), senior management, counsel, and three arbitrators met for one day
of settlement discussion. The goal was to settle the issue of quantum and
to structure a schedule for payments. All three arbitrators participated.
However, the driving force was. the chair of the arbital tribunal. At the
end of the day, the parties had reached agreement in principle and initialed
a heads of agreement. A detailed settlement agreement to be embodied in
award on consent was tendered to the tribunal with one financial issue left
for resolution by the arbitrators.
The potential risk here was that, if the parties had failed to settle,
the information shared with the tribunal during the settlement discussions
would have related directly to the issues of relief that the arbitrators, upon
[Vol. 4:329
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resuming their original roles, would have had to decide. For their own
good reasons, the parties agreed to accept this risk and to attempt to settle
the money issues with the arbitrators as facilitators. Fortunately, it
worked.
In another ICC arbitration, after two weeks of evidentiary hearings
on liability and damages, the parties agreed that the three arbitrators should
participate in settlement discussions. This arbitration also concerned a
development agreement and was backward looking in its perspective.
Claimants sought substantial damages plus injunctive relief and specific
performance. The goal of the settlement discussions was to look forward
and attempt to work out a new relationship between the parties. After two
sessions, each about one and a half days in duration, the parties elected to
have the arbitrators resume their original roles and to render an award.
All of the arbitrators were present during joint and private sessions with
the parties and their counsel. Because the settlement discussions were
forward looking, information shared with the arbitrators did not bear on
the merits of the dispute and did not affect the subsequent preparation of
the award by the arbitrators.
V. SOME GROUND RULES
The foregoing discussion focuses on post-dispute situations in
which arbitration has ensued and the parties have not previously agreed
that the arbitrator can perform any role other than the conventional role of
arbitrator. From the discussion emerge some ground rules which parties,
counsel, and arbitrators might consider. First, because the arbitrator's role
is defined by the parties, whether ad hoc or by way of agreed upon
institutional rules, the parties must agree expressly and in writing as to the
role of the arbitrator in settlement discussions between the parties.
Second, the arbitrator must agree to participate in settlement discussions
only with the express written agreement of the parties and only in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the parties agreement. Third,
in the event the arbitrator must resume the arbital role after participating in
settlement discussions, the arbitrator should undertake to decide the matter
only on the merits and only on the record. The arbitrator must take
especial care not to add subconsciously to the arbitration record as a result
of information acquired informally and off the record during settlement
discussions. Fourth, the parties must expressly agree in writing or on the
record that the arbitrator's participation in settlement discussions will not
be asserted by any party as grounds for disqualifying the arbitrator or for
challenging any award rendered by the arbitrator (unless, for example, on
its face it is apparent that award is based on information outside the record
1998] 335
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and learned by the arbitrator during settlement discussions). Fifth, all
aspects of the settlement discussions will be kept confidential unless all
parties and the arbitrator expressly agree otherwise in writing. Sixth,
during settlement discussions, the arbitrator will not hint at the arbitrator's
view of the evidence or the likely outcome if the arbitration goes forward.
Seventh, the arbitrator must not judge the credibility of any witness on the
basis of a) the witness having been a party representative during settlement
discussions or b) anything said about or attributed to the witness during
settlement discussions. This is important whether the settlement
discussions occur before or after the evidentiary hearing where the witness
testifies, or before or after filing of a written statement by witness.
Eighth, the arbitrator must not judge a party's case in light of an
intractable position of the party during settlement discussions, especially
where the arbitrator perceives an apparently valid, objective basis for
resolving the parties' differences. In other words, the arbitrator must not
permit his or her impartiality to be compromised.
VI. CONCLUSION
Participation by an arbitrator in settlement discussions raises knotty
issues. But they can be effectively addressed.
Adversarial processes like arbitration cause parties to rush to the
underlying contracts to find every conceivable breach, every basis for
claims of bad faith, and every hint of deceit and fraud. The pathology of
the process takes over. The process drives the parties. The parties do not
drive the process.
If an appropriate procedure was available in connection with each
administered arbitration whereby arbitrators could learn of each party's
real interests and needs, a forward looking resolution might be facilitated,
rather than having arbitrators focus solely on the past. If such a service
was provided by arbital institutions, it could indeed be salutary in
appropriate cases.
If arbital institutions, arbitrators, and counsel were to agree that
they share some responsibility for assuring that the parties resolve their
differences in the most expeditious and value-creating way, the time will
have come to provide policies and procedures pursuant to which arbitrators
and counsel can in appropriate circumstances feel free to discharge that
responsibility.
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SOFTWARE PROTECTION: COPYRIGHTS,
PATENTS, TRADE SECRETS AND/OR SUI GENERIS
Karl F. Jorda
What is the best form of protection for software has been and still
is a most unsettled and vexing - and hence very topical - issue in
intellectual property (IP) law and practice.
Congress, of course, did amend our copyright law in 1980 to make
it clear that software is copyrightable.' Likewise, legislation was enacted
in foreign countries and the European Union in past years, stipulating that
software is only copyrightable, i.e. not patentable. Trade Related
Intellectual Property (TRIP) also requires that copyright protection be
provided by World Trade Organization countries. Thus, it is not
surprising that Ralph Oman, the former Register of Copyrights, and others
maintain that an international consensus in favor of copyright protection
has emerged, even though many believe that copyright protection is an
artificial construct inasmuch as the aims of copyright law and computer
programming are diametrically opposed, the former stressing subjective,
individualistic, creative elements, and the latter, objective, technical and
scientific systematization. Software is functional, non-literal by nature as
it performs a task or generates an output.
Thus, there are many authors and practitioners here and abroad
who believe that copyright laws are inappropriate as forms of protection
and it is patent law and/or sui generis systems which would offer better
protection for software. And more and more countries follow the lead of
the United States and sanction the patenting of software. Headlines of
recent articles bear this out; to wit The Case for Software Patent
Protection; Software Patents Come of Age; and Patents, Not Copyright,
Poised for Bigger Byte of Software. But there are significant problems
with software patents as illustrated by the following titles: Now You See It,
Now You Don't: Was It a Patentable Machine or an Unpatentable
'Algorithm?'; Software Patent Protection: Debugging the Current System,
etc. According to Professor Hollaar (University of Utah) it is high time
that Congress "clarify the patentability of software-based inventions. "2
1. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994).
2. See Hollaar, Justice Douglas Was Right: The Need for Congressional Action on
Software Patents, 24 AIPLA Q. J. 283, 305 1996.
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The shift to patents is also influenced by the recent decisional trend.
limiting the scope of copyright protection on the one hand, while
expanding the scope of patent protection for software on the other hand.
With software protection being a practitioner's nightmare (as one
article bemoans) and with both patent and copyright forms of protection
being Procrustean Beds, it shouldn't come as a surprise that the notion of a
sui generis form of protection for software, in lieu of or in addition to
present routes of protection, has considerable appeal.
Professor Samuelson's 1994 Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs3 comes immediately to mind as well as
Richard Stem's sui generis utility model law proposal, launched in 1993.'
Indeed, I remember well that the first impulse by the IP profession back in
1965 when the issue first arose, was to provide a sui generis form of
protection, as was fashioned (improvidently according to some
practitioners) in 1984 for semiconductor chips via the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act' and will likely be done in the near future for databases.
3. SAMUELSON, MANIFESTO CONCERNING THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER
PROGRAMS (1994).
4. See generally Richard Stem, sui generis utility model law proposal (1993).
5. SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION ACT of 1984, 17 U.S.C. § 901 (1994).
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The United States blazed the trail in giving copyright protection for
software. Until just recently, many other countries favored sui generis
protection for software, but that argument was finally settled in
GATT/TRIPs and last December's World Intellectual Property
Organization Copyright Treaty. Copyright is now universally seen as the
preferred means of protection. To try to make certain that we all have a
clear idea of the metes and bounds of protection for computer software in
the United States, let me start with a few copyright basics.
Copyright protects the authors of original works of authorship.
You know what they are: sculpture, novels, poems, paintings,
newspapers, newsletters, jewelry, fabric designs, recipe books, motion
pictures, sound recordings, maps and charts, architectural works, cartoons
- the list goes on and on. The copyright law does not normally protect
useful articles. Generally the patent law protects useful articles.
Copyright protects a lamp base in the shape of a Balinese dancer that is
artistic. But it doesn't protect the design of the lamp as a whole. Even so,
copyright in fact has always protected useful works. Maps and charts have
been protected since 1790, so it comes as no surprise that copyright also
protects computer programs, very useful creations that are essentially
operating instructions for a machine. The courts have played a major role
in defining the scope of copyright protection. After deciding the basic
issues of copyright-ability of software, they got into the tough issues.
Under United States law, computer programs are literary works. As with
other literary works, the law protects both literal and non-literal features of
a program.,
Counsel, Dechert Price & Rhoads; Pravel Professorial Lecturer in Intellectual Property
and Patent Law, George Washington Law School. Former United States Register of Copyrights;
Chair, American Bar Association's Committee on International Copyright Treaties and Law.
1. Literal refers to the actual source code or object code or the computer screens or the
user interfaces, and non-literal refers to the SSO, the plot, the flow of elements one into another,
and the relationship of the elements one to another.
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I. THORNY ISSUES
But it's not quite so simple. What's protected? What's
copyrightable? What's not, particularly on the non-literal side?
Copyright, of course, protects only the expression of ideas, not the
ideas themselves. In copyright cases, the defense often claims that it has
only borrowed un-protectable ideas, rather than protectable expression. In
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble, a 1967 non-software case involving
written instructions for entering a promotional contest, the circuit court
stated the general principle: if a work is so simple and so straightforward
as to leave available only a severely limited number of ways to say
something, the expression would be un-copyrightable, even if it was very
creative.2  The idea and the expression had merged. Since we use
computer programs in a functional context, the idea/expression argument is
often transformed into an inquiry as to whether or not copyright in a
program gives the copyright owner a monopoly over a technological
function.
In an early series of cases, Whalen v. Jaslow, the most famous, the
courts developed a reasonably simple approach to this issue.3 To see if
somebody had copied expression or ideas, the judges determined whether
or not other programs could be written that performed the same function as
the copyrighted program. If another program could be written to perform
the same function, then that program is an expression of the idea and
protected from copying. The idea is very general: in this case, the
organization of a dental office. Everything else is expression, including
SSO. Of course independent creation of an identical program is okay.
This simple approach has not survived, particularly in the most difficult
area of the law trying to figure out if somebody infringed not the actual
computer code, the literal aspects of the program, but the non-literal
aspects, the SSO.
In 1997, the Court of Appeals in New York decided Computer
Associates v. Altai. The case deals with the question of whether the scope
of protection of the non-literal aspects of a computer program may be
protected by copyright.' What is an idea and what is expression?
The decision rejects the broad approach I just described. The Altai
court declined to find infringement even when faced with strong evidence
of copying of non-literal elements. The defendant, Altai, had admitted
copying the actual code of one version of the plaintiff's program and paid
2. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble, 262 F. Supp. 737 (D. Mass. 1967).
3. Whalen v. Jaslow, 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
4. Computer Assoc. v. Altai, 126 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1997).
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damages of $350,000. The real dispute concerned a second, so-called clean
version of the program that Altai programmers created without seeing all of
plaintiff's source code. For this clean room version, the appeals court found
that there was no copying of the literal computer code. The court then looked
for copying of the structural or organizational (the non-literal) elements of the
program.
It looked for substantial similarity between the non-literal elements of
both programs. Substantial similarity, of course, is the standard the courts
apply in finding whether or not infringement has taken place. It found none.
Any SSO that was very similar was not copyright infringement. In its
analysis, the court applied what we called the abstraction test to determine
whether or not the non-literal aspects of computer programs are substantially
similar. The court also drew on the doctrines of merger, scnes'-faire, and
public domain, which I will explain.
Under the merger doctrine, of course, since the expression is
inseparable from the idea, you can not get protection. The scnes'-faire
doctrine holds that certain stock or standard literary devices are not
copyrightable.
Applying these doctrines, and the principles of non-protection for
public domain elements, the court reached its most critical conclusion
regarding the similarity between the plaintiffs and defendant's programs.
The court said that the similarity in the structure between the plaintiffs and
Defendant's program was dictated by the nature of other programs with
which it was designed to interact, and thus, is not protected by copyright.
The court did not ask the tough question: Is it independently created or does
the similarity result from copying?
It is important to note, however, that the Altai court accepts the
principle that copyright protection can extend to a computer program's non-
literal structure. The amount of protection due structural elements, in any
given case, will vary according to the protectible expression found in the
program at issue.
Let's see how the Altai court applies the abstraction test. Step-by-
step, it analyzes both programs in order of increasing generality from
object code, to source code, to parameter lists, to services required, to
general outline. Object code and source codes are protected as literal
elements. Then the court moves further down the spectrum of abstraction
and as it goes it filters out protectible expression from non-protectible
elements to determine the scope of the plaintiff's copyright in the non-
literal structure of a computer program. The court filters out the elements
dictated by efficiency, function, the programming techniques that all
programmers use, external factors (interoperability), or elements taken
from the public domain. Finally, the court compares the remaining
1998]
342 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
protectible expression in Computer Associates' program with Altai's
program to see whether or not the defendant copied any aspect of protected
expression, any of the remaining golden nuggets.
Using this three-step abstraction-filtration-comparison test, the
Altai court has a much narrower view of exactly what components of the
program are subject to copyright protection. Under this test, quite a bit of
copying is tolerated, perhaps more than would be allowed in true literary
work. With a clearer idea of what is protected, generally speaking, the
source code, object code, the golden nuggets of the program's non-literal
aspects, let's look at a few related controversies. These too, are literal
aspects of a computer program. We see them and hear them and touch
them on the screen.
A battle arose over the protectibility of screen displays and other
user interfaces. As with other works, to be protected, computer screens
must contain more than de minimis copyrightable authorship. Some
computer screens only record information, and they are often not
copyrightable because they are just blank forms, or just lists of common
words, and lack enough original expression to support a claim to
copyright. Even so, in 1993 a district court in Boston, in Lotus v.
Borland, found that a menu tree contained enough originality to be
copyrightable.: Even though functional considerations played a part in the
creation of the menu, the court found that function did not dictate the final
version of Lotus' menu on the screen. The court pointed out that a great
variety of possible words and phrases could accomplish the desired
function. The court gave three reasons for its finding. First, Lotus'
format deperds on the programmer's personal judgments and preferences
among many possible choices. Second, even the user of the program can
change the menu tree, so how can it be dictated by function? And third,
the court noted that many other spreadsheet programs used different menu
trees, and mere functionality did not account for these differences. In
conclusion, the court found that Borland's menu tree was sufficiently
similar to Lotus' to constitute copyright infringement.
That decision did not survive the appeal. In March of 1995 the
First Circuit overturned the district court's decision and held that Lotus'
menu tree, made up of words and phrases, is un-copyrightable subject
matter as a matter of law. Citing Section 102(b) the 1976 Copyright Act,
the court found that textual menus (as opposed to complex graphic or
animated user interfaces) are simply a method of operation, for which
Section 102 explicitly prohibits copyright protection.6 The court explained,
5. Lotus v. Borland, 831 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass 1993).
6. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541-2602 (1976).
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"we think that method of operation . . . refers to the means by which a
person operates something, whether it be a car, a food processor or a
computer . . . . "7 In many ways, the Lotus menu command hierarchy is
like the buttons used to control, say, a videocassette recorder, or like the
dashboard of a car.
In a 4-4 decision last year, the Supreme Court upheld the First
Circuit's decision, without an opinion that would have helped clarify the
law.
Enough on copyrightability. Let me discuss one last controversy:
II. REVERSE ENGINEERING
A very significant issue on the infringement side is whether or not
someone can reverse engineer a copyrighted program to produce a
competing program. Let me explain. By reverse engineering, somebody
can figure out the physical composition or electrical properties of
electronic, mechanical, chemical, and other industrial products. As
applied to computer programs, reverse engineering refers to the whole
range of activities, from the study of publicly available sources of
information about a program to the process of creating pseudo-source
code, as well as decompilation or disassembly, breaking down the program
to its component parts and then rebuilding it sentence by sentence.
We have to keep coming back to the same basic premise, copyright
protects expression, and not ideas. Copyright does not protect the
functionality of a program. Nothing. in the copyright law prevents
someone from analyzing program code, then taking the ideas, algorithms,
or methods used in the program to create another program.
Anyway, the reconstruction of the original source code from the
object code is like doing a puzzle. You use a decompiler or disassembly
program to search the original for known or anticipated instructions. One
method used to separate idea from expression is the so-called clean room
approach used by Altai. With this approach, you would attempt to extract
only the ideas from a competing program in order to replicate its functions.
A dirty room team actually copies the original program and decompiles it
to develop a pseudo-source code. The team studies the code to identify
interfaces and document ideas. They then prepare detailed written
descriptions of the design elements of the original program without using
actual code, and programmers in the clean room take that intermediate
product, that detailed script, and work from its description to imitate the
original program. One problem in this approach is that if too much actual
7. Lotus v. Borland, 73 F.3d 355 (1st Cir. 1995).
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detail from the original program gets into the clean room, even structure,
sequence and organization, the non-literal elements, they may wind up
scrapping the end product as too dirty, or too infringing.
But the basic question remains: does decompilation appropriate
more than unprotected ideas in the attempt to accomplish the same
functions of another program? Decompilation does involve the copying of
a computer program if only as an intermediate step and, is, therefore, a
prima facie infringement. The primary rebuttal argument relies on the fair
use defense, codified in Section 107 of the United States copyright law.
Decompilation for academic research, such as a computer science
professor performing classroom analysis with his students is, in all
probability, within the fair use privilege. Decompilation for commercial
purposes normally stands on a different footing. Copyright owners argue
that the decompilation of a program to produce a competing product fails
all four of the fair use factors:
1) the nature and purpose of the use is entirely commercial;
2) the copyrighted source code, as an unpublished work, is
subject to a very narrow scope of fair use;
3) the entire work is copied;
4) harm to the market for the original is presumed with
commercial use.
Decompilers reject this claim. They say their purpose which is to
gain access to ideas, is a socially valuable one. They argue that software is
the first and only copyrightable work that is not transparent, that is not
read or played when it is used, and as such, does not clearly reveal its
ideas or expression. Since copyright does not protect ideas, the argument
goes, they should be available to the public, and decompilation is one of
the few ways to accomplish this. In Lotus v. Borland, the First Circuit
discussed the economic implications of interoperability, and concluded that
software compatibility has a beneficial public impact that should be
encouraged.,
Decompilers also argue that the market factor weighs in their favor
since the end result is non-infringing; any market loss is attributable to the
appropriation of idea, not expression, and to the building of a better
product. They may have an unfair competitive advantage since they did
not have to pay for the original innovative development costs.
On the other hand, others point out that although most copyrighted
works disclose their ideas on inspection, this is not a requirement, since
copyright protects unpublished works. And, Copyright Office regulations
8. Id.
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let people deposit copies of programs with the trade secret portions blocked
out, which blocks access to ideas as well as expression.
So we have reached the point in our history where we have more
questions than answers. How have the courts resolved the related issue of
interoperability? Let's look at one case decided by the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.
Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit in Nintendo v. Atari, found that
the unlocking program contained protectible expression. He affirmed the
lower court's holding that Nintendo would likely establish that Atari
infringed its locking program by copying the literal elements of the source
code. However, Judge Rader noted an important qualification. He
specifically reversed the lower court's finding that Atari's intermediate
copying of the locking program for the purpose of reverse engineering
infringed Nintendo's copyright. The court found such intermediate
copying was fair use: in Judge Rader's words, "[r]everse engineering
object code to discern the unprotectible ideas in a computer program is a
fair use. " 9 Of course, the court did not say that the fair use doctrine
authorizes unrestrained reverse engineering. One can reproduce the
software only to the extent necessary to understand uncopyrightable
portions of the work. In the words of Judge Rader, any reproduction of
protectible expression must be strictly necessary to ascertain the bounds of
protected information within the work.
So I have given you the basics and the hot issues. Winston Churchill
once said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the
others. In many ways, copyright is the worst form of protection for
software, except for all the others. Although patent protection shows some
limited promise for break through ideas, copyright will continue as the
primary means of protecting software for the foreseeable future.
9. Atari v. Nintendo, 1993 WL214886 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Charter prohibits "the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."'
This is the great peace principle of international law, described by
Professor Thomas Franck as "the apex of the global normative system...
"2 States then may be entitled to peace, and if - a very large if -
collective security systems can be made fully operative, states may be
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, Boston. This paper was first
delivered at the International Law Association's (American Branch) International Law Weekend
in New York City on November 7, 1997.
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
2. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AMER. J.
INT'L L. 46, 88 (1992).
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entitled to "protection against aggression . . ." Though the leap from
states rights and obligations to individual rights and obligations is not one
that international law makes very often, we may be moving towards a legal
regime where individuals can claim a right to peace. The purpose of this
panel is to examine how this peace might be secured. The focus of the
discussion rests on the question of the link between a particular
methodology of governance, namely democracy and peace.
II. THE CAUSES OF WAR AND PEACE
For centuries mankind has examined the causes of war. Each age
has brought its own theories. One of the newer observed phenomenon
which has heavily engaged political scientists, is the observation that
"[d]emocracies almost never fight each other."" This empirical statement
leads to an examination of whether there is something inherent about the
nature of democracy that produces peace, at least when interacting with
other democracies, and if so, whether the promotion of democracy could
secure a more lasting peace.
Il. THE PROPOSITION THAT DEMOCRACIES ALMOST NEVER FIGHT
EACH OTHER
First, let us look at the proposition that democracies almost never
fight each other. A brief examination of the voluminous literature brought
to bear on this statement reveals that every aspect of the sentence has
received microscopic examination using global data from about 1815
onwards. What do we mean by democracy? Surely there weren't any true
democracies until well into the twentieth century. How long does a
democratic government have to remain in power for the government to be
counted as democratic?5 What do we mean by fight? Should we count
threats of force? Do we require a certain number of bodies before we are
willing to count the conflict as a fight?6 All of these variations have been
examined and yet, as Professor Bruce Russett carefully demonstrates, the
"research result is extremely robust, in that by various criteria of war and
militarized diplomatic disputes, and various measures of democracy, the
3. Id.
4. BRUCE RUSSETr, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-
COLD WAR WORLD 3 (1993).
5. See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 205-35 (1983).
6. See RUssETr, supra note 4, at 12, & n. 1 - ch. 1.
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relative rarity of violent conflict between democracies still holds up. "7
Another observation is also relevant. "Democracies are not
necessarily peaceful . . . in their relations with other kinds of political
systems [such as autocracies]." The observation about peaceful relations
between democracies does not generally include any observations about
civil wars, the wars which have killed far more people since World War II
than inter-state wars, nor does it look at relative homicide rates within
particular societies or covert actions, so the empirical statement is only one
facet of the overall picture of the use of force. One suggestion I have for
the social scientists that might prove fruitful in filling the gaps is that they
identify which states have had the longest periods of no war at all against
any states, whatever their form of government - that they study these
states and see whether they find any common characteristics. Conversely
they could also study those countries that are most frequently engaged in
international conflict and inquire about the possible characteristics that
cause this perpetual belligerency. Nonetheless, the observation that
democracies hardly even fight each other is an interesting statement. The
essential question then is whether peace among democracies is "a result of
some features of democracy, rather than being caused . . . by [other
factors which may or may not be] correlated with democracy. "9
First, what do we mean by democracy? Professor Samuel P.
Huntington describes its essential feature as "[ellections, open, free and
fair . . . ." In the past century the West's experience with democracy has
also been accompanied by the steady development of other features of
government that appear to go along with open elections: "the rule of law,
a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech,
assembly, religion, and property, . . . [w]hat might be termed
constitutional liberalism . . . ."" In the latest edition of Foreign Affairs,
Fareed Zakaria reminds us that democracy, in the sense of guaranteed
elections, does not necessarily go hand in hand with the other pieces of
constitutional liberalism or vice versa. He points to numerous examples of
popularly elected leaders who "bypass their parliaments and rule by
presidential decree, eroding basic constitutional practices."2 Conversely,
he points to Hong Kong, under British rule, which had almost no electoral
7. Id. at 10.
8. Id. at 11.
9. Id.
10. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 7, 9 (1991).
11. Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of the Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOR. AFF. 22 (1997).
12. Id. at 23.
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participation, except in the last few years, and yet had a fair court system,
and a relatively uncorrupt bureaucracy that protected citizens' basic
rights.' 3 There has been a huge rise in the number of states with elected
governments, particularly in the last 20 years. By some estimates, "118 of
the world's 193 countries are [now] democratic," 4 but this rise in elections
has not been accompanied by a rise in the other institutions of limited
constitutional government. Whether the basic proposition, that
democracies almost never fight each other, will remain true in an era
where an increasing number of elected governments deny basic civil
liberties remains to be seen.
Thomas Jefferson understood the distinction between elections as
such and the other necessary features of limited government when he
observed: "an elective despotism was not the government we fought
for."' 5 Immanuel Kant, in his essay on Perpetual Peace also expanded
upon the link between democracy, peace, and human rights.'6 Indeed he
may be hailed as the modem era's father of this debate.
IV. DOES DEMOCRACY ENCOURAGE PEACE?
A. Theoretical Challenges
Those who espouse the view that "one way to promote universal
and perpetual non-aggression, probably the best and, perhaps, the only
way, is to make democracy an entitlement of all peoples"1' have to contend
with competing theoretical challenges and with other alternative
explanations of the phenomenon of the democratic peace. The overarching
theoretical challenge comes from the structural realists such as Kenneth
Waltz 8 and John Mearsheimer.1' They believe that the behavior of states
is governed by "the structure of the international system and [a particular
state's] position in that structure. "2 They bemoan the end of the Cold War
13. Id. at 29.
14. Id. at 23.
15. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 120 (William Penden ed.
1954) (1787).
16. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 107-39 (T. Humphrey rev. ed. 1983) (1795).
17. Franck, supra note 2, at 88.
18. KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979).
19. John Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War, 15
INT'L SEC. 5-56 (1990).
20. RUSSETr, supra note 4, at 24.
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because it gave "order . . . to the anarchy of international relations." 2'
They believe that "the prospects for international peace are not markedly
influenced by the domestic political character of states, that it is the
character of the state system, not the character of the individual units
composing it, that drives states towards war . . . . "22 "The nature of
states' internal systems of government is seen as nearly irrelevant. .... 23
Believing that there is something inherent about democracy itself,
or democracy combined with liberal constitutionalism, which restrains
states from engaging in war is a direct challenge to the structural realists.
The most obvious conclusion is that the phenomenon that democracies
don't fight each other (but do fight other political systems) must arise from
the normative structure of democracy at least when it interacts with other
democracies but a number of alternative suggestions have been offered to
explain the democratic peace that do not rely on the nature of democracy
or its attendant institutions.
B. Alternative Suggestions to Explain the Democratic Peace
There is only time to mention a few of the alternative explanations
but I would suggest that some of them are wrong and neither of them is a
sufficient explanation of the democratic peace. I will briefly discuss only
four prominent alternative explanations for the democratic peace.
1. Similar Political Cultures Don't Fight
This explanation posits that it is the similarity of the political
culture that restrains war not the particular characteristics of the political
framework. This is simply incorrect. Autocracies fight each other quite
frequently so it cannot be the similarity of the political culture as such that
restrains war.
2. Distance Makes the Heart Grow Fonder
Until 1945 democracies outside Western Europe were few and far
between. Since wars most often occur between neighboring states it is not
surprising that there were few wars between democracies. The problem
with this suggestion is that even where democracies were neighbors they
did not fight, and in the post World War II period, where there are far
more proximate democracies, the phenomenon of the democratic peace still
holds up.
21. John Mearsheimer, Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Aug. 1990, at 37.
22. Id. at 38.
23. RUSSETr, supra note 4, at 24.
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3. Belonging to Common Intergovernmental or Supra-National
Institutions is What Prevents War
There are two replies to this argument. One is that democracy and
liberal constitutionalism encourages "independent centers of power"24 such
as common interstate institutions, so the rise of the institutions themselves
may be seen as incident to the democratic process. The other reply is that
peaceful relations must necessarily precede the creation of the common
institutions. In other words, the institutions arise out of peace; they do not
themselves cause it, though no one doubts that they may help maintain the
peace.
4. Riches Ensure Peace
This explanation holds that the richer a state, the more it has to
lose in the devastation of war, thus the less likely it is to engage in war.
Democracies, at least until the last decade or two, have usually been
wealthy, thus between themselves there are double disincentives against
conflict. This argument is much like the argument that "trade and
investment make peace."25 The problem with both these arguments is that
there are plenty of counter examples. Peace -often exists between states
with weak economic ties and between poor states. Also both trade and
wealth can generate competitive aggression.
V. WILL PROMOTING DEMOCRACY PROMOTE PEACE?
If neither of the alternative explanations is sufficient, what is it
about democracy itself that may persuade us that promoting democracy
will promotn peace? Are democracies more dovish in general than other
political systems either because "the political culture favor[s] . . . the
peaceful resolution of disputes" 26 or because governments have to answer
to the population, especially during wars, which produces the restraint we
seek? The answer sadly has to be no. "[D]emocracies are about as war-
prone and disputatious in general (not towards other democracies) as are
other kinds of states. ,27
What are "the basic norm[s] of democratic theory" 28 that may
restrain war? "[V]oting equality, egalitarian rights to human dignity, the
notion that disputes can be resolved without force, the idea of the consent
24. Id. at 26.
25. Id. at 28.
26. Id. at 30.
27. RussET-r, supra note 4, at 30.
28. Id. at 31.
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of the governed, [and] the idea that resort to force is illegitimate . . . to
secure . . . rights because the institutions linked with liberal democracy
will secure those rights without force." 29 Political opposition and open
discussion are also seen as necessary for good and legitimate policy
making. When other nations are seen as also possessing these political
norms they are perceived as legitimate, possessing restraints on
governmental excesses and not likely to be out to dominate us. We in turn
do not wish to dominate them because their conduct conforms with our
professed norms. The perceived legitimacy of the fellow democratic state
operates as a powerful restraint on any impulse to overthrow such a
government both internally and internationally. When democracies fight
authoritarian states on the other hand, the conflict is often waged in the
name of overthrowing an illegitimate leader. The Gulf War against Iraq
and the United States invasion of Panama are two examples, though
ironically the Gulf War also had to the effect of restoring an autocracy to
power in Kuwait.
There are of course scholars who challenge the very emphasis on
democracy and civil and political rights and question whether those human
rights "should be given priority over economic, social and cultural
rights."3" Professor Anne Orford "question[s] the assumption that the
powerful international institutions operating in the economic and security
areas [which might be seen as, or used for, promoting democracy are
indeed] the bearers of even . . limited liberal versions of democracy and
rights in the post-Cold War era.""' These scholars are not about to jump
on the bandwagon of international institutional intervention.
One scholar who has perhaps tried the hardest to separate out other
possible influences on conflict is Professor Bruce Russett. Through a
series of calibrated tables he has looked at the influence of a variety of
factors as well as the fact of democracy itself on conflict. He tests such
factors as wealth, economic growth, alliances, contiguity, and military
capability ratio. What he finds is that "the effect [of democracy] is
continuous, in that the more democratic each member of [any two possible
warring states] is, the less likely is conflict between them."3" He also
looks at such variables as political stability, structural/institutional
constraints, normative cultural restraints, and even the levels of deaths
resulting from political conflict within countries. From his studies he
29. Id.
30. Anne Orford, Locating the International:. Military and Monetary Interventions After
the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 443, 464 (1997).
31. Id.
32. RUSSEr', supra note 4, at 86.
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concludes that:
The more democratic are both members of a pair of states,
the less likely is it that a militarized dispute will break out
between them, and the less likely it is that any disputes that
do break out will escalate. This effect will operate
independently of other attributes such as the wealth,
economic growth, contiguity, alliance or capability ratio of
the countries.33
Russett concludes that the "results do suggest that the spread of democracy
in international politics . . . can reduce the frequency of violent conflicts
among nations. "14
Perhaps, in the end we also have to proclaim boldly what amounts
to a moral belief, namely that we think voting and respect for individual
rights is simply a preferable system. The studies seem to indicate that
democracy will engender peace, if enough states follow the same pattern,
but it may in any event be worth promoting for its own sake. If the
premise democracies don'tfight each other remains true even in the era of
"The Rise of Illiberal Democrac[ies], " 3 promoting democracy will be a
useful means to peace. If on the other hand the premise breaks down, as
the voting aspect of democracy becomes divorced from liberal
constitutionalism, we shall be forced to look at the broader institutional
framework to find the causes of peace.
The complex issues of how any state, and in particular the United
States, might go about promoting democracy, the dangers of intervention,
and the hazards of various forms of aid, I will leave to my fellow panelists.
33. Id. at 72-3.
34. Id. at 92.
35. Zakaria, supra note 11, title.
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THE RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE AT THE UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
Charles Duryea Smith*
Thank you so much, Valerie, for the invitation to join you today. I
have chosen what I think is an important part of the larger subject of Peace
and Democracy: The Link and the Policy Implications; it is the rule of
law.
In 1984, Congress passed the United States Institute of Peace Act.
In early 1986, the presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed Board of
Directors met and hired the first staff, including me as general counsel.
Four years later, in 1990, the Board created the Rule of Law Initiative and
turned to me, as the lawyer on the staff, to direct it. Advocating for this
program at this free-standing federal educational institution were a number
of your colleagues: the board chairman, John Norton Moore, and board
members Max Kampelman, Richard Schifter, and Morris Leibman, all
lawyers; and historians Elspeth Rostow and Allen Weinstein. I would like
to use my time today to describe the development of this program and
indicate where it stands today. In so doing, I will point to certain
historical changes and philosophical issues that are directly reflected in the
life of the institute and this program and that may help inform our
discussion today about war and peace and the role of democracy in
moderating, if not ending, international war and creating more peaceful
nations.
When the Institute's Rule of Law Initiative began, George Bush
was President, Mikael Gorbachev led the Soviet Union, and the Berlin
Wall had fallen, but the Cold War was still not history. In hindsight, we
know now that we were in the endgame of the Cold War. But no-one
knew this then for sure. This is the historical context in which the United
States Institute of Peace designed its Rule of Law Initiative.
* Charles Duryea Smith, IV is the Acting Inspector General of the Peace Corps and
earlier was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Ethiopia. He has been the General Counsel of the United
States Institute of Peace; served on the staffs of federal study commissions addressing
immigration and refugee policy, the World War II internment of Japanese Americans, and a
national peace academy; and taught and published in criminal and international law. He is an
alumnus of Phillips Academy and Oberlin College, received his J.D. from Boston University,
and has done graduate studies at Washington University and Harvard Law School.
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Interestingly enough, when the Board decided to establish the Rule
of Law Initiative - a legal program that would focus on changes
happening in both the communist world and a number of third world
countries - they encountered a classic dilemma as the Cold War died:
what I would term the clash between the Hans Morgenthau, Henry
Kissinger power politics view of the world and the normative view of
change exemplified by the law. Taking the Cold War as the post-World
War II exercise of conventional power politics, one could see that
normative or value-driven rule of law concerns would not be on that table.
Yet, it was precisely those concerns - captured by the phrases peace with
justice and peace with freedom and including civil and human rights as
well as democratic forms of governance - that informed the Board's view
that a rule of law initiative was not only timely but was a necessary
component of a new federal institution devoted to exploring, as stated in
the Institute's enabling act, the means to promote international peace and
the resolution of conflicts among the nations and peoples of the world
without recourse to violence.
So, when the Initiative was set up, I faced not only the immediate
question of how to allocate enough time from my principal role as general
counsel in order to get the program off its feet but also the corollary
question of identifying an individual who could help get it going. I was
fortunate in attracting Neil Kritz as the rule of law staffer, and today he is
the director of the Rule of Law Initiative. Kritz brought energy,
Washington experience, good contacts in the human rights community, and
a particular view of the rule of law that influenced directly what we did
together and my thoughts today on where this type of initiative might go.
Specifically, Kritz has deep interest in international law and in the question
of how law can play a role in developing peace out of wartime situations.'
As we developed it, the Rule of Law Initiative has two basic
parallel lines or conceptual maps. First, is the concept of negative peace:
peace as the absence of war. This work evolves directly out of armed
.conflict. Second, is the concept of positive peace: peace as quality of life.
This is what Fareed Zakaria describes as the content of liberal democracy
in his recent essay in Foreign Affairs entitled The Rise of Illiberal
Democracy. Along the lines of his essay, it is interesting to note that,
while the Rule of Law Initiative did not establish a separate category for
the electoral side of democracy-building, its- programming ended up
1. See generally Neil J. Kritz, The Rule of Law in the Postconflict Phase: Building a
Stable Peace, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall,
United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 1996).
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distinct from the election programs sponsored by the Uuited States Agency
for International Development or the National Endowment for Democracy.
Let me now turn to both views, negative and positive peace, and illustrate
how they work in the Institute's Rule of Law Initiative.
Negative peace, peace as the absence of war, begins out of war.
Its predicate is violent conflict - whether international or within a state.
It is important to keep in mind that, today, some ninety percent of violent
political conflict is occurring within states, not between states. That is, the
international world is essentially peaceful; domestically, the world is at
war. This domestic violence includes state violence against people: the
kind of violence spelled out so movingly by R.J. Rummel in Death by
Government.2 It includes Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, Zaire, and it includes
the lawlessness of Central America: post-conflict violence against the
populace by gangs of soldiers and guerrillas uncontrolled by at best
rudimentary police forces and legal institutions in El Salvador, Nicaragua,
and Guatemala.
At the Institute, the most prominent negative peace project is called
Transitional Justice. I believe that this is the project which to date has
defined the Institute's Rule of Law Initiative. Transitional justice
addresses the question of how a formerly totalitarian society that is
becoming democratic can judge the actions of the former government. The
principle, in psychological terms, is that, unless issues of the past are
brought to the surface and confronted, the country will be unable to come
to grips with its history. The complementary principle is that countries
emerging from totalitarian pasts need not feel isolated, as if no-one else has
ever dealt with such complex problems. The project in 1995 produced a
three-volume edited study, published by the United States Institute of Peace
Press, entitled Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon
with Former Regimes. Volume One, General Considerations, has a
number of background essays on such subjects as criminal and non-
criminal sanctions, moral responsibility, victim compensation, and
commissions of inquiry. Volume Two, Country Studies, offers case
studies of post-World War II transitional justice in twenty countries from
Germany and France after Nazism to South Korea, Argentina, Uganda,
Czechoslovakia, and Russia. Volume Three, Laws, Rulings, and Reports,
includes laws and reports for commissions of inquiry and on such topics as
privacy protections and prosecutions. In my mind, it is the most important
because it contains original material. In draft, these volumes were used in
creating the South African truth commission, among others. In addition, a
number of Institute grants have supported the work of such commissions
2. R. J. RUMMELL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT (Transaction Publishers 1994).
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and their academic advisors. A principal governmental mechanism has
been selective prosecutions of the most serious offenders of human rights
- the torturers, the Eichmanns - and through truth commissions the
creation of histories where there had been suppression and silence, as in
South Africa today. I believe this represents the negative peace foundation
for the rule of law. The work continues with impact and immediacy, as
Neil Kritz is in Bosnia today meeting officials about steps the nations of the
former Yugoslavia might take to establish a joint truth commission.
The second activity for the Rule of Law Initiative has focused on
positive peace. Zakaria lists components of this under the heading liberal
democracy. They include a political system marked not only by free and
fair elections but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the
protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property.
This latter bundle of freedoms he writes might be termed constitutional
liberalism and is theoretically different and historically distinct from
democracy, which he views as identified by elections, not by the content of
individual liberties and protections. The Institute has supported this strand
of work, the positive peace side, through grants for American scholars and
practitioners assisting new democracies in constitution-drafting and in
judicial development and for a range of scholars from the United States
and around the world who are looking at general and quite specific issues
surrounding the rule of law in theory in specific countries. In addition,
individual scholars and diplomats such as Louis Sohn, Max van der Stoel,
and Bereket Habte Selassie have won fellowships for a year of work at the
Institute focusing on rule of law issues. It is particularly important, I
think, to note the World Bank, surely an important bell-weather indicator
for important change in international policies, is becoming increasingly
focused on positive peace questions beyond a strictly economic appraisal of
its work. Perhaps the best example of how the rule of law is taking root is
the Bank's interest in factoring problems of corruption into its lending and
review policies.3 This recognition cannot help but make the wider range of
rule of law matters increasingly central to securing a world at peace with
justice and freedom.
In closing, I'm pleased to report that, as we look back on the Cold
War and forward into the new millennium, the Rule of Law Initiative at
the United States Institute of Peace has become an important American
3. See, e.g., Restraining Arbitrary State Action and Corruption, in THE STATE IN A
CHANGING WORLD: WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997, SELECTED WORLD DEVELOPMENT
INDICATORS (The World Bank, June 1997); THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE WITH
GOVERNANCE (The World Bank, May 1994, second printing April 1996); HELPING COUNTRIES
COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK (The World Bank, Sept. 1997).
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actor in rule of law matters, both negative and positive peace, with special
expertise on commissions.4
4. I would recommend that any of you interested in grant or fellowship support for work
in the area contact the Institute's headquarters in Washington, D.C. The phone number is (202)
457-1700.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Corruption has become a major topic of almost daily attention
within the media. It has been of varying degrees of concern in different
countries. Historic and cultural differences play a role. In some Asian or
Arab cultures, for instance, the bakshish mentality is a way of life and is
socially accepted. In other countries, partly due to a lack of strength on the
part of the government and to the power of organized crime, bribery is
LL.M, Columbia University School of Law, 1982; J.D., Universities of Bochum and
Bonn, 1981. Dr. Andreas G. Junius is a partner in the law firm of Pdnder, Volhard, Weber &
Axster, resident in the firm's New York office. His practice focuses on general civil law,
German and EEC-related banking, corporate, antitrust, merger acquisitions, leveraged leasing,
and project finance work. Dr. Junuis has lectured on German Banking law at Boston University
School of Law since 1990.
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notorious and overwhelming. Thus, in recent years, sensational bribery
cases concerning bribery of politicians, as well as of government officials,
have been covered by the international press and have been dealt with in
the different jurisdictions.
Examples of such bribery include the cases of top Italian politicians
being accused and tried for receiving money from the Mafia, as well as the
case in Singapore about the public official who was sentenced to fourteen
years of prison after it was proven that, in exchange for confidential
information in regard of government orders, he had received at least ten
million dollars over the years from international companies.' Politicians
around the world are accused of using their offices for the benefit of their
political parties.
It has always been obvious, but seems to become more commonly
understood, that international corruption harms domestic economies
because it creates unnecessary expense, as well as losses for those
competitors that attempt to market their products on a fair basis.
A. IBA Study Concerning Corruption
The Standing Committee on International Legal Practice, Section
on Business Law of the International Bar Association (IBA), has recently
published a comparative analysis of answers by lawyers from thirteen
mostly industrialized jurisdictions (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile,
Denmark, England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and the United States) to a questionnaire regarding the respective
legal settings of corruption.2 It led to interesting results. While there is a
substantial consistency among the different jurisdictions in their criminal
law approzch to fighting corruption on a domestic basis, the treatment of
international corruption, for example, the bribery of foreign public
officials, wherever it may take place, reveals important differences. Only
five of the questioned states declare some form of international corruption
a criminal act, while just three of these five do not require that the bribe be
committed within their own territory.3 That leaves the remaining eight
I. See Mark Pieth, Internationale Bestechungsfdlle und ihre strafrechtliche
Verarbeitung, SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR STRAFRECHT 313 (1996).
2. Sietze Hepkema & Willem Booysen, Bribery of Public Officails: An IBA Survey,
INT'L Bus. LAW, Oct., 1997, at 415-16.
3. The five countries first referred to are England, Sweden, the Netherlands, the
United States, and Australia (New South Wales), whereas Sweden, the Netherlands, and the
United States make up for the jurisdictions referred to in the latter part. Hepkema & Booysen,
supra note 2, at 415-16.
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jurisdictions without the possibility to prosecute and punish international
bribery under their criminal statutes.,
Interesting distinctions were found with respect to the tax treatment
of payments to public officials as well. Only five jurisdictions were found
to explicitly deny the deductibility of bribery payments as legitimate
business expenses under their respective tax laws.' That leaves the other
questioned states allowing the deduction of international bribe payments by
the concerned private business organizations.
B. Corruption in Germany
Germany has traditionally enjoyed a relatively low degree of
corruption. At least, that is the perception. One can only speculate why:
1) The system of governmental employment, civil service, has
provided for highly (some say overly) paid public officials with
considerable social standing and absolute job security in exchange
for an almost fiduciary relationship with the state/employer; and
2) Traditionally, there has been less opportunity for
bribery, due to a comparatively low level of state owned industries;
however, where opportunity exists (for instance with building permit
procedures, public procurements), bribery has been present also in
Germany.
These conditions have changed in particular since reunification with the
former East Germany:
1) The public service sector is no longer as highly respected
as before. Budget deficits led to pay freezes and outsourcing, and
high unemployment has caused envy and has led to reduced respect
for the civil service; and
2) In order for Germany to fulfill the convergence criteria for
participation in Europe, there are increased opportunities due to
privatization in eastern Germany and in Germany as a whole.
As a response to the rapidly growing influence of corruption on German
society and economy,6 prompt action became necessary to combat the
4. Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.
Switzerland has to be added to this group of countries. Pieth, supra note 1, at 315.
5. Canada, England, Chile, Italy, and, under certain limitations Denmark.
Hepkema & Booysen, supra note 2, at 415-16. In Denmark those payments are only deductible
if they are considered a customary and necessary means for conducting business in the relevant
foreign jurisdiction. d.
6. Estimated total economical damages per annum are $300-350 billion. Korruption
ist ein Kontrolldelikt, [Interview with Wolfgang J. Schaupensteiner, the Senior District Attorney
1998] 363
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
further spread of that cancerous disease. It also follows that in Germany
corruption as a problem has become a focal point now.
II. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND
STANDARDIZATION
As long as domestic laws do not globally prohibit international
corruption, one major practical argument against international corruption
efforts is the level playing field defense: we do not want to put our
exporters at a competitive disadvantage from competitors in corruption-
permissive countries.
To change that situation and because of the disadvantages already
mentioned, political (mainly from the United States) as well as (private)
economic pressure have led to different and independent, but nevertheless
very strong and hopeful efforts to ban corruption on an unified or
harmonized international basis. What are those international efforts?
.A. EU Conveniion
On May 26, 1997, the Council of the European Union (EU),
acting under Title VI (Article K.3 (2) (c)) of the Treaty of the European
Union, adopted the Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving
Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of
the European Union (EU Convention). Following its signing as the next
step, all European Union (EU) member states are to ratify the Convention
and to adjust their criminal laws concerning corruption accordingly. To
date (February 1998), no member state has ratified the EU Convention.
The EU Convention will only enter into force ninety days after notification
by the last member state that its domestic ratification procedures are
completed.
In Articles 2 and 3, the EU Convention distinguishes between
passive and active corruption, a common distinction under all domestic
laws concerned. Thus, the main and decisive innovation will relate to the
scope of coverage. It will include with regard to bribe actions with
officials of other EU countries as well as EU officials. That transborder
effect has been lacking under most domestic jurisdictions, which is even
more disturbing in the EU since the interdependence among the EU
member states has grown to previously unknown proportions, and since
virtually domestic market conditions exist. Furthermore, punishment of
and Special Corruption Officer of the District County of Frankfurter am Main, by Dr. Norbert
Copray], LAY REPORT 6 (1997). According to Schaupensteiner, police statistics provided by the
German F.B.I. counted since the first year of its official listing in 1994 documented there were
1557 bribery cases already. (on file with author) [hereinafter LAY REPORT].
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corruption will not be dependent on its success, but instead on the intent to
bribe.
Extensive concern is placed on the harmonization of domestic laws
in the member states and on cooperation of criminal enforcement
authorities. Article 6 deserves special recognition in that it requires
members to potentially make heads of businesses vicariously liable under
penal laws for acts of their employees within their business units.
Notwithstanding the innovative and important approach to extend
the domestic criminal laws to international bribery, the EU Convention is
also limited in two regards. First, only bribery action vis-A-vis public
officials, not private individuals, is targeted. Second, the prescribed
changes exclusively concern criminal legal measures. Other areas of the
law, like tax legislation or administrative measures, are not addressed by
the articles of the Convention.
B. OECD Measures
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) differs from the EU in many aspects, but, to our concern, it is the
difference in membership (including non-EU members such as. the United
States, Australia, Canada, Japan) that becomes crucial for the combat of
international bribery. At this point, almost thirty states are members in the
OECD.
The Council of the OECD decided upon a Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (OECD-Convention) as of
May 23, 1997. This convention was signed by the OECD member states
on November 20, 1997. The Convention shall enter into force on the
sixtieth day after five of the ten member states with the highest exports
share, representing sixty percent of the total export share of these ten
countries, have ratified it.
Although the scope of both Conventions is similar, the OECD-
Convention differs in important material respects from the EU-Convention.
The main distinctions, some of a narrowing nature, others extending the
field of application of the OECD-Convention,'7 are:
1) Only active corruption, such as bribing an official, is
included, not passive bribery committed by an official (Article 1).
2) Only bribe payments in order to obtain or retain a concrete
business deal are considered criminal. Thus, the so-called
7. The following analysis is based on the latest available proposal for the draft
convention. During the final adoption process certain changes may have been made.
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facilitating payments preceding the business relationship itself
might still be tolerated.
3) In contrast to the EU-Convention, not only governmental
officials in member countries of the organization, but all officials
in foreign government functions as well as all officials in
international organizations are going to be included.
4) Lastly, it is not clear whether prosecution has to be made
or if national law may leave discretion for the respective domestic
enforcement organs to decide about criminal action when
international bribe actions become known. Ultimately, under good
faith principles a party may not use this discretion to circumvent its
obligations to combat bribery in accordance with the OECD
Convention.
Still, considering the less than hopeless attempts by the United
Nations in the 1970s to create an Anti-Corruption Convention, it is a major
success for the OECD to form a global alliance to combat international
bribery. It must be seen as a starting point on which future efforts can be
built.
Prior to the adoption of, and in addition to the above-described
OECD-Convention, the Council of the OECD released an official
recommendation "On Combating Bribery in International Business
Transactions. ",
Apart from referring to the desired criminalization of international
bribery in the member countries, the recommendation comprises many
different measures. It addresses topics like tax deductibility, accounting
requirements, auditing methods, internal company controls, public
procurement, and others. Due to its informal nature, the effects of the
recommendation may lead to precise government action in the member
states, but shows an international consensus to fight corruption and also
might precede future OECD actions with more authoritative strength.
C: Council of Europe Action and Other International Efforts
The Council of Europe, which is an organization that is distinct
from, and less integrated than, the EU membership with a much wider
membership, has been working on the subject of international bribery as
well. Mainly by cooperation provisions referring to the Council of Europe
in the Treaty of the European Union, the linkages between both
international organizations have tightened. As a result, the importance of
the Council of Europe has grown considerably.
8. OECD Doc. (C (97) 123/final) (May 30, 1997).
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The efforts by the Council of Europe are meaningful for mainly
one reason. In contrast to the European Union, the membership of the
Council of Europe includes most former communist Eastern European
States. For the purpose of reaching a level playing field throughout
Europe, the inclusion of the Eastern European economies, which provide
for many problems in the context of corruption and organized crime in the
EU-member states, seems necessary.
Other organizations that have been dealing with international
bribery are the Organization of American States (OAS)9 and the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in the context of its rules of Public
Procurement.
III. CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION IN GERMANY
Bribery can be dealt with under criminal, civil, tax, and
administrative law. At the annual German Lawyers' Congress 1996 in
Karlsruhe, one focus was organized crime and corruption. Following
those discussions, and after surprisingly similar bills were introduced by all
parties and legislative organs of German government, the German
legislature became active. In August 1997, the Bundestag (the lower
House in the German Parliament) passed an anti-corruption act0 to tighten
criminal law as well as other segments of the German legal system on the
wide field of corruption.
A. Criminal Law
The Anti Corruption Act does not criminalize international
bribery. According to sections 3, 5, 6, and 7 of the German Penal Code
(known as the Strafgesehbuch (StGB)), German criminal laws, like most
other criminal laws, only apply in cases with a close domestic connection.
A specific provision for the punishment of international bribery does not
exist yet.
The Anti Corruption Act of this year did not alter this concept.
Thus, only domestic, but not international bribery remains criminalized,
unless such conduct otherwise falls within the scope of fraud,
embezzlement, or tax evasion. However, many if not most situations of
9. Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996); Manfred MOhrenschliiger, Strafrechtliche Vorhaben Zur
Bekdmpfung der Korruption auf Nationaler Und Internationaler Ebene, JURISTENZEITUNG 822,
831 (1996).
10. The Act on the Combat of Corruption and other Measures for Fighting
Corruption entered into force on August 20, 1997. (BGBI. I, S.2038) [hereinafter the Anti-
Corruption Act].
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international bribery do not fulfill the code definition of bribery or the
ancillary crimes.
Despite those shortcomings, there are a number of positive changes
under German criminal laws that are worth mentioning:
1) The definition of government official was broadened to
include employees of public entities organized under private law,
and it now matches the EU-Convention's definition described
above. For example, not the form of the entity by which the
person is employed, but the substantive scope of the occupation in
question determines the quality as potential addressee and potential
perpetrator of passive bribery.
2) In contrast to the former law, the favor being sought by the
private party does not have to refer to a specific action by the
official, but it is sufficient that the favor is granted within the
context of the official's duties.
3) This amendment reflects the statutory purpose of
maintaining the trust of the public in the Public Administration.
Formerly, the official had to benefit at least indirectly from his or
her wrongdoing (e.g., donation to official's sport club); under the
amendment, benefits to third parties not directly related to the
official are sufficient (e.g., donation to the church).
4) The potential punishment was raised to a maximum of ten
years for severe bribery. The minimum sentence for certain
actions such as when bribery leads to illegal acts of the influenced
officials, was raised to one or to two years, which is the threshold
to become a felony (in contrast to a misdemeanor).
5) Under the amendment, protection of free competition has
been emphasized much more by moving the provisions into the
Penal Code and by increasing the punishment. Among the more
interesting provisions rank the prohibition of illegal agreements in
the context of public procurement" and in bribery in private
business dealings.12
As a result, it has to be emphasized that there still remains a
decisive distinction from the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
11. § 298 StGB.
12. § 299 StGB (formerly and with less severity included only in section 12 of the
Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG), which stands for the Act Against Unfair
Competition). For a detailed look at all the changes, see Mattias Korte, Kampfansage gegen die
Korruption, 39 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2556, 2557 (1997).
[Vol. 4:361
Junius
because under current German law it is not illegal to bribe foreign public
officials.
B. Civil Law
For many years, the German Federal Supreme Court has held that
contracts resulting from bribery actions are void under section 138 BGB,
the German Civil Code, as conflicting with "bonos mores."" Thus, a
party that formerly paid under the table is not only hindered from
enforcing its seemingly contractual claim, but it also has to bear all the
consequences resulting from the nullity of the contract in concern. In
addition, bribe payments can lead to the obligation to pay damages under
the intentional fraud provisions of the Civil Code, section 826 BGB.
C. Tax Law
Under German tax law, it is, in principle, possible to deduct
foreign bribe payments as necessary business expenses. 4 However, there
are limitations to that rule. For instance, according to section 4 (as
amended) of the German Income Tax Code, the deduction is disallowed if
the concerned action has led to prosecution or sentencing under the
German criminal code. 5
Since under the current criminal code actions of international
bribery are not included, those expenses do not fall within section 4.
Thus, they remain deductible, at least for now.
In addition, tax procedure rules give the tax authorities the right to
require precise disclosure of the recipient and the circumstances of the
deductible expense. This feature, combined with exchange of information
procedures between certain countries under their double taxation treaties
with Germany, can be expected to have a desirable impact on foreign
bribery activities.
D. Administrative Measures
It is important to note that companies and other judicial persons
cannot be criminally liable under German law. Hence, other measures
have to be found to get to the companies.
13. 94 BGHZ 268, 271.
14. Press release 20/94 by the BdF (Federal Treasury) as of March 21, 1994.
Bestechungs-und Schmiergelder, 5 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 436 (1994).
15. § 4 Abs. 5 S. 1 Nr. 10 EstG. For details, see Wolfgang Joecks, Abzugsverbotfr
Bestechungs- und Schmiergelder, 27 DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR STEUERRECHT 1025 (1997).
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To strengthen the effects of new legislation, (and also the
upcoming efforts to combat international bribery) administrative measures
like so called black lists have been put into place.
Companies that get caught in bribe actions have been listed with
the effect that they are banned from government orders for varying periods
of time. One German federal state, Hesse, came up with that procedure in
1995 and, in 1996, listed more than sixty enterprises. 6  The names on
these lists are kept strictly confidential from the public, but not to the
companies concerned. Just the number of companies being listed. is
published on a frequent basis. Public agencies intending to contract with
mainly private construction companies have to check with the Hessian
County Government to make sure that the company with whom they wish
to enter into a contract is not banned from government orders.
Similar methods are used abroad. It appears that this feature has
become very effective. For instance, in connection with an action that led
to imprisonment of a public official, one major German corporation was
banned from Singaporean government orders for five years."7
IV. COMPLIANCE EFFORTS BY THE INDUSTRY
There is growing concern among enterprises to make sure by
internal measures that corruption, including international bribery, is
contained. Experts are convinced that despite the necessity of tougher
criminal laws, international bribery can be successfully limited only by the
industry itself. "I Companies have to install effective internal revision
procedures and sanction mechanisms to be able to control and stop bribery
payments.
In an attempt to raise that topic and to help standardize those
internal means, the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V. (BDI),
the German Industry Association, recently published a pamphlet with
recommended guidelines of conduct.19 There is a common understanding
that the often made statement, "not companies, but their employees are
corrupt" does not reflect the true situation.2D Since, mainly higher level
management and representatives are able to participate in illegal antitrust
16. Littwin, Manahmen zur BekAnpfung der nationalen und internationalen
Korruption, Zeitschrift fur Rechtspolitik (ZRP) 1996.
17. Reiner Scholz, Uternehmen Schwarze Liste, DIE ZEIT, Mar. 7, 1997, at 30, 31.
18. See LAY REPORT, supra note 6.
19. BUNDESVERBAND DER DEUTSCHEN INDUSTIE EMPFEHLUNGEN AN
GESCHAFTSFUHRUNGEN UND VORSTANDE DER GEWERBLICHEN WIRTSCHAFT ZUR
BEKAMPFUNG DER KORRUPTION IN DEUTSCHLAND, 3 [hereinafter BDI].
20. BDI, supra note 19; LAY REPORT supra note 6, at 6.
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agreements, sales agents and foreign branch representatives being involved
in such actions, typically receive orders from higher ranking management.
Therefore, it is necessary to provide for role model behavior by the boards
and leaders of the German companies operating in international business,
and by that, also to avoid the spectacular criminal trials we have seen in
recent years. Article 6 of the EU-Convention calling for criminal liability
of business heads when making bribery related decisions, must be seen in
this context.
In evaluating the BDI guidelines' recommendation of strict
observance of the German criminal law as the most important measure, the
question of the non-criminalization of international bribery must be raised.
So far enterprises have been able to hide behind the existing gap in
German statutory law, 2 an aspect United States companies have been
complaining about for a long time.
For the EU, the possibility to corrupt foreign officials and to
escape criminal liability will be gone with the new legislative act in 1998.
However, there will always be the difficulty to obtain knowledge of
foreign bribery payments. The OECD Convention, by requiring that the
member states secure their accounting and bookkeeping rules prevent
bribery payments from being covered up, will be a major step forward.
However, it appears to fall short of expressly prohibiting tax deductibility.
A realistic chance to achieve a certain control over bribery abroad, is the
strict implementation of internal company measures like specific training
and education of the employees, job rotation in positions with increased
exposure to the possibility of bribery, to create alternatives in the supply
chain, and so as to avoid dependencies, effective revision methods and
better cooperation among the concerned company departments.
V. OUTLOOK
In the context of growing concern about international corruption,
Germany will quickly attempt to tighten its legislative and administrative
measures. The Anti-Corruption Act of 1997 should be followed by new
legislative measures in 1998 to close the gap to the efforts by the EU and
the OECD. As it appears right now, a new legislative act will be
presented to the German parliament by April 1998 that should contain the
prescribed changes by the EU. Since all domestic parties agree in
substance, there should be no problem in passing that bill. It remains to be
seen, though, if the new act will be limited to the measures prescribed by
the EU-Convention or if it goes beyond, which seems possible, for
21. The cited pamphlet still leaves the door open for international bribe payments.
BDI, supra note 19, at 6.
1998]
372 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
example, by banning tax deductibility of foreign bribe payments. This
should apply also to the efforts to adopt legislation in accordance with the
OECD-Convention. n
It is safe to say that there exists an almost unique coalition among
the opposing parties in the German Parliament, the Association of
Chambers of Commerce (known as the Deutscher Industrie-und Handilstag
(DIHT)), and the Federation of the German Industry (BDI) to combat
international bribery. That kind of common effort has become possible
since the awareness has grown that corruption is not only unethical, but
also harms the export industries with higher costs and unfair competition,
and thus, a level playing field would be beneficial for all involved.
22. BT-Drs. (Bundestag-Drucksache) [Printed matter of the lower house of the
German Parliament] 13/8082 from June 26, 1997.
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The collapse of the Soviet Union has resulted in far-reaching
changes in the global environment. One of the immediate effects of the
demise of what Ronald Reagan dubbed the Evil Empire was the need to
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find useful work for the army of FBI agents who formerly were assigned to
counter-intelligence. Because they would no longer be sitting for hours in
unmarked vehicles in full surveillance mode, those agents were available
for reassignment. According to intelligence agencies, FBI agents were not
the only ones looking for work. The reduction in East-West tensions
enabled intelligence services in allied nations to devote greater resources to
collecting sensitive United States economic information and technology.
While its full implications are not yet apparent, the passage of the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 might be viewed as the FBI agent full
employment act. The government will now make use of sophisticated
investigators hitherto employed at rooting out spies, waste, fraud, abuse,
and other criminal activities in an effort to protect something else that is
vital to our national security and prosperity - the nation's trade secrets. It
is yet one more step in the progress of the effort to criminalize conduct that
was formerly of interest only to commercial lawyers.
I. BACKGROUND
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 et seq.,
became effective on October 11, 1996. Its passage was prompted by
concern over the efforts of foreign businesses and governments to conduct
industrial espionage against United States businesses both at home and
abroad. United States intelligence reports established that there was a
continuing threat of economic espionage that was emanating mostly from
such allies as France, Japan, and Israel. Oddly enough, the businesses
most routinely at risk were those in the defense industry. Apparently the
R&D costs involved in home-grown defense technology were too high for
our foreign friends. Rather, they wanted cutting-edge weapon systems
technology at a cut-rate price.
The Act also provided American businesses with the prospect of
federal assistance in the effort to prevent competitors from stealing their
intellectual property. While twenty six states had legislation on the books
to prevent trade secret theft, the federal law provides protection for
businesses in the states without appropriate legislation and provides another
option for aggrieved businesses in the states where trade secret acts were
already in place. The federal law does not preempt or displace other
remedies. I
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (1996).
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II. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
A 1994 Report to Congress on Foreign Acquisition of and
Espionage Activities Against United States Critical Technology Companies
reported that the intelligence organization of one ally ran an espionage
operation that paid a United States government employee to obtain United
States classified military intelligence documents. Citizens of that ally were
found to be stealing sensitive United States technology used in
manufacturing artillery gun tubes within the United States. Other agents of
that ally stole design plans for a classified reconnaissance system from a
United States company and gave them to a defense contractor in their home
country. A company based in the territory of the ally was suspected of
surreptitiously monitoring a Defense Department telecommunications
system in order to obtain classified information for the intelligence
organization of its government. Citizens of that country were investigated
for passing advanced aerospace design technology to unauthorized
scientists and researchers.
According to the 1994 report, another country that did not
maintain its own intelligence service relied on private companies to do that
kind of work. Those firms operate abroad and collect data for their own
purposes, but also gather classified documents and corporate proprietary
information for the use of their government. For example, electronics
firms from that nation directed their data gathering efforts at United States
firms in order to increase the market share of companies in that country in
the semiconductor industry. With friends like that, who needs enemies?
The magnitude of the problem is substantial. The White House
Office of Science and Technology estimated that business espionage cost
United States companies $100 billion annually in lost sales.' The most
likely targets are companies involved in one or more of the technologies
named on its National Critical Technologies List (NCTL). These include
sophisticated manufacturing technology, materials, information, and
telecommunications. Also included are biotechnology, aeronautics, surface
transportation, energy, and environmental technologies. Loss of
proprietary information related to these products would be likely to
undermine the United States strategic industrial position according to the
FBI.
According to the National Counterintelligence Center and the State
Department, seventy-four corporations reported more than 400 incidents of
suspected foreign intelligence incursions against their business last year.
2. Ed Jopeck and Ken Sawka, Foreign Espionage: Is your Business at Risk? (visited Oct.
30, 1997) <http://www.execpc.com/-mhallign/indict.html>.
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Slightly more than half of these incidents involved technologies on the
NCTL. So, much of American commercial activity is potentially at risk.
III. DOESN'T EVERYBODY Do IT?
The CIA has repeatedly denied that the Agency will engage in
corporate spy work.' However, apparently if the information turns up, the
Agency will pass it along to interested parties. The CIA is reportedly
providing the government with information about Japanese auto technology
that may be of support to President Clinton's effort, in cooperation with
Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, to produce a more fuel-efficient car
through the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles. While much of
the data on the current state of auto technology abroad may be gathered
from publicly available sources, some of it is gathered clandestinely and is
classified. Battery technology in Japan is of particular interest according to
Matt Dzieciunch, a project engineer at the government-Big Three
cooperative effort known as the United States Advanced Batteries
Consortium.'
For the most part, American companies do not need the
government's help to spy on their competitors. The vast majority of
business and competitive information may be obtained legally and ethically
from newspaper articles, trade publications, SEC filings, specialized
databases, and from materials readily available at trade shows. Sensitive
or restricted data include financial information, manufacturing processes,
customer lists, and other information not normally shared with those
outside a business.
The CIA has long monitored data on such world economic issues
as oil production, crops, world trade, foreign government economic
policies, and technology. After the Clinton Administration formed the
National Economic Council in January 1993, the CIA's role in economic
intelligence grew in support of enhancing United States competitiveness in
the world. By forming a cooperative among the Big Three auto makers,
the government facilitated the sharing of information gathered through
foreign industrial spying. When Stansfield Turner was Director of Central
Intelligence, the agency would brief United States corporations about its
findings of the acquisition plans of foreign governments through seminars
at the Commerce Department. Information sharing has been practiced with
private defense contractors under a number of administrations. Laws
designed to permit American companies to gain access to the work product
3. Robert Dreyfuss, Company Spies, Mother Jones Mo Jo Wire (visited Oct. 30, 1997)
< http://www.mojones.com/motherjones/MJ94/dreyfuss.html >.
4. Id.
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of United States government laboratories and to avail themselves of
cooperative ventures without fear of the antitrust regulators also facilitated
United States government assistance to the military-industrial complex.'
IV. THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996
The Act treats those who steal on behalf of a foreign government
or knowing that the offense will benefit a foreign government, foreign
instrumentality, or foreign agent differently from those who merely
appropriate trade secrets or business information for domestic use. It also
punishes organizations who engage in the prohibited skullduggery more
harshly than individuals.
A. Penalties for Criminal Violations
Those who steal trade secrets with the intent or knowledge that
they are doing so for or will benefit the foreign entities or agents may be
imprisoned up to fifteen years and fined not more than $500,000. If an
organization gets into the foreign intrigue business and steals trade secrets,
it makes itself liable for a fine not to exceed ten million dollars.
Those who merely want to rob Apple to benefit Bill Gates will be
imprisoned not more than ten years or fined not more than the schedule in
18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1987) permits or both. An organization that limits the
influence of its thefts to United States territory may be fined not more than
$500,000.
Perhaps of more far-reaching significance, the Economic
Espionage Act includes a provision that permits the forfeiture to the United
States of:
any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds
the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of
the violation; and any of the person's property used, or
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit or
facilitate the commission of the offense ....6
The forfeiture provisions make such forfeiture an option within the
discretion of the court, as part of the sentencing process, "taking into
consideration the nature, scope, and proportionality of the use of the
property in the offense."I Thus, it is within the power of the court to order
what in effect would be a corporate death sentence for a new company
5. Id.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1834 (a)(1), (a)(2) (1996).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1834 (a)(2) (1996).
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established on the basis of purloined information in the possession of its
founders.
B. Civil Remedies
Of course, in the business context, the conniving trade secret thief
must be concerned about civil suits, which can result in injunctive relief to
stop the production line, damages, seizure of unjust profits as well as
attorneys fees. This has been the traditional means of stopping the
unlawful conversion of trade secrets. Prior to the enactment of the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, twenty six states had anti-trade secret
theft laws on the books. Common law theft and conversion statutes also
applied.
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 permits the Department of
Justice to get involved on the civil side as well,' and it provides that the
Attorney General may obtain appropriate injunctive relief against any
violation of the Act in federal district court.
C. Extraterritorial Application of the EEA
This power potentially may have far-reaching effects, as the law
provides that it is applicable to conduct outside the United States if the
offender is a United States citizen or permanent resident alien or an
organization organized under the laws of the United States government or a
state government or an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in
the United States.9 Thus, if a multinational corporation incorporated in
Delaware engages in trade secret theft in England or hires someone to do
the evil deed abroad on its behalf after a meeting in the company's offices
in New York to plan the theft, the offense may be punished in the United
States.
Likewise, if an American investigator is hired by a foreign
company to commit economic espionage abroad, he may be prosecuted in
the United States (as well as in the country where the crime was
committed, assuming that country prohibits trade secret theft).
D. Economic Espionage and Trade Secret Theft Defined
A trade secret is defined as:
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific,
technical, economic, or engineering information, including
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (1996).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1837 (1996).
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patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas,
designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes,
procedures, programs or codes, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing if-
the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep
such information secret; and
the information derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the
public.10
Thus, in order for the theft to be actionable under this law, the
owner must have taken some measures that objectively would be
reasonable under the circumstances to protect the confidentiality of the
trade secret information at issue, and the government must demonstrate
that the secret has some economic value as a result of its confidentiality.
Thus, it behooves corporate America to add to the compliance programs
established to mitigate any punishment imposed under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organization a program of trade secret
protection. Attorneys who practice in this field will have to figure out
what is reasonable in terms of protection and will have to keep up with
what the courts are saying on the subject. On the defensive side, the
company caught in this sort of conduct may wish to minimize the
protective efforts of its competitive adversary in order to demonstrate that
what appeared to be a trade secret was really readily available and thus,
not a trade secret.
The intent required in order to be guilty of criminal conduct under
the act is different, depending upon whether the theft has foreign
ramifications or not. For economic espionage to be actionable under 18
U.S.C. §1831(a) (the foreign economic espionage offense), the offending
individual or entity must have taken the trade secret knowingly "intending
or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government, foreign
instrumentality, or foreign agent."" For the domestic theft of trade secrets
offense, 18 U.S.C. §1832(a), the offender must knowingly have
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (3)(A), (3)(B) (1996).
11. 18 U.S.C. §1831(a) (1996).
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intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to or
included in a produce that is produced for or placed in
interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit or
anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or
knowing that the offense will injure any owner of that
trade secret. '2
Thus, for a conviction of the domestic trade secret crime, the
government must show not only the theft but also, in effect, that the theft
would damage the owner and would economically benefit someone other
than the owner. The government must also show that the theft occurred
with respect to a product that is in interstate commerce.
In this regard, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have articulated a
doctrine of inevitable disclosure of trade secrets in subsequent
employment, which simplifies proof of what is a theft. Under this theory,
a change of employment will result in a theft of a trade secret when the
two employers involved are competitors; the new position taken by the
departing employee is comparable to or would inevitably involve
knowledge gained in the previous position; the new employer did not do
enough to protect against disclosure of trade secrets, and there was some
evidence of intent to disclose trade secrets." The First and Eighth Circuit
have considered and rejected the doctrine."1
The law also will punish those who receive, buy, or possess the
stolen trade secret information, knowing that it has been stolen or obtained
without authorization." Attempts and conspiracies to commit trade secret
theft are also offenses under the Act.'6
It is unclear what the status of reverse engineering will be under
this new statute. Silicon Valley entrepreneurs have made fortunes by
moving from company to company and using their knowledge acquired on
their previous job for the benefit of their new employers. A disgruntled
former employer, when anticipating a suit, for example, for sex
discrimination, might launch a pre-emptive strike by suing for theft of
trade secrets under the Economic Espionage Act. Likewise, when a group
of disgruntled auto mechanics leaves dealership A for more remunerative
12. 18 U.S.C. §1832(a) (1996).
13. See Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186, 1192 (5th Cir. 1984);
PepsiCo Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995).
14. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d 467 (1st Cir. 1995) and IBM Corp. v.
Seagate Technology, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20406 (D. Minn. 1991), remanded for a more
specific statement of relief, 962 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1992).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (a)(3) (1996).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (a)(4), (5) (1996).
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work at dealership B and makes off with the list of loyal service customers,
dealership B may end up vicariously liable if the new employees send out
marketing letters to their old customers.
It is notable that this statute is broader in scope than most previous
trade secret laws. By covering business information, the act covers data
that may not be economically useful except by a competitor seeking
financial information or expansion plans or other corporate intelligence. It
also covers attempts to steal trade secrets and conspiracies to steal trade
secrets. 1
Perhaps because of the ambiguities of the statute and the situations
to which it might be applied, Attorney General Janet Reno personally
assured Senator Orrin Hatch prior to passage of the law that for five years
following its effective date, any prosecution undertaken pursuant to the Act
would have to be personally approved by the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Criminal Division. Traditional standards of case selection are likely to be
applied in determining whether to go forward with a particular
prosecution. Thus, the Department is likely to look at the economic value
of the damage to the victim from the theft, the clarity of the proof of
criminal intent, the measures in place to protect the secrecy of the
information purloined, and the availability of civil remedies to redress the
harm short of prison, huge fines, and forfeiture.
E. The EEA Does Not Preempt Other Laws
The statute provides that it should not be construed as preempting
or displacing any other civil or criminal remedies provided by any United
States federal, state, commonwealth, possession, or territorial law for the
misappropriation of trade secrets. It also does not affect the disclosure of
information under the Freedom of Information Act."1
Thus, a corporate victim of trade secret theft may have an array of
possible avenues of retaliation available to it. Attorneys must be careful,
however, in selecting the remedies and considering a possible call to the
FBI or the Department of Justice, not to run afoul of state bar ethical rules
by improperly threatening criminal prosecution in order to gain advantage
in an ongoing civil matter. It would be better to merely alert the FBI and
let the government's investigation take its course without threatening the
other side.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(4), (5) (1996).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996).
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F. Protecting the Trade Secret from Disclosure in Litigation
The statute anticipates that the proof of the offense may require the
disclosure, in whole or in part, of the hitherto secret and valuable trade
secret information. Corporate counsel should seek the benefit of 18
U.S.C. § 1835 and petition the court at the outset of the matter for an
order to preserve the confidentiality of the trade secrets at issue. Should
the court not understand the sensitivity of the issue and order its disclosure,
the United States has the right to lodge an interlocutory appeal with the
Court of Appeals to forestall such missteps.
G. Enforcement Actions To Date
1. United States v. Worthington,,
Patrick Worthington, a maintenance supervisor at PPG Industries'
fiberglass research center, misappropriated diskettes, blueprints and other
types of confidential research information and offered them to the chief
executive officer of Coming Glass, which is PPG's chief competitor. The
Coming Glass CEO alerted PPG and the FBI. An undercover FBI agent
met with Worthington and his brother, Daniel, to provide them with a
$1,000 down payment for the trade secrets. Both Patrick and Daniel
Worthington were indicted under the Economic Espionage Act.10 Patrick
Worthington pled guilty and was sentenced on June 5, 1997 to fifteen
months in jail. His brother, Daniel, who was in the deal for $100, was
sentenced to five years probation, including six months of home detention.
2. United States v. Kai-Lo Hsu,,
Kai-Lo Hsu, a technical director for Taiwan's Yuen Foong Paper
Co., and Chester S. Ho, a biochemist and professor at a university in
Taiwan, were arrested as part of an FBI sting operation at the Four
Seasons Hotel in Philadelphia on June 14, 1997. An agent, posing as a
corrupt Bristol-Myers scientist and a technology information broker, met
with Mr. Kai-Lo Hsu and Mr. Ho. The objective was to steal trade secrets
relating to Bristol Myers' anti-cancer drug, Taxol. Reportedly Mr. Ho
was present at the meeting to verify the value of the Taxol technology
which was confidential while Kai-Lo Hsu and Jessica Chou agreed to pay
19. R. Mark Halligan, Reported Criminal Arrests Under the Economic Espionage Act of
1996 (visited Mar. 28, 1998) <http://www.execpc.com/-mhallign/indict.html> (citing United
States v. Worthington, Criminal No. 97-9 (W.D. Pa. 1996)).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(1), (3), (5) (1996).
21. Halligan, supra note 19 (citing United States v. Kai-Lo Hsu, Criminal No. 97-323
(E.D. Pa. 1997)).
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$400,000 for it. Ms. Chou is reportedly in Taiwan which does not have an
extradition treaty with the United States. Kai-Lo Hsu and Chester Ho have
been indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(4) for attempted theft of trade
secrets and 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(5) for conspiracy to steal trade secrets.
3. United States v. Pin Yen Yang22
Pin Yen Yang and his daughter, Hwei Chen Yang (a/k/a Sally
Yang) were arrested on September 4, 1997 at Cleveland's airport as they
were about to embark on a trip to New York. Mr. Yang, age seventy, is
the president of Four Pillars Enterprise Company, Ltd. of Taiwan. The
company manufactures and sells pressure-sensitive products in Taiwan,
Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, Singapore, and the United
States. Sally Yang is an officer of the company which has more than 900
employees and annual revenues of more than $150 million. The arrest
followed conversations by Mr. Yang and his daughter with an employee of
Avery Dennison Corporation, of Pasadena, California, which
manufacturers adhesive products such as postage stamps and mailing
labels. The Yangs wanted to obtain Avery's trade secrets from the
employee, who worked at Avery Dennison Corporation's facility in
Concord, Ohio. The Avery employee cooperated with the FBI. Federal
prosecutors estimate that the research and development costs expended to
develop the information obtained by the defendants from Avery Dennison
prior to their arrest at between $50 and $60 million. The Yangs were
charged with mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to steal trade secrets under
the Economic Espionage Act, money laundering, and receipt of stolen
goods under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1832, 1956, and 2315 (1994).
4. United States v. Steven Louis Davis
Steven Davis, a process control engineer for Wright Industries in
Nashville was assigned to be the lead process control engineer when
Gillette Company retained Wright Industries to assist in developing a new
generation of razor systems. After working on the project for a few
months, Wright Industries, at the request of Gillette, removed Davis from
the project in late September 1996. Davis thereafter sent highly
confidential engineering drawings to competitors of Gillette, including Bic
Corporation, American Safety Razor, and Warner Lambert. Davis
contacted potential purchasers by facsimile and E-mail and represented that
he had 600 megs of Gillette's product, equipment, and assembly drawings
for sale. In addition to violations of the Economic Espionage Act, 18
22. United States v. Pin Yen Yang, Criminal No. 1:97MG0109 (N.D.Ohio 1997).
23. United States v. Steven Louis Davis, (M.D. Tenn. 1997).
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U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) and (3), Davis has been charged with wire fraud
under 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 is one more step in the
relentless march of the Congress toward criminalizing behavior hitherto
considered the subject for civil litigation only. The Act provides a
powerful new tool to protect the industrial and intellectual patrimony of
corporate America. It also raises the stakes when a company fires an
employee or hires a disgruntled employee of a competitor, acquires another
company in the same or a related industry, or even when it trains its own
employees on internal trade secrets. Corporate counsel should well
develop procedures to guard against inadvertent violations.
ASSET FORFEITURE: HOME AND ABROAD
Steven L. Kessler
Good intention will always be pleaded for every
assumption of power.... [T]he Constitution was made to
guard the people against the dangers of good intentions.
There are men in all ages who mean to govern well, but
they mean to govern. They promise to be good masters,
but they mean to be masters.
-Daniel Webster
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There are more than two hundred different forfeiture statutes,
covering literally everything from soup to nuts. Each state has at least two
forfeiture provisions, i.e., one civil and one criminal, with some states
having more. New York, for example, boasts no fewer than fifteen
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separate forfeiture statutes, fifteen different ways for the government to
seize and forfeiture your property.
The civil forfeiture statutes have been the most controversial and
have caused most of the stir during the last several years. In general, they
provide to law enforcement agencies or assistant United States Attorneys
the authority to file a civil lawsuit against the offending property in civil
term.
I. HISTORY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
Civil forfeiture laws are actually an anomaly in American law.
They empower law enforcement agencies to seize money or other property
they believe has been used in, is intended to be used in, or is proceeds of
criminal activity. There is no need for a conviction before seizure or
forfeiture. In fact, the property owner does not have to be charged with a
crime. Civil forfeiture prosecutions are brought in rem against the
culpable or guilty property. Since the property is guilty of the criminal
activity, the legal fiction goes, the property is being seized and punished.
No individual is being prosecuted. Therefore, fundamental constitutional
protections such as the presumption of innocence, having the government
convict you of the charge instead of you proving your innocence, and the
right to be free from unjust private property takings by the government
quite simply do not apply. Compounding this is that the procedures
claimants must follow to contest a forfeiture are remarkably complicated,
even for seasoned attorneys, and therefore give the government every
advantage.
Unlike "criminal forfeiture statutes, which require a conviction
before property can be taken from an individual, civil forfeiture laws
require only a showing that agents have probable cause to believe that the
property was used or intended to be used to facilitate a crime, or that it
represents the proceeds of a crime. It is difficult to conceive of a lower
standard relating to criminal law. Civil forfeitures, after all, are criminal
proceedings, no matter what the Supreme Court has held, with the
government as plaintiff, a crime forming the basis of the action, and the
property being guilty of involvement in a crime. This is especially
troubling when you realize that, by and large, seizures are premised upon
the essentially unchecked discretion of a cop.
Where did these laws come from? Despite being relatively new to
us, the concept of civil forfeiture was acknowledged even before the
Greeks. Some cite to the Bible. In Exodus, chapter 21, verse 28, it is
written: "If an ox gore a man or a woman that they die, then the ox shall
be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten. But the owner of the ox
[Vol. 4:385
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shall be quit." The perfect civil forfeiture? Not really. Unlike in a true
civil forfeiture, the Biblical sovereign did not acquire the offending
property or its value. Nor did society benefit by eating the ox. Rather,
this was social justice, meted out to discourage revenge from the
deceased's family.'
As our predecessors traveled through the generations, they adopted
many of the Biblical practices. Revenge was the common thread.2 Rome
had its Twelve Tables.3 The Greeks followed closely behind.4 And Britain
had its common law. Indeed, at common law, civil forfeitures were in the
nature of a deodand, the spiritual predecessors of forfeiture statutes.5
Derived from the Latin phrase Deo Dandum, meaning, "to be given to
God," 6 the deodand itself originated in pre-Judeo-Christian practices.7
These practices, similar to the Talmud's interpretation of the goring ox
passage, reflect the view that the instrument of death is the accused and
that religious atonement is required. Property or its value was given to the
1. Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeiture, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L. Q. 169, 180-
181 (1973). Of course, were the owner aware of the dangerous propensity of the ox, the result
would be different, both today and in Biblical times.
But if the ox were wont to push with his horn in time past, and it hath been testified to
his owner, and he hath not kept him in, but he hath killed a man or a woman, the ox
shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death.
Exodus 21:29.
According to the Talmud, the use of the phrase "and its flesh shall not be eaten" is intended
as a prohibition against receiving benefit from the animal. This prohibition becomes effective
from the moment the offending animal is convicted, even prior to its stoning. See TALMUD,
TRACTATE BABA KAMMA 41a. Thus, the Biblical source for the notion of forfeiture does not
contemplate a scheme under which a governing body or agency benefits from the use of the
guilty property. See Steven L. Schwarcz & Alan E. Rothman, "Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form
of Commercial Law?, 62 FORD. L. REV. 287, 290 (Nov. 1993).
2. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 34 (1881).
3. 1 ScoTr, THE CIVIL LAW 69 (1932). See also W. DURANT, STORY OF CIVILIZATION,
(1972). "If a guadruped causes injury to anyone, let the owner tender him the estimated amount
of the damage; and if he is unwilling to accept it, the owner shall ... surrender the animal that
caused the injury." 7 TWELVE TABLES 1, translated in 1 SCOTr, THE CIVIL LAW 69 (1932).
4. "We banished beyond our borders sticks and stones and steal, voiceless and mindless
things, if they chance to kill a man; and if a man commits suicide, bury the hand that struck the
blow afar from the body." AEschines the Greek (389-314 B.C.E.) as quoted in the DRUG
AGENTS' GUIDE TO FORFEITURE 2. See also OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881);
Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168 (1873).
5. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974). See, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law -
Banished at Last7?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 770 (1977).
6. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n. 16 (1974).
7. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1-38 (1881).
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Crown "with the belief that the king would provide money for masses to
be said for the good of the dead man's soul, or insure that the deodand was
put to charitable uses."8 For the kings, however, the motivation was
hardly spiritual. It was pure, unadulterated greed. Sound familiar?
In medieval times, the scope of forfeiture was absolute. Known as
"forfeiture of estate," it deprived the offender of all personal and real
property.9 Subsequently, under the guise of redressing a loss caused by
criminal activity, civil forfeiture became a premium source of revenue for
the Crown in common law England.'0 Centuries later, long after the
religious purpose of the deodand had ended, the practice remained a source
of revenue for the Crown and was further supported as a deterrent to
negligence." The final justification, however, remained revenue, and lots
of it. It was fundraising at its best. Things were so frustrating for the
commoner, and lord alike, in merry old England that, bowing to their
pressure, one of the concessions granted in the Magna Carta was the
creation of what was called the "year and the day" rule: The king held
real property for non-treasonous offenses of one year and a day, after
which time the property would revert to a tenant's lord. 2  Personalty,
however, would escheat to the Crown.
When the British left home and settled a New World called
America, they brought with them many of their old, indeed despised,
customs. Remarkably, too, when a custom, formerly distrusted, was seen
from the opposite side of the fence for the first time, it looked much better.
This was true with forfeiture. The first Congress of the United States
abolished forfeiture of estate for federal offenses in 1790,13 and the Federal
Constitution protected property through both the Due Process Clause 4 and
a specific limitation on the scope of forfeiture in the context of treason."'
Nevertheless, the forfeiture tradition was maintained in the colonies
8. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 681. Deodand was abolished by Parliament in 1846, and
remedies for wrongful death developed in its place, with damages paid to those harmed by a
person's death rather than to the State through the forfeiture of the offending property.
9. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038-1039 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
919 (1980).
10. Finkelstein, supra note 1, at 169.
11. Torrance G. Reed & Joseph P. Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable Interests and
Procedural Due Process, 62 N. C. L. REV. 57 (1983).
12. MAGNA CARTA, cl. 32.
13. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 24, 1 Stat. 117. This provision is currently codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3563.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("prohibiting [ftorfeiture except during the life of the
person attained").
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through the maritime and customs laws, the reason why some of today's
more powerful federal forfeiture laws are codified in the admiralty laws. 6
The founding of a new nation did little to change these ancient traditions.
Almost immediately following the adoption of the Constitution, ships and
cargo were made subject to forfeiture under federal law. 7 The concept
made sense then. Our fledgling Republic depended on customs duties for
almost all of its revenue, and the ship owners who failed to pay the import
duties on the cargo were the same people from whom we had just declared
our independence! They were our enemies, not our citizens, and most of
them were half a world away. In that context, there could be little to
debate regarding the propriety of seizing and forfeiting their property.
Forfeiture quietly remained on the books until, one day, President
Reagan's staff figured out that these laws could be used and abused as high
powered weapons by law enforcement in the War on Drugs. The rest, as
they say, is history.
II. THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND TODAY'S FORFEITURE: MONEY
One of the most alarming aspects of our current forfeiture scheme
is that it permits law enforcement agencies to keep the proceeds of their
forfeitures. This creates an overwhelming financial incentive for abuse,
one that would tempt even the most honest cop. Probably the most
remarkable example comes from Arizona. In one county, a statute
provides that a police officer will receive a salary as long as there are
enough funds in the forfeiture account to pay his salary. The local media
coined this collars for dollars. Enough said.
Among the many courts that have expressed grave concern about
these and other forfeiture practices is the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
In 1992, the Court, traditionally very conservative, said it was
"enormously troubled by the governments' increasingly and virtually
unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the disregard for due
process that is buried in those statutes. " "
Other federal and state courts have echoed similar concerns. In
United States v. One Parcel of Property,9 the Eighth Circuit stated: "We
16. The English Navigation Acts in the 1600s required that all commodities shipped to the
colonies be transported on British vessels. A violation of these laws resulted in the forfeiture of
the illegally carried goods as well as the ships that transported them, a dear price to pay for an
upstart industry in the colonies.
17. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 683 (1979).
18. United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2nd Cir.
1992).
19. United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992).
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are troubled by the government's view that any property, whether it be a
hobos hovel or the Empire State Building, can be seized by the government
because the owner, regardless of his or her past criminal record, engages
in a single drug transaction." Abuse also was a concern in Jones v. United
States Drug Enforcement Administration,2° where the district court held
that "the statutory scheme as well as its administrative implementation
provides substantial opportunity for abuse and potentiality for corruption."
The court continued with a pointed, and telling, observation: "The law
enforcement agency has a direct financial interest in the enforcement of
these laws. . . . The obviously dangerous potentiality for abuse extant in
the forfeiture scheme should trigger, at the very least, heightened scrutiny
by the courts when a seizure is contested."21
On the state level, at least one high court, familiar with forfeiture
matters, has noted its concern. In Wohistrom v. Buchanan,22 the Arizona
Supreme Court recounted the threat of forfeiture statutes upon an
individuals due process rights.23
Yet, it has remained for two other courts to put the facts of the
instant case in perspective. The Fourth Circuit observed:
One of the most potent weapons in the government's war
on drugs is its ability to obtain the civil forfeiture of
property that aids violations of the drug laws.
Congress has given this weapon increased power,
expanding the war to every piece of real property involved
in the narcotics trade. Yet even warfare is conducted by
rules. It is the judiciary's responsibility to ensure that the
civil forfeiture penalty fells only those property interests
which spring rightly and justly into its reach. While we do
not doubt that the anomalous circumstances of this case
20. Jones v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 819 F.Supp. 698, 724
(M.D. Tenn. 1993).
21. Id.; see also United States v. $191,910 in United States Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1069
(9th Cir. 1994) (disparity between government's and claimant's burdens in forfeiture proceedings
"involves a serious risk that an innocent person will be deprived of his property"); United States
v. That Certain Real Property, 798 F. Supp. 1540, 1553 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (discussing inherent
problematic due process issues relating to civil forfeiture and government's unchecked use of
civil forfeiture statutes).
22. Wohlstrom v. Buchanan, 884 P.2d 687 (Ariz. 1994).
23. See also In re 1986 Chevrolet Corvette, Ariz. Lexis 78, 169 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 30
(Ariz. 1994) (expressing concern over the government's increasing power in the area of
forfeiture).
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render it something of a rara avis, even the rarest of
species deserve shelter under the law's aegis ...."'
Most notably, the United States Supreme Court recognized the
government's direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of forfeiture
proceedings. In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,5
Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, one of the Supreme Courts most
ardent conservatives and the government's strongest supporters, wrote of
his "distrust of the Government's aggressive use of broad civil forfeiture
statutes." "I am disturbed," he continued, "by the breadth of the new civil
forfeiture statutes . . . which subjects to forfeiture all real property that is
used, or intended to be used, in the commission, or even the facilitation, of
a federal drug offense." 26  Notably, the Justice went on, "ambitious
modem [forfeiture] statutes and prosecutorial practices have all but
detached themselves from the ancient notion of civil forfeiture."27 Hence,
"it may be necessary . . . to reevaluate our generally deferential approach
to legislative judgments in this area of civil forfeiture."2
Sadly, there is good reason for the distrust. Under the guise of
attempting to recoup the costs of crime and crime prevention, from 1985 to
1996, the federal government has secured more than $5 billion in forfeited
proceeds, with another $1.5 billion in the pipeline. 29 The United States
Attorney's office in the Southern District of New York collected more than
$420 million between 1985 and 1994. Indeed, in 1994 alone, they brought
in close to $50 million, $17 million more than their annual budget. The
Eastern District of New York, during the same period, collected more than
$31 million, plus another $70 million in civil judgments, settlements,
criminal fines and assessments. Their operating budget is $26 million.
Even our deficit-oriented government has figured out that when your $26
million investment shows a $100 million return, you are doing something
right. In short, the forfeiture laws have permitted the government to
become a "full financial partner and participant in what is unquestionably
the largest business in the country. ',30
24. United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property, 998 F.2d 204, 213-214 (4th Cir. 1993)
(emphasis supplied).
25. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Susan Adams, Forfeiting Rights, FORBES MAGAZINE, May 20, 1996, at 96.
30. STEVEN L. KESSLER, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL FORFEITURE: FEDERAL AND STATE
PRACTICE § 1.01, 1-2 (Clark 1993 and Supp. 1998), quoting Sinoway, et al., Current Trends in
Asset Forfeiture (California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, 1992).
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The extent of the government's financial stake through the use of
the forfeiture statutes came to light through released Department of Justice
memoranda. In 1989, the Acting Deputy General, Edward S. G. Dennis,
Jr. sent a memorandum indicating the need to meet the department's
forfeiture budget: "If inadequate forfeiture resources are available to
achieve the above goal, you will be expected to divert personnel from
other activities or to seek assistance from other United States Attorneys
offices, the criminal division and the executive office for United States
Attorneys. ""
In 1990, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh warned all federal
prosecutors that the department was far short of its projection of $470
million in forfeiture deposits with only 3 months remaining in fiscal 1990,
and that they must increase the volume of forfeiture actions:
We must significantly increase production in order to reach
our budget target. . . . Failure to achieve the $470 million
projection would expose the Departments forfeiture
program to criticism and undermine confidence in our
budget projections. Every effort must be made to increase
forfeiture income during the remaining three months of
[fiscal year] 1990.
Federal prosecutors realized the conflict of interest and skewing of
priorities created by the forfeiture statutes. In 1993, after a new
administration was installed at the Department of Justice (DOJ), the former
director of the DOJ Asset Forfeiture Office, Michael Zeldin, remarked:
The intelligent thing to have done would have been to pick
our cases more carefully and not overreach. We had a
situation in which the desire to deposit money into the asset
forfeiture fund became the reason for being of forfeiture,
eclipsing in certain measure the desire to effect fair
enforcement of the laws as a matter of pure law-
enforcement objectives.32
In addition, the Department of Justice gives positive recognition
and incentives to United States Attorneys offices on the basis of the amount
of assets they seize. As Myles Malman, a former federal prosecutor from
Florida, said: "There is nothing inherently wrong with rewarding people
for the assets they seize. But there has to be clear communication that they
31. Stephen Labaton, Seize Property in Crime Cases Causes Concern, N.Y. TIMES, May
31, 1993, at Al.
32. Id.
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shouldn't sacrifice good judgment and conscionability for statistics. The
system is subject to abuse. ,33
This aggressive forfeiture policy has caused and continues to cause
abusive results. The Pittsburgh Press published a series of articles in
August 1991. Following a ten-month investigation, the paper uncovered
more than 400 instances of innocent people who had to forfeit money or
property to federal authorities. More recently, the Arizona Tribune and
the Orlando Sentinel have uncovered similar abuses.34  Representative
Henry Hyde, R-Ill., recently estimated that about eighty percent of the
people losing property under federal civil asset forfeiture laws are never
even charged with a crime.35 Despite a potential claimant's lack of a nexus
to illegal activity, the forfeiture process goes on simply because many
claimants do not have the resources to challenge federal authorities.
Economist Sam Staley, President of the Urban Policy Research Institute,
noted that "[m]any [claimants] lack the resources and sophistication to
fight a prolonged court battle ... ,36 This comes as no surprise to federal
authorities, since, statistically, if they seize and hold the property, the
forfeiture process itself will force the claimant to abandon his or her claim
more than eighty percent of the time.
This government-sanctioned policy directing an agency, whenever
possible, to seize property to meet budget projections is reflected in the
Department of Justice's incentives for using this process and the statistical
knowledge that at least eighty percent of the claimants run out of the
financial resources and energy to fight the government and go away. This
has resulted in all seizing agencies retaining seized property even if an
investigation reveals that the property involved is not associated with illicit
activity or the property owner is an innocent owner. Not only is this
policy de facto outright theft, but it also amounts to a clear violation of the
Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause.
The broad campaign of the Justice Department to abuse the
forfeiture statutes indicates a systematic conspiracy to indiscriminately
deny the due process, equal protection and First and Fourth Amendment
rights of citizens. This is possible because the forfeiture statutes do not put
the initial burden on the government to institute proceedings promptly,
upon notice, with an opportunity to be heard, and show not only probable
cause, but lack of innocent ownership or other defense by proof beyond a
33. Id.
34. See KESSLER, supra note 30.
35. HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY SAFE FROM
SEIZURE? (The Cato Institute, 1995).
36. Carl Horowitz, INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, Dec. 9, 1993, at 1.
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reasonable doubt. Given the cumulative abuses, the statutes are
unconstitutional as applied.
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE FORFEITURE REFORM
After the Supreme Court last term made a mockery of our
Constitution in Bennis v. Michigan37 and United States v. Ursery,3" House
Judiciary Chairman Henry Hyde, a Reagan Republican from Illinois,
introduced the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (H.R. 1835). 39 He and
Representative John Conyers, a Carter Democrat from Michigan and the
ranking Democrat on the Committee, have joined hands on this one, in an
attempt to remedy some of the worst problems affecting federal civil
forfeiture laws.
Some of the important changes in the new bill are:
1) Place the burden of proof on the government to prove that,
by clear and convincing evidence, the property is subject to
forfeiture.
2) Provide for the appointment of counsel for property
owners who cannot afford lawyers to challenge forfeitures, paid
for from the Federal Asset Forfeiture Fund.
3) Clarify the innocent ownership defense, most specifically
to state that an owner who takes reasonable steps to prevent others
from using the property for criminal activity can get his property
back.
4) Eliminate the requirement that owners post a bond before
being allowed to challenge the action. What a concept! Your
house has been seized, your business has been shut down, all of
your money has been seized or frozen, and, before you are
permitted to challenge the seizure, you have to post a bond of
$5,000 or ten percent of the property's value, whichever is less.
5) Extend from 10 to 30 days the time for property owners to
file a claim for the return of their property.
37. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S.Ct. 994 (1996).
38. United States v. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996).
39. This is the successor to H.R. 1916.
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6) Require the government to institute judicial forfeiture
proceedings within ninety days after the filing of a claim
7) Permit property owners to sue the government for
negligence in handling or storage of their property, if the property
is not ultimately forfeited.
8) Provide federal courts with the ability to grant possession
of the contested property to the owner during the pendency of the
forfeiture proceeding, if possession by the government during the
action would cause the owner to suffer substantial hardship (such
as preventing the functioning of a business or leaving an owner
homeless).
As originally enacted, this bill goes a long way toward correcting
the abuses experienced under the current structure. Not surprisingly, the
Department of Justice has fought Congress, and fought hard, to change the
bill, introducing its own version of a reform measure. No hearings have
been conducted regarding the DOJ-drafted H.R. 1965, nor has the bill
been subjected to public scrutiny or intensive committee review. At sixty-
nine pages, it is fifty-four pages longer than H.R. 1835. Quite simply, it
mocks the reform effort of H.R. 1835.
It is noteworthy that H.R. 1965 is supported by no organizations
other than the Department of Justice and its client agencies, all of whom
have a direct interest in expanding their forfeiture powers. As illustrated
above, forfeited assets serve as supplemental budget funds which go
directly into the agencies coffers.
A review of the following passages in H.R. 1965 reveals that its
passage is worse than no reform at all.
1) It permits the government to seize and hold private
property even without probable cause, while it uses depositions,
interrogatories and other discovery mechanisms to justify its
seizure and after-the-fact filing of a complaint. This also imposes
costly pre-trial discovery burdens on the innocent private property
owner.
2) It defines proceeds so broadly as to include gross receipts
of an offense, without any allowance for the cost of legitimate
goods and services provided by the offender, e.g., the otherwise
innocent merchant. The only relief provided is in unduly limited
number of fraud cases. But this does not apply to wire and mail
fraud, where RICO or money laundering activity is involved
1998]
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Congress charges that are prevalent in a large number of
regulatory and other white collar crime indictments.
3) It permits the pre-trial restraint of substitute assets. This
restraint has never before been authorized by statute and has been
specifically rejected under numerous theories by every circuit court
addressing the issue since 1991. Among other things, this would
prevent the charged individual from retaining counsel and paying
for the defense with his or her own assets before being found to
have committed the crime with which he or she has been charged.
4) It limits the definition of innocent owner or third party to
purchasers of goods and services, thereby expressly seeking to
overturn Supr6me Court precedent including donees, banks and
other innocent, bona fide sellers of goods and services.
5) It restricts the appointment of counsel for indigent
claimants to cases meeting Star Chamber procedural requirements,
an anathema to American law. The claimant requesting court-
appointed counsel must submit to wide open cross-examination by
the federal prosecutor, on any issue, including the merits of the
case, before an appointment can take place.
The DOJ proposal is abusive and unfair. If reform is indeed
desired, H.R. 1965 should be rejected in Congress, and the bi-partisan
supported H.R. 1835 should be adopted.
IV. FORFEITING ASSETS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
So how do these expansive laws affect assets outside the United
States? The major case in this area is United States v. All Funds on
Deposit in Any Accounts.'
In All Funds, the government sought funds on deposit in the
claimant's name in bank accounts in England. The District Court found
that it had in rem jurisdiction over foreign accounts, and granted summary
judgment for the government. Claimant appealed. The Second Circuit
affirmed, holding that: actual or constructive control of property was
required for in rem jurisdiction, and the district court had constructive
control and therefore properly asserted in rem jurisdiction over funds in the
United Kingdom.
What was the basis of the courts decision? Indeed, in rem
40. United States v. All Funds on Deposit in Any Accounts, 63 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1995).
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jurisdiction over property that isn't even in your country that's absurd!
Not according to the Second Circuit.
The court began with the statute. In response to the inability of a
district court to effect service outside its state's borders, Congress enacted
28 U.S.C § 1355(d), which provides that a district court "with jurisdiction
over a forfeiture action pursuant to subsection (b) may issue and cause to
be served in any other district such process as may be required to bring
before the court the property that is the subject of the forfeiture action."
This national service of process provision clearly conferred in rem
jurisdiction on district courts in forfeiture proceedings with respect to
property located within another judicial district in the United States."' But
no published opinion had applied § 1355 to property located in a foreign
country.
The government argued that § 1355 obviated the need for a district
court to exercise any degree of control over property to sustain a forfeiture
proceeding. According to the government, the only relevant inquiry under
§ 1355 is whether any of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture
proceeding occurred in the district in which the action was commenced,
even if the property is located in a foreign country.
The Second Circuit rejected this argument. Although Congress
certainly intended to streamline civil forfeiture proceedings by amending §
1355, even with respect to property located in foreign countries, the court
did not believe that Congress intended to fundamentally alter well-settled
law regarding in rem jurisdiction. The circuit cited the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Propery,42 where the
Court said that "to institute and perfect proceedings in rem. . . . the thing
should be actually or constructively within the reach of the Court."43 This
control. is required in addition to the requirements of subject matter
jurisdiction and venue. Therefore, the issue for the Second Circuit was
control: whether the property was within the actual or constructive control
of the district court in which the action is commenced.
So where was the court's control? Brooklyn to Buckingham
Palace? The claimant argued that the District Court lacked any degree of
control because England was not obliged to remit the seized funds to the
United States. There was no legal entitlement of the United States to the
41. See United States v. $633,021.67, 842 F. Supp. 528, 531-32 (N.D. Ga. 1993); United
States v. Contents of Account No. 2033301, 831 F. Supp. 337, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
42. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
43. See also Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, (1992) ("the
court must have actual or constructive control of the res when an in rem forfeiture suit is
initiated").
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funds, either under British law or a bilateral treaty, which might require
the British authorities to turn over the confiscated funds to the United
States. Since neither existed, claimant argued, there is no constructive
control.
But the Second Circuit disagreed. Notwithstanding the absence of
a binding obligation on the part of England to relinquish the funds, the
Court concluded that the district court had constructive control of the funds
by virtue of the demonstrated cooperation of the British government
pursuant to the 1988 Treaty and the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act. In
1990, the British High Court issued a restraining order freezing the funds
based solely on a request by the United States. In September 1993, at the
request of the United States Marshals Service, British law enforcement
officials served copies of the forfeiture complaint and warrant on the
British banks holding the funds. And in 1994, the 1990 restraining order
was continued by the High Court.
Therefore, the British courts and law enforcement acted essentially
as agents of the United States for purposes of this forfeiture action. Every
action of the British law enforcement officials was in direct response to
requests from American authorities. Although the Second Circuit refused
to delineate the precise scope of what will constitute constructive control in
future cases - and probably why this case has not been followed - the
court was satisfied that at least under these facts, the government met its
burden of demonstrating that the British government would turn over at
least a portion of the seized funds to the United States, thereby vesting the
district court with the requisite constructive control over the funds.
Noteworthy of review is In re F," a situation reversing the facts of
All Funds. In In re F, the British High Court enforced a forfeiture order
from an American court against British assets. The court ruled that
enforcing the American order would not be contrary to the interests of
justice pursuant to section 26(A)(1)(c) of the Drug Trafficking Offenses
Act of 1986. The court noted the importance to recognize the seriousness
and scale of drug trafficking, the underlying criminality in the forfeiture
proceeding, and the sophistication of asset concealment and money
laundering. The Vienna Drug Convention and the United States-United
Kingdom bilateral agreement of assisting in proceedings for the freezing,
seizure and forfeiture of the proceeds of drug trafficking require
international cooperation while simultaneously ensuring the maintenance of
44. This decision, dated November 29, 1996, is discussed extensively in British Court
Enforces U.S. Civil Forfeiture Order, 13 INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT LAW REPORTER, 362
(Sep. 1997), and in US Civil Forfeitures Now Enforced in England, British Dependent
Territories, 1 ASSET PROTECTION INT'L 9 (Aug. 1997).
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the basic concepts of English justice.
The British court had no problem upholding the reversal of the
burden of proof in the American proceeding regarding standing or the
underlying issue of whether the funds were the proceeds of drug
trafficking. The court did not find these procedures so contrary to the
English concepts of justice as to prevent the court from reaching a
conclusion that enforcement of the forfeiture order is not contrary to the
interests of justice.
The bottom line regarding the law in this country on the forfeiture
of foreign assets in domestic litigation is that there appears to be no
legislative or judicial gloss or guidance other than the cases discussed.
Prosecutors cite All Funds as gospel, permitting the seizure and forfeiture
of foreign assets. Defense attorneys distinguish All Funds quite properly, I
think, on the facts, as, in fact, the Second Circuit did. What the courts
will do in the future is anyone's guess. What is interesting, however, is
the absence of any other published decision since August 1995. It appears
that neither side is willing to take the chance on this one just yet,
preferring instead to work out some compromise.
This area promises to be an exciting one to watch. Given the
questions relating to the constitutionality of civil forfeiture in normal, run-
of-the-mill situations in the United States, including the burden of proof,
admissibility of hearsay, Eighth Amendment concerns, questions of
standing, and protections more in line with criminal prosecutions,
expanding the results of these already questionable procedures could have a
chilling effect upon the Constitution as we know it. It remains to be seen
how far the courts are willing to bend to support the Executive Branch's
seemingly insatiable appetite in the name of the War on Drugs.
19981 399
FACILITATING ACCOUNTABILITY: THE
POTENTIAL VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL
GUIDELINES AGAINST IMPUNITY
Madeline Morris'
We strive to overcome impunity for international crimes such as
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Our reasons may
include a vision of justice and perhaps a hope for deterrence.
Notwithstanding our aspirations to establish a regime of
accountability, impunity remains a recurrent pattern. Where an effort at
accountability is undertaken at all, it consistently is approached through a
second-best alternative to full and complete accountability - some form of
partial accountability and, hence, partial impunity. I will begin by briefly
examining the reasons for this consistent pattern of compromise and then
consider what contribution international guidelines on accountability might
make in moving toward a regime of consistent and meaningful
accountability.
Holding perpetrators fully accountable for their crimes would
include appropriate trial and punishment of each individual responsible for
the crimes committed, together with appropriate reparations made by
perpetrators to victims. In many contexts, one would wish also to utilize
some form of truth commission to ensure the credible and authoritative
revelation, documentation and memorialization of the events in question as
a comprehensive whole.
But that ideal of full accountability for international crimes is
never, in practice, attained. National and international efforts at achieving
accountability for such crimes typically resort to means designed to render
something less than full accountability. This occurs for three identifiable
reasons.
First, the resources required to achieve full accountability often are
prohibitive. The offenses in question typically involve large numbers of
perpetrators and victims. Prosecutions and other accountability
mechanisms as well as victim compensation schemes all therefore demand
extensive financial, physical, and human resources. Often, those demands
arise in post-conflict contexts in which the nations affected suffer from a
* Professor of Law, Duke University.
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dearth of resources. Rwanda provides perhaps the most extreme example.
There, tens of thousands are suspected of participation in genocide. The
Rwandan judiciary, along with much of the national infrastructure, was
destroyed in the course of the 1994 genocide and war. The resources
required to achieve full accountability in each case in Rwanda would
quickly overwhelm national capacities.
The second reason for the pattern of compromise is that political
considerations may constrain the extent to which accountability is pursued.
Such constraints arise from the need to continue to live with (and perhaps
to share power with or even to work toward reconciliation with) the
perpetrator population or constituency. Argentina and South Africa
exemplify two faces of this phenomenon. In Argentina, threats of military
insurrection halted the Alfonsin government's prosecutorial efforts to hold
accountable perpetrators of human rights abuses committed under the
former military regime. In South Africa's transition from apartheid, a
negotiated settlement to a political conflict that had already involved
bloodshed and had the potential to involve much more included a rather
robust amnesty provision. Such precarious balances of power, sometimes
involving military threats, often place political constraints upon the degree
of accountability to be sought.
Third and finally, all too often accountability fails for lack of will
at national or international levels. In such cases, there may be a denial that
the crimes were committed or crimes may be acknowledged, but resource
limitations or political constraints such as those just discussed may be used
as a pretext for inaction that is actually born of a lack of will. Failures of
will at the international level clearly have impeded the efficacy of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
(ICTY/R) since their inception. Lack of commitment to the success of the
ICTY/R on the part of elements of the international community has been
reflected in a paucity of funding, failure to arrest indictees, and other
forms of obstructionism.
Because of these factors of resource limitations, political
constraints, or lack of will (or some combination of the three), national and
international bodies charged with the handling of international crimes
typically adopt a compromise or second-best approach. That approach
usually is comprised of some or all of the following elements. First, a
decision may be made to pursue accountability only for some subset of the
individuals responsible for the crimes. The ICTY/R, for example, is
expected to prosecute at most a few hundred of the thousands of
perpetrators in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The remaining bulk of
the perpetrators will have to be prosecuted in national courts or not at all.
And in South Africa, for instance, an amnesty is made available under
402 [Vol. 4:401
Morris
specified conditions to all perpetrators of the relevant crimes except for
some few whom the amnesty-granting authority determines committed
crimes disproportionate to their political purpose.
A second element of a compromise approach may be some form of
plea-bargaining. Rwanda, for example, has passed specialized legislation
offering all but the most culpable category of perpetrators a substantial
sentence reduction in return for a full confession and guilty plea.
Third, a sentence-reduction may be provided for all perpetrators,
quite apart from a plea-bargain program. This may be done to relieve the
state of the long-term burden of supporting a massive prison population or
may be done in the interests of reconciliation.
Fourth, legal action may be taken against perpetrators for lesser
offenses than the genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity actually
committed. One version of this is prosecution for ordinary crimes (such as
murder or rape) where national legislation provides only for such offenses
and not for the greater, international crimes. Another frequently used
mechanism for taking legal action for a lesser offense is deprivation of
citizenship or immigrant status and, possibly, deportation on the ground
that the individual violated immigration regulations by failing to disclose
his criminal acts when applying for immigrant status or citizenship.
Second best approaches are taken not only in place of full criminal
prosecution but also in place of civil reparations from perpetrators to
victims. One such compromise is the award of an unenforceable (or
probably unenforceable) civil judgment (for example, where the
perpetrators' assets are outside of the country). Another compromise
approach to reparations is where a successor government (or the
international community) provides reparations to victims rather than the
perpetrators being made to do so. While often indispensable for purposes
of acknowledgment and rehabilitation of victims, this approach makes no
inroads against the impunity of perpetrators.
Finally, there are those approaches to accountability that are not
inherently compromises but are second-best when adopted in lieu of, rather
than in conjunction with, other mechanisms for accountability. These
include lustration and truth commissions, both of which may serve
important functions, but since they provide neither for criminal liability nor
for reparations, they cannot provide anything approaching full
accountability.
An array of compromise approaches to accountability thus has
been employed over the years by international as well as national entities.
Each compromise renders an outcome of partial accountability and, hence,
partial impunity. The draft Statute for an International Criminal Court also
does not offer a panacea of accountability, having strictly limiting
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jurisdictional provisions, and making only a weak mention of anything
approximating victim reparations. Accountability, thus, has not been and
will not in the foreseeable future become an all or nothing question, but
rather must be viewed as a matter of degree.
In sum, there is a spectrum of possible outcomes between complete
impunity and full accountability. As I have discussed, outcomes that fall
short of full accountability often are attributable to resource limitations and
political constraints as well as to a lack of will. It is with these points in
mind that I want now to consider the advisability of developing
international guidelines on accountability.
Given the predictable obstacles to accountability and the spectrum
of possible outcomes between complete impunity and full accountability,
we must ask, in considering guidelines on accountability, what forms of
accountability such guidelines would mandate. The guidelines might
provide that the type and extent of accountability that states are obliged to
establish would vary depending upon specified factors, which I will
discuss. The guidelines might also very usefully include a set of
facilitative provisions that would delineate mechanisms for the provision of
assistance to the states bearing the primary responsibilities for
accountability in order to facilitate their overcoming the predictable
obstacles to accountability.
Several factors would be relevant in determining in each context
the type of accountability mechanisms required of states and the extent of
their necessary scope. The most obvious of these factors would be the
nature of the offenses committed. Presumably, genocide, crimes against
humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions would give rise to
the strictest accountability requirements in guidelines that address a range
of international crimes.
Additional factors determining the type and extent of accountability
required would relate to the three chronic obstacles to accountability:
resource limitations, political constraints, and lack of will. Resource
limitations and political constraints may diminish the degree of
accountability and redress that a state can realistically be required to
achieve in a given context. For example, where the number of
perpetrators is high and availability of resources is low, the number of
defendants to be prosecuted may be smaller than the total number of
perpetrators. However, a diminution in standards of accountability should
be the very last resort, not the first response, to such obstacles. The first
line of response should be the provision of international facilitation in
overcoming those obstacles in order to achieve the greatest possible
measure of accountability. Thus, rather than only clarifying and
reiterating the mandate to achieve accountability, it may be useful for
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guidelines on accountability to include facilitative provisions that focus on
providing assistance in overcoming the predictable obstacles to
accountability.
In this regard, the guidelines could delineate responsibilities of
member states to facilitate the efforts of those states bearing the primary
responsibility for accountability by providing resources (financial, human
or physical) to a specified extent when delineated conditions arise
warranting such assistance. In particular, the guidelines might provide for
the creation of a judicial rapid reaction force or international legal
assistance consortium prepared to reinforce, supplement, and assist in the
rehabilitation of post-conflict national justice systems. Such an entity
would be prepared to respond quickly with the specialized expertise
required to help ensure accountability and judicial rehabilitation in a post-
conflict environment.
The guidelines' facilitative provisions might also address what I
will term a lack of political resources, which may often hamper national
efforts at establishing accountability. A lack of political resources would
be reflected in difficulties in gaining extradition, in obtaining evidence
outside the country, or in gaining access to perpetrators' assets that are
outside the country. The guidelines' facilitative provisions could help to
overcome political resource limitations by providing for forms of judicial
cooperation including special extradition or transfer arrangements,
mechanisms for evidence provision, and methods for freezing and
accessing perpetrators' offshore assets.
Addressing the second of the three major obstacles to
accountability, political constraints, will be more complex. The parties
might undertake to provide mediation or even military intervention to
foster accountability under some circumstances. One can readily envision
limits to what would be possible in this regard. The mixed results of
peacekeeping and related missions trace those limits all too graphically.
Nevertheless, diplomatic and military interventions can be effective in
some contexts, and could be brought much more to bear in the cause of
accountability,
A special problem, falling within the category of political
constraints, is the risk of bias or the appearance of bias in the
national accountability process. Where the regime administering
accountability does so after prevailing in a conflict with those now
being brought to justice, the reality or appearance of victors'
justice may taint the proceedings, undermining their claim to
legitimacy. One form of international facilitation that may help to
ameliorate this potential problem would be the provision of
international monitoring to help ensure the impartiality of the
1998] 405
406 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
accountability process. If the monitoring agency has the
confidence of the parties (particularly of the party fearing bias),
then the monitoring function may be valuable in minimizing the
potential problem of bias or the appearance of bias in the
accountability process.
Finally, the guidelines could address a lack of will to pursue
accountability. A specific delineation of the extent and form of
accountability mandated under specified conditions would clarify the
parties' obligations. With obligations clarified, pressure for compliance
could be brought to bear. At the same time, assuring assistance in
overcoming resource limitations and political constraints would render
those obstacles less readily available as pretexts for inaction actually born
of a lack of will.
A set of guidelines on accountability could, in its preamble,
articulate the aspiration of eliminating impunity. In their substantive
provisions, the guidelines could clarify and articulate what is required
nationally and internationally in the pursuit of accountability. The
facilitative provisions could ensure assistance in overcoming the
predictable obstacles to accountability. By doing all of that, the guidelines
could eliminate ambiguities, obstacles and excuses so that appropriate
pressure could be brought to bear on those who would otherwise lack the
will to pursue accountability. By crafting guidelines that clarify national
and international responsibilities to establish accountability and that also
provide for facilitation and assistance to states bearing primary
responsibility for establishing that accountability, the likelihood is
heightened that some substantial measure of accountability will, in fact, be
achieved. The key in drafting guidelines on accountability would be to
facilitate as well as to demand the greatest degree of accountability that is
realistically possible in order to maximize the degree of accountability
achieved in each instance in which perpetrators must be called to account.
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In early 1997, Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni' assembled a group
of individuals to discuss the creation of a set of guiding principles for
combatting impunity for international crimes. The group included myself,
Professor Michael Scharf,2 Professor Paul Williams,3  and Professor
Madeline Morris. During a period of six months, this group worked on
drafting a set of guidelines that would prohibit states from granting
amnesty, pardons, or token sentences to persons responsible for
committing international crimes. Once completed, the guidelines would be
provided to the international and United Nations community for
consideration and possible adoption.
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One component of the proposed guidelines is the creation of a
mechanism to facilitate and coordinate international efforts in bringing the
perpetrators of international crimes to justice and in rehabilitating the
national judicial systems of affected states. Madeline Morris and I were
assigned to draft this section of the guidelines.
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice systems are among those institutions that suffer most during
violent conflicts. The collapse of state institutions like the judiciary is a
fundamental cause for the subsequent failure of the legal system and the
general breakdown of the rule of law. In a post-conflict intervention, the
international community must focus its efforts beyond peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions. There must be comprehensive efforts to support
structures that will ensure a lasting peace. Ensuring accountability and
rehabilitating the judicial system are fundamental to this effort.
There is a general consensus that the United Nations, international
agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and individual
governments providing post-conflict assistance in the justice sector need to
better coordinate their activities and ensure that programs are
complementary and collectively meeting the needs of the host country.
There is currently no international mechanism to bring together NGOs,
national governments, and United Nations agencies for post-conflict
accountability and judicial rehabilitation. There is also a need to react
rapidly to a post-conflict situation in order to gain credibility and separate
support from local NGOs. At two recent international conferences,5
individuals representing NGOs, national governments, international
organizations, and academia met to recommend ways to improve the
international community's approach to ensure accountability for war
criminals and met for assisting countries in judicial rehabilitation during a
post-conflict period. One suggestion that emerged from the first
conference and was further discussed at the second conference was the
creation of a judicial response unit that could quickly respond to the
immediate and somewhat longer-term needs of judicial systems in post-
conflict environments.
This memo sets forth a framework for the creation of the
International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC). In essence, ILAC, in
the aftermath of violent conflicts, would be able to facilitate and coordinate
NGO, government, and United Nations efforts in two crucial areas:
5. Both the March, 1997 and the October, 1997 conferences were organized by the
Stanley Foundation.
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bringing war criminals to justice, and rehabilitating the national judicial
and legal systems.
ILAC would work closely with international peace keepers, who
assume de facto, if not de jure, involvement in law enforcement functions
during a post-conflict situation. To date, peace keepers, civilian police,
and international police monitors have been forced to operate in
environments where the local criminal justice system has been decimated
or is simply non-existent.
ILAC would enter the post-conflict environment simultaneously
with, or as a close follow-up to, peacekeeping operations. Serving as a
locus of international legal assistance and domestic NGO involvement,
ILAC would coordinate the efforts of specialized agencies, NGOs, and
donor governments. Bringing together ideas and people, ILAC would
mobilize forces to sign onto a common set of principles and goals and to
operate in a coordinated and efficient manner.
ILAC would also focus on pressuring national governments to
pursue war crimes and human rights abuse prosecutions. Countries
emerging from domestic or international conflict are generally fragile and
are almost certainly grappling with the traumatic effects of recently
committed war crimes and human rights abuses. Often, members of
emerging ruling governments have themselves violated international
humanitarian law and are thus more likely to advocate for a general policy
of amnesty, or other form of impunity, rather than a policy of
accountability. Governments in a post-conflict environment will frequently
argue that impunity and quick reconciliation are the only possible avenues,
considering that the destroyed judicial system is not capable of prosecuting
the alleged human rights abuses. ILAC will foster governments'
compliance with their international obligations to prosecute alleged war
criminals and human rights violators. In addition, ILAC's presence may
help to deter further violations of international humanitarian law.
II. THE ILAC MISSION
ILAC will be an association of international NGOs working
together to promote the rule of law throughout the world. ILAC will work
closely with local NGOs in affected States to ensure their immediate
involvement in the assistance projects.
Realizing that an independent and effectively run judicial system is
the sine qua non of the rule of law, ILAC will provide technical legal
assistance focused on the prosecution of alleged war criminals and human
rights abusers and on judicial restructuring in countries emerging from
domestic or international armed conflict, and it will be committed to
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effectuating the appropriate enforcement of humanitarian law and to
rebuilding their legal systems. Where appropriate, ILAC will also provide
services to facilitate the interaction of national and international criminal
jurisdictions.
Because ILAC is comprised of international NGOs experienced in
analyzing the state of legal systems and providing assistance to countries
developing their national judicial systems, it will be able to respond
quickly and effectively in providing needed post-conflict legal assistance.
ILAC will be firmly committed to the principles of national
sovereignty. ILAC will not seek to promote a particular legal system,
realizing that a broad-minded spirit towards other cultures and awareness
of the strengths of different legal systems are necessary to achieve the goal
of establishing effective judicial systems throughout the world.
ILAC will be premised on the belief that assistance in developing
judicial systems must be undertaken with the consent of national
governments. Cooperation between ILAC and national governments is
necessary if ILAC assistance is to be beneficial.
ILAC will be politically neutral, and it will conduct its work in a
manner that is transparent to the international community.
ILAC will be committed to a system of continuing self-evaluation,
and it will reform its practices in order to best meet the needs of the
victims of human rights abuses and to further the principles of justice and
fairness within the international community.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF ILAC
ILAC will be a separate non-profit entity comprised of
international NGOs who are actively engaged in the development of
national judicial systems ,(e.g., the American Bar Association's Central and
East European Law Initiative (CEELI), the International Bar Association,
R6seau des Citoyens, International Judges' Association, Soros, and
Netherlands Association for the Judiciary). It will be particularly
important for ILAC to be comprised of a full range of international NGOs
who have proven themselves to be capable of taking on the complex and
time-consuming responsibilities of post-conflict judicial reconstruction.
Pursuant to ILAC's by-laws, ILAC's members will elect an
Executive Board. The Board will be comprised of five permanent
members (to ensure geographical and program diversity), six rotating
members, and three Government/Agency Advisory Council members.
ILAC will have a permanent headquarters and a full-time staff,
consisting of a Director (who will oversee all ILAC operations); an
Administrative Assistant (who will assist the Executive Director); a Fund
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Raiser/Development Director (responsible for securing administrative and
programmatic funding); an Outreach Coordinator (responsible for
maintaining contact with members and securing personnel support for
program implementation); a Program Director (responsible for all
logistical support for implementing the two Rapid Response Programs,
including training mission participants); a Research Director (responsible
for preparing briefing papers for the ILAC missions); and an Accountant
(responsible for the overall financial management of the project).
ILAC members may decide to send personnel to the permanent
headquarters.
IV. THE GOVERNANCE OF ILAC
In order for ILAC to effectively accomplish its mission,
particularly the provision of on-ground technical legal assistance, ILAC
must gain international stature and authority. This will allow ILAC to
more easily mobilize national and international support for its work and to
achieve legal standing to quickly implement its programs in a host country.
The United Nations (e.g., U.N. DPKO, U.N. Human Rights
Center) may be an appropriate agency to undertake a cooperative role with
ILAC. There is already a close working relationship between United
Nations agencies and international NGOs. ILAC will also have to secure
close working relations with States, which may be called upon to intervene
in a post-conflict situation.
The cooperation between the United Nations and ILAC, and
support for ILAC's work, could be part of a larger United Nations Standby
Agreement (focused on international legal NGOs) that would permit the
United Nations to utilize ILAC when responding to affected States. The
paramount issue would be to ensure that ILAC could mobilize and engage
rapidly under United Nations auspices.
States may also want to utilize ILAC in their unilateral response to
a post-conflict situation. For instance, the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) may want to call upon ILAC to assist
the agency in providing immediate assistance to a State emerging from
conflict. An affected State may also appeal directly to ILAC for
assistance.
V. COORDINATING MECHANISM FOR ILAC
The main programmatic objective of ILAC will be to rapidly and
effectively provide assistance to post-conflict national judicial systems. In
fulfilling its mission, ILAC will be able to provide two teams of legal
experts to assist the host country in the post-conflict environment. ILAC
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will be capable of sending two different types of teams of legal experts to
assist the host country in the post-conflict environment. Depending on the
needs of the affected State, one or both types of teams may be utilized.
A. Judicial Accountability Response Unit
The Judicial Accountability Response Unit (JARU) will support
international efforts to bring war criminals and human rights offenders to
justice. The JARU will be comprised of legal experts selected by ILAC.
The JARU will work closely with the ICC or any ad hoc tribunal
established to prosecute suspected war criminals and violators of
international humanitarian law.
The JARU will remain in country and focus on the following:
1) Assist the government in designing a systematic approach
for prosecuting war criminals and human rights offenders;
2) Assist the government in implementing the investigation
and prosecution of war criminals and human rights offenders
(including assistance to judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys);
3) Support the creation of local human rights NGOs which
can sustain advocacy work;
4) Assist in mobilizing support from the international
community for investigations and prosecutions, including financial
assistance and cooperation in gaining evidence and extradition of
indicted persons outside the country's territory;
5) Monitor the government's performance in implementing
the system of accountability for war criminals and human rights
offenders (including trial monitoring);
6) Serve as an objective source of information and deter the
dissemination of misinformation and disinformation;
7) Create mechanisms to provide protection to potential
witnesses fearful of physical violence;
8) Work with the Judicial Development Response Unit (see
section B below) in developing a judicial system that will initiate
an effective system of accountability, including assistance in
building judicial infrastructure, training legal personnel, and
reforming laws;
9) Create a Rules of the Road project to ensure that the
process of detaining individuals by the government for serious
[Vol. 4:407412
19981
violations of international humanitarian law is consistent with
international legal standards; and
10) Provide liaison and coordination services where
appropriate to facilitate the interaction of the national justice
system and the ICC or any ad hoc international tribunal.
B. Judicial Development Response Unit
The Judicial Development Response Unit (JDRU) will be
comprised of legal experts selected by ILAC. The JDRU will be
responsible for assessing the current state of the judicial system in the host
country. The JDRU will use a predetermined judicial assessment model to
identify which areas of the judicial system are intact, functional, and which
areas need to be re-deployed, recreated or redesigned. Based on this
assessment, ILAC will coordinate an outreach campaign among ILAC
members and donors so that they may undertake a more long-term program
of assistance and development.
The JDRU will serve as a bridge between initial peacekeeping
activities and long-term assistance. Once long-term ILAC members arrive
in the host country, the JDRU will continue to provide on-ground
coordination during the initial phase of operation. However, once ILAC
members establish their own coordinating mechanism to accomplish long-
term judicial restructuring, the JDRU will relinquish involvement with the
judicial restructuring program.
Long-term judicial restructuring could address the following:
1) Identify revisions to legislative and constitutional mandates
necessary for a truly independent and effective judiciary;
2) Determine whether comprehensive jurisdiction is set within
the judiciary on all matters relating to the application of laws,
including violations of international humanitarian law;
3) Determine whether there is sufficient financial support for
the judicial system;
4) Determine whether there exists a sufficient number of
trained attorneys, judges, and court personnel to participate in a
revitalized judicial system; and
5) Determine whether there are sufficient court facilities to
allow the judicial system to function.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There will undoubtedly be detractors of the ILAC concept. Some
will say that it is simply not needed. Others will suggest that States, not
NGOs, best handle post conflict rehabilitation. Still others will argue that
NGOs simply are not capable of coordinating their programs in any
meaningful way.
Yet, we believe ILAC is an idea whose time has come. The recent
experience in Bosnia and Rwanda demonstrates that there is a vast void in
a post-conflict situation, where the breakdown of the rule of law is
systemic, and the need for rapid post-conflict accountability and judicial
rehabilitation is essential. ILAC can become a crucial component to the
international community's response to the devastation of conflict within or
between states.
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Truth and reconciliation commissions have played a critical role in
a number of countries that had to come to terms with a past marked by
protracted conflict, civil strife, violence, and massive human rights abuse.
The most widely known example is the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission established in 1995 in South Africa to examine Apartheid-Era
crimes.' In the past, truth commissions were used to investigate human
rights violations in a variety of countries. In particular the commissions
were used after countries had undergone major political changes, namely
transition from an authoritarian regime to democratic rule, be it in the
wake of violent internal conflicts, or a gradual peaceful revolution when
civilian leadership took over from a military regime.2
The International Human Rights Law Institute at DePaul
University in Chicago undertook an empirical study on international and
non-international conflicts since World War II. This study shows that
* Angelika Schlunk is a trial attorney at the Federal Department of Justice of Germany.
She worked on the legality and workability of international treaties and was involved in the
PrepCom discussions of a Draft Statute for the establishment of a Permanent International
Criminal Court [hereinafter ICCI at the United Nations. Currently, she has taken leave of
absence from her former job in Bonn, Germany, to do research on accountability mechanisms for
human rights violations in armed conflict in the context of third party intervention at the J.F.
Kennedy School of Government in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
1. National Unity And Reconciliation Act, No. 1111, (July 26, 1995) (available on the
internet, Truth And Reconciliation Commission Home Page <http://www.truth.org.za/>).
2. Priscilla Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,
in 1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 225-61, 600-11, 613-33, 635-55 (Neil J. Kritz ed. 1994).
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from 229 international and internal conflicts, excluding the classic inter-
state armed conflicts, nine were the subject of a truth commission, and
twenty-four were the subject of a national inquiry commission, while
twenty-two were the subject of domestic prosecution and two of
international prosecution. For many of these conflicts, of course, there
were no redress mechanisms in place., A large number of new democratic
governments, namely in Latin America, vested in truth commissions to
examine human rights violations after they came to power., In some cases,
the establishment of a commission seemed to give proof of the
government's political will to bring human rights offenders to justice, but
the decision-makers changed their policy shortly after and granted
amnesties for the perpetrators.' In other countries, the legislature had
already enacted blanket amnesties for human rights abuse. Later, a new
government set up a commission to investigate those crimes and to provide
reparation for victims.6 In connection with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, many Eastern European countries adopted democratic political
systems and found themselves confronted with the human rights abuses of
their former communist regimes. Truth commissions are not as popular in
Eastern Europe as they have been in Latin-America. Only a few states set
up investigative commissions, for instance, Lithuania, in 1991, to
investigate collaboration with the KGB,' or Germany, in 1992, to examine
the impact of communist dictatorship on society and to foster the process
of German unification These examples show the wide range of different
3. Jennifer Balint, An Empirical Study on Conflicts (of an international and non-
international character, civil conflicts and tyrannical regime victimization) and their outcomes
since WWI, REPORTS ON THE UNITED STATES MEETING OF EXPERTS ON REIGNING IN IMPUNITY
FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, (Apr. 13, 1997)
held in Washington D.C., International Human Rights Law Institute DePaul University College
of Law, Chicago.
4. To investigative commissions in Latin-America, see Margaret Popkin Sampers &
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin America, 20 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 79 - 115 (1995).
5. For example, Argentina - National Commission on Disappeared Persons established in
1983, the Full Stop Law (Law No.23.492, Dec. 3, 1986, N.E.D.L.A., 1986-B, at 1100) limits
prosecution and the Due Obedience Law (Law No. 23.521, June 4, 1987, B.O., June 9, 1987)
refers to acting under superior orders as a defense.
6. For example, Chile National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation established in
1990, the Decree-Law No. 2191, Apr. 18, 1978, granted amnesty for all criminal acts from Aug.
11, 1973 to Mar. 10, 1978 (Diario Oficial No. 30.042, Apr. 19, 1978).
7. The parliamentary commission was set up on December 17, 1991 to the purge of KGB
agents. See Jozef Darski, Police Agents In The Transition Period, in UNCAPTIVE MINDS, IV,
27-28 (Winter 1991-92).
8. Enquete-Kommission zur Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur
in Deutschland.
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political and cultural backgrounds of states that use the instrument of a
truth commission to cope with their abusive past.
I. WHAT Do WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS?
Truth commission is a catchy name, mostly used generically, for a
wide variety of bodies set up to investigate a past history of human rights
violations in a given country. There is no such thing as a standard truth
commission; the set-up, design, responsibilities, and mandate vary
significantly from case to case. Although the word truth commission may
convey an imprecise, even misleading image, investigating commission
might be a more adequate title, because it refers more accurately to what a
commission does. I will use the term truth commission because it is still
the most frequently used one.
Priscilla Hayner, who is an expert on truth commissions in the
United States, has come up with four primary constituting elements to
define a truth commission which I find very helpful:
A truth commission focuses on the past.
A truth commission does not concentrate on a specific
event in the past but attempts to paint an overall picture of
certain human rights violations over a period of time.
A truth commission exists for a pre-determined period of
time and ceases to exist when its mandate ends, usually
with the submission of a report of its findings; and finally
A truth commission is vested with certain authority.9
This is a description of the common features. Other features vary. Truth
commissions can be established as national commissions by a national
legislator or by an act of the executive.10 They can be set up as the
outcome of a negotiated peace accord and conducted by an international
panel like the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador in 1992." An
9. Hayner, supra note 2, at 227-28.
10. For instance, in Bolivia, the National Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances was
created by presidential decree, so was the Argentinian National Commission on the Disappeared
in 1983: Uruguay established the Investigative Commission on the Situation of Disappeared
People and its Causes through act of parliament in 1985.
11. Created through the Peace Accord between FMLN and the Salvadoran government
under the mediation of the United Nations, signed at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City on Jan.
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alternative to the case-by-case negotiated or established commission was a
Permanent International Truth Commission which would provide for a
ready-made framework that could be brought to life if so requested by a
state. 
2
National funds or international organizations could sponsor these
organizations. Exceptional is the case of the 1993 commission of inquiry
in Rwanda. A coalition of four non-governmental organizations, Africa
Watch (United States), Centre International des Droits des la Personne et
du Developpement Democratique (Canada), Federation Internationale des
Droits de l'Homme (France), and Union Interafricaine des Droits de
l'Homme et des Peuples (Burkina Faso) set up the International
Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations."
They range from elaborate multi-body commissions such as the
1995 Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa14 to one-man-
commissions with very limited resources as in Honduras ."5
II. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF A TRUTH COMMISSION?
A truth commission usually serves many different purposes. Its
main function is to investigate past human rights abuses, not with an aim to
prosecute individuals, but to find out the truth about certain events, for
example, when and where did what happen? Who was involved, as a
perpetrator, or as a victim? A truth commission is first of all an
instrument to examine the facts about the crimes and atrocities that have
occurred in a country. The second important purpose is to give a report of
these findings, publish it, and confront the public with the truth. This
exposure to the facts is supposed to have a cathartic and educational effect
on the society in transition. The impact of such a record would be the
basis for the third important purpose of a truth commission: which is the
acknowledgment of the past. Acknowledgment in this context means that
16, 1992; report of the Commission submitted to the United Nations on Mar. 13, 1993, U.N.
Doc. S/25500.
12. See Michael P. Scharf, The Case For A Permanent International Truth Commission, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375-410 (1987).
13. Hayner, supra note 2, at 243, n.78.
14. Supra note 1. According to chapter 2, section 3, paragraph 3 of the Act, the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission consists of three separate commissions with
different functions: the Commission of Human Rights (ch. 2, sec. 3, para. 3, sub-para. (a)), the
Commission for Amnesty, (ch. 2, sec. 3, para. 3, sub-para. (b)), and the Commission for
Reparation and Compensation (ch. 2, sec. 3, para. 3, sub-para. (c)).
15. National Commissioner for the Protection of Human Rights in Honduras, preliminary
report: The Facts Speak For Themselves - The Preliminary Report on Disappearances of the
National Commissioner for the Protection of Human Rights in Honduras, CENTER FOR JUSTICE
& INTERNATIONAL LAW (CEJIL), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AMERICAS (1994).
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the government admits the misdeeds of the past, and that the society
accepts its involvement and recognizes the consequences of its
involvement.' 6 Acknowledgment is finally the first step to reconciliation.
It is the key to the healing process in a conflict stricken society.
Additionally, truth commissions would have the mandate to offer
recommendations for rebuilding society, for instance recommendations on
how to improve the judicial system of a country or to protect human rights
in the future more effectively.
III. WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TRUTH
COMMISSIONS?
The success of a truth commission depends upon the political will,
financial resources, and support of the society. If the political leadership
in a country is determined to examine human rights violations and has the
tenure to promote such an undertaking within society and against the
resistance of opposing stakeholders, a truth commission will be a valuable
tool to start the recovery process. The beauty of a commission is that it
can be established almost instantly at a relatively low cost. It is a
temporary institution with a limited mandate that can be designed
according to the specific needs of a society.
The proceedings before a commission do not have to follow the
rigid rules of the law of criminal procedure. A commission is therefore
more flexible in hearing and accommodating witnesses, and in evaluating
evidence. 17
Although human rights literature mostly favors criminal
prosecution as the best guarantee against human rights violations in the
future, 8 atrocities of the past cannot comprehensively be captured by the
means of criminal proceedings. The reason for a criminal trial is to judge
the guilt of an individual upon the evidence presented with the result of
either acquitting or convicting that individual. However, we are talking
about crimes of a much larger scale than a murder case before a district
court. Genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious human rights
violations usually occur in a certain social climate of political oppression
and racial prejudice toward minorities. A court is not supposed to give an
16. To the issue of acknowledgment see Luc Huyse, Justice after Transition: On the
Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the Past, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 51-78 (1995).
17. An illustrative report on the hearings before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
in South Africa see Michael Ignatieff, Digging up the Dead, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 10, 1997,
at 84-93.
18. Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations
of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542 (1991).
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account about the circumstances of the historic, economic, and political
reasons for a crime, nor about the involvement of different groups in the
society or political influence from the outside which may have encouraged
the perpetrators and fostered hatred and violence that made crimes such as
disappearances, torture, and mass killings possible. Giving an account,
providing explanations, and offering recommendations for a better future
are exactly the purposes of a truth commission. Thus, a truth commission
can serve purposes which a criminal trial usually cannot.
However, as much as flexibility is the strength of a truth
commission, it is its salient weakness. Contrary to a court, a truth
commission has to be vested with authority by the political decision-makers
that may not have an interest in establishing an independent and
resourceful investigating commission. Authorities may deny access to
information and confidential material. Potential witnesses before the
commission may be reluctant to testify if they are not guaranteed protection
against alleged perpetrators or members of a violent and abusive former
regime who regain political power. 19
Even if commissions come up with comprehensive reports, their
findings can only have an impact if the public takes notice and if the
policymakers allow for significant changes. Those changes include
institutional reforms, protection of human rights in the future, and
exclusion of wrongdoers of the past from positions of power, if not
criminal prosecution. Many truth commissions, namely in Latin-America,
that have done remarkable work investigating human rights abuses were
often ridiculed by national parliaments that enacted amnesty laws for
former government officials or military personnel.20 Divergent interests,
scarcity of resources, and impunity laws are certainly not only a challenge
to the work of a truth commission, but they also affect judicial proceedings
as well. 2' However, truth commissions are inherently vulnerable to
changes in political willingness. Therefore, national truth commissions are
hardly an effective policy option in weak civilian societies or countries
ravaged by civil strife. An international truth commission provided by the
international community and conducted by experts from the outside,
operating in a safe environment, may be an alternative in those cases.
19. In Argentina, victims find themselves confronted with police-officers who tortured
them and still are on duty, see Calvin Sims, Argentina's Bereft Mothers: And Now, a New Wave,
N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at A4.
20. Argentina, supra note 5.
21. On the problems of the International Tribunal for Rwanda see James C. McKinley Jr.,
On 1994 Blood Bath in Rwanda, Tribunal Hews to a Glacial Pace, TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997, at Al
To the situation of the national judiciary in Rwanda by the same author, Massacre Trials in
Rwanda Have Courts on Overload, TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at A9.
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However, without a geographical link to the conflicting society, it may not
serve its cathartic purpose as well as its national commission.2
Besides its dependence on the good-will of the political decision-
makers, a truth commission carries the risk of too high expectations.
Victims who testify before the commission may have to go through the
agony of their traumatizing experiences without obtaining relief or even
tangible benefits.23
IV. COMBINATION OF SEVERAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
Reconciliation of conflicting groups is a long-term process which
requires complex and multifold strategies. There is no simple strategy to
healing the wounds of the past. Accordingly, decision-makers should
make use of a variety of policy options rather than focus on either criminal
prosecution or truth commission. Accountability mechanisms such as
tribunals, investigative commissions, and illustration procedures are not
mutually exclusive. All of these strategies should be combined as parts of
a comprehensive conflict management scenario.
From the perspective of a decision-maker who thinks hard about
the several policy-options and strategies for conflict management, truth
commissions are tempting because they can be tailor-made. However,
they do not fit into every situation, and an emerging democracy will have
to deal with many more urgent issues and problems than just coming to
terms with its violent past. However, they are a flexible instrument that
can be adjusted according to the specific needs of a country. There are at
least five reasons that make truth commissions particularly valuable for the
reconciliation process. First, when implemented with the necessary legal
powers and responsibilities, they are an effective tool to give an accurate
record of human rights abuses in the past, and to inform the public about
what happened. Second, besides the truth-telling function, a commission
can be an adequate forum to decide issues such as reparation,
rehabilitation, and compensation for victims.3' Third, a commission may
serve as a basis for further in-depth investigation for criminal prosecution. 2
22. Alfred P. Rubin, Dayton, Bosnia, and the Limits of Law, THE NATIONAL INTEREST
(Winter 1996/97), at 41- 46, 44.
23. Suzanne Daley, In Apartheid Inquiry, Agony is Relived but Not Put to Rest, N. Y.
TIMES, July 17, 1997, at Al.
24. An example is the Commission for Reparation and Compensation in South Africa (see
National Unity and Reconciliation Act, July 26, 1995, ch. 2, § 3, para. 3, sub-para. (c), ch. 5)
(National Unity and Reconciliation Act, supra note 1).
25. The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Res. No. 780
(1992), examined human rights abuse in Former Yugoslavia. Its report provided the prosecutors
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with valuable information about
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The fourth argument is that it can be a very valuable instrument to fight
impunity, provided that the political leadership will not compromise
justice. Even if a country is not capable of immediately prosecuting
alleged perpetrators of violent crimes committed under the auspices of the
former regime, the findings of the commission would lay the ground for
criminal prosecution. Finally, the documentation about the crimes will
educate future generations. This is especially important if those who have
lived through the nightmares of the atrocities, whether as a victim or as a
perpetrator, refuse, for whatever reason, to deal with the conflict.
the events to be further investigated. The report is reprinted in CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LAW OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 65-198 (1996); this
commission was not a truth commission, however, a truth commission could, among others,
serve the same purpose.
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ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
Steven J. Gerber
It cannot be overemphasized how historic the negotiations to
establish a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) have been. Over
120 states have participated in the process and not one of them questions
the need for a permanent ICC to try individuals accused of the most
serious international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity or
serious violations of the laws and customs of war (war crimes). In
addition, hundreds of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participate
in the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC).'
Over the last several months, some of the most supportive
governments, known among themselves as the like-minded,2 and many of
the NGOs have become increasingly dissatisfied with several positions
taken by the United States government in the negotiations to establish an
ICC. These positions include the role of the United Nations Security
Council in the Court's jurisdiction, and whether the Court will have an
Independent Prosecutor authorized to initiate investigations and
prosecutions on his or her own initiative.
In fact, there have been comparisons between the ICC negotiations
and the campaign to ban landmines. In the case of the landmine treaty, the
NGO coalition and the states pushing for the treaty made a strategic
decision to get what they considered to be the best treaty, even if the
United States would not sign. A similar strategy, to push for the most
effective and fair court even if the United States will not join, has been
discussed as a possible route if the United States does not change its
positions on several key issues.
Unfortunately, an ICC without United States participation is
unlikely to succeed. It will not have a police force of its own to enforce its
decisions and apprehend indicted individuals. The court will depend on the
J.D., M.A., Director of the International Criminal Court Project of the World
Federalist Association and Coordinator of the Washington Working Group on the ICC.
1. For more information on the Coalition for an ICC, see http://www.igc.apc.orglicc,
call (212)599-1320 or write CICC, 777 U.N. Plaza, New York, NY 10017.
2. The like-minded countries are a group of approximately forty countries that have
pushed ICC negotiations forward and include many United States allies, such as Canada,
Australia, Germany, Italy and other countries located in Europe, Latin America and Africa.
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
cooperation of states party to the treaty establishing the Court. The
negotiating states have still not determined what to do when a state fails to
cooperate with the Court.
The ICC will be effective only if the political will of the
international community is behind it. One of the most important methods
to enforce compliance will be for other states to pressure the non-
complying state to meet its treaty obligations. If the United States
government does not participate in the ICC, who will apply political
pressure to cooperate with the Court?
After all, it is the United States that has done the most to arrest
indicted war criminals in the former Yugoslavia. The European states who
are pushing for the best possible treaty, regardless of United States
participation, have done little to force the states of the former Yugoslavia
to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia.
The United States has also provided more financial support,
seconded personnel, and equipment for the two ad hoc tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda than any other country.3 If the United
States does not participate in the ICC, which countries will provide
adequate resources?
Of course, some have argued that even if the United States does
not ratify the treaty establishing the ICC, it could still support the work of
the court -' that it would still be in the interest of the United States to
support the ICC. Unfortunately, the United States Senate has already
indicated on several occasions that it would consider any effort to
cooperate with the court without the Senate's advice and consent to
ratification as an attempt to bypass the Senate's constitutional role and
would oppose this.4
It is true that an effective court, as defined by NGOs, could be
created without United States involvement, but such a court is unlikely to
be effective. If such a court were created and failed because of lack of
United States participation, it would be even worse than if the court had
3. In 1994 and 1995 the:
Several states have contributed assistance to the Tribunal in the form of a loan of
personnel to the Office of the Prosecutor. As of 29 May 1995, the Tribunal was
receiving seconded personnel from the following states: United States (21 personnel);
United Kingdom (5); Netherlands (3); Denmark (2); Norway (2); Sweden (2). . . . In
addition, the United States made a contribution of computer systems and related
services for the Office of the Prosecutor valued at up to $2,300,000. The United
Kingdom has also made a contribution of equipment valued at approximately $30,500.
4. 1997 State Department Authorization bill (not passed).
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never been created. It would set back the attempt to enforce international
humanitarian law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly in an interconnected world, Americans and people
throughout the world are encountering situations in which their human
rights are abused abroad. People are traveling to exotic parts of the world
that have not experienced the extent of foreign penetration.
Simultaneously, the enormous gaps between wealthy and impoverished
countries and peoples are exacerbated by the ever present media, so that
the less fortunate people are reminded daily of the huge differences that
exist.
The rise of transnational organized crime groups enables such
groups to dominate and control the action of governments. Faced with this
menace, well-meaning law enforcement agencies have persuaded
legislatures and governments to compromise civil liberties and human
rights. In other cases, law enforcement agencies sometimes take extralegal
shortcuts to achieve their goals. The ends justify the means syndrome can
have especially dangerous consequences in emerging countries. In many
cases, lack of or insufficient legal infrastructure and legal traditions result
in persons being detained arbitrarily and are unable to obtain due process
* Bruce Zagaris, Esq., is a partner at Cameron & Hornbostel L.L.P. in Washington,
D.C.; Founder and Editor-in-Chief of the INT'L ENFORCEMENT LAW REPORTER.
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or obtain redress.
In increasing cases where United States persons are improperly
detained abroad and the host country's legal machinery is
insufficient, defendants must resort to the assistance of the United
States government or international human rights machinery. For
reasons well known, the machinery is quite limited. Hence,
counsel designing lobbying strategies to rescue such persons must
be quite inventive.
To provide some concrete examples of lobbying strategies to
resolve international criminal and human rights issues, I will use the case
of Jim and Penny Fletcher of Huntington, West Virginia. This is a recent
case on which I worked that received some media attention. The Fletchers
were detained in October 1996, charged with the murder of Jerome
Joseph, a water taxi driver on the island of Bequia. Eventually, their case
went to trial, and the court dismissed all charges and finally released them
in August 1997. In this introduction, a chronology of essential events will
be set forth.,
This paper alludes in the title to Paradise Lost, which became a
theme at the end of the case. It took the theme from a quote in Senator
John Kerry's recently written book on transnational crime.2 The phrase
"Paradise Lost" refers to how the beauty of the islands and the tourism
potential are squandered by the penetration of St. Vincent by transnational
organized crime.3 The resulting corruption increasingly impacts tourists
and foreign visitors.
Having taught at the University of the West Indies Faculty of Law
and having participated as a consultant in several administration of justice
projects in the region, I was acquainted with the legal system and legal
professionals in St. Vincent. From the beginning, my trip to St. Vincent in
January 1997 and my conversations with legal professionals showed me
that the detention and prosecution of the Fletchers was the result of an
apparent personal vendetta engendered by altercations that Penny Fletcher
had had with some prominent people in St. Vincent, exacerbated by efforts
to approach them for a bribe. This approach was aborted as a result of the
1. For an excellent chronology of events, see The Fletcher Story Unfolds, THE HERALD
DISPATCH (Huntington, W.Va.), Aug. 9, 1997, at 8B, col. 1., on which this account relies
heavily.
2. See, e.g., SENATOR JOHN KERRY, THE NEW WAR: THE WEB OF CRIME THAT
THREATENS AMERICA'S SECURITY (1997). In the cover, Kerry quotes: "Let none admire. That
riches go in Hell." JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 690-91 (1667).
3. Id.
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notoriety and media attention given to the Alan Heath case.4
After Heath's wife was brutally murdered as they were sleeping on
their yacht in waters off the St. Vincent coast, Heath was detained for
approximately three weeks and had his passport taken. The St. Vincent
government received detailed information and intensive cooperation from
the South African government on the close and loving relationship between
the couple. Still, the St. Vincent government did not release Heath.
Instead, according to Heath, one of Heath's attorneys in St. Vincent
solicited a bribe for $25,000 (U.S.), the amount of the life insurance policy
on her - information transmitted by the South African government to the
St. Vincent government. Eventually, after strenuous intervention by the
South African government and on the very day Heath paid the requested
money, Heath was released.-
His release triggered a massive press campaign by Heath with the
cooperation of the South African government to expose the injustices he
and his wife had experienced.6
We had witnesses and written reports, documenting exactly with
whom and when the Fletchers' interrogations and initial detentions
occurred, including a report from a former high-level police official who
served as our investigator. Just as important, my personal conversations
with St. Vincent law enforcement officials, politicians, civil servants, and
the legal community convinced me that from the start the St. Vincent
government had no information implicating the Fletchers in the murder,
but that the highest level of the government wanted to prosecute them to
serve other agendas. 7 As the case continued, my investigation showed that,
notwithstanding the State Department's denials, their own documents
confirmed their suspicions of my same thesis. Additional documentation
would show many other cases of sham detentions, extortions and attempted
4. Kathy Moloney, Yachtsman Heath Warns Would-Be Travellers to St. Vincent, THE
MERCURY (S. Africa), Dec. 2, 1996, at 3; Kathy Moloney, Heath Vows to 'Kill" St. Vincent
Tourist Trade, THE MERCURY (S. Africa), Dec. 12, 1996, at 3.
5. Alan Heath's description of his order with documents showing payments (undated) (on
file with author). The diplomatic notes also confirm and supplement his version (on file with
author).
6. Bribe?, THE NEWS (Kingstown, St. Vincent), Dec. 20, 1996 at 1, col. 1; Kiva Clarke,
Wife Killed, Husband Bribes His Way Out of Jail, SUNDAY MIRROR (S. Africa), Jan. 19, 1997;
P.C. Hughes, Corruption in High Places, THE VINCENTIAN, Jan. 3, 1997, at 16; Editorial,
Heath Heats Up Tourism Ministry, SEARCHLIGHT, Jan. 10, 1997; Visitor Vows to "Kill" St.
Vincent Tourist Trade, THE NEWS (Kingstown, St. Vincent), Feb. 2, 1997; Editorial, Scandals
and Tourism, THE NEWS, Jan. 10, 1997, at 6; Ministry Denies Bribery Charge, THE NEWS
(Kingstown, St. Vincent), Jan. 31, 1997, at 1.
7. For more details on the involvement by high-level St. Vincent Government officials,
see Jim Flannery, Killers Or Victims, SOUNDINGS (Essex, Ct.), Aug. 1997, at A14.
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extortions, egregious violations of rights of defendants, and attempts to
manipulate the media.
In addition, to my surprise, the evidence of significant penetration
of St. Vincent government by organized crime became more abundant as
the case and our investigations continued. On February 25, 1997, a
preliminary inquiry (P.I.) for the Fletchers was held and was completed on
approximately March 10, 1997. The magistrate found that, although only
extremely limited circumstantial evidence existed, probable cause existed
to bind the Fletchers over for trial.
On May 2, 1997, ABC News aired a Nightline program about the
case. Two days later, Inside Edition, a national program, aired an expose.
Shortly thereafter, Extra, a daily tabloid program, regularly aired
developments in the case, including information on the deteriorating
medical conditions of the Fletchers.
The St. Vincent Prime Minister personally responded. In a radio
interview aired in the United States on May 5, 1997, the Prime Minister
castigated ABC News and characterized its program as unjust and trying to
interfere with a fair trial. He defended his government's handling of the
Heath case, denied any corruption, and said in reference to the Heath case
"[t]his is a country where you can't come and murder your wife .... 8
On May 10, 1997, President Clinton, meeting Caribbean leaders in
Barbados, discussed the case with the St. Vincent Prime Minister and
urged him to assure that they be accorded full due process.
On May 11, 1997, a lawyer for Penny Fletcher said the St.
Vincent officials had denied her medical treatment for what could be the
onset of cervical cancer. St. Vincent authorities claimed they could not
allow treatment because they feared she would escape.
On May 27, 1997, on the only government-owned radio station,
the St. Vincent Prime Minister read a letter, stating that "this couple has
an unsavory reputation and their behavior ... was bizarre and offensive."
He went on to read the letter, stating "[tihere certainly appears to be very
strong circumstantial evidence that they were involved in this tragedy, and
many of us believe they are guilty. "'
On June 6, 1997, Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to United States
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, expressing outrage at the Prime
8. Transcript of Radio Interview with Prime Minister of St. Vincent, May 5, 1997, at 2
(on file with author). The unofficial transcript was prepared by THE NEWS (Kingstown, St.
Vincent), from a video obtained from the St. Vincent Government Television.
9. Transcript of excerpts related to that of the Fletchers' from Prime Minister Mitchell's
News Conference, Kingstown, St. Vincent & the Grenadines (May 27, 1997) (on file with
author). The unofficial transcript was prepared by THE NEWS (Kingstown, St. Vincent), from a
video obtained from the St. Vincent Government Television.
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Minister's remarks and seeking strident action. On June 13, 1997, six
members of Congress wrote a similar letter to the St. Vincent Ambassador.
By now, the media had become increasingly interested in the diplomatic
ramifications of the case.
In the Spring of 1997, medical reports confirmed that Penny
Fletcher had a precancerous condition of the cervix. Penny first
complained of her problems in November 1996. After many months of
almost daily heroic efforts to obtain treatment for her by the Consul
General's Office, United States Embassy in Barbados, she was eventually
able to obtain a colposcopy. It confirmed the diagnosis, and she then
underwent cryosurgery in an effort to freeze the cancerous cells. Against
the doctor's order, Penny was not allowed to stay overnight in the hospital.
After she passed out on her return to prison, the St. Vincent government
allowed her to return to the hospital. In the meantime, the St. Vincent
government, through its Prime Minister and its press agent, was reporting
that both Fletchers were in excellent medical condition and received
excellent treatment in prison. The media and even members of Congress
zoomed into the fray, burrowing through the public reports, and depicted
the tragedy in growing sympathetic tones.' 0
On July 9, 1997, as the trial started, an angry Judge Dubar Cenac
delayed the trial until after a hearing on pre-trial publicity was conducted.
Prosecutor Karl Hudson-Phillips, a Trinidadian attorney, attacked the
Fletchers and their counsel, claiming they had initiated a smear campaign
against the St. Vincent legal system.
On July 11, 1997, prosecutors asked Judge Cenac to delay the trial
until October and to grant a request for a worldwide gag order on coverage
of the trial and criticism of the St. Vincent legal system.
On July 14 and 16, 1997, the court held hearings on the request.
On July 16, 1997, St. Vincent Police Commissioner Randolph Toussaint
sued West Virginia reporter Mark Truby for writing about the allegation of
the extortion attempt concerning the Fletchers' release.
On July 16, 1997, the St. Vincent Prime Minister appeared on the
CNN Court Television Program, Burden of Proof to rebut allegations of
corruption and unfairness in the Fletcher, Heath, and other cases." His
decision to appear and his performance were failures that gave rise to more
pressure to allow the Fletchers to have a fair trial immediately.
On July 17, 1997, the United States Ambassador to St. Vincent
10. See Mark Truby, Mitchell's Comments Anger Rockefeller, THE HERALD DISPATCH
(Huntington, W. Va.), June 10, 1997.
11. PM on Burden of Proof Today, THE HERALD OF ST. VINCENT, July 16, 1997 (on file
with author).
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visited with the Fletcher family in Kingstown, and then the highest ranking
official in St. Vincent, in a move symbolizing the growing interest of the
United States government in the case.
On July 18, 1997, Judge Cenac ordered the Fletchers' trial to start
July 28 and denied the motion for the gag order. St. Vincent Police
Commissioner, Toussaint, resigned without explanation.
On July 28, 1997, the trial started. At the beginning of the trial,
CNN's Burden of Proof did a program on the case. I appeared on the
program. Although I refused to discuss the facts of the Fletchers' case,
citing concern to provide new ammunition for the prosecution to delay the
case, I did point out that our investigation indicated that at least fifteen
persons had been subjected to extortion or attempted extortion in criminal
cases in St. Vincent. When asked what travelers to foreign destinations
should consider, I noted that, in the case of journalists traveling to St.
Vincent, they had to be aware that the St. Vincent government does not
hesitate to detain, deport, and otherwise harass such journalists. At the
time, the St. Vincent government and its supporters were furious about
these remarks.
Ironically, the Police Commissioner's filing of a libel case against
Mark Truby (the lead foreign reporter on the case), the efforts to prevent
him from leaving the country during the trial's recess, threats to bring a
libel action against John McWethy, the refusal to allow the government
owned radio to interview Dr. Gonsalves (the Vincentian defense counsel)
about the Heath and Fletchers' cases, and the Prime Minister's public
warnings to the Vincentian people about talking to foreign media
concerning the case, all underscored the importance of the media during
the Fletchers' case and similar cases. It is painfully transparent when
governments try to cover up their actions and prevent coverage by the
media.
On July 31, 1997, a juror complained of receiving threatening
phone calls at work by a male with a foreign accent who warned that he
better return a verdict of not guilty. Word of the threat was not announced
in opened court. Trial was recessed early, and Cenac promised to explain
to the jury what had occurred. The prosecutor used the incidents to move
for a mistrial and request a postponement of the trial. Again, Judge Cenac
denied the request.
On August 1, 1997, Cenac ordered the trial to continue, despite a
threat to a juror revealed on July 31 and another that surfaced the
following day.
On August 8, 1997, at the end of the prosecutor's case, Judge
Cenac directed the jury to acquit the defendants without need for the
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defense to put on its case. 12
II. EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Initially, the United States government, through the State
Department's Consular Affairs Office and the United States Embassy in
Bridgetown, Barbados, assured the family, inquiring members of
Congress, and counsel that the case was handled by the St. Vincent and
United States governments in a normal fashion and with no imperfections.
Unfortunately, the United States government also from the start followed
the standard it follows in other cases of Americans detained abroad: as
long as the Fletchers were treated the same as Vincentian detainees, then
the United States government could not press the St. Vincent government.
From a policy perspective, the evidence of penetration of the St.
Vincent government by transnational organized crime was one element that
enabled the defense team to argue vociferously for more proactive
measures to help the Fletchers. Evidence existed in official" and unofficial
United States government reports, anecdotal media reports,' and cable
traffic. The reports in United States Embassy and State Department cables
that the victim's murder was drug-related also gave rise to the importance
of the involvement of transnational organized crime throughout the case.
According to United States official reports, the Grenadines have been a
"pipeline for drugs transiting to the United States and the French Islands.
Substantial local trafficking organizations engaged in large scale
12. For comprehensive background on the verdict, the trial, and the entire ordeal, see a
series of articles in the Aug. 9, 1997 issue of THE HERALD-DISPATCH (Huntington, W.Va.) at
1A, by Mark Truby, Finally, Freedom: Fletchers Head for Home After Judge Directs Not Guilty
Verdict.
13. E.g., Cable Secretary of State, United States Dept. of State, DAS Hrinka's Meeting
with Vincentian Opposition Figure Gonsalves, (May 1993) (discusses how the St. Vincent
Government's obstinacy in cooperation with the United States in the investigation of a cocaine
shipment on the Lucky Star, a Vincentian-flagged vessel, came from the fear of possible drug
traffickers' reaction) (on file with author).
14. The media reported the underground economy in St. Vincent, protection by the St.
Vincent Government of criminals caught in law enforcement investigations, and corruption in
government supported projects had apparent participation by criminal elements. See, e.g., P.C.
Hughes, E.C.G.C. Fiasco, Etc., THE VINCENTIAN, May 23, 1997, at 15 (discusses the failure on
ill-advised construction projects in the Grenadines due in part to corruption and irregularities);
Government Continues Talks on Failed Marina Project, THE ST. VINCENT HERALD, June 16,
1997 (discusses the failed Ottley Hall project due partly to the bankruptcy of its Italian investors);
P.C. Hughes, This Most Hideous N.D.P. 7Yrant, THE VINCENTIAN, May 9, 1997, at 15
(concerns the $30 million Campden Park Container Terminal Project and its approval without
advice of the cabinet).
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acquisition, storage, and transshipment of cocaine, often in ton lots."" The
problem of cocaine transiting through the Grenadines 6 and allegations of
corrupt payments and loans to public officials have increased."
The facts of the case should have been reason to invoke 22 United
States Code section 1732. It provides:
Whenever it is made known to the President that any
citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of
his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign
government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith
to demand of that government the reasons of such
imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in
violation of the rights of American citizenship, the
President shall forthwith demand the release of such
citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably
delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not
amounting to acts of war and not otherwise prohibited by
law, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or
effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings
relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be
communicated by the President to Congress."
Defense counsel argued that the irregular circumstances of the Fletchers'
arrest and detention, in conjunction with the abusive treatment and the
absence of any evidence to corroborate the charges, together with the
police's admissions of lack of evidence and apologies when they arrested
the Fletchers, required President Clinton to initiate action under the
provisions of section 1732.
Defense counsel called on the United States government to
consider further action, including the imposition of sanctions, in the event
the government of St. Vincent did not release the Fletchers or did not
provide sufficient reasons for their detention.' 9 The Fletchers' counsel
15. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 197 (Mar.
1995).
16. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 220 (Mar.
1997).
17. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 548 (Mar.
1996).
18. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1997).
19. The measures the President can take, once he finds wrongful detention, are all that will
bring pressure on the offending foreign nation short of war. For instance, the House bill
encourages the President to "suspend in part, or wholly, commercial relations with the said
Government" since the statute allows "such means not amounting to acts of war and not
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sought action under section 1732 in vain since mid-December 1996. We
argued that today the scope of the statute's protection is just as broad as
courts have recognized its applicability to varied situations, including the
unjust detention and incarceration of an American citizen by the criminal
justice system of a foreign government.30 The State Department took the
position that this 1868 statute is rarely invoked and gives it wide
discretion. Therefore, in practice, the State Department ignores the
provision. We pressed the judicial precedents that the President and the
State Department must make inquiry upon the type of information made
public in the Fletchers' case. We noted that in the Flynn case, involving
an American citizen sentenced to a six-year term of imprisonment in
Mexico, the court stated: "[Tihe language and legislative history of the
Hostage Act convince us that Congress placed a judicially enforceable duty
on the Executive to inquire into the circumstances of an American citizen's
extended detention abroad. ",21United States consular officials must use their "best efforts in
protecting the citizen's legal and human rights. "2 They are required to use
their "own creative approach" in achieving these goals. 2
Defense counsel requested the United States government to review
the Fletchers case in light of the documents that the South African
government, on its own initiative, shared with respect to corruption in St.
Vincent in the context of the Heath case. The South African government
initiated the exchange because of its concern about the abuse of rights of
the Fletchers. The actions of the South African government were quite
extraordinary.
Sandra Ingram, a foreign service officer and attorney in the United
States Embassy in Barbados, attended the preliminary investigation (P.I.)
and wrote a report?4 Although the Fletchers' counsel and family knew the
report was favorable to their contentions of procedural irregularities, and
although the Fletchers had executed a privacy waiver, suddenly the State
Department officials claimed that the report was protected. On the last day
otherwise prohibited by law." Or if economic sanctions fail, "to order the arrest and to detain in
custody any subject or citizen of such foreign Government, who may be found within the
jurisdiction of the United States." American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1981), citing 46 CONG.GLOBE 4205.
20. See, e.g., Flynn v. Schulz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1195 (7th Cir. 1986).
21. Id.; see also Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195, 199 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Flynn with
approval).
22. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 400, 401 (on file with author).
23. Id.
24. Memorandum from Sandra Ingram, United States Consul General, United States
Embassy to Barbados, Fletcher Preliminary Inquiry (March 12, 1997).
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for the State Department to furnish the Fletchers' counsel's report prior to
filing a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act, it allowed
Congressional staffers to view the report. The next day, The Herald-
Dispatch in Huntington, W.V. leaked some sensational parts of the report.
As a result, the State Department decided to release the report in its
entirety rather than with redactions.
The report would turn out to be a critical document. The conduct
of the State Department after the preliminary hearing had been alarming.
Until April 24, 1997, the State Department refused to accede to requests to
furnish the Ingram report. Until then, it had regularly furnished
documents requested by the defense counsel, although it only summarized
its diplomatic notes. In the meantime, in March 1997, the State
Department sent a cable to interested members of Congress, characterizing
the P.I. as containing no abnormal procedures. The information and
overall characterization by the cable was in sharp contrast to the Ingram
report and even to the diplomatic note sent by the United States
government dated April 16, 1997. In fact the cable even stated that "the
Prime Minister assured her (the United States Ambassador) that the case
will proceed in accordance with Vincentian law and pledged that the
Fletchers would receive medical attention whenever they needed it." The
United States Embassy cable made these statements even though they knew
that the Ingram report expressed deep concerns about the fairness and
outside influence on the judicial process, especially since the defense
counsel had constantly informed them since December 1996 of the outside
influence by the Prime Minister.
As a result of the United States government's action from March
12 until April 24, 1997, interested members of Congress and other
policymakers had been under the wrong impression that the United States
government believed the procedure was normal and fair.
The Ingram report noted that "anyone who owned a .22 handgun
and .22 ammunition and was on Bequia the night Joseph was murdered
could be the murderer. At least one witness testified he owned more than
three .22 guns and ammunition and was on Bequia the night of October
6.,
The statements that "[tihe Magistrate's decision flies in the face of
all reason" and "[tihere is not one scintilla of physical evidence connecting
the Fletchers to Jerome Joseph's murder" were important. Usually much
physical evidence is present in circumstantial cases.
25. THE INGRAM REPORT, Mar. 12, 1992, at 3 (unpublished government report obtained
by a request under the FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT) (on file with author).
26. Id.
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The report depicted that "[flear, intimidation and interference from
'higher authorities'" were factors in this case.27 According to the Ingram
report, "decisions regarding the Fletchers were being made by 'higher
authorities.'"'
The Ingram Report characterized the prosecution as a "witch
hunt" 9 and cautioned that it was highly unlikely for the Fletchers to receive
a fair trial in St. Vincent.
At the preliminary hearing, the arresting officer, Sgt. Ernest
James, admitted that at the time of charging the Fletchers he did not have
evidence of their guilt: no witness; no weapon; no fingerprints; no blood;
no ballistics; and no motive.
Apparently, because of tensions between the St. Vincent
government and the United States government, due to drastically reduced
United States foreign aid, the action by the United States in the WTO to
end preferential access for bananas, St. Vincent's main export, to the
European Union (EU) (60% of its foreign exchange), pressure to eradicate
marijuana (the second best potential earning potential for the same
growers), and the perceived snub by President Clinton of Prime Minister
Mitchell when a meeting with CARICOM Prime Ministers was scheduled
after more than two years of waiting, the United States government did not
have the courage to carry out its legal responsibilities. °
One stroke of fortune involving the Executive Branch was that
President William J. Clinton, in May 1997, was making his first and only
official visit to the Caribbean during his presidency. Because of the
eventual involvement of key politicians, including the 1996 West Virginia
Democratic gubernatorial candidate Charlotte Pritt, Senator Jay
Rockefeller (D.-W.V.), the media, and others, President Clinton publicly
raised the predicament of the Fletchers and whether their legal and medical
rights were being safeguarded at the Caribbean Summit when he met
privately with St. Vincent Prime Minister James F. Mitchell.
III. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
A key factor in the eventual resolution of the case was involvement
and pressure from the United States Congress. Initially, some members
sent expressions of interest in the case to the United States Ambassador to
St. Vincent.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. For background see the series of articles by Mark Truby, Voyage to a Nightmare, THE
HERALD-DISPATCH (Huntington, W.Va.), April 13, 14, 1997.
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Due to the Fletcher family's desire to heed the advice of their
Vincentian counsel, the United States Embassy's desire to allow the
Vincentian criminal procedure to operate without fear of any outside
pressure, and the assurances. from the Executive Branch that the case was
proceeding normally and in accordance with the law, we initially had
difficulty interesting members of Congress or their staff to follow, let alone
agitate for more action by the Executive Branch.
Normally, and even under the most urgent circumstances,
persuading the legislative branch to become actively involved in a foreign
case is difficult. Members of Congress are inclined merely to send a letter
to the United States ambassador about a case. However, they can do a lot
more. They can inquire of and urge the executive branch to become more
active. They can ultimately hold hearings in the nature of oversight or
even enact new legislation. They hold the power of the purse, an
increasingly important discretionary authority, especially when the
Republican party controls Congress. They can also approve ambassadors
and/or foreign service officers nominated for another post, and they can
also lobby for disciplinary action to be taken against United States officials
who have misbehaved. They can communicate with foreign leaders and
even visit the detained Americans in the foreign country.
In the Fletchers' case, some members of Congress phoned a few of
the international human rights organizations and urged them to consider
involving themselves in the case.
Members of Congress can visit and/or write letters to the executive
branch and/or foreign officials and make such letters available to the
media. Members can make public statements, criticizing United States
and/or foreign officials and urging compliance with the international and/or
domestic laws.
A few events in the Fletchers' case enabled us eventually to
involve more members and have some of them become active. Most
importantly, we had to find a champion in each chamber of Congress.
Through Ed Stoner, Esq., a partner with the Pittsburgh office of Reed,
Shaw, McLay, and Smith and Jim Fletcher's classmate from undergraduate
days, we were able to interest a senior staff person in Congressman Lee
Hamilton's (D-Ind.) office. Congressman Hamilton is the lead minority
person on the House Committee on International Relations. The fact that
Stoner and Fletcher attended DePaul College in Indiana and had other
Indiana ties also helped.
Just as important, constant pressure on West Virginia members of
Congress, a visit from Charlotte Pritt, visits from Sally and Rod Duncan
(Jim Fletcher's sister and nephew respectively), phone calls from J. Robert
and Kathlyn Fletcher (Jim Fletcher's parents), and jawboning in the media
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resulted in both Sen. Rockefeller (D-W.V.) and Congr. Nick Rahall's (D-
W.V.) active involvement in the case. Because Senator Rockefeller is one
of the leading members of the Democratic Party in the Senate, works with
the Clinton Administration on many issues, and personally socializes with
the Clintons and Gores, he was a formidable ally. In addition, Bob
Fletcher, Jim's father, had served on the board of the university in West
Virginia during Senator Rockefeller's tenure as that university's president.
Members of Congress started critically questioning the handling of
the case by the State Department and even eventually started a dialogue
with President Clinton. Subsequently, joint letters were sent to the St.
Vincent government and on one occasion by Sen. Rockefeller to Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright.
During the trial, when The Herald-Dispatch reporter Mark Truby's
ability to depart St. Vincent was in jeopardy, Senator Rockefeller
personally phoned United States Ambassador Jeanette Hyde, thereby
thwarting the use of a libel suit to prevent Truby from leaving St. Vincent
and to force him to jail. Intimidation of the media was a frequent tactic
during the case, thereby underscoring the importance of the media.
At critical junctures either Sally or Rod Duncan, or both, made
visits to Washington to galvanize the legislative branch. Thereafter, the
extended Fletcher family (including Penny Fletcher's two sisters in
Knetucky and Ohio) constantly contacted members of Congress. At
another critical juncture, Arturo Diaz and I visited staff persons in
Congress and briefed them on the development in the case. Personal
contact is critical to ensure involvement of many key members of
Congress, that staff persons focus on the human element and actually
review the documents and facts of the case.
IV. ROLE OF THE MEDIA
The media played a critical role in galvanizing support and
preventing the St. Vincent government from denying the Fletchers a trial.
In particular, the Prisoners in Paradise package of articles published by
The Herald-Dispatch in Huntington, West Virginia, ran on both the
Gannett News Service and the Associated Press wires. The media has
reported that Truby's courage and thorough reporting kept the Fletchers
alive, moved federal officials in the United States to action on the
Fletchers' behalf, and, finally, lead to their acquittal in a free and fair
trial.3 Indeed, the media, especially Mark Truby and John McWethy,
31. For fuller discussion, see Robert C. Gabordi, Editorial, Freedom of the Press Key to
Fletchers' Release, Pursuit of Justice, THE HERALD-DISPATCH (Huntington, W.VA.), Aug. 12,
1997.
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ABC-News, had enormous and invaluable importance in the case. While
McWethy's role was a catalyst at one important time, Truby's role was
constant, tireless, penetrating, and courageous (especially due to the still
pending libel suit brought by the now former Police Commissioner of St.
Vincent).
A. Mainstream Media
The first major break was when Nightline decided to cover the P.I.
Here the contact was Ed Stoner. John McWethy, Chief, National Security
Correspondent, ABC-News, knew Stoner from DePaul College where they
simultaneously served as editors of the school newspaper and head of
radio, respectively. Subsequently, the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) documents revealed that Nightline's involvement and some critical
inquiries helped motivate the Executive Branch to take the case more
seriously and justify the absence of more forceful action to protect the
rights of the Fletchers.
The decision by Nightline to cover the case enabled us to interest
other media outlets. The live media that covered the case, included: Inside
Edition, which did two major pieces; Extra, which did over fifteen stories;
CNN, whose Burden of Proof covered the case twice, and whose World
News and Headline News ultimately covered the case; CBS Morning News
(both television and radio); NBC World News; and then various local
affiliates of the major networks, especially in West Virginia, Kentucky,
Ohio, and Illinois, where some members of the Fletcher family resided.
An important development was that in May 1997, Julia Fletcher,
the fourteen-year-old-daughter of Jim Fletcher, along with her step-sisters
Wendy Franzen and Kathy Fletcher, called a news conference, shown on
network news reports, criticizing the St. Vincent government and warning
The Whole World Is Watching, which subsequently came to be an often
repeated theme of the defense.
In the print media an early break was the intensive, thorough, and
balanced coverage by The Herald-Dispatch and a reporter named Mark
Truby. Although coming from the Fletchers' hometown, the coverage by
Truby was not just one-sided, but exposed some of the criticisms of the
Fletchers, especially of their drunkenness and rowdy behavior in the period
leading up to the murder accusations. The Herald-Dispatch was part of the
Gannett chain, a major United States media organization whose products
include USA Today.
Sometime after the Nightline story, other major newsprint became
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interested. They included The Los Angeles Times, The Miami Herald,32
the San Francisco Chronicle,3 and Cox newspaper chain. Eventually, the
Associated Press and other syndicated print media were covering the case.
The story started appearing throughout the country. In particular, the case
even started appearing in the tourism and yachting periodicals and in the
Caribbean regional media - print media very friendly to St. Vincent.
Nevertheless, no matter how friendly they might have been in their
coverage, the exposure of the St. Vincent government's denials of
allegations of improper arrests, failure to administer basic medical
treatment to prisoners, human rights abuses, corruption, and muzzling the
media, were all adverse to the St. Vincent government and created
pressure on the government to accord the Fletchers better treatment.
B. Tourism/Sailing-Related Media
In the Fletchers' case, the travel media and the tourism and travel
industry were important. With the slow demise of banana production,
tourism was quickly becoming the number one industry and foreign
exchange earner in St. Vincent. Politically, travel and tourism, especially
the sailing industry, were important to St. Vincent. The St. Vincent Prime
Minister was from Bequia in the Northern Grenadines and had based his
economic and political strategy on attracting sailing, developing marinas,
small hotels, and sailing-based tourism (i.e., adventure and ecotourism).
Because the predicaments of both the Heaths and the Fletchers
derived from sailing in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, news of their cases
and the patterns of abuses and corruption could have devastated the St.
Vincent travel and tourism industry. Our investigations indicated that
many other tourists and sailors encountered violence, extortion from the
police, and human rights abuses. Almost weekly we documented each of
these incidents with citations, sending them to the State Department and
Congress in support of out continuing requests for action under 22 United
States Code section 1732. Apparently they sometimes found their way to
selected media outlets.
Incredibly, despite the many incidents of crime and corruption
encountered by tourists to St. Vincent, the United States Department of
State's consular bulletin on St. Vincent, including the one prepared in
January 1997, only mentioned as potential crime problems that on occasion
32. Juan 0. Tamayo, A Murder, A Rich Couple- And a Scandalized Nation, THE MIAMI
HERALD, July 24, 1997, James Anderson, Scientific Evidence in Murder Trial, THE MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 7, 1997.
33. Chronicle News Service, A Bullet, a Dead Man and Two American Party Animals,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Aug. 2, 1997, at Cl.
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tourists have had things taken on the beach and/or from boats (e.g., petty
thefts).
When the United States executive branch refused to issue an
updated travel bulletin that more accurately reflected the circumstances, the
defense team prepared and issued its own, entitled Between the Devil and
the Deep Blue Sea: Improper Detention, Extortions, and Other Nefarious
Activities in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Albeit only one page, it
provided websites, chat group sites, and ways to gain more information. It
also was a plea for persons to contact the defense team and/or persons in
the St. Vincent government; it helped galvanize persons whose only
connection with the case was watching it on television.
Just as importantly, the defense team started to contact the sailing
and ecotourism media. Here, Ed Stoner was important because he is a
sailor and has a boat similar to the Carefree, the Fletchers' boat. Again,
persuading the sailing media that the Fletchers had suffered injustices at the
hands of the St. Vincent government was difficult.3' The sailing and
ecotourism magazines are designed to promote sailing and ecotourism as a
fun, safe, and enjoyable activity. 5 Such magazines will not curry favor
with Caribbean and Vincentian officials or their advertisers by
underscoring the negative attributes and corruption encountered by sailors
there. Eventually, the accumulation of attention and publicity by the mass
media, interest by President Clinton, the legislative branch, and the
international human rights groups, and continued transmission of
information by the defense team made them interested in investigating the
accusations .36
V. INVESTIGATION
In cases in which Americans are detained and charged with crimes
abroad and in which lobbying and the media are to play roles, information
is essential. Many ways exist to assemble information, including: official
34. For some of the early stories in the sailing media, see Murder and Extortion in
Paradise, 236 LATITUDE 38, 94, (Feb. 1997) (on file with author).
35. For a typical reaction of the sailing and tourism media, see Bill Barich, Death by
Tourism, OUTSIDE 75-83 (Nov. 1997)
Jim Fletcher's family had an attorney massaging the State Department in Washington
and working the international media, and so many charges of corruption and
mistreatment had been tossed out helter-skelter that it was impossible to decipher the
truth. The people who live in St. Vincent and the Grenadines - or SVG, as it's
known - were frankly in shock.
Id.
36. See, e.g., Jim Flannery, Killers Or Victims, SOUNDINGS (Essex, Ct.), Aug. 1997, at
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reports by the United States government on human rights 7 or on the
criminal justice system of a country, information received through
responses to Freedom of Information Act requests, research from various
United States data banks, including the Foreign Information Broadcast
Service reports (summaries of television and radio media from the country
and/or region concerned), the hiring of investigative firms in the United
States and/or in the country concerned, criminal justice documents, and
international human rights reports.
With respect to international human rights reports, there was a
local Human Rights Group in St. Vincent. Although this author personally
visited St. Vincent and then phoned the head of the Vincent human rights
organization, the head of the organization was not willing to exchange
information or even confirm that his organization had a newsletter.
Further research indicated that the Harvard Law Library did have the
newsletters. We visited the Harvard Law Library and reviewed the
reports, which proved quite useful in confirming, documenting, and
elaborating to the State Department and executive branches the pattern of
human rights abuses and irregularities in the operation of the Vincentian
criminal justice system.3"
The media can provide an excellent source of information when
undertaking investigation. In many cases, if the media investigate and
report over time on a case and perceive abuses and injustices, they can
become allies and will provide the defense counsel with various leads.
In the case of St. Vincent, the abuses and human rights
37. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 1992 (1993) (it discusses the calls for investigations into fatalities
resulting from police shootings in 1992 although no investigations occurred); U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 1995 (1996); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
1994, 1 (Mar. 1995) (on file with author) (it discusses the high number, estimated at ninety
percent by the regional human rights group, Caribbean Rights, of convictions by confessions and
the use of unwarranted police practices, including the use of physical force during detention,
illegal search and seizure, and not properly informing those arrested of their rights; it also
discusses the absence of any instances of the SVGs successful conviction and punishment of
police officers involved in such abuses).
38. See, e.g., its discussion of a United Nations report criticizing prison conditions as
violating the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules. VINCY RIGHTS: BULLETIN OF THE ST. VINCENT
AND THE GRENADINES HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION (St. Vincent and Grenadines Human
Rights Association, S. Africa), Sept. 1989, at 5 (on file with author); SVG-HRA Reviews The
Administration of Justice in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, VINCY RIGHTS: BULLETIN OF THE
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION (St. Vincent and
Grenandines Human Rights Association, S. Africa), July 1990, at 1-2 (on file with author).
(criticizing the police conduct in criminal cases and calling for an independent review board or
Citizen's Committee to inquire into complaints made by citizens of abuse and criminal behavior
committed by the police).
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deprivations had occurred over a long period of time. As a result, this
author persisted in developing a dialogue with a variety of people, such as
former high-level Vincentian politicians, media reporters and
commentators in St. Vincent," Vincentian politicians and law enforcement
officials, United States government officials who deal with St. Vincent,
diplomatic officials from other countries who deal with St. Vincent, and
concerned Vincentian business persons. They provided sympathy, verified
and supplemented much information, and gave us many new leads. For
instance, a Vincentian lawyer and op-ed author characterized the Fletchers'
and Heath cases as important because they brought attention to atrocities
suffered by poor and virtually defenseless Vincentians at the hands of the
police. In fact, he said the violations were so frequent that he coined the
phrase illegal normality to describe them.4'
Our investigation was aided by a book written by a former editor
of a sailing magazine, whose book Sitting Ducks chronicles the intrigues
that started when she and her husband (her boyfriend at the time) were
startled one night when their yacht was boarded by a naked local native
armed with a machete. The intruder stabbed her husband, but was then
maced and caused no further harm. The book discusses the difficulties her
husband had in obtaining medical treatment (e.g., his father removed him
from the local hospital to a private doctor's clinic after he became infected
in the hospital). Most importantly, her book discusses police ineptitude
and corruption." It mentions how the Mitchells' (James F., only a member
of Parliament at the time, and his wife, at the time, Pat) acknowledged the
police problems and then introduced the author to Nolly Simmons, who
served as the local criminal investigator. Sure enough, Simmons located
the culprit and had him arrested. Local law enforcement and the judicial
community, however, protected the assailant and mislead her repeatedly
about the proceedings, so that even after she initiated many phone calls,
39. E.g., Frank E. Da Silva, Hans Matadial, Our Millstone, THE VINCENTIAN, May 30,
1997 at 15, col. I (it discusses the role of the alleged bag-man for high-level officials in the St.
Vincent Government in arranging illegal pay-offs. He is the person to whom Alan Heath
allegedly paid $25,000).
40. Cecil Blazer Williams, Television, Police and Justice, THE NEWS (Kingstown, St.
Vincent), May 17, 1997; Cecil Blazer Williams, Police Excesses, THE NEWS (Kingstown, St.
Vincent), April 19, 1997; and Cecil Blazer Williams, Dat Bad-Dat Good, THE NEWS
(Kingstown, St. Vincent) March 1, 1996.
41. BETSY HITZ-HOLMAN, SITrING DUCKS 133-34 (1984) (it provides details of proactive
means that the St. Vincent Criminal Investigation Division canvassed yachts and homes of
foreigners on the pretext of checking passports, visas and cruising permits, while planting drugs
on unsuspecting travellers. Upon discovering the drugs, the agents would typically demand on-
the-spot payoffs or sexual cooperation from women, threatening their victims with exposure and
stiff fines if convicted).
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the case was dismissed .42 One of the greatest problems for the Fletchers
was that the main protagonist and witness against them was Nolly
Simmons. More importantly, Penny Fletcher's altercations with Pat
Mitchell (the Prime Minister's former wife), Nolly Simmons, and other
friends of the Prime Minister apparently had solidified the desire of the St.
Vincent government to turn the screws on them.
Sitting Ducks also discusses the murder of Carl Schuster, an
American yachtsman who was killed aboard his boat Zig Zig in or around
1978 by a machete in the same harbor where the Heaths' yacht was
attacked in October 1996. The attacker was never prosecuted. The book
notes how the Vincentians were mainly concerned about the potential
adverse impact his death would have on tourism.4 3
VI. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FORA
In cases where United States citizens are illegally detained abroad
and subject to violations of international human rights treaties, counsel
should consider what, if any, recourse there may be to international human
rights fora. In the Fletchers' case, documenting abuses of their
international human rights was pivotal. I immediately determined that the
St. Vincent government had ratified the Civil and Political Covenant and
even the optional protocol, thereby authorizing individual victims to bring
petitions. I finally documented and briefed each incident in which an
abuse occurred, noting the provisions of the Civil and Political Covenant
that were breached.
In particular, counsel for such persons may be able to bring an
action before either the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or the
United Nations Human Rights Committee. Neither of these avenues will
produce a quick judgment or order for the host government to release the
individuals. Nevertheless, they can be powerful mechanisms to focus the
attention of the public, international organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, and policymakers in the host and other interested
governments. The filing of an action in an international human rights fora
will make policymakers, both in the host government and in the United
States government, focus on the particularities of the alleged abuses,
making the host government answer the allegations.
Just as important, the preparation and filing of a petition can help
mobilize the media and other interested persons. The filing and acceptance
by an international human rights fora of a complaint will itself indicate that
42. Id. at 117-18.
43. Id.
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the claims of the alleged victim(s) may have substance.
Unfortunately, although this author did prepare a petition for filing
in an international human rights fora, he was not actually able to file the
petition. Politics intervened. Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, the lead counsel in St.
Vincent for the Fletchers was also the leader of the opposition party. If he
helped and was associated with the filing of a petition alleging that his
executive and judicial branches were participants in depriving persons of
their fundamental human rights, he apparently perceived his political
standing would be compromised. Because a petition in an international
human rights fora (i.e., United Nations Human Rights Committee) requires
a certification from local counsel that local remedies have been exhausted,
his cooperation and approval was required. Theoretically, we could have
obtained a certification from other counsel, but the use of a third local
counsel would have been impolitic, although this avenue was explored.
His unwillingness to sign the certification blocked use of this potential
mechanism.
Still another avenue was to enlist an international human rights
nongovernmental organization (NGO) in the case. This author sought out
several international human rights organizations. The difficulty of
obtaining help from an international human rights NGO is that they have
few resources for the number of their projects and commitments.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth Caribbean is traditionally viewed as
having a comparatively strong human rights position and therefore not in
need of interventions from international human rights NGOs.
International human rights NGOs that work in the Western
Hemisphere focus primarily on Central America, the Andes, and countries
in which thousands of persons are suffering endemic and systemic
violations. In the Caribbean, they tend to focus on countries such as Haiti
or Cuba. The comparative absence of traditional reporting on human
rights problems in St. Vincent, except the national newsletter which has an
extremely limited circulation, made most organizations hesitate to believe
such abuses could exist. Such NGOs also prefer to help indigent and
defenseless people. Persuading NGOs to help wealthy, white Americans
posed an additional obstacle, since they understandably prefer to
concentrate their limited resources on the oppressed, underprivileged, and
poor.
Eventually, the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights (LCHR) did
become involved and issued a Lawyer-to-Lawyer letter. Immediately
before the P.I., one of their lawyers almost attended the P.I. as an
observer. Through constant dialogue with the LCHR, the latter was able
to follow the mounting international human rights violations suffered by
the Fletchers. Just as important, defense counsel gained knowledge about
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the types of international human rights the LCHR prioritized. Eventually,
overreaching by the St. Vincent government triggered the LCHRs
involvement.
The few human rights books on the Caribbean proved an important
source of information because they covered the suppression and
manipulation by the existing St. Vincent government of the media and its
coverage of criminal cases and related public policy issues."
Through other investigation, we uncovered and exposed the
detention and expulsion on August 26, 1986 of Cert Declerq, a Belgian
reporter working with Trends Financial magazine, who was investigating
alleged financial frauds perpetrated by offshore banks in St. Vincent.45 Our
exposure of this and similar incidents proved a precursor of the aggressive
action by the St. Vincent government to influence the media coverage of
the case.
On the publicly owned media, the St. Vincent Prime Minister
made public statements, referring to the Fletchers as "classic ugly
Americans" and stating that most Vincentians believed the Fletchers were
guilty. These statements followed his promise to President Clinton of fair
process and that the judiciary was independent. The Prime Minister, in a
visit to the United States, criticized the United States media's reporting on
the Fletchers' case and on charges of corruption in the Heath case, and
said he still thought Alan Heath was guilty for his wife's brutal murder.
He invited the media to interrogate the lawyers who represented Heath.
When the government media arranged an interview with Dr. Ralph
Gonsalves, counsel for both Heath and the Fletchers, the media abruptly
cancelled the interview at the last minute, angrily citing orders from the St.
Vincent government as reasons for the cancellation.
On the eve of trial two incidents spurred the involvement of the
LCHR. On July 4, 1997, Ralph Gonsalves, the lead defense counsel in St.
Vincent, was served with a summons for criminal contempt. The charges
were based on his comments immediately after the P.., on March 10,
1997, in which he characterized the magistrate's decision a "travesty of
44. E.g., Rickey Singh, Freedom of Expression in the Caribbean, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 179-81 (1991) (the former Attorney
General of St. Vincent threatened legal action against the writer of a contentious article in the
newspaper THE VINCENTIAN and extracted an apology and promise not to ridicule the integrity
of a Vincentian judge in exchange for non-prosecution of the journalist).
45. See, Immigration Officials Expel Belgian Journalist, FOREIGN BROADCASTING
INFORMATION SERVICE, Aug. 2, 1986, at S3 (citing the Caribbean Area News Association, Aug.
26, 1986).
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justice."" Similar comments by him were reported by the St. Vincent
press and on an ABC-Nightline segment devoted to the case. The fact that
the St. Vincent government waited four months later - specifically on the
eve of the trial - to charge Gonsalves, and then set his trial for the very
same day as the Fletchers' trial, signalled the politicization of the criminal
justice system.
On July 7, 1997, as he entered St. Vincent, Arturo Diaz, Esq., a
lawyer with the firm Cancio Nadal Rivera & Diaz based in Puerto Rico,
and who was in charge of the overall coordination of the defense team, was
detained at the airport by St. Vincent Authorities. They interrogated him
about a letter he had sent to the United States Consul general, at the
consul's request. The letter alleged conversations between Diaz and an
individual purporting to negotiate on behalf of the St. Vincent government
for the Fletchers' release in exchange for a cash payment. On advice of
counsel, Diaz refused to answer questions about the letter, and was
released that day. Previously, an attorney and bagman for the St. Vincent
Prime Minister and Police Commissioner had threatened to charge Diaz
with criminal libel for comments he made about the apparent extortion
solicitation relating to the case.
Already, at this time the St. Vincent Police Commissioner, who
was the target of corruption accusations in this case and in the Heath case,
had sued Mark Truby of The Herald-Dispatch for civil libel. Truby was
clearly the leading journalist on the case in terms of the quantity and
quality of pieces.
The LCHR issued and broadly disseminated its Lawyer-to-Lawyer
letter, condemning the actions of the St. Vincent government. The LCHR
cited Principle 16 of the United Nation's Basic Principles on the Role of
Lawyers. It states that "governments shall ensure that lawyers (a) are able
to perform all of their professional functions without intimidation,
hindrance, harassment or improper interference; and (b) shall not suffer, or
be threatened with, prosecution or administrative, economic or other
sanctions for any action taken in accordance with recognized professional
duties, standards and ethics."
It recommended sending letters, urging authorities in St. Vincent
and the United States that all measures be taken to guarantee a fair trial
without additional hindrance against the legitimate activities of defense
counsel.
The Lawyer-to-Lawyer network, combined with the many media
pieces and Congressional interest and criticism, exerted pressure on the St.
46. John McWethy & Ted Koppel, Nightmare in Paradise (ABC Nightline television
broadcast, May 2, 1997) Transcript No. 97050201-jo7, at 7.
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Vincent government, and most likely added credibility to many of the
charges of the defense team and the media, even though the government
denied that such pressure had any influence at the time.
VII. POTENTIAL ROLES OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS
Other governments can play an important role in international
criminal and human rights cases. Normally, governments cooperate with
each other in the investigation and prosecution of a transnational criminal
case. In an era where transnational criminal groups are playing important
and growing roles, the number of law enforcement groups involved in the
investigation and prosecution of cases has multiplied exponentially. As a
result, the numbers, types, and levels of experience, sophistication, and
honesty among law enforcement officials vary widely.
An important element in the Fletchers' detention was the inordinate
influence in St. Vincent economics and politics of transnational organized
crime. The defense team focused on this problem and its national security
implications as reasons for action in support of the Fletchers. The concern
about the penetration of St. Vincent by transnational organized crime
seemed to be the reason for Joseph's murder. FOIA documents and
reports from other government sources indicated that Joseph's murder was
drug related. Prior reports by the United States government and the media
of the increasing use of the Grenadines and St. Vincent for cocaine
transshipment and money laundering seemed to be a reason that the St.
Vincent government had to divert attention from this line of investigation,
especially since it would have produced more pressure for the Vincentian
government to take remedial action and would have damaged the political
standing of an already fragile government.
When a United States person is arrested and prosecuted abroad, the
United States government sometimes is the initiator and driving force
behind the investigation. On other occasions the United States government
is an important participant. In cases in which the United States
government is an important participant in conducting investigations and
prosecutions, its willingness to help may be more constrained than when it
is not a participant. Nevertheless under 22 United States Code section
1732 and Sec. 400 of the Foreign Affairs Manual, the State Department
has an obligation to protect the legal and medical rights of an American
detained and to do everything possible, even using its creativity, to protect
the rights of detained Americans. The same United States Embassy
overseas that houses attaches from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
United States Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the
Internal Revenue Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and
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other law enforcement agencies. The United States Embassy and these
agencies cooperate with the United States agencies and host government on
the very criminal investigations and prosecutions that result in the arrest of
Americans. When the United States Embassy and its Consul General
provide services to protect the legal and medical rights of American
persons detained abroad, they may not be inclined to be as sympathetic,
creative, and energetic as they would be in cases in which the United
States government is not a participant in the investigation and prosecution.
In cases in which the United States government is not a participant
in the investigation and prosecution, the ability and willingness of the
United States government to take major steps toward pressuring the host
government to protect the legal and medical rights of Americans may be
colored by other foreign policy matters. As mentioned above, in the case
of the Fletchers, the United States relationship with St. Vincent was
already strained by many factors.
One problem was the litigation brought by the United States in the
World Trade Organization to end illegal preferences extended to bananas
from the Eastern Caribbean, including St. Vincent. The sale of bananas
recently represented one-half of St. Vincent's foreign exchange. Because
the St. Vincent Prime Minister comes from the Grenadine islands, an area
ignored to such an extent before his election that Union Island had an
armed rebellion, the current St. Vincent government is perceived as unduly
favoring the Grenadines and not helping mainland St. Vincent, where the
banana growing occurs. The next potential cash crop is marijuana.
However, under heavy pressure and occasional criticism from the United
States, the St. Vincent government has agreed to and facilitated eradication
of the marijuana crop. The United States used to be a heavy provider of
foreign assistance to St. Vincent, but has phased out almost all of its aid.
The only aid that continues is related to narcotics, which is politically
detrimental to the St. Vincent government. In addition, in the context of
the issuance of the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the
United States has commented on the corruption surrounding the efforts by
St. Vincent to act on counternarcotics enforcement.
In other cases, such as the example presented by the United States
citizens who accidentally crossed from Kuwait into Iraq after the Gulf War
and were arrested and convicted of crimes, the realities of United States -
Iraqi relations made it difficult for the United States to exert pressure on
Iraq to release the two Americans.
Other governments can play important roles. In the case of the
Fletchers, the South African government was key. It furnished important
information that it could have kept confidential and provided enormous
moral support. Its officials spent much time talking to defense counsel and
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to the media.47 The Heath family constantly sent communications in support
of the Fletchers." The defense team was able to show how identical much
of the illegal behavior of the St. Vincent government officials was in both
the Heath and the Fletcher cases. The outrage of South African
government officials helped the Fletcher family and supporters, defense
counsel, and ultimately the legislative branch understand the patterns of
illegality. Interestingly enough, the United States executive branch
maintained that the cases were different. The active support of the South
African government undermined the credibility of the denials by the St.
Vincent government officials.
In the Fletchers' case, the South African government's care and
attention to detail and follow up in the diplomatic notes was much greater
than that of the United States government. It enabled defense counsel to
suggest that the United States government be equally as efficient in both
the preparation of notes and insistence on replies and/or other action. The
media underscored the similarity between the two cases and the contrasting
conduct between the South African and United States governments in
protecting their nationals.
Interestingly, in October 1997, the Durban South African police
were able to conduct investigations in St. Vincent. As a result, one person
confessed that he and another person had murdered Lorraine Heath. It
happened precisely as Alan Heath claimed to the St. Vincent police and the
media.49
In some cases, foreign governments, other than the United States
and the host government, will be interested in the case. An example is the
Fletchers' case, discussions of human rights abuses, corruption, and
dangers to tourists in St. Vincent had an adverse impact on tourism,
especially sailing tourism, in the Eastern Caribbean. Some people confuse
Grenada with the Grenadines. Even if they understand the difference,
47. Keith Ross, Yachtie's Death Furore, DAILY NEWS (Durban, S. Africa) May 16, 1997
(on file with author) (about the connection between the Heath and Fletchers cases and the
cooperation between the two families).
48. See, e.g., Marvin Meintjies, Caribbean Cruise Ordeal, DAILY NEWS (Durban, S.
Africa), May 29, 1997 (on file with aurhor) (report of a meeting between Nigel Heath, brother of
Alan Heath, and Rod Duncan, nephew of Jim Fletcher, comparing notes and showing photos of
them).
49. Keith Ross, St. Vincent Killers Identified, DAILY NEWS (Durban, South Africa), Oct.
6, 1997 (on file with author); Keith Ross, Don't Hang Them, Says Husband, DAILY NEWS
(Durban, South Africa) The articles state that Durban Supt. Todd Suomaroo and Supt. Allan
Alford identified the murderers as wanted criminal Dalton Kiel and a man known only as
Muslim. Id. Kiel is wanted by the police in Trinidad on five counts of armed robbery and other
offenses. Mr. Kiel had confessed to an informant on the island that he and Muslim had
committed the murder and robbery. Id.
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many sailors who would visit the Grenadines, continue on to Carricou (an
island which is part of Grenada and the first island south of the Grenadines
chain) and Grenada. In addition, in the Fletchers' case, the St. Vincent
Prime Minister, who is the longest sitting Prime Minister in the Caribbean
Common Market and Community, characterized the case as an attack on
the entire Caribbean and on the legal system of the region. This
mischaracterization was a political move to develop active support from his
political allies. Hence, defense counsel naturally had to explain to the
diplomats from surrounding islands that our efforts were merely directed at
saving the lives of two innocent Americans, attempting to obtain a speedy
and fair trial for them in one country, and protecting their international
human rights. We noted that a certain high level official of the St. Vincent
government was trying, at every opportunity, to regionalize the case when
it was in the best interests of the region to isolate it as St. Vincent's
problem.
Governments can decide to become involved at various times in
different cases. In a high visibility case, such as the efforts to prosecute
the former Shah of Iran and Manuel Noriega, the efforts of foreign
governments and even international organizations (e.g., the Organization
of American States in the case of Noriega) are activated. The handling of
the atrocities during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
and the efforts to bring to justice the persons allegedly responsible for the
Lockerbie case, illustrate the involvement of the United Nations and other
international organizations. The cases involving the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda even indicate the ability to create a new international
organizatioi: for the sole purpose of bringing justice to the investigations
and prosecutions of those responsible for the atrocities.
VIII. LESSONS
An important lesson is to file early, and often, Freedom of
Information Act requests for documents related to the case. In the
Fletchers' case the requests produced a weekly flow of documents on both
the handling of the Fletchers' case and the handling of other cases in St.
Vincent. Even if the State Department does not respond timely, the
administrative appeals and/or litigation normally will produce useful
documents. The requests and appeals also create pressure on the executive
branch whose obligations are to assist in protecting the legal rights of
Americans detained abroad.
Personal contacts and family networks can be crucial. One cannot
underestimate the enormous importance of fourteen-year-old Julia Fletcher
in galvanizing the media to support her efforts in securing justice for her
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father; the constant efforts of the extended Fletcher family's contacts and
networks; and many individuals who responded to articles and participated
in the lobbying efforts, even though they had no connection with the
Fletchers or the family.
The ability to have someone design strategy with respect to the
governments, media, and nongovernmental organizations, and then design
and prepare communications, and help implement the strategy are
essential. Because of the diversity of people involved, it can become
complicated to manage the paper flow and to connect the various people.
A proper assessment of the interaction between domestic and
international law, comparative law, and foreign policy is required. Just as
important, someone must constantly monitor the strategy and its
implementation, since it will need constant adjustment in accordance with
events. Hence, a strategy reassessment is required every so often.
These cases often take time. Hence, deep pockets and patience are
helpful. When a loved one is incarcerated overseas in difficult
circumstances, tension and stress exist among family and friends. They all
make sacrifices and cannot continue to make the sacrifices indefinitely.
Sometimes, they require candid assessment for the predicament of their
loved ones, so that they are able to deal with the predicament for the
duration of the ordeal. For instance, most observers would not have
expected the situation with the United States hostages in Iran after the
takeover of the United States Embassy to have lasted for almost the bulk of
the Carter Administration.
The family's budget is often a limiting factor. Hard decisions must
be made based on the financial situation. In some cases, help from the
executive and legislative branches and from non-governmental
organizations can help leverage professional services when budgets are
limited.
The reactions of the host government are important. On the one
hand, the St. Vincent government underestimated the impact of the media
and sympathy and interest in the case. On the other hand, when it became
active, criticizing the media and then insisting on rebuttal time both
personally and through a public relations firm,5 it only focused more
attention on the allegations. More recently, the reports of a confession by
the alleged murderer of Lorraine Heath and the dismissal by the judge of
the case, commenting there was no direct or indirect evidence against the
Fletchers, undermined the government's efforts. Nevertheless, the St.
Vincent government is still trying to restore its reputation by castigating
50. Government Hires P.R. Firm in Fletcher Case, THE HERALD (Bequia, St. Vincent)
June 12, 1997.
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the media.'
In the Fletchers' case the facts were helpful because there was no
evidence against the Fletchers with respect to the murder in question. A
difficult element of the Fletchers' case was that the murder charge did not
permit bail in St. Vincent. If the defendant from the United States or
another country is a member of or knowingly working with a transnational
organized crime group (not the case in either the Fletchers' or Heath
cases), especially in the active commission of transnational crimes, then
the lobbying work becomes more difficult. Even more difficult would be
lobbying on behalf of a person charged with genocide or war crimes
conducted over a long period of time.
Another important element in the Fletchers' case was that, after the
P.I., the defense team retained Dr. Richard L. Johnny Cheltenham to
represent Penny Fletcher. He was diligent in preparing technical legal
motions, a brilliant orator, and tireless in his preparation. Politically, he
had no ax to grind. He was a Barbadian, a member of Parliament, and a
very distinguished and experienced lawyer who had defended many murder
cases. His cooperation with Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, who was also an
experienced criminal trial lawyer and brilliant orator, and the rest of the
team proved a formidable combination.
Lobbying in public international law issues concerning serious
transnational crimes is an art, not a science. It is not for the weak at hand.
It requires investigative skills, an assessment of the many variables at-play
in the existing legal and diplomatic elements, and pursuit of a multi-faceted
strategy that must be periodically reassessed and adjusted. When a loved
one is lost in paradise in circumstances such as the Fletchers', international
lawyers, governments, and others who believe in the rule of law must be
involved.
51. Associated Press, St. Vincent Leader Attacks Media, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Aug.
15, 1997, at 7A; Dugie Joseph, St. Vincent Leader Criticizes Media, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
Aug. 15, 1997, at C1.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Transnational human rights litigation has succeeded at a steady
pace since the Second Circuit's 1980 decision, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.' In
Filartiga, the court construed an eighteenth century statute - the Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 2 - as granting both a cause of action and
jurisdiction to two Paraguayan citizens.3 The ATCA provides: "[D]istrict
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or treaty of the
United States."' Accordingly, the Second Circuit permitted the Filartigas
to file suit against a Paraguayan official for violating the customary
* M.A., Yale University, 1998; J.D. candidate, Yale Law School, 1999, Ph.D. candidate,
Yale University, 2000. I owe many thanks to David S. Bedeerman, Drew S. Days, III, Paul
Dubinsky, Robert D. Harrison, Derek P. Jinks, Harold Hongju Koh, Ruti Teitel, and Beth Van
Schaack. This Article is dedicated to Jennifer Morrow.
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
3. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
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international law against torture since the official had allegedly tortured to
death Dr. Filartiga's seventeen year-old son. Over the years, the Filartiga
ruling has achieved a strong following in several other circuits.,
Notably, the Filartiga line of cases was temporarily disturbed by a
contrary District of Columbia Circuit decision Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic.6  Congress effectively overturned that case by passing the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)., The TVPA contadicts Judge
Bork's position in Tel Oren that the ATCA could not establish a cause of
action for modem customary international law.8 The Statute enumerated
two specific causes of action, torture and extrajudicial killing, leaving the
remainder of the ATCA intact. Now several years after the TVPA,
Section 1350 case law has continued to develop; with more circuits
following the Filartiga decision and other causes of action being deemed
appropriate for litigation.9In this discussion, I analyze the TVPA and its legislative history to
demonstrate the scope and consequence of Congress' endorsement of
human rights litigation. This endeavor is undertaken primarily in response
to an emergent challenge to transnational human rights litigation. That is,
a handful of scholars have recently argued that the consensus view on
international law includes an ill-founded maxim that customary
international law is federal common law.1o This critique, which has been
called the revisionist position, potentially disrupts ATCA litigation.
Specifically, if customary international law is not federal common law, the
federal judiciary arguably could not elaborate other causes of action
without specific political branch authorization.
5. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1992); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 189 (1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason I, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D.
Cal. 1987); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980), affd on other
grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
6. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
7. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 78, codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
8. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
9. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995) (genocide); Doe v. Unocal,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5094, 32-35 (March 25, 1997) (slave trade).
10. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of Human Rights Litigation, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. (1997); Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and
International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Weisburd, State Courts]; Arthur
M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988); Cf.
Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665
(1986).
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Indeed, revisionists argue that customary international law should
not be federal law without a prior political branch sanction due, in large
part, to democratic accountability and separation-of-power concerns. In
response, I take the position that the TVPA blunts the force of this
criticism. In particular, the statute's text and legislative history
demonstrate: that passage of the TVPA provides ample political branch
authorization for the wider Filartiga doctrine if such authorization was
indeed necessary; and that the TVPA legislative history indicates
Congressional agreement with the conventional view that customary
international law is federal common law absent political branch action."
The TVPA, thus, both immunizes the, Filartiga doctrine from the
revisionist challenge, and brings into question the merits of the revisionist
position itself.
II. READING THE TVPA: CHOOSING AN INTERPRETIVE METHOD
My discussion primarily relates to aspects of the revisionist
critique presented by Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, since
their work both explicitly challenges Filartiga and also attempts to account
for the TVPA. Notably, Bradley and Goldsmith's argument has evolved;
that is, their position has increasingly hardened in response to their critics.
Initially, they presented their argument that political branch authorization is
necessary for federal courts to apply customary international law as federal
law, but gave no indication of rules that would define such an authoritative
signal. Derek Jinks and I argued that if such a political branch signal were
necessary, it has been given: Congress, in passing the TVPA, endorsed
the Filartiga line of cases.12
In rebuttal to our TVPA argument, Bradley and Goldsmith moved
from an earlier, cursory discussion of the statute" to recognizing that the
11. The present discussion directly builds on earlier work. See Ryan Goodman & Derek
P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (Nov. 1997). This work should be consulted for its more encompassing
analysis of the revisionist position within the context of the Filartiga doctrine. For other
extensive criticisms of the revisionist position, see Derek P. Jinks, The Federal Common Law of
Universal, Obligatory, and Definable Human Rights Norms, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
(forthcoming 1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming 1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary
International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM. L. REV.
371 (Nov. 1997); and Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land Customary International Law as
Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (Nov. 1997).
12. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 11.
13. Indeed, the initial revisionist position only briefly mentioned the statute for the limited
claim that the TVPA "[bly creating a federal cause of action for torture ... arguably provides a
basis for federal question jurisdiction for suits involving torture." Bradley & Goldsmith,
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TVPA definitely creates a cause of action for torture and extrajudicial
killing. However, they claim that the TVPA should be read, first, as
failing to endorse the Filartiga line of casesand, second, as a
Congressional rejection of Filartiga's open-ended approach. The TVPA,
they argue, should be construed to limit Section 1350 suits to only the
enumerated causes of action, torture and extrajudicial killing. They
conclude: that if Congress intended to sanction the federal courts' view
that other causes of action are permitted under Section 1350, the text of the
statute would have to stipulate such an endorsement explicitly. In short,
this most recent articulation of their position effectively denies the very
possibility of federal common law; since the Congress must specify by the
full extent of the judiciary's interpretive domain.
Indeed, to avoid the TVPA destructive implications for the
revisionist position, Bradley and Goldsmith implicitly now appear to
embrace Justice Scalia's textualist approach to statutory interpretation.
Conspicuously, Bradley and Goldsmith eschew discussion of any details of
the legislative history. Instead, they perform a series of exercises that
accord with the textualist approach: comparing the purposes of analogous
statutes and making inferences from the structure of the statute as a whole.
Most importantly, their suggested requirement of a clear textual statement
closely accords with the central "radical" 1 principles of Justice Scalia's
textualism. Ultimately, their approach departs from established
conventions not only of international law but also of statutory
interpretation.
In contrast to Bradley and Goldsmith's approach, I interpret the
meaning and purpose of Section 1350 and the TVPA by including a close
examination of the TVPA legislative history. The judiciary's general
method of statutory interpretation encourages this use of legislative
history." And, my assessment of the TVPA, in particular, relies on the
Customary International Law, supra note 10, at 873 n.356 (citing Weisburd, State Courts, supra
note 10, at 3-4); see also Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 10, at 56 ("Congress can enact
statutes creating federal causes of action for violations of international law, as it has done with
respect to torture, for example.") This brief aside offered no indication of either the deep
interconnections between the TVPA and Section 1350, or the extensive legislative history
concerning congressional support of the Filartiga doctrine. Furthermore, claiming the TVPA
arguably provides a cause of action for torture is unnecessarily ambiguous; and discussing the
statutes application only to torture - when the body of the statute also deals extensively with
extrajudicial killings - suggests a surface reading of simply the statute's title.
14. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (1990).
15. In 1983, Judge Patricia Wald remarked: "No occasion for statutory construction now
exists when the Court will not look at the legislative history." Patricia M. Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 195 (1983). Although the frequency of the Court's reliance on legislative history has
declined, nearly all the Justices still generally agree to the utility of legislative history in statutory
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most authoritative aspects of the relevant record committee reports' 6 and
statements by the bill's sponsors. 7
IH. LESSONS OF THE TVPA
An honest appraisal of the TVPA legislative history reveals clear
Congressional support for the consensus position: that Filartiga was
rightly decided and that customary international human rights law is
federal common law. This assessment can be analyzed in three parts.
That is, examining the TVPA text and legislative history establishes: a)
Congress did not intend the TVPA to prevent the litigation of other causes
of action under the ATCA; b) Congress' intent endorsed the Filartiga
doctrine; and c) Congress agreed with the conventional view that
customary international law is federal common law. I discuss each of
these assessments in turn.
A. The TVPA Should Not Limit Other ATCA Causes of Action
A textualist would be hard pressed to prove the TVPA should limit
the scope of the ATCA. Judges have read the ATCA to include a clear
substantive component: a relatively open-ended cause of action for torts
committed in violation of the law of nations. The TVPA provides no
statement, clause, or provision to suggest Congressional disagreement with
the prevailing judicial application of the ATCA. Moreover, a strong
presumption rests against interpreting a subsequent statute to limit the
effect of a prior statute, without a clear Congressional statement to such an
interpretation. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 751 (2d ed. 1995) ("The Supreme Court still relies on
committee reports (even if less than before), and in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501
U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991), all of the other Justices joined in a footnote explicitly rejecting Justice
Scalia's general proposition that legislative history is irrelevant to proper statutory
interpretation.").
16. Wald, supra note 15, at 201 ("Committee reports remain the most widely accepted
indicators of Congress' intent."); ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 15, at 743 ("Most judges
and scholars agree that committee reports should be considered as authoritative legislative history
and should be given great weight (i.e., a statement in a committee report will usually count more
than a statement by a single legislator)."); Id. ("Committee reports appear particularly well-
suited for the authoritative role they play. Most legislation is essentially written in committee or
subcommittee, and any collective statement by the members of that subgroup will represent the
best-informed thought about what the proposed legislation is doing.").
17. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 15, at 791 ("The qualms courts and commentators
may have about relying on statements made during floor debates and in legislative hearings often
disappear when the speaker is the sponsor of the bill or amendment that includes the statutory
provision being interpreted.").
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effect.'8 Indeed, examining the structure of the statute as a whole now with
the codification of the TVPA at Section 1350 supports the consensus view:
the statute encompasses more than jurisdictional issues. That is, the
ATCA wing like the TVPA wing creates procedural jurisdiction, but also
creates a substantive cause of action. Several federal courts, relying on
their "reading of the plain text of Section 1350," have recognized similar
implications.' 9 Notwithstanding these assessments, at worst, Section 1350
statutory construction is unclear. And, in the event of textual ambiguity,
even a plain meaning rule would permit recourse to legislative history 20
The TVPA legislative history reveals one pervading concern in the
Congressional deliberations: that passage of the TVPA should not disturb
the ongoing development of ATCA litigation. Indeed, the House's
principal sponsor of the TVPA - Representative Gus Yatron - specially
denounced interpreting the TVPA as a narrowing device:
International human rights violators visiting or residing in
the United States have formerly been held liable to money
damages under the Alien Torts Claims Act. It is not the
intent of the Congress to weaken this law, but to strengthen
and clarify it. Federal courts should not allow
Congressional actions with respect to this legislation to
prejudice positive developments, but rather to act upon
existing law when ruling on the cases presently before
them.2 '
18. Id. at 645 (explaining the interpretive rule "that one provision of a statute should not
be interpreted in such a way as to negate or perhaps even derogate from other provisions of the
statute (to the extent that this is possible)").
19. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation II, 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Our reading of theplain text of §1350 is confirmed by the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, codified at this section.") (emphasis added); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, No. 96-1474 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4767, *54, *55 (E.D. La. Apr. 9, 1997); Kadic
v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2nd Cir. 1996); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 181, 185
(D.Mass. 1995).
20. Patricia U. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-1989 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.L.REV. 277, 285
(1990).
The Plain Meaning Rule basically articulates a hierarchy of sources from which to divine
legislative intent. Text comes first, and if it is clearly dispositive, then the inquiry is at an end.
Legislative history, therefore, still has an important role to play as long as statutory construction
is not entirely plain.
21. The Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1417 Before the Subcomm. on
Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1988) (Rep. Yatron). [hereinafter TVPA House Hearings].
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In this regard, members of the House Subcommittee asked all the
witnesses to give assurances that the legislation would endorse, rather than
weaken, other Section 1350 litigation.? In short, the TVPA legislative
history provides little, if anything, to suggest that the Congress thought the
TVPA should be a device for restricting suits; rather, the evidence
overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that Congress wanted to leave the
Filartiga doctrine, at the very least, unimpeded.
B. Congress Adopted the TVPA to Endorse the Filartiga Doctrine
The TVPA legislative history provides a surplus of evidence
concerning Congress' endorsement of progressive developments in Section
1350 case law. In particular, the House Report provides language
unequivocally supporting the Filartiga litigation, and emphasizes the
acceptability of the judiciary's prospective incorporation of existing and
evolving customary international law norms: "[C]laims based on torture
or summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may
appropriately be covered by Section 1350. The statute should remain
intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen
in the future into rules of customary international law."23
Correspondingly, the Senate Report reiterates the House Report,
explaining the reason Congress added the TVPA to Section 1350, rather
than replace Section 1350, was to assure the continuation of other causes
of action.'4 Additionally, the Senate Report specifically discusses ATCA
cases involving other causes of action to underscore the view that:
"[T]orture or summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that
may appropriately be covered by Section 1350."2 Indeed, the Senate's
principal sponsor of the bill, Senator Arlen Specter, explained that the
TVPA was primarily a gap-filling device, meant to safeguard the ongoing
litigation: "This bill closes a gap in the law. Under court decisions, aliens
have the right to sue their torturers under the Alien Tort Claims Act, but
not United States citizens. This bill would extend protection to United
22. TVPA House Hearings, supra note 21, at 71-72 (Rep. Yatron) (asking all panelists to
assure committee that TVPA would not weaken ATCA).
23. H. REP. NO. 367(I), 102D CONG., 1st Sess. 1991, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 1991
WL 255964 (Nov. 25, 1991).
24. S. REP. No. 249, 102D CONG., 1st Sess., 1991 WL 258662 (Leg. Hist.) at 3 (Nov.
26, 1991) (emphasis added). ("Section 1350 has other important uses and should not be
replaced.").
25. Id at 4;. ("For example, outside of the torture and summary execution context, several
Federal court decisions have relied on Section 1350.") (citing Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, 623 F.Supp 246 (1985); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864 (D. Md.
1961)).
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States citizens while retaining the current law's protection of aliens. "2
The TVPA was essentially understood as a measure to "eliminate any
uncertainty here and would compliment the ongoing litigation efforts under
the ATCA."27 In sum, Congress wanted to ensure that human rights
litigation would not be bottlenecked by Tel-Oren and passed the TVPA to
ensure the continued success of the Filartiga doctrine.
C. The TVPA Indicates Congress Joins the Consensus View that
Customary International Law is Federal Common Law
Perhaps most debilitating for the revisionist position is the Senate
Report's language strongly supporting the position that customary
international law is appropriately considered federal common law. In no
uncertain terms, the Senate Report endorses this principle, with specific
regard to the elaboration of international law in human rights cases:
While the legislation specifically provides Federal district
courts with jurisdiction over these suits, it does not
preclude state courts from exercising their general
jurisdiction to adjudicate the same type of cases. As a
practical matter, however, state courts are not likely to be
inclined or well-suited to consider these cases.
International human rights cases predictably raise legal
issues such as interpretations of international law that are
matters of Federal common law and within the particular
exFertise of Federal courts.2
The Senate Report dovetails with the House Report's emphasis on
keeping the ATCA "intact to permit suits based on other norms that
already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary
international law."29 In short, the Congress, itself, adheres to the maxim
that customary international law is federal common law, especially in
human rights cases.
26. 137 CONG. REC. S1378, 1378 (Jan. 31, 1991) (Statement of Sen. Specter) (emphasis
added); see also TVPA House Hearings, supra note 21, at 86-87 (Sen. Solomon) ("[The TVPA]
will serve, in my judgment, to clarify a technical point in the existing law.")
27. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Immigration & Refugee Affairs of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101 C., 2 S. 19 (1990) at 40-
41 (emphasis added); see also 135 CONG. REC. H6423, 6426 (Oct. 2, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Leach) (describing TVPA clarificatory function in ensuring progression of ATCA judicial
successes).
28. S. REP., supra note 24, at 6 (emphasis added).
29. H. REP. No. 367(I), 102D CONG., 1st Sess. 1991, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N., 86 1991 WL
255964 (Nov. 25, 1991).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS
After the TVPA, judges who want to respect Congress' intentions
should feel free, if not encouraged, to incorporate human rights violations
in addition to official torture and extrajudicial killing. Indeed, the
revisionist reading of the TVPA requires Herculean judicial activism to
avoid this conclusion. Furthermore, some of the revisionist arguments
concerning the TVPA demonstrate the hollowness of their claims for
democracy. Congress, after all, clearly did not want the TVPA to disturb
the incorporation of other causes of action under the Filartiga doctrine.
Yet, Bradley and Goldsmith would use the TVPA specifically for such
mischief.
At a greater level of abstraction, the TVPA also indicates
Congress' support for the continued judicial practice of applying customary
international human rights law as federal common law. Congress' stance
should confound the revisionist position. The revisionists' instruction to
courts, to incorporate as federal law only customary international law
norms that are designated by statute is a rule that the Congress, itself,
opposes.
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International law is part of United States law. Indeed, international
law - or the "law of nations" in eighteenth century parlance - has been
considered part of United States law since the founding., The Judiciary
Act of 1789, the enabling legislation of Article III,2 establishes federal
court jurisdiction over torts committed in violation of the law of nations.
This provision, the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), provides: "[D]istrict
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or treaty of the
United States."' Given the paucity of potential claims arising under
eighteenth-century "law of nations," this provision predictably generated
J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 1998; Prospective Law Clerk to William C. Canby,
Jr., United states Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Iwant to thank the many who provided
invaluable asistance: David Bederman, Drew S. Days III, Paul Dubinsky, Ryan Goodman, cathy
Ivanic, Harold Hongju Koh, and Ruti Teitel. Finally, I want to dedicate this article to my
mother, Beverly.
1. See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 55-56 (1952).
[T]he Constitution was framed in firm reliance upon the premise, frequently
articulated, that ... the Law of nations in all its aspects familiar to men of learning in
the eighteenth century was accepted by the framers, expressly or implicitly, as a
constituent part of the national law of the United States ....
2. See Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution,
82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (1988) (describing Judiciary Act as "the structural statutory law of the
new nation" and, with the Constitution, part of the "'organic laws'" of the Founding).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
466 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 4:465
few suits through the early years of the republic.4 The shockwaves of Nazi
Germany, the "final solution," and Nuremberg would, however,
fundamentally alter the landscape of international law., Since the end of
World War II, international law has regulated not only relations between
states, but also relations between states and their citizens.6  Individual
human rights are now indisputably part of the transnational legal system.
This development created the juridical space necessary to revive the
ATCA. Given the ever-widening consensus on the legal status of an
inviolable core of international human rights, renewed interest in the
ATCA was arguably inevitable.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala was the breakthrough case.7 In Filartiga -
aptly termed the "Brown v. Board of Education of domestic human rights
litigation"8 - the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that official torture
violates the law of nations, and, therefore, gives rise to an actionable claim
under the ATCA.9 Confronted with a constitutional challenge to the
ATCA, the Filartiga court also held that Article III permitted such
jurisdiction since the "law of nations," as part of the federal common law,
arises under the laws of the United States.'0 Filartiga has since met with
near uniform approval in the academy" and federal courts. 2 Only Judge
4. Of course, eighteenth century CIL encompassed very few norms. See Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). Additionally,
only roughly 15 treaties were in force in 1789. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction
Over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1, 46 (1985). Many scholars have offered explanations for this initial paucity of ATCA
claims. For a particularly rich account, see Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the
Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 470-71 (1989).
5. See Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political
Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2038 (1997) (discussing Nuremberg as a "paradigm
shift").
6. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 227-40 (1993);
Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than
States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1-16 (1982).
7. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
8. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L. J. 2347, 2366
(1991).
9. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
10. Id. at 887 n.20 ("International law has an existence in the federal courts independent
of acts of Congress . . . ."); Id. at 885 ("[T]he law of nations ... has always been part of the
federal common law") (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) and The Neireide,
13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815)).
11. See, e.g, Kathryn Burke, et al., Application of International Human Rights Law in
State and Federal Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 291, 321 (1983); Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G.
Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims
Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 57, 98-102 (1981); Symposium,
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Bork's now-repudiated concurrence in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic
challenged the Filartiga holding that the ATCA provided a federal cause of
action for certain international human rights violations.'3 In short, a
veritable consensus emerged that some subset of CIL, including certain
international human rights norms, is part of federal common law.
I. THE REVISIONIST CRITIQUE: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN UNITED STATES LAW?
The Filartiga line now faces a new challenge.14  This emergent
challenge to the consensus view, which Ryan Goodman and I have called
the "revisionist position,"' questions the foundations of the Filartiga
holding. This critique claims that the consensus view "is the result of a
combination of troubling developments, including mistaken interpretations
of history, doctrinal bootstrapping by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
INT'L L. 1 (1981); Symposium: Federal Jurisdiction, Human Rights, and the Law of Nations:
Essays on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305 (1981).
12. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 817 (1997)
[hereinafter Customary International Law] ("[Alimost every federal court that has considered the
modem position has endorsed it.") See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir.
1995) (describing the "settled proposition -that federal common law incorporates international
law"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) ("It is ... well settled that the law of nations is part
of federal common law."); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995) ("It is
well settled that the body of principles that comprise customary international law is subsumed
and incorporated by federal common law."); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights
Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1473, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876, 885; Xuncax, 886 F.
Supp. 162, 193; United States v. Schiffer, 836 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 31
F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
reh'g granted on other grounds 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
13. Tel-Oren 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). See also Michael
Ratner & Beth Stephens, lyrants, Terrorists and Torturers Brought to Justice; United States
Courts Provide Compensation for Victim, NEW YORK L.J., May 15, 1995, at S5. ("Judge Bork's
opinion is the only judicial opinion calling Filartiga into question. Since then every decision has
supported the result reached in Filartiga; most have awarded substantial damages.").
14. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
Current Illegitimacy of Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997) [hereinafter
Human Rights Litigation]; see also Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and
International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'LL. 1 (1995); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch
and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View
of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986).
15. See Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: Federal Common Law
and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 469 (1997).
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Relations Law, and academic fiat."16 Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack
Goldsmith suggest that - contrary to Filartiga's holding - CIL is not
federal law absent political branch authorization and, as a consequence,
federal courts should have limited, if any, jurisdiction over claims arising
under CIL." Furthermore, the revisionists argue that if CIL is not part of
federal common law, ATCA suits between non-citizens would be
unconstitutional for failure to fit under any of Article III's provisions.
Indeed, the doctrinal consequences of the revisionist critique are potentially
crippling for the Filartiga line.
The normative force of the revisionist position rests on two related
concerns. First, the revisionists suggest that international law increasingly
regulates "many areas that were formerly of exclusive domestic concern."' 8
Second, the revisionists decry the "new CIL,"' 9 which governs a broad
range of juridical relationships,20 emerges quickly,2' and is less consent-
based than traditional CIL. 2 Thus, the revisionists conclude that the "new
CIL" has many potentially troubling doctrinal implications: federal CIL
might preempt an unacceptably broad range of state laws;23 federal CIL
might involve federal courts in issues best left to the political branches;'
and federal CIL might potentially invalidate inconsistent, democratically-
produced United States political branch action.Y Under the revisionist
view, these concerns counsel against the wholesale incorporation of CIL
16. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 821.
17. A word on the parameters of my analysis is in order. First, in this short presentation,
I will not provide an in-depth explication of Bradley and Goldsmith's position. For a summary
of their argument, see Goodman & Jinks, supra note 15, at 470-79. The steps of the argument
are far more nuanced than I will discuss, however, the objections I raise here center on the
applicability of this critique to ongoing ATCA litigation. Second, I will not discuss the
implications of the Torture Victim Protection Act. For an excellent, succinct discussion of the
TVPA's relevance to this debate, see Ryan Goodman, Congressional Support for Customary
International Human Rights Law as Federal Common Law: Lessons of the Torture Victim
Protection Act, 4 ILSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. (forthcoming 1998). This short Article draws on a
more extended piece I co-authored with Ryan Goodman, supra note 15. Article written by Ryan
Goodman and I. See Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: Federal
Common Law and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 1997). This
piece summarizes one of the arguments we advance in that Article.
18. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 821.
19. See id. at 838-42.
20. See id. at 839-40.
21. See id. at 840-41.
22. See id. at 841-42.
23. See id. at 846-47.
24. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 844-46.
25. Id. at 857-58. 868-69.
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into federal common law. Bradley and Goldsmith thus conclude that
absent political branch authorization, CIL is not federal law.26
Although the revisionist position can, and has been, discredited
along many fronts, I focus here on one argument.27  My claim is that close
examination of actual judicial practice deprives the revisionist critique of
all normative force. Federal courts do not incorporate the "new CIL"
without a searching inquiry that satisfies the revisionist concerns over
democracy, separation of powers, and federalism. Thus, the actual nature
of judicial inquiries and the resultant findings merit further inspection.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN UNITED STATES
COURTS: THE STRUCTURE OF ATCA LITIGATION
The structure of controlling case law lends little support to the
revisionist critique. Indeed, the revisionist critique cautions against the
wholesale incorporation of CIL into federal common law without ever
analyzing the categories of CIL norms that courts actually deem judicially
cognizable. The structure of current ATCA litigation supports two related
conclusions. First, federal courts have developed a rigorous analytical
framework delimiting the application of international law in United States
courts; and second, this framework has, in practice, recognized a set of
wholly unobjectionable CIL claims. In short, the Filartiga line of cases
appropriately fashions a federal common law of universal human rights
norms.
Federal courts utilize a stringent tripartite test for assessing
whether an alleged act constitutes an actionable CIL claim. Filartiga
established that, under the ATCA, judicially cognizable CIL must be 1)
universal; 2) obligatory (as opposed to hortatory or aspirational); and 3)
definable." This tripartite test effectively limits the range of actionable
26. See id. at 868, 870; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 1.
27. Many commentators have provided sound critiques of the revisionist position. See
Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
1998); Goodman, supra note 17; Goodman & Jinks, supra note 17; Gerald L. Neuman, Sense
and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 FORD. L. REv. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, Law of Our Land Customary
International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORD. L. REV. 393 (1997).
28. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885-87; see also In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation II, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885-87)
("We thus join the Second Circuit in concluding that the Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1982), creates a cause of action for violations of specific, universal and obligatory international
human rights standards . . . ."); Forti v. Suarez-Mason I, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539-40 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881) (other citations omitted) ("The contours of the
requirement have been delineated by the Filartiga court and by Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren ....
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claims to a small subset of CIL, namely, jus cogens (or "compelling law")
norms. Therefore, successful ATCA plaintiffs must raise claims based on
jus cogens norms, 29  a short list of settled, peremptory norms. 0
Accordingly, the three prongs of the ATCA's "jus cogens test"3' enable a
delimited but fundamentally important category of legal norms to succeed.
Discernible patterns have emerged in ATCA litigation. Utilizing
the "jus cogens test," federal courts have identified some clearly actionable
CIL norms including: genocide,32 official torture, extra-judicial killing,3 '
This 'international tort' must be one which is definable, obligatory (rather then hortatory), and
universally condemned."); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (1995).
29. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 39th Sess., art. 53, U.N. Doc.
A/39127 (1969); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[Jus cogens 'embraces customary laws considered binding on all nations,' and 'is derived
from values taken to be fundamental by the international community, rather than from the
fortuitous or self-interested choices of nations.'") (quoting David F. Klein, A Theory for the
Application of the Customary International Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE
J. INT'L L. 332, 350-51 (1988); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmt. K 1987;
Craig Scott, et al., A Memorial for Bosnia, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 28 (1994) (Jus cogens norms
"derive from principles that the legal conscience of humankind deems essential to coexistence in
the international community.").
30. The notion of jus cogens employed in ATCA litigation closely tracks, but does not
mirror, the conventional understanding of this term in public international law. See, e.g.,
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (1995) (drawing on notion of non-derogability in
holding that "the prohibition against [the action] is non-derogable and therefore binding at all
times upon all actors."); Doe v. Unocal, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5094, *27 (C.D. Cal. March
25, 1997) ("Under the ATCA, jurisdiction may be based on a violation of a jus cogens norm
which enjoys the highest status within international law.") (citations omitted); In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation I, 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving suit
of wrongful death "by official torture in violation of jus cogens norm of international law,
properly invokes the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts under § 1350"); Siderman v.
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992) ("In Filartiga, though the court was not explicitly
considering jus cogens, Judge Kaufman's survey of the universal condemnation of torture
provides much support for the view that torture violates jus cogens.").
31. Ryan Goodman and I have elsewhere described the contours of the "jus cogens test" in
some detail. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 15, at 494-511.
32. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1996); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4767, *19-21 (E.D. La. Apr. 9, 1997); Mushikiwabo v.
Berayagwiza, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4409, *34 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1996).
33. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2nd Cir, 1980) ("inhere are few, if any,
issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so united as the limitations on a
state's power to torture persons held in its custody."); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F.Supp.
1189,1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (alleging acts of the defendant violated "a fundamental principle of
the law of nations: the human right to be free from torture"); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,
978 F.2d 493, 498 (citing Siderman v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992))
(explaining that it is "'unthinkable'" to hold that official torture does not violate customary
international law); Forti, 672 F.Supp. 1531, 1541 (expressing "no doubt" that official torture is
cognizable §1350 violation of law of nations).
34. See, eg., Forti, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp 162, 185.
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disappearances," and prolonged arbitrary detention. 6  Likewise the federal
courts have uniformly rejected a (much broader) range of CIL. Note that
many of these norms are arguably CIL, but they fail to meet the "jus
cogens test." The list of unsuccessful claims includes: expropriation of
property,3' fraud, 11 negligence in aircraft crashes3' and mismanaged sea
mhe practices of summary execution ... have been met with universal condemnation
and opprobrium.... An affidavit signed by twenty-seven widely respected scholars of
international law attests that every instrument or agreement that has attempted to define
the scope of international human rights has 'recognized a right to life coupled with a
right to due process to protect that right.' And again, not only are the proscriptions of
these acts universal and obligatory, they are adequately defined to encompass the
instant allegations. (citations omitted ).
35. See, e.g., Forti, 694 F.Supp 707; Xuncax, 886 F.Supp. 162, 185.
36. See, e.g., Forti, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541-42 (holding that prolonged arbitrary
detention has "sufficient consensus.., is obligatory, and is readily definable."
37. See, e.g., Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.Supp 209, 214-15 (N.D. I11. 1982);
Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 n. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1986) ("While there is no consensus on what
constitutes a violation of the 'law of nations,' in one area there appears to be a consensus. A
taking or expropriation of a foreign national's property by his government is not cognizable
under § 1350.")
38. See Trans-Continental Investment Corp., S.A. v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 500 F.
Supp. 565 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (concerning fraudulent misrepresentation to receive $2.5 million
deposit in bank); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2nd Cir. 1975) (involving action for
fraud, conversion, and corporate waste); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, Inc., 475 F.2d 142 (7th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (involving fraud in procuring workers from foreign country).
39. See Benjamin v. British Europena Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2nd Cir. 1978)
(finding that no evidence supports the claim that negligence constitutes law of nations violation).
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vessels,40 free speech,4 1  libel,' child custody law,' 3  and financial
misconduct."
The degree of consensus in ATCA litigation is remarkable.
Indeed, federal courts are divided on the status of only one CIL norm: the
prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. While the norm
clearly satisfies the requirements of universal condemnation and obligatory
prohibition, federal courts have disagreed about the definability of the
norm.'
5
Significantly, federal courts have closely guarded against any
unwarranted expansion of the jus cogens category." The range of potential
jus cogens violations are, of course, not a fixed set. Other norms may at
some point assume the character of a universal, obligatory norm, and
40. See Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, S.A., Pan., 255 F. Supp. 919,
923 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("Negligence in providing a seaman with a safe place in which to work,
and unseaworthiness of a vessel in that respect, are not violations of the law of nations."); Lopes
v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F.Supp. 292, 294-95 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (stating doctrine of
unseaworthiness that allowed compensation for seamen beyond maintenance and cure was
particular American principle not found under law of nations); see also Khedivial Line, S.A.E.
v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 51-52 (2nd Cir. 1960) (per curiam) (denying ATCA
jurisdiction because unrestricted right of access to harbors by vessels of all nations not a part of
law of nations).
41. See Guinto, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 ("However dearly our country holds First
Amendment rights ... a violation of the First Amendment right of free speech does not rise to
the level of such universally recognized rights and so does not constitute a 'law of nations.'").
42. See Akbar v. New York Magazine Co., 490 F.Supp 60, 63 (D.C.C. 1980) ("No treaty
concerning libel has been noted nor allegedly violated, and plaintiffs have hot alleged any
violation of "ti.t law of nations" as the term has been interpreted by the courts.").
43. See, e.g., Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1978) ("[The 'law of
nations,' to the extent that it speaks on the subject, does not demand a particular substantive rule
regarding custody of alien children.").
44. See Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 259 F.Supp 324, 328 (E.D.Pa. 1966)
(refusal of life insurance company to pay proceeds is not law of nations violation nor approaches
the calibre of cases legitimately found under § 1350); cf. Cohen v. Hartman 634 F.2d 318, 319
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that converted funds between employer and employee does not involve:
a) internal relations nor; b) affect national sovereignty and thus in no way a law of nations
violation).
45. One court has rejected such claims. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason I, 672 F. Supp. 1531,
1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("Because this right lacks readily ascertainable parameters, it is
unclear what behavior falls within the proscription . . . . Lacking the requisite elements of
universality and definability, this proposed tort cannot qualify as a violation of the law of
nations.") Conversely, one federal court, after considering the reasoning of the Ford court,
allowed the claim. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187.
46. See, e.g., Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. 162, 189 ("[C]aution is required in identifying new
violations of jus cogens."); Forti 1, 672 F.Supp, at 1542-43 ("Before this Court may adjudicate a
court claim under §1350, it must be satisfied that the legal standard it is to apply his one with
universal acceptance and definition; on no other bases may the Court exercise jurisdiction over a
claimed violation of the law of nations.').
Jinks
definable. This is the nature of an evolving legal order. Nevertheless,
federal courts have clearly exercised great caution in determining whether
an alleged offense constitutes such a violation.
III. RETHINKING REVISIONISM: THE LESSONS OF THE ATCA
LITIGATION "
Several lessons can be gleaned from the Filartiga case line. First,
the structure of the litigation underscores the distinction between CIL, in
general, and actionable CIL. The potentially troubling features of the new
CIL, while thought-provoking, are largely irrelevant to the ATCA line.
Second, prevailing judicial practice demonstrates the systematicity of the
Filartiga line. The uniform results in the case law eviscerate the
importance of the revisionist charge that CIL is "often unwritten .
unsettled . . .difficult to verify;"" the "contours [of which] are often
uncertain."48 At worst, such characterizations might be relevant to
borderline inquires. However, these characteristics cannot be fairly
attributed to justiciable or jus cogens CIL. Components of CIL that are
"difficult to verify" or "uncertain" simply do not survive the rigorous
standard articulated by federal courts.
Finally, the specific norms that federal courts have incorporated -
genocide and torture for example - are decidedly unobjectionable.
Bradley and Goldsmith refer only to deeply disputed norms, such as the
death penalty, when articulating the dangers of the Filartiga line. Their
critique, however, is not persuasive when applied to genocide, torture, or
summary executions. The illegal character of these actions is beyond
reproach. With respect to this category of CIL, it seems absurd to suggest
that the incorporation of such norms produces anti-democratic outcomes
frustrating the legitimate ambitions of states or the electorate.
The structural concerns that animate the revisionist critique simply
do not implicate the current international human rights litigation. In this
sense, Bradley and Goldsmith are tilting at windmills. The incorporation
of CIL takes place against the backdrop of many jurisprudential and
institutional safeguards designed to frustrate the wholesale incorporation of
CIL. At a minimum, the revisionist challenge loses all persuasive appeal
when applied to the ATCA litigation. Indeed, the Filartiga line has
appropriately fashioned a federal common law of universal, obligatory, and
definable human rights norms.
47. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 855.
48. Id. at 858.
47319981
REVIVE THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
Andrew N. Vollmer
I. THE SITUATION BEFORE AEROSPA TIALE ............................ 475
II. AEROSPATIALE ........................................................... 478
III. THE SITUATION AFTER AEROSPATIALE ............................. 479
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REVIVING THE HAGUE
EVIDENCE CONVENTION .............................................. 482
This article is about the Hague Evidence Convention' and the
Supreme Court's decision in Aerospatiale.2 Because of Aerospatiale, the
Hague Evidence Convention is used only rarely for party discovery in
United States litigation. That is unfortunate, and my purpose here is to
suggest reasons and ways to revive use of the Convention. I will first
discuss several aspects of the international discovery situation before
Aerospatiale. Then I will discuss the Aerospatiale decision and the
reaction of United States courts to it. Finally, I will propose circumstances
in which United States courts should consider more frequent first use of the
Convention. Extensive commentary about the Hague Evidence Convention
and the Aerospatiale decision exists.,
I. THE SITUATION BEFORE AEROSPATIALE
Three aspects about the international discovery situation before the
Aerospatiale decision are important. They are the opposition of foreign
countries to United States methods of discovery, the adoption of the Hague
Evidence Convention, and the various interpretations by United States
* Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C. I am grateful for research assistance
from my colleague Amber Cottle. The views expressed in this article, which are based on notes
for a panel presentation on international discovery at a meeting of the American Branch of the
International Law Association on November 8, 1997, are not necessarily those of the law firm or
its clients.
1. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
2. Socit Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522
(1987).
3. See, e.g., D. EPSTEIN AND SNYDER, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 10.10-12 (2d ed.
1996); L. TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 173-76, 182-93 (1996 & Supp. 1997); A.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 809-61 (1993); 1 B. RISTAU,
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE 159-243 (1995).
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courts of the relationship between United States discovery and the Hague
Evidence Convention.
Essential to an understanding of the appropriate role of the Hague
Evidence Convention in United States litigation is the strong resentment of
foreign countries to United States style of discovery, employing the
traditional discovery methods available in federal and state rules of
procedure.4 The main foreign objections to direct United States discovery
are its breadth and intrusiveness, and its control by the requesting party
rather than a judicial official in the foreign country.' In civil law countries,
the gathering of evidence is an exercise of judicial sovereignty.6 The much
more restrictive scope of foreign discovery, especially in civil law
countries, generally reflects important foreign public policies, such as
protection of personal and business privacy. Direct United States
discovery has provoked strenuous foreign objections and resistance such as
diplomatic confrontations, diplomatic protests, and retaliatory actions,
including in particular the enactment of blocking statutes to prevent the
production of information for purposes of United States litigation.,
Against this background of opposition, the United States ratified
the Hague Evidence Convention in 1972. Currently, approximately twenty
eight countries have ratified the Convention. The Conventions purpose
was to establish a system for obtaining evidence located abroad that would
be tolerable to the state executing the request and would produce evidence
utilizable in the requesting state.8 It was to bridge differences between the
common law and civil law approaches to the taking of evidence abroad, 9 to
standardize the form of the request, the languages to be used, and the
reasons justifying refusal to execute a request, and to eliminate some of the
4. No aspect of the extension of the American legal system .beyond the territorial frontier
of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in
investigation and litigation in the United States. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 442 (1987).
5. See A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 664-71 (1993);
D. EPSTEIN & J. SNYDER, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 10-4 - 10-7 (1996); L. TEITZ,
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 158-59 (1996).
. 6. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 557-58 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting); SNYDER
supra note 5, at 10-14.
7. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, Reporters' Notes 1, 4 (discussing diplomatic
protests and blocking statutes); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-
FIRST CONFERENCE 565-92 (1964) (quoting various diplomatic protests); A. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 698-740 (1993); D. EPSTEIN & J. SNYDER,
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 10-3 - 10-6 (1996); L. TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 158-
59, 165 (1996).
8. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 530.
9. Id. at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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unnecessary steps between the initiating and executing courts.'0
The Convention has both procedural and substantive elements. For
execution of letters of request sent by the judicial authorities of a signatory
state to a competent authority in another signatory state, the only method in
the Convention that involves the use of compulsion to obtain information,"
the receiving state typically applies its own laws as to methods,
procedures, and the extent of compulsion. The Convention also embodies
several substantive protections. The person providing information may
invoke any applicable privilege under the law of the state of execution or
the law of the requesting state (Article 11). A receiving state may refuse
to execute a letter of request that would prejudice its sovereignty or
security (Article 12). Finally, Article 23 gives signatories the option of
declaring that they will not execute Letters of Request issued for the
purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in
common law countries. Nearly all countries that ratified the Convention
have included some form of an Article 23 reservation.' 2
Starting in the 1980s, the Convention became the subject of
litigation in the United States. The main issue in this litigation was
whether and in what circumstances parties to United States litigation
needed to use the procedures of the Convention rather than the standard
direct discovery methods offered by federal and state procedural rules.
United States courts reached three main answers to this question.
10. A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 810 (1993).
11. The Hague Convention also provides for non-compulsory discovery through diplomatic
officers, consular agents, and commissioners.
12. The modem form of the reservation states that the receiving country will not execute a
letter of request requiring a person to state what documents relevant to the proceeding are or
have been in the person's possession, custody, or power or to produce any documents other than
particular documents specified in the request as being documents appearing to the requesting
court to be or likely to be in the person's possession, custody, or power. See Report by the
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on International Law on the Work of the Special
Commission of April 1989 on the Operation of the Hague Conventions of 15 November 1965 on
the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters and
of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, in 28
I.L.M. 1556 (1989); Report by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on International
Law on the Second Meeting of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Hague
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, in 24 I.L.M. 1668, 1675-77 (1985); Report by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague
Conference on International Law on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, in 17 I.L.M. 1425, 1427-28 (1978); Socit Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United
States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 563-64 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting)
(the emerging view of [the Article 23] exception to discovery is that it applies only to requests
that lack sufficient specificity or that have not been reviewed for relevancy by the requesting
court (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Some concluded that the Convention's procedures are the exclusive method
of obtaining information located in another signatory of the Convention. A
party to United States litigation may not use direct discovery through the
courts rules of procedure. Others decided that the Convention requires
first but not exclusive use of its procedures. If initial resort to the
Convention is not satisfactory, a party to United States litigation may use
direct discovery through the court's rules of procedure. Finally, some
courts found that the Convention has no applicability to discovery from a
litigant that is subject to the United States court's personal jurisdiction. It
applies only to discovery from a person not a party.
II. AEROSPATIALE
In Aerospatiale, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected
both extreme interpretations and adopted a modified form of the middle
ground. The case concerned requests for documents, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions from two French companies that moved for
a protective order for to require use of the Convention, citing the French
blocking statute against foreign discovery other than through the
Convention. The Court held unanimously that the Hague Evidence
Convention was not the exclusive means of obtaining evidence located in a
signatory state, with the majority noting that the opposite conclusion would
create several asymmetries and potential unfairness to United States
nationals or citizens of non-signatory countries involved in United States
litigation. '3
The Court also unanimously agreed that the principle of
international comity required first use of the Convention, at least in some
cases, although the Justices divided over the result produced by applying
the comity doctrine. Five members of the Court in an opinion by Justice
Stevens held that comity required only an ad hoc, case-by-case balancing
of foreign and United States interests to determine when first use of the
Convention is required. They noted that letters of request could be unduly
time consuming, expensive, and less certain to produce needed evidence
and urged trial courts to consider the following factors, among others: the
sovereign interests of the United States; the sovereign interests of the
relevant foreign state; the likelihood that resort to the Conventions
procedures would be effective; the breadth and intrusiveness of requested
discovery; and the special difficulties that foreign litigants encounter in
responding to United States style discovery." In a footnote, Justice
13. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 540 n.25.
14. Id. at 544-46. In note 28, the majority said that what is now section 442 of the
Restatement identifies the concerns that guide a comity analysis.
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Stevens said the French blocking statute did not alter his conclusion,
although it was relevant in a comity analysis because it identified the nature
of the sovereign interests in nondisclosure of certain types of information."
Four Justices concurred and dissented (Blackmun, Brennan,
Marshall, and O'Connor), taking the position that comity required a
general rule of first use of the Convention, subject to an exception for
cases where resort to the Convention would be futile or when its
procedures prove to be unhelpful. The dissent thought that the principle of
comity leads to more definite rules than the ad hoc approach endorsed by
the majority and warned that the Court's ad hoc comity analysis will be
performed inadequately and that the somewhat unfamiliar procedures of the
Convention will be invoked infrequently."
III. THE SITUATION AFTER AEROSPATIALE
The Aerospatiale opinion has been heavily criticized, 7 and its
promise of first use of the Convention is not being fulfilled. In particular,
courts have complained about the unstructured balancing test of the
majority in Aerospatiale and wished for more specific rules. Although a
few United States courts ordered first use of the Convention, they for the
most part do not do a sensitive, serious balancing of factors in individual
cases and instead simply permit the use of direct United States discovery.
The only real benefit of Aerospatiale has been that the courts rejecting the
use of the Convention have tended to narrow the discovery requests in a
way they probably would not have for domestic discovery.
A few United States courts have required first use of the
Convention," but most have not. Their reasons are that discovery under
15. Id. at 544 n.29.
16. Id. at 548, 554 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
17. L. TErrz, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 189 (1996) (The Aerospatiale opinion has
been severely criticized and rightly so, for its parochial approach to international cooperation and
its gutting of the Hague Evidence Convention, leading basically to a last resort utilization
approach).
18. In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 353-56 (D. Conn. 1991) (applying
the Aerospatiale balancing test and holding that the Hague Convention applied to discovery
requests against a French corporation because the discovery requests were intrusive, the
FED.R.CIv.P. would infringe upon French judicial sovereignty, and no evidence suggested that
the Convention's procedures would prove ineffective); Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH &
Co., 117 F.R.D. 33, 37-38 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (relying on Justice Blackmun's concurrence and
dissent rather than the majority's more complex balancing test and concluding that the Hague
Convention governed the service of interrogatories against a West German manufacturer because
the FED.R.CIv.P. would offend the sovereign interests of civil law countries such as Germany
and because the Hague Convention does not frustrate the sovereign interests of the United
States); Geo-Culture, Inc. v. Siam Inv. Management S.A., 936 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Or. Ct. App.
1997) (holding, without any discussion, that the Hague Convention applied to discovery of
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the Convention produces unsatisfactorily limited amounts of information;
discovery under the Convention is slow;' 9 foreign nations typically do not
have significant interests in limiting United States discovery; and the
United States has significant interests in prompt, complete pretrial
discovery. Of the courts refusing to order first use of the Convention,
some have narrowed the discovery requests out of deference to foreign
sensitivities,20 but the majority have not. 2'
jurisdictional facts); Knight v. Ford Motor Co., 615 A.2d 297, 299-302 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1992) (holding that Hague Convention procedures, rather than New Jersey discovery rules,
applied to discovery requests against a German corporation because New Jersey rules would
infringe upon Germany's sovereign interests and no evidence suggested that the Convention
procedures would be ineffective).
19. Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding use of
Convention would delay proceedings); Anglo American Ins. Group, P.L.C. v. Calfed Inc., 940
F. Supp. 554, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding Hague Convention more time-consuming than
discovery under Federal Rules).
20. Fishel v. BASF Group, 1997 WL 587003, at *24 (S.D.Iowa) (granting plaintiff's
motion to compel discovery against German corporations under the FED.R.CIv.P. because the
discovery did not implicate Germany's sovereign interests and the Hague Convention procedures
would unduly delay the proceedings, but limiting discovery); Bedford Computer Corp. v. Israel
Aircraft Indus, Ltd., 114 B.R. 2, 6 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990) (applying the FED.R.CiV.P. rather
than the Hague Convention to discovery against an Israeli corporation because the discovery
request did not prejudice Israel's sovereign interests and the Convention's procedures would
delay the proceedings, but limiting the scope of the discovery to make it as unintrusive and
pertinent as is appropriate in the circumstances); Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 258-60
(M.D.N.C. 1988) (applying the. to discovery against a French corporation because the
FED.R.CIv.P. did not impinge on any specific sovereign interest of France, but narrowing the
scope of the plaintiff's discovery requests); Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D.
386, 390-91 (D.N.J. 1987) (holding that the FED.R.CIv.P. governed interrogatories and requests
for documents against a Swedish corporation because the Hague Convention procedures would
have delayed discovery and the discovery did not violate any specific sovereign interest of
Sweden, but streamlining the plaintiffs discovery requests on the ground that expansive
discovery without concomitant relevance is not what the [Aerospatiale] Court envisioned).
21. In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana, 172 F.R.D. 295, 307-11 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (holding that the FED.R.Civ.P., rather than the Hague Convention, applied to discovery
against French corporations because the discovery requests were not intrusive, the discovery
would not jeopardize French sovereign interests, and the Hague Convention procedures would be
complicated, time consuming, and expensive); Doster v. Schenk, 141 F.R.D. 50, 52-55
(M.D.N.C. 1991) (denying German defendant's motion for protective order and holding that the
FED.R.CIV.P. applied to the plaintiff's discovery requests because the requests were not
intrusive, they did not compromise Germany's sovereign interests, and the Convention's
procedures would not be effective); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp.,
734 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. I!1. 1990) (permitting discovery under FED.R.CIv.P.); Roberts v. Heim,
130 F.R.D. 430 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (same); Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335 (E.D.N.Y.
1988) (applying the FED.R.Civ.P. to document requests and interrogatories against a West
German defendant because the discovery was not extensive and the Hague Convention was more
expensive and less effective than the FED.R.CIv.P.); Moake v. Source Int'l Corp., 623 A.2d
263, 265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (affirming lower court's ruling that New Jersey
discovery rules applied to interrogatories against a German corporation because discovery
requests did not violate Germany's interests and no evidence suggested that the Hague
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The Convention remains applicable or useful in certain situations.
For example, United States courts use the Convention to compel
information abroad from a person in a signatory country who is not a party
to the litigation and not reachable by a subpoena.Y Sometimes courts
prefer the use of the Convention to obtain information from a non-party
even if the party can be reached by a subpoena in the United States. 2
United States courts also typically require use of the Convention for
discovery that will occur on the territory of a signatory, such as a
deposition or a visual inspection.
This limited use of the Convention has not satisfied the objections
of foreign countries to direct United States discovery. They have not come
to accept the United States position on use of the Convention, although no
particular international dispute about United States discovery is currently in
the public eye. For example, foreign governments continue to file briefs
objecting to United States discovery.14 In addition, as recently as the early
1990s, when the United States proposed to amend the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure explicitly to allow United States courts to ignore the
Hague Evidence Convention and even to authorize the use of discovery
methods that violate the laws of foreign countries, several foreign countries
strongly protested. They urged the use of discovery methods that involve
the foreign government such as those in the Convention. The proposal was
not adopted.2
Convention procedures would be more effective); In re Asbestos Litig., 623 A.2d 546, 549 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that the plaintiff did not have to conduct discovery against a Finnish
defendant under the Hague Convention procedures); Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, 531
N.Y.S.2d 188, 191 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (applying New York's discovery rules, rather than the
Hague Convention, to interrogatories and document requests against a West German corporation
because the discovery did not implicate any specific sovereign interest of West Germany and the
foreign party failed to demonstrate that the Hague Convention procedures would be effective);
Sandsend Fin. Consultants, Ltd. v. Wood, 743 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App. 1988) (affirming trial
court's ruling that applied Texas rules to discovery involving a foreign corporation).
22. The Gap, Inc. v. Stone Int'l Trading, Inc., 1994 WL 38651 (S.D.N.Y.); Rich v KIS
Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 258 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Orlich v. Helm Bros., Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d
10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
23. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 607 F. Supp. 324, 326-27
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (quashing subpoena duces tecum served on British nonparty's New York office
but seeking documents usually stored in Britain and stressing importance of using the Convention
because the antitrust action before the Court was an internationally sensitive matter).
24. Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1995) (dealing with section 442
of the Restatement, not the Hague Evidence Convention).
25. An article of which I am a co-author describes these events: The Effect of the Revised
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on Personal Jurisdiction, Service, and Discovery in
International Cases, 150 F.R.D. 221, 243-44 (1993).
ILSA Journal of Int 7 & Comparative Law
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REVIVING THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
In sum, United States lower courts rarely require first use of the
Hague Evidence Convention for party discovery, having struck the balance
under Aerospatiale too far toward United States interests, and foreign
countries continue to object to the untempered use of direct United States
discovery methods. This tension led to diplomatic incidents and friction in
the past and threatens to continue to do so. The danger remains that, in
some future case of significant interest to a particular foreign country,
direct United States discovery will cause substantial damage to United
States foreign relations.
United States courts therefore should shift the balance back toward
foreign interests to some extent and resort to first use of the letter of
request procedure in the Convention more frequently. United States courts
should be more receptive to using the procedures of the Convention when,
consistent with the main purposes of the Convention, doing so would
significantly reduce the risk of foreign objections.
The purposes of the Convention suggest a few types of situations in
which first use would make sense. As said at the beginning, the
Convention has both procedural and substantive goals. It is mainly
procedural in that it allows a requested state to use its own procedures to
obtain evidence and thus to preserve its notions of judicial sovereignty.
The Convention is also substantive. By involving government officials of
the foreign country to review and participate in evidence gathering, the
foreign government can narrow requests, ensure protection of its sovereign
and national security interests, and ensure that its personal privilege and
privacy laws are respected.
As a result, a United States court should use the letter of request
system first when it would significantly advance these goals, that is, when
the specific circumstances of the particular case indicate that:
1) The type of requested information has special protection
under the laws of the foreign country (personal privacy, protection
of intellectual property, trade secrets, or other information that
could assist a foreign commercial competitor, state secrets, and
bank secrecy).
2) The identity of the requested party raises special foreign
concerns (such as a foreign state, an agency of a foreign sovereign,
or foreign government official).
3) An unusual interest of the foreign country calls for the
involvement of officials of that country in providing the
482 [Vol. 4:475
Vollmer
information so that its notions of judicial sovereignty are satisfied
(the information might be applicable in parallel proceedings in the
foreign country and the United States; the foreign country would
want to take evidence in its way for its proceeding and to have the
evidence taken only once).
Other categories might exist, just as exceptions could always exist.
For example, on some occasions the United States court might need
information quickly, and the procedures of the Convention would be too
slow.
Under this approach, first use of the Convention would not be
justified simply because the foreign country is a party to the Convention
and prefers Convention procedures or because the information is located in
the foreign country. In addition, use of the Convention would not be
justified simply because the foreign country has a general blocking statute.
One virtue of this proposal is that it is true to the majority analysis
in Aerospatiale and does not need any further international, judicial, or
legislative action to be adopted. This approach merely urges that United
States courts give more weight to certain foreign interests as reflected in
foreign laws or policies. In accordance with the case-by-case comity
analysis of Aerospatiale, this will result in more frequent first use of the
Convention.
1997]
SECTION 1782 OF TITLE 28 (U.S. CODE): IS THERE
A DISCOVERABILITY REQUIREMENT?
Gregory F. Hauser
There is an excellent, thorough, and relatively recent discussion of
the issue in a student note by Peter Metis.' These remarks supplement and
update that discussion. Courts continue consistently to reject any
discoverability inquiry in cases where the request for assistance under
section 1782 comes from a foreign tribunal, reasoning that the requesting
authority is better aware of its own discovery rules and procedures and
presuming that they have already been considered and applied.2
The federal courts have reached differing results, however, when
such a request comes directly from a party to a foreign litigation.
The Courts of Appeals for the First and Eleventh Circuits have
held clearly that a threshold requirement for the grant of such a request
under section 1782 is that the evidence sought must be discoverable under
the law and procedures of the foreign tribunal.,
The justifications for the requirement are to avoid disadvantage to
a United States party vis a vis an opposing party when they are litigating in
a country with limited pre-trial discovery and to prevent any attempt to
circumvent foreign law and procedure and thereby also any offense to a
foreign tribunal.4
The Courts of Appeals for the Third and District of Columbia
Circuits have not directly held that there is such a discoverability
Remarks by Gregory F. Hauser, Walter, Conston, Alexander & Green, P.C., New
York City.
1. Peter Metis, International Judicial Assistance: Does 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Contain an
Implicit Discoverability Requirement?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 332 (1994).
2. See e.g., United States v. Morris, 82 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1996); In re Letter
Rogatory from the First Court of First Instance in Civil Matters, Caracas, Venezuela, 42 F.3d
308, 310-11 (5th Cir. 1995).
3. See In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Lo
Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564 (1 1th Cir. 1988); In re Request for Assistance from Ministry
of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1lth Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub
nom. Azar v. Minister of Legal Affairs, 488 F.2d 1005 (1989).
4. See, e.g., In re Application ofAsta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d at 5-7.
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requirement, but have in dicta discussed the requirement with apparent
approval.-
The district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, even
while acknowledging that there was no direct Third Circuit ruling, has
recently followed the apparent dictates of the Third Circuit dicta and found
a discoverability requirement.6 Indeed, the discoverability requirement had
originated in another decision by that same district court.7
The Ninth Circuit has gone no further than to acknowledge the
seriousness of the policy concerns underlying the discoverability
requirement, but the district court for the Central District of California has
firmly imposed such a requirement?
The Fifth Circuit has also discussed the decisions requiring a
discoverability finding with apparent approval,'0 but district courts in that
circuit have split on whether the dicta is binding and thus on whether such
a requirement should be imposed." In a case before the Federal Circuit
that did not reach the issue, a dissenter argued at length for the
discoverability requirement. 12
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, has taken
the clear opposing stand that, even when a request under section 1782 is
not from a foreign tribunal itself, there need be no discoverabilty
5. See In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Service of the United
Kingdom, 870 F.2d 686, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 1989); John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d
132, 136 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, 51 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir.
1995) (noting that neither of the Third or D.C. Circuits had yet actually held that a finding of
discoverability was a requirement for the grant of a private litigant's request under section 1782);
Foden v. Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 60 n.1 (2d Cir. 1993) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Foden v.
Aldunate, 510 U.S. 965 (1993).
6. In re Application of Mats Wilander, No. 96 Misc. 98, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19357,
at *7-*11 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1996).
7. Peter Metis, Note: International Judicial Assistance: Does 28 U.S. . § 1782 Contain
an Implied Discoverability Requirement?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 332, 352-54 (1994); see Selas
Corp. v. Electric Furnace Co., 88 F.R.D. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1980); but see Foden. 3 F.3d at 61 n.3
(disputing this interpretation of the Pennsylvania case).
8. See Okubo v. Reynolds, 16 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1994).
9. See In re Application for an Order for Judicial Assistance in a Foreign Proceeding in
the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, England, 147 F.R.D. 223, 226 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
10. In re Letter Rogatory, 42 F.3d at 310-11.
11. Cf., In re Application of Gert Duizendstraal, No. 3:95-MC-150-X, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16506, at *4-*7 (N.D. Tex. April 16, 1997) (finding no discoverability requirement) with
In Re Trygg-Hansa Ins. Co., 896 F. Supp. 624, 626-27 (E.D. La. 1995) (finding that court must
review whether the evidence sought was discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction).
12. See In Re Jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d 721, 724-26 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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showing. 3 The request should be denied only if there is "authorative proof
that a foreign tribunal would reject evidence obtained with the aid of
section 1782," such authoritative proof entailing "judicial, executive or
legislative declarations that specifically address the issue of evidence
gathered under foreign procedure." 4 The bases for the Second Circuit's
position are the absence of any discoverability requirement in the language
of the statute as well as its history and purposes." In response to the
concerns underlying the discoverability requirement, the Second Circuit
has noted that "any and all other limitations upon discovery that would be
available under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 . ..are also available under section
1782(a)" and that concerns about lack of reciprocity may be addressed is a
"closely tailored discovery order. "16 In an additional, indirect response to
courts that have felt allowing discovery in the United States not allowed in
the foreign jurisdiction would offend the foreign tribunal, the Second
Circuit noted a British litigation in which the House of Lords on appeal
vacated an injunction imposed by a lower court against such discovery in
the United States, finding that the discovery did not interfere with British
due process.' 7
At least one district court has apparently followed the Second
Circuit's suggestion and conditioned the requested discovery on
reciprocity.' 8  Thus, discoverability is not irrelevant but only one
consideration in the exercise of the discretion of the district court, which
remains the ultimate arbiter.
The Seventh Circuit has not yet considered the issue, but the
district court for the Northern District of Illinois has twice taken the
position that, since the statute states no discoverability requirement, a
decision on a section 1782 request from a foreign litigant is entirely a
matter of the district court's discretion.' 9
Two other intriguing issues have arisen in section 1782 cases. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has declined to adopt or to try to
13. See Esses v. Hanania, 101 F.3d 873, 876 (2d Cir. 1996); Euromepa S.A. v. R.
Esmerian Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1098-1101 (2d Cir. 1995); Foden v. Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 58-61
(2nd Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Foden v. Aldunate, 510 U.S. 965 (1993).
14. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1095, 1100; see also Hanania, 101 F.3d at 876-77.
15. See id.; Foden, 3 F.3d at 58-60.
16. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1100 n.4, 1101.
17. See id. at 1100 n.3.
18. See id. Hanania, 101 F.3d 873 at 876.
19. See Elm Energy and Recycling (U.K.) Ltd. v. Basir, No. 96 C 1220, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15255, at *25-*29 (N.D. III. Oct. 9, 1996); Verson v. Allied Products Corp., No. 87 C
7549, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8981, at *2-*3 (N.D. I11. Sept. 25, 1987).
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enforce on a foreign court an exclusionary rule with respect to evidence
obtained for a foreign criminal prosecution pursuant to section 1782 but
allegedly in violation of due process,2 although a New York district court
in an earlier, similar case had ordered a foreign prosecutor to return such
evidence, basing its authority to do so on a conclusion that the prosecutor
had submitted to the jurisdiction of the United States court by submitting
the request for evidence.2 ' The distinctions between the two decisions were
that, in the Ninth Circuit case, the evidence had already been submitted to
the foreign court and, even if the foreign prosecutor had submitted itself to
the jurisdiction of the United States court, the foreign court had not. =
Finally, a recent dispute raised the issue whether section 1782
could be used to reach documents in the possession or control of a United
States entity but located outside the United States. In the district court, the
request was denied on the ground of privilege, but the Court of Appeals
ruled that the privilege had been waived and remanded for consideration of
the extraterritorial issue.? Before the district court ruled, however, the
application was withdrawn with prejudice.
20. See Okuba v. Reynolds, 16 F. 3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1994).
21. See In re Letter of Request from the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, 138 F.R.D. 27,
32-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
22. See Okuba, 16 F. 3d at 1021.
23. See Chase Manhattan Corp. v. Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 1997); see also In
re Application of Sarrio S.A., No. M 9-372, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14822 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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I. THE JURISDICTIONAL REGIME IN EUROPE
The countries of Europe have entered into multilateral treaties to
facilitate doing business in Europe. These treaties cover jurisdiction,
enforcement of foreign judgments and choice of law. The individual
states in the United States have analogous arrangements to facilitate doing
business within the United States. However, due to what are perceived as
extravagant awards of damages in the United States, most non-United
States companies are afraid of that jurisdiction. It is often thought by the
layman that the jurisdiction of other courts is not so wide. He may well be
wrong.
A. Jurisdiction of the English Courts
The English Courts have territorial jurisdiction in respect of
England and Wales. Scotland, Northern Ireland, Isle of Man and the
Channel Islands are separate jurisdictions.
The main legislation governing jurisdiction is the Civil Jurisdiction
and Judgments Act 1982 (Act) which is "an act to make further provision
about the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals in the United Kingdom and
certain other territories and about the recognition and enforcement of
judgments given in the United Kingdom or elsewhere . . . ."' This Act
was passed to bring the Brussels Convention into effect in English Law.
There is a similar Act and Convention applicable to most of the non-
European Union European countries (the Lugano Convention) that was
brought into effect by the civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1992.
1. Civil Jurisdiction Judgments Act of 1982 (England).
Loble
Indeed, the wording of the respective Conventions are mostly identical,
save that the Lugano Convention does not have an equivalent to Article 58.
B. Jurisdiction Under the Conventions
The Conventions do away with the individual countries own rules
on jurisdiction in relation to disputes to which the Conventions apply.
However, the net of the courts of some countries can still be spread
extremely wide. Provided that the Conventions do not apply, the German
courts, for example, still have jurisdiction over anyone who has assets in
Germany. The French courts will still assert jurisdiction on the grounds of
nationality. The English courts also have extremely wide jurisdiction. 2
C. The Basic Rule
The primary basis of jurisdiction under the Convention is the
domicile of the defendant. For the purposes of the Convention a person is
domiciled in the state in which he resides or in which he has a substantial
connection. A company is domiciled in the state in which it is
incorporated, has its registered office or its central management and
control.
Article 2 of the Convention provides, "subject to the provisions of
this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever
their nationality, be sued in the courts of that state."'
D. Special Jurisdiction
Article 5 of the Convention sets out a secondary basis of jurisdiction. It
provides that
a person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another
Contracting State, be sued:
(1) in manners relating to a contract, in the Courts for
the place of performance of the obligation in
question; ...
(3) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict in
the Courts for the place where the harmful act
occurred; ...
2. See infra section III.
3. Brussels Convention, art. 2.
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(5) as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of
a branch, agency or other establishment, in the Courts for
the place in which the branch, agency or other
establishment is situated ....
There are special provisions dealing with insurance and consumer
contracts. Article 16 gives exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile,
to the courts of the relevant country in which:
(i) the subject of the action is an object in rem or
immovable property;
(ii) the constitution, nullity or dissolution of companies
or other associations or legal persons;
(iii) the validity of entries in public registers;
(iv) patents, trademarks;
(v) enforcement of judgments (the courts of the
country in which enforcement is sought).'
E. Jurisdiction Agreements
The provisions set out above deal with the day to day jurisdiction
of Courts in civil and commercial matters. Arbitration matters are among
the few areas to which the Convention has no application. Article 17,
however, provides:
if the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in the
Contracting State, have agreed the Court, or the Courts of
a Contracting State, are to have jurisdiction to settle any
disputes which have arisen or which may arise in
connection with a particular legal relationship, then those
Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction.6
The Article goes on to provide that such agreement must be in
writing, evidenced in writing or be in accordance with the practices in a
particular trade. It should however be noted that Article 17 also provides:
4. Id. art. 5.
5. Id. art. 16.
6. Id. art. 17.
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"if an agreement conferring jurisdiction was concluded for the benefit of
only one of the parties, that party shall retain the right to bring proceedings
in any other court which has jurisdiction by virtue of this Convention."'
F. Summary of Jurisdiction Under the Conventions
In England, jurisdiction can only be taken by the English Court if
proceedings can be served on the defendant or defendants. Where a
defendant is domiciled in an European Union country, or most of the other
European countries, the English courts jurisdiction is governed by the
Conventions allowing service of proceedings to be made out of the
jurisdiction without the leave of the Court.
G. Jurisdiction of the English Courts Where the Conventions Do Not
Apply
Where the defendant is not domiciled in a Convention country, the
Convention does not apply. While the English court can exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant present in England, leave must be obtained
from the Court to serve proceedings out of the jurisdiction. The Court has
discretion over decisions to grant leave to serve proceedings out of the
jurisdiction and will only do so if the applicant for such leave shows that
he has a good, arguable case on the merits. The principle circumstances
in which service of a writ out of the jurisdiction is permissible are
contained in Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (R.S.C.) which
provide that the Court may allow service out of the jurisdiction, inter alia,
if:
(a) relief is sought against a person domiciled within
the jurisdiction;
(b) an injunction is sought ordering the defendant to
do or refrain from doing anything within the jurisdiction
(whether or not damages are also claimed in respect of a
failure to do or the doing of that thing);
(c) the claim is brought against a person duly served
within or out of the jurisdiction, and a person out of the
jurisdiction is a necessary or proper party thereto;
(d) the claim is brought to enforce, rescind, dissolve,
annul or otherwise affect a contract, or to recover damages
7. Id.
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or obtain other relief in respect to the breach of a contract,
being (in either case) a contract which:
(i) was made within the jurisdiction, or
(ii) was made by or through an agent trading
or residing within the jurisdiction on behalf of a
principal trading or residing out of the jurisdiction,
or
(iii) is by its terms, or by implication, governed
by English law, or
(iv) contains a term to the effect that the High
Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine
any action in respect of the contract;
(e) the claim is brought in respect of a breach
committed within the jurisdiction of a contract made within
or out of the jurisdiction, and irrespective of the fact, if
such be the case, that the breach was preceded or
accompanied by a breach committed out of the jurisdiction
that rendered impossible the performance of so much of
the contract as ought to have been performed within the
jurisdiction;
(f) the claim is founded on a tort and the damage was
sustained, or resulted from an act committed, within the
jurisdiction; or
(g) the claim is brought to enforce any judgment or
arbitration award. 8
There are numerous cases relating to the obtaining of leave to
serve and the setting aside of service or writs out of the jurisdiction. The
case-law shows that when exercising its discretion under Rules of Supreme
Court Order 11, the Court must consider among other things:
(i) the general undesirability of subjecting a foreigner
to the jurisdiction of the English court when no allegiance
8. Rules of the Supreme Court, ORDER 11 (England).
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is owed here particularly if the dispute has little to do with
this country or the claim is dubious;
(ii) whether the parties have agreed that the particular
court should have exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute;
(iii) where proceedings have already been begun in another
court.
(iv) which court can give most effective relief;
(v) whether one party will suffer an unfair
disadvantage in a particular jurisdiction9
This also has the same effect as Article 21 of the Convention which states:
where proceedings involving the same cause of action
between the same parties are brought in the courts of
different contracting states, any court other than the court
first seised shall of its own motion decline jurisdiction in
favour of that court. A court which would be required to
decline jurisdiction may reinstate its proceedings if the
jurisdiction of the other Court is contested;'0
A defendant who has been served with proceedings, whether
domiciled in England or not, can make an application to the Court
disputing the jurisdiction of that court by applying for an order setting
aside service of the writ, an order declaring that the writ has not been duly
served, or an order discharging any order giving leave to serve the writ out
of the jurisdiction. There may be further or other reasons indicating the
fact that the English court is not the proper forum (forum non conveniens).
It can be seen from the above that complicated, time-consuming and
expensive disputes can arise over jurisdiction.
The English Court's discretion to decide upon the extent of its own
jurisdiction is extremely wide. This is clearly illustrated by the following:
With all respect to the Judge, I think that this reasoning
confuses two different jurisdictions. One is the jurisdiction
to try the issues in the Action. That is disputed. It derives
from the Brussels Convention and the 1982 Act. It
depends on whether the First Defendant was domiciled in
the United Kingdom at the relevant date. The other is the
jurisdiction to decide whether it has jurisdiction to try the
9. Id. ORDER 11.
10. Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 21.
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issues in the Action. This is an inherent jurisdiction. It
does not derive from the Brussels Convention or the 1982
Act. Its existence is beyond dispute.
The High Court is a Court of unlimited jurisdiction. This
does not mean that its jurisdiction is universal and
unrestricted. It means that, unlike inferior courts and
tribunals, it has jurisdiction to decide the existence and
limits of its own jurisdiction. It has an indisputable
jurisdiction (of the second kind) to decide whether or not it
has jurisdiction (of the first kind) to entertain substantive
proceedings. If it decides that it has no jurisdiction (of the
first kind) to entertain them, its decision is nevertheless
one made within its jurisdiction (of the second kind). If it
makes a mistake and erroneously assumes a jurisdiction (of
the first kind) to entertain substantive proceedings which it
does not truly possess, it makes an error of fact or law, but
it is not one which goes to its own jurisdiction (of the
second kind). It is inherent in the rule of law itself that
somewhere in any judicial system there must be a court
which possesses jurisdiction to determine the limits of its
own jurisdiction.I
II. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
A. Under a Treaty
Since there is a uniform system of jurisdiction in the convention
countries, it is easier to enforce judgments of other convention countries
than those of non-convention countries. The conventions also deal with
enforcement. Article 26 commences: "[a] judgment given in a
Contracting State shall be recogni[z]ed in the other Contracting State
without any special procedure being required. "'12
Furthermore, recognition and enforcement is not confined to final
money judgments. However, injunctions and other orders of foreign
.courts will also be given effect.
There are limited grounds for resisting enforcement:
11. Canada Trust Company v. Stolzenberg, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1582.
12. Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 26.
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(i) enforcement would be contrary to the public policy
of the State in which enforcement is sought;
(ii) if the judgment was given by default and the
defendant was not duly served;
(iii) if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment
given between the same parties in the State in which
recognition is sought;
(iv) that in order to arrive at its decision the court has
decided a preliminary question concerning the rights or
status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in
property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, will or
succession in a way that conflicts with a rule of private
international law of the State in which recognition is
sought, unless the same result would have been reached by
the application of the rules of private international laws of
that State; or
(v) if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier
judgment given in a non-Contracting State involving the
same cause of action and between the same parties,
provided that the latter judgment fulfills the conditions
necessary for its recognition in the State in which
enforcement is sought."
The rules for enforcing foreign judgments are set out in a statute
containing almost identical rules to New York and a number of other states
of the United States.
The procedure for registration of foreign judgments is that the
judgment or certified copy, together with the translation if the original
judgment is in a foreign language, is lodged with the High Court of Justice
together with the affidavit in support of an application for the judgment to
be registered.
The application is made ex parte by lodging papers with the
Master's Secretary's Department. Assuming the conditions of the
applicable Act are complied with, an order will be given for the judgment
to be registered. Notice is then given to the defendant that the judgment
has been registered and that the defendant has twenty one days in which to
13. See generally id. (emphasis added).
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apply to set aside the registration. If an application is made there will be a
hearing before the Master in the Queen's Bench Division of the High
Court.
Under the Administration of Justice Act of 1920 and subsequent
legislation, judgments obtained in the Superior Courts in many parts of Her
Majesty's Dominions outside the United Kingdom may be registered.
Under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933,
judgments obtained in the Courts of various foreign countries may also be
registered in this Country. The 1933 Act allows the judgments of higher
courts in the countries with which the United Kingdom has entered into
bilateral treaties td be enforced by registration.
Registration of the judgment will be set aside if the court is
satisfied:
1. [t]he judgment is not a judgment to which the Act
applies or was registered in contravention of the provisions
of the Act; or
2. The Courts of the Country of the original court had
no jurisdiction (according to the English rules of private
international law) in the circumstances of the case; or
3. The judgment debtor being the defendant in the
proceedings in the original court did not, (notwithstanding
that process may have been duly served on him in
accordance with the law of the Country of the original
court), receive notice of those proceedings in sufficient
time to enable it to defend the proceedings and did not
appear; or
4. The judgment was obtained by fraud; or
5. The enforcement of the judgment would be
contrary to English public policy; or
6. The rights under the judgment are not vested in the
person by whom the application for registration was
made. 4
The judgment may be set aside if the registering court is satisfied
that the matter in dispute in the proceedings in the original court had
14. Foreign Judgments Reciprocal Enforcement Act 1933 (England).
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previously been the subject of a final and conclusive judgment by a Court
having jurisdiction in the matter. This registration procedure is similar to
that for registering judgments from Convention countries.
B. At Common Law
Judgments of countries with whom there is no treaty and which are
not party to the Convention may be enforced by bringing an action
on the judgment. The foreign judgment is the cause of action and
an application can be made for summary judgment on the grounds
that there is no defense to the action.
In order for a foreign judgment to be enforced the English Courts
must be satisfied that the foreign court had jurisdiction according to the
English rules of private international law.
In a nutshell, the English Courts' requirements for jurisdiction are
that:
1. The defendant in the enforcement proceedings was resident
or if a body corporate had a place of business (or perhaps was
present) in the country of the foreign court which gave judgment;
or
2. The defendant to the enforcement proceedings was plaintiff
or counter-claimed in the proceedings in the foreign court; or
3. The defendant agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the
foreign court; or
4. The defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign
court by taking an active step in the proceedings other than in
relation to i) property which had been seized; or, ii) disputing the
jurisdiction of the foreign court).
The leading case on the foreign law enforcement judgment is
Adams et al. v. Cape Industries plc and Capasco." I acted for the
plaintiffs in that case which involved an attempt to enforce, at common
law, judgments obtained in Texas by 206 plaintiffs injured by asbestos.
The judgments were obtained against the defendants in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division, and
proceedings were brought in the High Court of Justice in London to
enforce the judgments. The court declined to enforce the judgment for the
following reasons:
15. Adams v. Cape Industries pic and Capaso Limited, [1990] 2 W.L. R. 657.
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1) The defendants were not present in the country of
the foreign court when the proceedings were commenced;
and
2) It would be contrary to natural justice/public policy
to enforce the judgment on the grounds that there had been
no proper judicial assessment of the damages. 6
The court also found that the defendants, if they had been shown to
be present in the United States, would have been present in Illinois, and
that judgment given in Texas would not prevent the judgment from being
enforced. This was because the issue was before a Federal Court, and a
Federal Court is a court of the United States and not of the individual State
in which it sit. In other words, the United States of America is a country
for the purposes of English private international law! The appeal to the
Court of Appeals was unsuccessful.
A further argument advanced in that case has Court of Appeal
authority against it. The argument may however at some stage succeed
before the House of Lords. As seen above, English Courts will allow
service out of the jurisdiction in certain circumstances. They would then
expect foreign Courts to enforce their judgments. The argument, based on
reciprocity, is that English Courts should enforce foreign judgments in
analogous circumstances. This argument rests heavily on the doctrine of
the comity of nations.
C. An English Perspective of the United States
The United States courts are perceived in Europe as exercising
excessive jurisdiction. As we have seen above, the jurisdiction of the
English court is extremely wide. I am not anti-American. I am a partner
in an American law firm. The fear in Europe is of excessive and
unpredictable jury award -and multiple damages.
The English courts jurisdiction is as wide or possibly even wider
than that of the United States courts, but there is less perception that the
English courts are to be avoided and less ruffling of the feathers of other
courts due to two factors - sensitivity and sovereignty. The English
courts are sensitive to the notion that they should not be seen to be
grabbing cases that do not belong in England and are sensitive to the
sovereignty of foreign courts.
Furthermore, there is a danger that if United States courts claim
jurisdiction in inappropriate cases those judgments will not be enforced.
16. Id.
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This could be because the United States court did not have jurisdiction or
on the grounds of natural justice. One example is if service on a non-
United States company had been effected by serving its United States
subsidiary or, even worse, the Secretary of State.
Regarding service, the United Kingdom lodged no objection under
Article 23 of the Hague Service Convention and service can therefore be
effected directly. Instruct a solicitor to effect service of United States
proceedings on an English company. It is quicker and more effective than
going through official channels and any eventual judgment will be less
likely to be unenforceable for lack of proper service.
III. EVIDENCE
A. Introduction
I suggest below the most appropriate procedures in particular
cases; it is not an exhaustive review of the law or procedure. Evidence
may be obtained in England and Wales for use in foreign proceedings
without any formal order. In certain other countries the obtaining of
evidence without the leave of the court is a criminal offense but the English
Courts will not interfere with any procedure whereby witnesses appear
voluntarily to give evidence or produce documents. In restricted
circumstances production of documents may be contrary to English law."
The United States is a prolific source of requests and therefore the
means of obtaining evidence outside the United States under United States
federal law is also set out in this guide.
B. The Methods of Obtaining Evidence in England and Wales
Evidence may be collected in England and Wales for United States
proceedings in the three ways described below.
1. Voluntarily
Depositions can be taken and documentary evidence collected from
any persons willing to appear voluntarily. This must be done in a way
acceptable to the United States Court and depositions are frequently taken
before the United States Consul.
2. Pursuant to Rule 28(b) of the Federal Rules
Evidence can be obtained in any of the three ways set out in Rule
28(b):
17. See Protection of Trading Interest Act of 1989 (England).
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1) On notice, before a person authorised to administer
oaths in the place in which the examination is held, either
by the law of that place or by U.S. law; or
2) Before a person commissioned by the English
Court and a person so commissioned shall have the power
by virtue of his commission to administer any necessary
oath and take testimony; or
3) Pursuant to Letters Rogatory (known in England as
Letters of Request and so referred to below)."
Further, a United States national or United States resident present
in England or Wales may be subpoenaed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1783.
However; there may be a conflict between the obligation of a
United States national or United States resident to comply with such a
subpoena and local law. For example, in a London branch of a United
States bank a subpoena would not be effective. A London branch of a
United States bank should require the protection of an English Court Order
before divulging any documents or information. There is also a limit to
the subject matter jurisdiction of foreign courts. 9
3. Pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters
The Hague Evidence Convention is working well in England. The
statute passed to bring the convention into effect will probably enable an
American attorney to collect more and better evidence than in any other
country outside the United States.
The Evidence (Proceedings in other Jurisdictions) Act of 1975 was
passed partly to give effect to the Hague Convention. The Act goes further
than necessary for the purposes of the Convention and should be read in
conjunction with Order 70 of the Rules of the Supreme Court to ascertain
the boundaries within which evidence can be obtained pursuant to the
Convention or for foreign proceedings generally and the procedure for
obtaining such evidence. The procedure under The Hague Convention is
the same for any country which is a party to it and indeed for any country
which requests judicial assistance from the English Court.
18. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 28(b).
19. See Mackinnon v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jennrette Securities Corporation, [1986] 2
W.L.R. 453.
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C. Letters of Request
Letters of Request may be submitted either (i) through diplomatic
channels, or (ii) by direct submission by English Solicitors. If English
Solicitors are not instructed by the party seeking an Order for depositions
or the production of documents the Treasury Solicitor will make an
application to the Court for an Order but it is more prudent to instruct
English Solicitors in case the witnesses resist the Order. It is also quicker
to instruct Solicitors and to send the Letters of Request directly to them.
An Order can then be obtained within a week, whereas transmission
through diplomatic channels takes considerably longer.
D. Discovery and Fishing Expeditions
Discovery in England and Wales is much narrower than the
discovery which is allowed in the United States. English Courts will not
countenance fishing expeditions. The English Court is prohibited from
making an order requiring any particular steps to be taken unless they are
steps which could be taken to obtain evidence for the purposes of civil
proceedings in the English Court. The English rules distinguish between
(i) evidence in the nature of proof to be used for the purposes of the trial
and (ii) evidence in the nature of pre-trial discovery to be used for
purposes of a train of inquiry which might produce evidence for trial. The
English Court will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of
obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents and will not give effect to a
request for those purposes.
The notes to the Rule of the Supreme Court state:
the English Court will refuse to make an order in aid of a
foreign request for evidence if it appears or to the extent to
which it appears that that evidence is required, not for the
purpose of proof at the foreign trial, where it is admissible
and relevant to the issues in those proceedings, but for the
purpose of discovery, something in the nature of a roving
inquiry in which a party is seeking to 'fish out' some
material which might lead to obtaining admissible evidence
at the trial, even though the procedure of the foreign court
permits such a practice, as does, for example, Rule 26 of
the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . . On the
other hand, if the foreign request is for evidence in the
nature of proof to be adduced at the trial, the English
Court will give effect to such request and it may do so
5031998]
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subject to modifications as to the disallowance of certain
witnesses or documents. 0
As a practical matter, it is becoming more and more difficult to
obtain orders for United States proceedings as the procedure has been
abused, and the English Court is wary of attempts to obtain pre-trial
discovery and fishing expeditions. This was exemplified in the case of
State of Minnesota v. Philip Morris Incorporated and Others. In that case
the Court of Appeal set aside an order for evidence to be provided in
England for use in United States tobacco litigation on the grounds that the
Letter of Request was too wide and uncertain in its scope and that the
request could not be made acceptable by amendment. The Court quoted
Lord Denning MR from the Westinghouse case (infra), "[i]t is our duty
and our pleasure to do all we can to assist that court, just as would expect
the United States court to help us in like circumstances. Do unto others as
you would be done by."
Nevertheless, the court went on to say,
I have striven mightily to give effect to the Request, but
reluctantly, and for the reasons given, have been unable to
do so. In my judgment this is not a case where blue
pencilling is appropriate, or where the introduction by this
court of a safeguard in the form of a suitably worded
limitation can provide adequate protection for the
witnesses. Given the width of the Request, the formulation
of a suitably worded limitation by this court is not, in my
view, workable in the context of the proposed
examinations. What is required is that the Request should
be drafted in different terms. 2'
E. Proceedings Must have been Instituted or be Contemplated
The English Court will not give effect to any request from a United
States court unless proceedings have actually been instituted or proceedings
are contemplated. In this context contemplated means that proceedings are
imminent or pending.
20. See generally Rules supra note 8, notes.
.21. State of Minnesota v. Philip Morris Incorporated et.al., No. C1-94-8565 (Dist. Ct.
Minn.).
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F. General Principle
Subject to the above, the general principle followed by the English
Court in relation to requests from foreign courts is that the English Court
will ordinarily give effect to a request so far as is proper and practicable
and to the extent that is permissible under English Law.
G. No General Investigation
General investigation (as in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings)
will not be allowed. Documents sought must be specifically listed and not
referred to by general descriptions. Solicitors should be asked to advise on
the form of the document request before the request is submitted to the
United States Court. This will certainly save time in the long run, because
if this procedure is not followed there may be contested hearings in
England and possibly part or all of the request may be struck out.
H. No Discovery Order Against Non-Parties
Section 2(4)(a) of the 1975 Act prohibits the English court from
making an order against a stranger to the proceedings which requires him
to make general discovery of documents. Such an order would be in the
nature of a fishing expedition which is never allowed in the English court.
The request for witnesses to be heard or documents to be produced must
specify which evidence witnesses can give or the actual documents which
are to be produced.
Section 2(4) of the 1975 Act states: "[a]n Order under this Section
shall not require a person to produce any documents other than particular
documents specified in the Order as being documents appearing to the
Court making the Order to be, or likely to be, in his possession custody or
power." The Court must be satisfied that the documents in question are in
the possession, custody or power of the person against whom the Order is
made. The burden of proving this fact is on the applicant.
L Orders Available from the English Court
The English Court has power to make orders for:
1) oral or written examinations of witnesses;
2) the production of documents;
3) inspecting, photographing or preserving property;
4) taking samples of property;
5) conducting experiments on property;
6) medical examination of persons;
7) taking blood samples.
1998]
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Once an Order has been made by the English Court, depositions
are taken in "the English manner" before an Examiner appointed by the
Court.22 The Examiner will be an English barrister. In order to facilitate
the taking of depositions at a time convenient to the party requesting the
Order, it is normally better to have an Examiner of the party's choice
appointed rather than one of the Court Examiners who may not be
available at the required time. This can only be done if the application for
the Order is made by solicitors who will also make the appropriate
arrangements for the examination - including providing a court reporter if
required.
J. Videotaping
Examinations may also be videotaped. Recently an application to
set aside an Order for videotaping the taking of evidence was
unsuccessful.23 In that case Evans J. said:
Two things are clear. (i) A video recording of evidence
given in English Courts is not permitted. There is
statutory recognition of tape recordings: photographs in
Court are banned. In my judgment videotaping is not
allowed. (ii) At the other extreme, evidence in the form of
tape recordings and video recordings is capable of
admission in English courts, just as photographs are
commonly admitted.
Here we have an intermediate situation. What is sought is
videotaping outside the court, and it is proposed that the
videotaping should be available to the court itself. That is
parallel to the taking of tape recordings outside court of a
shorthand transcript outside court. It is clearly something
different from recording proceedings in the court itself...
Proceedings involving examination of witnesses outside
court are not necessarily limited to the permitted methods
of recording proceedings in court. It seems to me that the
request by the Californian court is not inconsistent with the
English mode.24
22. Rules, supra note 8, ORDER 39.
23. J. Barber & Sons v. Lloyd's Underwriters,[19861 2 All E.R. 845.
24. Id.
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K. Extra-Territoriality
It is noteworthy that many of the leading cases on extra-
territoriality are concerned with whether evidence should be produced for
foreign proceedings. In R. v. Grossman, the Court of Appeal declined to
make an order for disclosure of information held by a branch of Barclays
Bank in the Isle of Man under Section 7 of the Bankers' Books Evidence
Act 1879.2 Lord Denning M.R. said:
I think that the branch of Barclays Bank in Douglas, Isle of
Man, should be considered in the same way as a branch of
the Bank of Ireland or an American Bank or any other
Bank in the Isle of Man which is not subject to our
jurisdiction. . . . It is subject to the laws and regulations
of the Isle of Man. It is licensed by the Isle of Man
Government. It has customers there who are subject to
Manx law. It seems to me that the Court here ought not in
its discretion to make an Order against the Head Office
here in request of the books of the branch in the Isle of
Man in regards to the customers of that branch. It would
not be right to compel the branch - or its customers - to
open their books or to reveal their confidences in support
of legal proceedings in Wales. 6
The case of MacKinnon concerned an Order made against an
American bank, which was not a party to the main action, requiring it to
produce books and papers held at its Head Office in New York. These
related to an account of one of the Defendants, a Bahamian company which
had since the issue of the Writ been struck off the Register of Companies,
and a subsequent subpoena duces tecum which was served on an Officer of
the Bank at its London Office. Hoffman J. held that the Order and
subpoena, taking effect in New York, were an infringement of the
sovereignty of the United States, and, therefore, the English Courts should
not require a foreign bank which owed a duty of confidence to its
customers to produce documents outside the jurisdiction of the English
Courts. Because the bank was regulated by the law of the country where
the customer's account was kept (in this case the United States) and
concerned business transactions outside that country's jurisdiction was
material.
He said:
25. R. v. Grossman [1973] Cr. App. R. 302.
26. Id.
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the need to exercise the Court's jurisdiction with due
regard to the sovereignty of others is particularly important
in the case of banks. . . . If every country where a bank
happened to carry on business asserted a right to require
that bank to produce documents relating to accounts kept in
any other such country, banks would be in an unhappy
position of being forced to submit to whichever sovereign
was able to apply the greatest pressure.Y
He also referred to the decision of the New York Federal District Court in
Laker Airways v. Pan American World Airways, where subpoenas served
on English banks at their New York offices requiring them to produce
documents relating to transactions in England were quashed and stated
that: "this decision shows a welcome revival in a United States Court of
sensitivity to foreign sovereign interests."2
Perhaps the best known case on the subject of such requests is Rio
Tinto Zinc Corporation v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation. In this case
the House of Lords reversed a decision of the Court of Appeal which had
upheld the implementation of Letters of Request issued by a Court in
Virginia.
Viscount Dilhorne said:
for many years now, the United States has sought to
exercise jurisdiction over foreigners in respect of acts done
outside the jurisdiction of that Country. This is not in
accordance with international law and has led to legislation
on the part of other States designed to protect their
nationals from criminal proceedings in foreign courts
where the claims to jurisdiction by those courts are
excessive and constitute an invasion of sovereignty. 2
IV. PRIVILEGE AND DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Privilege
The Westinghouse case also comments in detail on claims to
privilege against production of documents sought under Letters of Request
and differentiates between documents required for the purposes of civil
27. Mackinnon v. Donoldson, Lofkin & Jennrette Securities Corporation [1987] 2 W.L.R.
453.
28. Laker Airways v. Pan American World Airways, 607 F.Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
29. Rio Jinto Zino Corporation v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] A.C. 547.
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proceedings and documents sought for the purpose of a Grand Jury
investigation which might lead to criminal proceedings. Lord Wilberforce
said:
Now Section 5 of the 1975 Act provides for the obtaining
of evidence for criminal proceedings but expressly the
section only applies to proceedings which have been
instituted (none have been instituted) and, impliedly, to a
request by the Court in which the proceedings have been
instituted. The case is therefore not within Section 5, and
the procedure is an attempt to get the evidence in spite of
that fact.0
A party wishing to obtain evidence for use in foreign proceedings
should institute proceedings, or at least produce some evidence that
proceedings are about to be commenced, before any application is made to
the Court for an order.
B. Duty of Confidentiality
X A. G. v. A Bank discussed the question of disclosure of
documents in breach of the duty of confidentiality owed by a bank to its
customers.31 Leggatt J. referred to the case of British Nylon Spinners
Limited v. Imperial Chemical Industries Limited and quoted the passage:
The Courts of this Country will, in the natural course, pay
great respect and attention to the Superior Court of the
United States of America, but I conceive that it is
nonetheless the proper province of English Courts, when
their jurisdiction is invoked, not to refrain from exercising
that jurisdiction if they think that it is their duty so to do
for the protection of rights which are peculiarly subject to
their protection. In so saying, I do not conceive that I am
offending in any way against the principles of comity...
32
The Judge also referred to the comment of Denning L.J., The writ
of the United States does not run in this country, and, if due regard is had
to the comity of nations, it will not seek to run here.
30. Id.
31. X A.G. v. A Bank [1983] 2 All ER 464.
32. British Nylon Spinners Limited v. Imperial Chemical Industries Limited [19521 2 All
E.R. 780.
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X A.G. v. A Bank was a case involving injunctions preventing a
Bank from complying with subpoenas issued by an American Court in
three actions. Although the proceedings were in chambers judgment was
given in open court. Leggatt J. summarized as follows:
On the one hand, there is involved in the continuation of
the injunction impeding the exercise by the United States
Court in London of powers which, by English standards,
would be regarded as excessive, without in so doing
causing detriment to the Bank; on the other hand, the
refusal of injunctions, or the non-continuation of them,
would cause potentially very considerable commercial
harm to the plaintiffs, which cannot be disputed, by
suffering the Bank to act for its own purposes in breach of
the duty of confidentiality admittedly owed to its
customers. . . . Any sanction imposed now on the Bank
would look like pressure on this Court, whereas as it
seems to me, it is for the New York Court to relieve
against the dilemma, in which it turns out to have placed
its own national, by refraining from holding it in contempt
proceedings are issued.
Accordingly, it was ordered that the injunctions should continue.
In In Re the State of Norway (No. 1 and No. 2) - Judgment 9th February
1989, Lord Goff upheld the decision of the Judge of the first instance
stating that: witnesses should not be required to reveal the identity of a
settlor in breach of a banker's duty of confidentiality unless the witness
should have evidence that the settlor was acting as the nominee or agent of
the tax payer.
C. Civil or Commercial Matter
There was also much discussion of the practice relating to Letters
of Request, possible infringement of United Kingdom sovereignty and
extra-territoriality in In Re the State of Norway (No.1) and In Re. the State
of Norway (No. 2) House of Lords (Judgment 9th February 1989).
There had previously been two cases in the Court of Appeal which
to some extent resulted in conflicting decisions. The main issue was
whether an action in the Sandefjord City Court in Norway to set aside an
assessment of tax was a civil or commercial matter. The Court of Appeal
in Norway (No. 1) had decided that this should be decided pursuant to the
laws of the requesting Court and not the recipient Court of the Letters
[Vol. 4:489
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Rogatory. In Norway (No. 2) the Court decided that it should be resolved
pursuant to the law of the Court receiving the request.
The main speech in The House of Lords was given by Lord Goff
who said:
The words (civil or commercial matter) should be given
their ordinary meaning, so that proceedings in any civil
matter should include all proceedings other than criminal
proceedings, and proceedings in any commercial matter
should be treated as falling within proceedings in civil
matters. On this simple approach, I do not see why the
expression should be read as excluding proceedings in a
fiscal matter.
D. Comity
It will be seen from the above cases that the English Courts are
keen, in accordance with the principle of comity of nations, to give effect
to requests for evidence from foreign courts. The English Courts are,
however, jealous in protecting the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, and
the border separating the willingness to assist foreign courts and the
protection of sovereignty is not always clearly defined.
E. Practical Matters
It is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain orders for witnesses
to give evidence for foreign, especially United States, proceedings. Letters
of Request must be drafted extremely carefully, and this applies even more
to document requests. It takes some time to obtain evidence using official
channels. The quickest way and the most likely to be effective is to draft
the request in conjunction with an English solicitor experienced in the field
and use that solicitor to make the application to the English court.
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I. THE ILA CONFERENCE
More than half of the world's nations have either abolished or no
longer practice the death penalty.I In this coming year, the opportunity for
a vast expansion in the number of nations which no longer adhere to the
death penalty appears almost certain because of events which occurred in
1997, some of which are detailed here. I was fortunate to be able to bring
together a group of outstanding scholars and an outstanding practitioner to
a panel on the death penalty2 at the International Law Weekend '97.3 The
focus of the weekend meeting was on practical applications of public
international law in domestic judicial and other proceedings, a topic broad
enough to encompass the development of limits on the use of the death
penalty in international law, and the application of these developments to
United States death penalty practices.
The topic for the ILA panel, Implementing the ABA Resolution
Limiting the Death Penalty: Bringing the International Movement to Limit
(Or Ban) the Death Penalty Home to the United States, sought to stimulate
a recognition away from the parochial attitudes of mainstream America.
Those attitudes are frequently found in local state legislatures, where the
1. Fifty nine countries have totally renounced the penalty. (Amnesty lists fifty
eight; and Georgia has enacted a new criminal code prohibiting the death penalty); see Amnesty
International, The Death Penalty: List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries (Mar. 1996),
HuGo BEDEAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 78-Table 6-1 (1997), (listing fifty seven
countries). Fifteen countries have abolished the death penalty except for extraordinary crimes.
d. at 80, Table 6-2. Twenty-seven countries with the penalty have suspended all executions and
have not had an execution in ten years. Id. at 81 (listing 28 countries).
2. The speakers, all of whom have expertise on the death penalty are: William
Schabas, Professor and Chair, Department des sciences, Universite du Quebec a Montreal, Ved
P. Nanda, John Evans University Professor and Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law,
University of Denver College of Law; John Quigley, Ohio State University College of Law; and
practitioner Ron Tabak, of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom and Chair of the Death
Penalty Committee of the Individual Rights and Responsibilities Section of the American Bar
Association. (While I will mention some highlights brought to the panel by the panelists, I will
let their works speak for them). My thanks to each of them for adding to my knowledge as well
as the knowledge of others about the death penalty. I also wish to thank them for many of the
ideas which were gleaned from their talks, and are elaborated here.
3. The annual event of the American Branch of the International Law
Association held from November 6-8, 1997, at the House of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York.
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death penalty is a highly politicized tool.4  As Professor Quigley
commented, the United States is becoming increasingly isolated from the
rest of the world, so much so that other countries are increasingly
unwilling to extradite persons to the United States.'
What could be a better topic than trying to open up the insular and
populist American thought and beliefs often reflected in state legislatures
by bringing to local discussions the debates and understandings which are
occurring in international public law. Those discussions are increasingly
limiting the application of the death penalty, and more generally,
increasing calls for moratorium and abolition. The United Nations Human
Rights Committee has voiced concerns about the extensive application of
the death penalty in the United States.6  Until the late 1960's, the death
penalty had little or no role in American electoral politics.7 However, that
has now changed since there has been both an increase in the politicization
of the death penalty and a concomitant decrease in the use of executive
clemency. Few Americans realize the harsh direction to which American
penal law has committed itself, its interrelatedness to politics or the
possible long term effects upon both our democracy and our economy.9
One of the darker sides of elected representative democracies is
that the elective process often results in failing to foster leadership to
broaden opinions, but instead has the opposite effect of causing elected
representatives to merely reiterate the unreflected, uneducated, and racist
responses of the majority.'0  Thus, there is a tendency in elected
4. See discussion infra, note 10 and accompanying text.
5. John Quigley, presentation at the ILA Conference, Nov. 8, 1997, New York
Association for the Bar of the City of New York.
6. UNITED NATIONS, U.N. HUM. RTs. COMM., Nineteenth Annual Report of
the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 §280 (1995) [hereinafter NINETEENTH
ANNUAL REPORT].
7. HUGO ADAM BEDEAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, BACKGROUND
AND DEVELOPMENTS 17-19 (1997).
8. Id.
9. A colleague at the University of Uppsala in Sweden once remarked that
concern about imprisonment was a mark of a free society, and that when a society locked up a
significant percentage of its people it was, by definition, no longer a free society.
10. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT
IN AMERICA (1995). Tonry points out that the targeting of prisoners for political advantage rose
to its current popularity in the United States during the volatile period of extraordinary growth in
the prison population since about 1980. See also David Bruck, Keynote Address: Political and
Social Misconceptions Fueling the Death Penalty, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 863, 864 (1996).
The death penalty's saturation of political life now extends to how we choose our
presidents. [It] became the defining event of the 1988 Presidential campaign, and may
have cost the election for the Democratic nominee, Massachusetts Governor Michael
Dukakis. By 1992, the next Democratic nominee, learned from Dukakis' mistake. In
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democracies to suppress leadership" and in the case of the death penalty, to
substitute emotional rhetoric for reasoned judgment. A death penalty in
which government takes the life of a citizen should be cause for great
alarm when political motivation is suspected and the trauma it causes to the
community can be viewed as being done for individual political gain. 2
Of equal concern, as the Title implies, is that the ILA panel sought
to focus on the national direction taken by the preeminent lawyer
organization in the United States, the American Bar Association, when on
February 3, 1997, the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
passed a resolution urging states not to carry out the death
penalty in their jurisdictions until the imposition of the
death penalty is carried out in a manner which would
ensure that death penalty cases are administered fairly and
impartially, in accordance with due process, and minimize
the risk that innocent persons will be killed."
the middle of the New England primary, Governor Bill Clinton rushed home to
Arkansas to preside over the execution of a brain-damaged inmate so impaired that he
planned to vote for Mr. Clinton after his execution.
See BEDEAU, supra note 1, at 18. "For several years it has been virtually impossible for any
candidate for high elective office in the states - governor, attorney general, appellate court judge
- to appear hesitant over (much less opposed to) the death penalty." See also, Phoebe Ellsworth
& Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: American's Views on the Death Penalty in THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 90 (H. Bedeau, ed. 1997).
11. See Robert D. Kaplan, Was Democracy Just a Moment?, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, 280, Dec., 1997, at 56, quoting Thomas Paine: "Society is produced by our wants
and government by our wickedness." It was the crude and reactionary philosophy of Thomas
Hobbes which placed security ahead of liberty in a system of enlightened despotism, from which
the Founders drew philosophical sustenance.
12. See David Bruck, supra note 10, at 865.
The depressing part of the [Susan] Smith case was that it did not strike most people as
odd, in the face of the terrible catastrophe to that community represented by the deaths
of Michael and Alex Smith out at John D. Long lake, that the only response from the
criminal justice system was to descend into nine months of costly legal maneuvering
and eye gouging in court over whether it would be better to kill this suicidal young
woman or let her suffer out her life in prison. In a traumatized community, this
melodrama of retribution was just not a very logical way to get about the work of
healing. Yet, that is what the legal system had to offer. When the battle was over, all
the legal system had to congratulate itself about was that it had managed not to make
an almost unimaginably horrible human disaster any worse.
13. Marshall J. Harman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New
Federalism After the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 337 (1997) (citing to the American Bar Association Resolution) [hereinafter Resolution].
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Few Americans appear to have any awareness of the seriousness of
the state of American death penalty practice. Not only has that practice
been condemned by international bodies as inimicable to current world-
wide thought, but that condemnation has now been opened for debate in
the national discourse. The American Bar Association has now
recommended and endorsed a resolution calling for a moratorium on the
death penalty. The accompanying report to that resolution highlights the
many serious deficiencies in the application of the death penalty in
America and highlights reasons for the call for a nationwide moratorium. 4
This panel sought to promote discourse on how and why evolving
limitations on the death penalty are being invoked in the international
community, and how these trends might be informative in implementing
the American Bar Association's Resolution calling for a moratorium on the
use of the death penalty by states and the federal government in the United
States.
H. THE ABA RESOLUTION
A. What it Does
The American Bar Association Resolution adopted in 1997 calls
for states "not to carry out the death penalty"' until the jurisdiction has
implemented policies and procedures that are consistent with ABA policies.
The purpose is to "ensure that death penalty cases are administered fairly
and impartially in accordance with due process"' 6 and to "minimize the risk
that innocent persons may be executed."" The policies which are referred
to in the resolution include: the ABA Guidelines for the appointment and
performance of counsel in Death Penalty cases (adopted Feb. 1989)18 and
Association policies intended to encourage competency of counsel in
capital cases. (Adopted Feb. 1979, Feb. 1988, Feb. 1990, and Aug.
1996); 19 to preserve the courts' authority and responsibility to exercise
independent judgment on the merits of constitutional claims in federal
habeas corpus proceedings as well as in state post-conviction proceedings
14. Report of the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities Section of Litigation (Accompanying the Resolution, supra, note 13)
[Hereinafter Report].
15. Resolution, supra note 13, introductory paragraph.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. para. (i).
19. Id.
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(adopted Aug. 1982, Feb. 1990);2 "Striving to eliminate discrimination in
capital sentencing on the basis of race" - of the victim or the defendant
(Adopted Aug. 1988, Aug. 1991); 2 1 and "Preventing execution of mentally
retarded persons (adopted Feb. 1989)" and persons who were under the
age of 18 at the time of their offenses (adopted Aug. 1983)."2
B. Why it is Necessary
The reasons behind the ABA resolution are not found in some
philosophical book, but in the actual practice in the United States.
Appointed counsel, including habeas counsel, have often undertaken the
tasks without proper training.4 The fault for this lies both with the
appointing mechanisms25 and with the gross underfunding that "pervades
indigent defense,"2 and with the general reluctance of local experienced
counsel to take these cases. 27  The results have been, as expected,
disastrous. In one case, defense counsel not only presented little mitigating
evidence, but also made no objections at all, as he told the jury that the
death penalty was appropriate." In Ross v. Kemp, the defense counsel was
a drug addict dependent on drugs during trial who was later convicted and
20. Id. para. (ii).
21. Resolution, supra note 13, para. (iii).
22. Id. para. (iv).
23. Id.
24. Report, supra note 14.
25. Id. "[Slome states simply assign lawyers at random from a general list - a
scheme destined to identify attorneys who lack the necessary qualifications and, worse still,
regard their assignments as a burden. Other jurisdictions amply 'contract' systems, which
typically channel indigent defense business to attorneys who offer the lowest bids."
26. Id. at 5. See also, supra note 14, quoting Stephen Bright, Counsel for the
Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime, But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J.
1835, 1839-1852 (1994).
They are unable to attract and keep experienced and qualified attorneys because of lack
of compensation and overwhelming workloads. Just when lawyers reach the point
when they have handled enough cases to begin avoiding basic mistakes, they leave
criminal practice and are replaced by other young, inexperienced lawyers who are
even less able to deal with the overwhelming caseloads. Generally, no standards are
employed for assignment of cases to counsel or for the performance of counsel. And
virtually no resources are provided for investigative and expert assistance or defense
counsel training.
27. In some rural counties in Texas, an appointed attorney is paid no more than
$800.00 for representation in a capital case. Id. at 7. In Virginia, the hourly rate is about
$13.00. Id. at 8. In one Alabama case, the attorney was given a total budget of $500.00 which
included all the money for investigative and expert services. d.
28. Messer v Kemp, 393 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. 1990). Defendant was executed.
Report, supra, note 14, at 7,9.
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sentenced to prison on state and federal drug charges.?' In Frey v.
Fulcomer, defense counsel complied with a state statute limiting mitigating
evidence, not knowing that that statute had been declared unconstitutional
three years earlier.?
Defunding of the regional death penalty centers3' established by
Congress to improve death penalty representation in the federal courts has
further increased the urgency of the ABA Resolution. Those regional
centers had achieved a success rate of forty percent, indicative of the need
for improvement in state court representation in death penalty cases.
In the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,32
Congress established deadlines for filing federal habeas petitions, by
placing limits on federal evidentiary hearings into the facts underlying
federal constitutional claims, putting severe restrictions on second or
successive habeas claims, and seemingly barring federal courts from
determining constitutional violations where state courts had erred in
making a contrary determination."
C. What is Needed Now to Implement It
It is imperative that State Bar Associations be moved to adopt the
ABA Resolution and to increase awareness of the dismal state of death
penalty representation as well as the other serious violations of due process
in death penalty litigation.
IUI. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY & RECENT CALLS FOR
MORATORIUM AND ABOLISHMENT OF THE DEATH PENALTY
There is a renewed energy in the international community towards
moratorium and abolishment of capital punishment throughout the world,
and in one sense the ABA Resolution is a continuation of that movement.
This year there were many new calls in regional and world bodies for
abolition of the death penalty.3'
29. Ross v. Kemp, No. 85-98-2-MAC (M.D. Ga. 1985). Defendant was
executed. Report, supra note 14, at 7, 9.
30. Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1992). Report, supra note 14, at
7.
31. Congress ended funding for Post-Conviction Defender Organizations
(PCDO's) which handled many capital post-conviction cases. (See Report, supra note 14, at 3).
32. Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
33. Report, supra note 14, at 3.
34. The advances discussed here were part of the presentation of Bill Schabas at
the ILA Weekend. Please see his paper for further discussion.
5191998]
520 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 4:513
A. The European Parliament
On October 2, 1997, the foreign ministers of the fifteen European
Union Member States signed the Treaty of Amsterdam. 33  There are three
main objectives to the Treaty, of which only one, the launching of the
Euro, has been given prominence in American newspapers. Two other
objectives of the Treaty have escaped notice. The first of these is the
planned expansion of the European Union (EU) to encompass the Central
and Eastern European states as well as Turkey and Cyprus. This will
create a vast economic, political, and human rights union with vast
implications for the balance of power in the Western world.
The last objective is the implementation of human rights norms
stated in the Treaty of Amsterdam itself.16 On July 16, 1997, President
Jacques Santer spoke on the year 2000 Agenda, a plan to have major
components of the treaty in place by the year 2000. The Treaty
"underpins the abolition of the death penalty in all EU member states." 7
A declaration concerning the abolition of the death penalty is included in
the final act, which declares that the death penalty is no longer applied by
any EU member state.'8 The new treaty also includes a sanctions provision
for serious and persistent violations of human rights. 9
As indicated, the treaty also allows for institutional reform and
expansion of the EU to include the former Eastern Bloc countries. 0 The
treaty will now have to be ratified by the national parliaments." The
35. The Treaty is available at <http://ue.eu.int.> The website also has news
releases and other information about the E.U. and the Treaty.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Summit Sees EU Stumble Onwards in Amsterdam - part 2 of 2, EUROPEAN
REPORT, June 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8517656. Under Section III, Final Act, the
Treaty has adopted the final text of the Declaration on the Abolishment of the death penalty.
That declaration reads as follows: 1. Declaration on the Abolishment of the Death Penalty. With
reference to Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Conference recalls that Protocol
NO. 6 to the European Convention for the Protections of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, and which has been signed and ratified by a
large majority of Member States, provides for the abolition of the death penalty. In this context,
the Conference notes the fact that since the signature of the above mentioned Protocol on 28
April 1983, the death penalty has been abolished in most of the member states of the Union and
has not been applied in any of them.
39. Id.
40. John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, EU Adopts Treaty of Amsterdam to
Revamp Institutional System and Include Former Eastern Bloc Countries as Additional Members,
3 INT'L L. UPDATE 130 (Nov. 1997).
41. European Parliament: European Court of Justice Rules in Favor of
Strasbourg, EUROPEAN REPORT, Oct. 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13046999.
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Treaty has been called "A charter of rights for citizens of EU."' 2 The
Treaty also gives the EU a stronger voice in international affairs, with a
new foreign-policy planning unit to be set up inside the EU Council of
Ministers .'
However, even outside of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU has
been a force for the abolishment of the death penalty. Paving the way for
the extension of the EU into the former Eastern Block countries, the EU
has been active in assessing anti-death penalty activities in the countries
being considered for future inclusion in the EU. On November 28, 1997,
the EU formally welcomed the Georgia Parliament's adoption of a new
penal code in which they abolish the death penalty in Georgia. "An EU
Presidency declaration greeted the move as 'an important step in
strengthening democracy and the rule of law,' and encouraged Georgia to
persevere in that direction, in particular with a view to early accession to
the Council of Europe."" The Joint EU/Lithuania Parliamentary
Committee held an inaugural meeting in Vilnius in October, Lithuania
being one of five candidates identified by the European Commission as
being insufficiently ready to start negotiations in early 1998. The Joint
committee "encouraged NGO involvement in monitoring of human rights,
and called on Lithuania to speed up the abolition of the death penalty."'4
The first meeting of the EU/Latvia Joint Parliamentary Committee took
place in Riga on Nov. 3 and 4, 1997, preliminary to work on accession to
the EU, and among the negotiations, was a call for "formally abolishing
the death penalty."" The first meeting of the Joint European Union-
Estonian Parliamentary Committee with Estonia was held in Tallinn on
Oct. 27-29, 1997, and the Joint Parliamentary Committee supported "the
Estonian Government and Riigikogu in their effort to abolish the death
penalty in Estonia. " 7
A United States delegation, which included Professor Julian Bond
and National Coalition to Abolish the Death Executive Director Steven
Hawkins met Jose Maria Gil-Robles, the President of the European Union
42. John Palmer, Amsterdam Summit: A Charter of Rights for Citizens of EU
Human Face of Brussels: The Right to Work and Laws to Banish Discrimination and Safeguard
Environment at Heart of New Deal, THE GUARDIAN, June 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL
2386803.
43. Euronews, 11/17/97 (Deutsche Presse-Agentur).
44. Euronews - 11/28/97. Membership in the European Parliament is granted
only to nations that have been admitted to the Council of Europe.
45. Euronews - 10/11/97.
46. Euronews - 11/13/97.
47. EU-Estonia: EU Holds First Joint Parliamentary Committee Meeting with
Estonia, EURO-EAST, Nov. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13228191.
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and Renzo Imbeni, a European Parliament Vice-President, as well as
Jeroen Schokkenbrock, Head of the Human Rights Section of the Council
of Europe in Strasbourg, in France in December, 1997." The purpose of a
series of meeting was "to urge European political leaders to sponsor the
adoption of a resolution in the European Parliament."49 The Resolution
invites companies that are considering locating a manufacturing plant or
making a major capital investment in the United States to give priority to
those twelve states and the District of Columbia that do not have capital
punishment.-° The basis of the resolution is that in order to join the EU
countries must abandon the use of capital punishment. Asking the
European companies to show "the same respect for human rights when
they cross the Atlantic, "5' the resolution will be presented by a number of
both American and European representatives, 2 and the resolution has the
support of a large number of anti-death penalty organizations.5 3 The goal is
to brand us as a "pariah nation, "5 a status that the United States is creating
for itself with its growing use of the death penalty.
The resolution grew out of an international discussion between the
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (NCADP), the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Hands Off Cain, an Italian
non-governmental organization working to abolish the death penalty.5'
B. The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe's now 40 member States, with 800 million
citizens, put abolition at the top of the list of priorities in 1997, agreeing in
October, 1997, to call for the universal abolition of the death penalty.-
The two day proceedings were hosted by President Jacques Chirac, who
stated: "It is the first time that 40 heads of state and government have
48. Speedy Rice, Lifelines, No. 72, 2 (Jan./Feb. 1998).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Steven Hawkins, Lifelines, No. 71, l(Nov./Dec. 1997).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Hawkins, supra note 51.
55. Id.
56. Bernard Besserglik, Council of Europe Seeks Wider Role on European
Stage, AGENCE FR. - PRESSE, Oct. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13412204,. Representation
at the two day meeting was very high: "Virtually every country in Europe - all 40 Council
members, together with four candidate members - attended, sending its highest possible
representation. Only two states were absent: Belarus, suspended for human rights violations, and
Serbia, which has not applied to join." d.
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gathered around a table to talk in the same terms about such essential
issues as man's place in society, his rights, his dignity, and social
progress.""1 The Council of Europe had condemned the death penalty as a
violation of human rights,-8 stating in a preliminary paper that the Council
"believes the death penalty can no longer be regarded as an acceptable
form of punishment from a human rights perspective."-
The Russian Federation and the Ukraine agreed to a moratorium
on the death penalty in order to obtain membership in the Council of
Europe in 1996.60 Since then, 62 persons have been executed in Russia.6 1
In January, 1997, a special commission of the European Parliament met to
discuss how Russia had not met her commitments. "Of special concern is
Russia's failure to abolish capital punishment and to impose a moratorium
on carrying out death sentences passed since Russia's admission to the
Council of Europe."" Instead of the Russian Federation being thrown out
of the Council, the Russian Federation ended up being influenced by it.63
Yet, Russia still maintains the death penalty despite its promises."
In 1996, Boris Yeltsin tried to decree a moratorium on capital punishment,
but this was defeated by the Duma, Russia's lower house of Parliament."
However, on Dec. 17, 1997, the Duma passed a draft law which requires
that the country's president approve each death sentence handed down by
the courts." Although the proposed legislation has yet to pass the upper
house and then be agreed upon by the Duma again,7 this marks a step
towards the fulfillment of Russia's promises.
57. Id.
58. Council of Europe Demands Worldwide Ban on Death Penalty, AGENCE FR.
- PRESSE, Oct. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13411718.
59. Id. The Council requires that within three years of admission new member
states ratify Article 1 of Protocol 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights.
60. Igor Vandenko, 62 Persons Executed in Russia After Her Admission to
Council of Europe, EURONEWS, Jan. 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7804295.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Russia's Parliament Considers Capital Punishment Changes, AGENCE FR. -
PRESSE, Dec. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13456505.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
1998] 523
524 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
C. The United Nations Human Rights Commission
The Human Rights Commission met at its headquarters in Geneva
for its annual meeting in March and April, 1997, with more than 200 non-
governmental organizations participating." This year the Commission
passed its first resolution condemning capital punishment," putting the
death penalty at the forefront of international human rights. The United
States was the only Western nation voting against the Resolution.0 The
Commission resolution urged "countries to consider abolishing capital
punishment. The resolution, sponsored by Italy but not legally binding,
passed in Geneva, 27-11. Fourteen nations abstained."7
The resolution also called on all countries that have not yet
abolished the death penalty "to suspend executions, with a view toward the
definitive elimination of capital punishment. "7 Lastly, it also called upon
countries which still practice state-sponsored executions "to spare
adolescents under 18 (when the crime was committed) and pregnant
women. "71
D. The United Nations Human Rights Committee
Few Americans or their local or national representatives are aware
that when the United Nations Human Rights Committee reviewed the
report of the United States on implementation of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,74 they found conditions surrounding the use of the death
penalty in the United States to be among the most serious problems placing
the United States out of compliance with the Covenant.
In the Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Annual General Assembly Report of the Human Rights Committee, the
68. Gustavo Gonzalez, Poor Harvest for UN Commission, Apr. 19, 1997, INTER
PRESS SERV., available in 1997 WL 7074924.
69. 1996 Set Grim Record for Executions: Amnesty, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Apr.
4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2089763. This is the first time the death penalty became an
accepted part of the agenda of the United Nations. Last year an attempt to approve a motion on
the death penalty in the General Assembly failed. Id.
70. World in Brief United Nations Resolution Opposing Death Penalty, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 1997, at A5, available in 1997 WL 2197852.
71. Id.
72. Gonzalez, supra note 68.
73. Agence Fr.-Presse, supra note 69. (Material in parenthesis added).
74. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was ratified by the U.S. Senate
in 1992. The initial report was submitted in 1994. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, INITIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA TO THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1994).
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United States Report was reviewed. 5 The Committee agreed with the
report of the delegation that American courts are not prevented from
seeking guidelines from the Covenant in interpreting American law. 6
However, the Committee expressed regret and concern over the lack of
knowledge about the Covenant by the judiciary, noting:
The Committee regrets that members of the judiciary at the
federal, state and local levels have not been fully made
aware of the obligations undertaken by the State party
under the Covenant, and that judicial continuing education
programmes do not include knowledge of the Covenant
and discussion of its implementation."
However, the Committee expressed even more serious concern
over the application of the death penalty in America, stating:
The Committee is concerned about the excessive number
of offenses punishable by the death penalty in a number of
states, the number of death sentences handed down by
courts, and the long stay on death row which, in specific
instances, may amount to a breach of Article 7 of the
Covenant. It deplores the recent expansion of the death
penalty under federal law and the re-establishment of the
death penalty in certain states. It also deplores provisions
in the legislation of a number of states which allow the
death penalty to be pronounced for crimes committed by
persons under 18 and the actual instances where such
sentences have been pronounced and executed. It also
regrets that, in some cases, there appears to be a lack of
protection from the death penalty of those mentally
retarded.78
Finally, the Human Rights Committee recommended:
75. Annual General Assembly Report of the Human Rights Committee: Report
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 3/10/95.A/50140 (1995) available in
(visited 10/97) <http://193.135.156.15/HTML/menu 4/chrrep.htm>.
76. Id. para. 276, which states in full: "[t]he Committee takes note of the
position expressed by the delegation that, notwithstanding the non-self-executing declaration of
the U.S., American courts are not prevented from seeking guidelines from the Covenant in
interpreting American law."
77. Id. para. 280.
78. Id. para. 281.
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The Committee urges the State party to revise federal and
state legislation with a view of restricting the number of
offences carrying the death penalty strictly to the most
serious crimes, in conformity with article 6 of the
Covenant and with a view eventually to abolishing it. It
exhorts the authorities to take appropriate steps to ensure
that persons are not sentenced to death for crimes
committed before they were 18. The Committee considers
that the determination of methods of execution must take
into account the prohibition against causing avoidable pain
and recommends the State party to take all necessary steps
to ensure respect of article 7 of the Covenant.' 9
E. Extradition
Extradition from other countries to the United States is seriously
hampered by the death penalty practices found within the United States.
Since the Soering decision by the European Court of Human Rights, there
has been an increased resistance to extradition requests by the United
States where the defendant may face the death penalty in the United
States.' While Soering was not based upon a view that the death penalty
itself was contrary to the Convention, it held that circumstances relating to
a death sentence, called the Death Row Phenomena, could result in a
violation of Article 3, prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment.Y It is almost systematic now that the United States
government will give assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed
because it is often a necessary precondition to the obtaining of extradition.
IV. Two PROHIBITION STATES
The ultimate aim of. any discourse is to focus on those states which
apply the death penalty since they are in the majority. However, since I
live in an abolitionist state, Michigan, I am particularly interested in
stopping further extension to those States which do not currently employ
the death penalty. During October and November, 1997, two States that
currently ban the death penalty, Michigan and Massachusetts, were
79. Id. para. 296.
80. Soering v United Kingdom (App. No. 14038/88), Series A, Vol. 161.
81. Comments by Bill Schabas at the ILA conference.
82. Soering, (App. No. 14038/88), Series A, Vol. 161. See discussion in
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL TREATMENT & TORTURE, 96-156
(1996).
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subjected to legislative attempts to reintroduce death penalty practices. In
Michigan, attempts to bring the death penalty back are almost always on
the agenda. The bill is introduced by a legislator who has little
information and has almost no understanding about the serious and difficult
problems which having a death penalty raises.
V. THE LOCAL DISCOURSE
The October, 1997, Michigan death penalty public hearing
occurred over a referendum, Resolution M, which attempted to place on
the ballot a resolution that anyone who killed a corrections officer could be
sentenced to death.s To make this change, the Michigan Constitution
would have to be altered. In the 1964 Constitution, thanks to the work of
Eugene Wanger and Tom Downs, among others, the death penalty was
prohibited.'
On Thursday evening, October 2, 1997, I received a phone call
from Beth Arnovitz, the director of the Michigan Council on Crime and
Delinquency, telling me that the referendum, Resolution M, would be
heard the following Tuesday morning, October 7th. Beth is the Paul
Revere of the well-organized and responsive community in Michigan
which opposes the death penalty. This gave us a little over 4 days to
organize a response. We are also more fortunate in having the Governor,
John Engler, also opposing the death penalty. The issue comes up almost
routinely every one to three years." On Tuesday, October 7th, the House
Judiciary Committee, chaired by Ted Wallace, met as planned. In the past
four days a great deal of organizational work had been done. People had
organized a bus up from Detroit. Religious groups had organized. Sister
Monica from the Catholic Conference and the Team for Justice were there.
I represented the Religious Society of Friends. Many other religious
groups were present. Professors were there, including myself, Justin
Brooks from my institution, and Andrea Lyons from the University of
Michigan. Jim Neuhardt and Marty Tieber from the Defenders, Wendy
Waggenheim, the lobbyist from the American Civil Liberties Union, were
there, and Pat Clark from the Michigan Council on Crime and
Delinquency were there. Overall, there were more than one hundred
persons who turned out on such short notice. There was only the bill's
sponsor and one other lobbyist for the Michigan Corrections Officers
83. Michigan House Resolution M, 1997.
84. See Eugene G. Wanger, Historical Reflections on Michigan's abolition of
the Death Penalty, 13, No. 2 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 755, 770-774 (1996).
85. Michigan Senate Joint Resolution F, which would have amended the state
constitution to permit reinstatement of the death penalty was filed in 1994.
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Union who were there in favor of the bill. At the end of the three-and-a-
half hour hearing the chairperson, Representative Ted Wallace, declared
that "the committee will issue a report that there is overwhelming
opposition to capital punishment... There is no need for a vote or further
hearings .... [T]he measure [is] dead."" There are now four bills calling
for the imposition of the death penalty that have been introduced in this
legislative session, each one garnering for its sponsor a little time in the
limelight and a chance for more votesY
The Massachusetts House of Representatives voted eighty one to
seventy nine, on October 28th, 1997, to bring the death penalty back to
Massachusetts.u The death of a ten year old boy and a series of murders
had created a lynch mob mentality in the state."1 A slightly different bill
had already passed the Senate. Thus, the House-Senate conference
committee had to come up with a compromise bill. The Senate easily
passed the compromise bill."0 Paul Hill and Sister Helen Prejean lobbied
for the abolitionists while families of some murder victims lobbied for the
compromise legislation.9' The end result came down to one vote."1
Representative John P. Slattery (D) then changed his vote, bringing the
tally to an eighty-eighty tie."1 When asked why he changed his vote, he
responded that he could not accept that the legislation might apply to
teenagers under the age of 18 or that it would weaken protections for
minority defendants."
But perhaps most he was influenced by the British au pair trial: "It
left me feeling that we can't always be certain that we executed the right
guy, and if we can't be certain of that, then I have a very big problem with
the death penalty."91
86. The wording of this last statement is taken from Hawkins, supra note 51, at
5.
87. Two in the Senate, SJRC and SJRD; and two in the House, SJRC and
HJRM.
88. Hawkins, supra note 51, at 3.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Rice, supra note 48, (see supra note 88 to finish).
95. Id. at 7.
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VI. COSTS & OVERLOAD IN PRISONS - THE FACTS & THEIR
IMPORTANCE TO THE DEATH PENALTY DEBATE
Many states, including Michigan have serious problems in their
prisons and corrections system. The build-up of prisons in the United
States during the last twenty years has been phenomenal. In 1996, the total
number of prisoners in the United States reached 1.7 million," costing
more than 30 billion dollars. United States incarceration at year-end,
1996, totaled 427 sentenced inmates per 100,000 persons, up from 292 per
100,000 in 1990.9 In Michigan, the number of people imprisoned has
risen from less than 8,000 two decades ago to over 43,000 today. The cost
of the prisons is 1.3 billion dollars annually in Michigan, outspending
higher education. In California, the number of prisoners has risen from
19,000 twenty years ago to over 150,000 persons today." There, the
taking of services from other budgets is more direct and observable.
There, the impact on education is more direct; the increase in funding for
prisons has been directly proportional to the loss of funds to higher
education." Not one new University in California has been built since the
build-up of the prisons has commenced.
VII. WRONG CONVICTIONS: WHY THEY OCCUR AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEATH PENALTY
In the last four years seventeen inmates sentenced to death in the
United States have been found innocent and freed.' ° In Illinois, nine men
have been found innocent and freed in the ten years since the death penalty
was reinstated there.1°1 Eight of the nine men were found innocent after
96. Christopher J. Mumola, et al., Prisoners in 1996, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, June 1997, NCJ
164619.
97. Id.
98. Fox Butterfield, Crime Keeps Falling, but Prisons Keep on Filling, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, § 4, at 1.
99. For example,
[t]he state (California) will have to build 24 new prisons at a cost of about $7 billion
by the year 2005 to handle exploding growth in inmate populations brought on largely
by the Three Strikes sentencing law. That growth will double the Department of
Correction's annual operating budget, from $3 billion to $6 billion.
Steve Lawrence, State Still Facing $1.1 Billion in Cuts Despite Higher Revenue, THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Feb. 21, 1996.
100. Ky Henderson, How Many Innocent Inmates Are Executed, 24 HUMAN
RIGHTS, No. 4, 10.
101. Id.
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intervention from outside sources, indicative that without outside
intervention, the errors would not have been detected. ,o2
All of the cases involved heinous crimes, and six of the nine
involved people of color convicted and sentenced to death for interracial
murders. In four of the cases, a rape was involved. 1 3
In Illinois, about forty lawyers, judges and legal organizations
signed a petition for a one-year moratorium to investigate what had
happened in these cases.'°' A number of factors appear to be involved in
why these errors occurred. First is the use of poor counsel. °0 As Ron
Tabak has suggested, "The quality of lawyers at trial for defendants in
capital cases is often abysmal, such that you can wind up getting the death
penalty more because of how bad your lawyer was than because of how
bad you were. "106
Secondly, the "extreme pressure from the public on law
enforcement to capture, convict, and give the death penalty in these cases
leads to faulty police work - some accidental, some deliberate. "'' As an
example, two men were sentenced to death after being framed by the
police in Chicago, even though the police learned who the real killers were
just days after the murders. But, by then, since they had framed the
innocent men, they could not expose their fraudulent work at that point. '0
Thirdly, the politicization of the death penalty, and its feature in
the running for political office, keep the emotional climate going. "Going
for and getting the death penalty in well-publicized cases looks good to
most constituents.'"0 What is not stated is that political advocacy of the
death penalty by politicians running for political office provides an avenue
of political opportunism with all of the associated costs being borne by the
taxpayer.
VIII. ADDING TO EXISTING HARSH PENALTIES: GET7ING THE
TRUTH OUT
The political manifestations become chilling when a representative
or senator parades the families of the victim of some terrible crime. I
102. Id.
103. Id. at 11.
104. Id. at 10.
105. Id. at 11.
106. Henderson, supra note 100, at 11.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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would suspect that asking any family of a victim of whether they would
choose a policy going towards the prevention of such a crime rather than
imposing the death penalty upon a person who already will spend the rest
of their life in prison,"' that family would seek prevention and ask that the
money be channeled into the community. But they are not given that
choice. Rather, the death penalty is suggested to them as the only
alternative."'
Michigan's criminal penalties are among the harshest in the world,
and adding the death penalty would add almost nothing more. Michigan
was the first political entity in the Western world to abolish the death
penalty. The state has never brought it back. Abolition occurred in 1847,
effective 1848.1", Michigan punishes those who commit first degree
murder with a mandatory life sentence, with no possibility of probation or
parole.1 3 There is no other alternative sentence available. Unfortunately,
most citizens do not know this and a random sample from among my
students elicits the belief that the ordinary penalty for first degree murder
is 8 years."14
This is consonant with a recent study that indicated that "only 4%
of respondents believed murderers sentenced to life actually spend their
whole lives in jail; the average estimate of a 'life sentence' was 15.6
110. Michigan provides a penalty of mandatory life imprisonment for first degree
murder. First degree murder in Michigan follows the language, originating in Pennsylvania, that
willful deliberate and premeditated murder and felony-murder constitutes first degree murder.
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.316. The statute mandates life imprisonment without any
possibility of probation or parole. The only way in which a convicted first-degree murderer will
be released is through pardon by the Governor (unlikely since the Willie Horton phenomena).
However, legislators frequently have done little to educate the public about this fact of Michigan
law.
111. This ignorance of existing law is endemic throughout the State and is
fostered by the media. For. example, fifteen years ago in Michigan, a young man confessed to
murdering four young girls. He is now often referred to as a serial killer. Almost weekly, the
newspapers report accounts of how this serial killer and mass murderer is about to be released
from prison. What is either missing from the accounts or placed at the end of the story is the
fact that this young man was allowed to plead to one count of manslaughter, one count of
attempted murder and a rape count, and was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment, which is
now about to expire. Having a death penalty would certainly not have impacted upon his
punishment at all, but the public does not make those distinctions, and the Donald Miller story is
often used as an example of why the state should have a death penalty.
112. Wanger, supra note 84.
113. See supra note 110.
114. Informal sampling taken during Michaelmas term, 1997.
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years"."5  In states with tough sentencing requirements, "few citizens
realize that this is so."116
In 1993, Bowers did a study which was replicated the same year by
Dieter in a national poll. Bowers asks respondents:
'If convicted murderers in this state could be sentenced to
life in prison with absolutely no chance of ever being
released on parole or returning to society, would you
prefer this as an alternative to the death penalty?' In all
five states (California, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, New
York) where this question has been asked, more people
have preferred this form of life imprisonment. (Bowers,
1993). Adding a requirement that the murderer be
required to work in prison industries for money that would
go to the families of their victims further diminishes
support for the death penalty."
IX. THE DERELICTION OF DUTY BY LEGISLATORS
Legislators have a duty to inform themselves of the serious
problems that implementing a death penalty imposes. Few bother to
garner even the most basic information about the implementation of a death
penalty. For example, many legislators still erroneously believe that the
death penalty decreases the cost of imprisonment.' Quite the contrary, the
death penalty imposes an enormous financial burden on the prison budget,
since killi.g a prisoner can cost up to ten times what it costs to keep a
prisoner in a prison for life. 19 I am aware of no legislator who has
informed any constituent of this fact. When the current penal system is
already creaking from the costs of the criminal justice system and is taking
money which previously went to higher education and to the communities,
legislative leadership must be called into question as to why these
important matters of fiscal responsibility have not been revealed to the
public.
115. Ellsworth & Gross, supra, note 10, at 99.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Richard C. Dieter, Millions Misspent: What Politicians Don't Say About
the High Costs of the Death Penalty in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 401 (H. Bedau, Ed.
1997).
119. Id. See also Justin Brooks & Jeanne H. Erickson, The Dire Wolf Collects
His Due While the Boys Sit by the Fire: Why Michigan Cannot Afford to Buy into the Death
Penalty, 13 No. 3 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 877 (1996).
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When a bill seeking to impose the death penalty is brought up for
hearing, one issue which needs exploration is whether the author of the
legislation has considered the impact of this legislation upon the state
budget, and whether it would raise local or state taxes, and its impact on
the provision of other services. For example, would any responsible
representative or senator sponsor a bill calling for a multi-million dollar
stadium without having any blueprint or estimate of the costs involved?
Why would any serious and competent legislator introduce legislation
calling for the death penalty without researching the issue of costs?
The most basic responsibility of any legislator is to investigate the
full impact and cost of legislation that they are sponsoring. Anything less
reflects poor judgment on the part of the sponsor.
X. CONCLUSION
When considering death penalty legislation, the debate should be
realistic. Abstract discussions of good and evil, or the bizarre asking of
the question of whether, in the abstract, one is in favor or opposes the
death penalty, clouds the debate. Intense scrutiny should be focused on the
politician who is sponsoring the bill. One way to determine whether the
politician is simply looking for easy votes is to question their knowledge on
the topic and whether they have done their homework (other than the
political homework).
The purpose of this panel at the ILA Conference was to integrate
the various strands towards moratorium and abolishment of capitol
punishment as it affects those efforts in the United States. It is astonishing
that Americans have so little appreciation of either the changes which are
being wrought within the American criminal justice system, or of the
changes in the other direction which are occurring throughout the world.
It is the hope that this panel and this article will stimulate thinking in these
directions.
Knowledge makes the key difference. Knowledge about
alternatives to violence, about alternatives to executions, makes the death
penalty less attractive. Given information about capital punishment as it is
practiced, about the limitations of the criminal justice system to determine
guilt or innocence, about the failings of a very seriously flawed system,
about the lack of proportionality in application, about the death penalty's
inevitable highly politicized content, and its numerous errors, few
Americans continue to adhere to the rectitude of such punishment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As a goal for civilized nations, abolition of the death penalty was
promoted during the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights' in 1948. It found, however, that expression was only implicit in
the recognition of what international human rights law designated "the
right to life;" the same approach was taken in the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted May 4, 1948.2 At the time, all but
a handful of states maintained the death penalty. In the aftermath of a
brutal struggle which took hundreds of millions of lives, few were even
contemplating its abolition. The idea of abolition gained momentum over
the following decades. International lawmakers urged the limitation of the
death penalty, by excluding juveniles, pregnant women, and the elderly
from its scope and by restricting it to an ever-shrinking list of serious
crimes. Enhanced procedural safeguards were required where the death
penalty still remained. In several subsequent international human rights
instruments, notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,3 the European Convention on Human Rights,4 and the American
* William A. Schabas, M.A. (Toronto), LL.D. (Montreal), Professor of Law and Chair,
D(partement des sciences juridiques, Universit6 du Qu6bec it Montreal.
1. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948), art. 3.
2. O.A.S. Doe. OEAISer.L.IVII.4 (1948), art. I.
3. 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, art. 6.
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Convention on Human Rights,, the death penalty is mentioned as a
carefully-worded exception to the right to life. From a normative
standpoint, the right to life protects the individual against the death penalty
unless otherwise provided as an implicit or express exception. Eventually,
three international instruments were drafted that proclaimed the abolition
of the death penalty. The first instrument was adopted in 1983 and the
others at the end of the 1980s.6 Fifty-one States are now bound by these
international legal norms abolishing the death penalty, 7 and the number
should continue to grow rapidly.' Fifty years after the Nuremberg trials,
the international community has now ruled out the possibility of capital
punishment in prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity.9
The importance of international standard setting was evidenced by
parallel developments in domestic laws. In 1945, there were only a
handful of abolitionist states. By 1997, considerably more than half the
countries in the world abolished the death penalty de facto or de jure.
4. 213 U.N.T.S. 221, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, art. 2§1.
5. American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force Jul.
18, 1978.
6. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, E.T.S. no. 114, entered into force
Mar. 30, 1985; Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights Aiming at Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, entered into force Jul. 7,
1991; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
Penalty, O.A.S.T.S. no. 73, 29 I.L.M. 1447, entered into force Oct. 6, 1993. The American
Convention on Human Rights, is also an abolitionist instrument because it prevents countries that
have already abolished the death penalty from reintroducing it. Thus, a State which has
abolished the death penalty at the time of ratification of the American Convention is abolitionist
from the standpoint of international law. Id.
7. Andorra, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Romania, San Marino,
Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela.
These States are abolitionist either de jure or de facto, and have either signed or ratified one or
more of the abolitionist treaties (Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to
Human Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. L. J. 79 (1997)).
8. Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine
have indicated their intention to be bound by international norms prohibiting the death penalty,
either by signing an abolitionist instrument or by publicly declaring their intention to ratify.
9. The Security Council has excluded use of the death penalty by the two international ad
hoc tribunals created to deal with war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S/RES/827 (1993), annex, art.
24(1); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S/RES/955 (1994) annex, art.
23(1). The International Law Commission has also excluded the death penalty in its draft statute
for an international criminal tribunal: U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), art. 47.
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Those that still retain it find themselves increasingly subject to
international pressure in favor of abolition. Sometimes the pressure is
quite direct. One example is the refusal by certain countries to grant
extradition where a fugitive will be exposed to a capital sentence.
Abolition of the death penalty is generally considered to be an important
element in democratic development for states breaking with a past
characterized by terror, injustice, and repression. In some cases, abolition
is affected by explicit reference in constitutional instruments to the
international treaties that prohibit the death penalty. In others, it has been
the contribution of the judiciary (judges applying constitutions that make
no specific mention of the death penalty but that enshrine the right to life
and that prohibit cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or
punishment). 0
Several recent works provide detailed overviews of international
legal issues relating to abolition of the death penalty." The intention of
this article is considerably more modest: to update the existing material by
addressing recent developments in international law. Three subjects are
considered; the ongoing debate within international organizations including
the United Nations and European institutions, the issue of the death penalty
and general sentencing matters involved in establishment of the
international criminal court, and the growing refusal of states to extradite
to the United States of America in cases where fugitives are subject to the
death penalty.
II. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The first truly international trials were held in the aftermath of the
Second World War and in many cases led to capital executions. The
Charter of the International Military Tribunal authorized the Nuremberg
court to impose upon a convicted war criminal "death or such other
punishment as shall be determined by it to be just."' 2 Many of the Nazi
defendants were condemned to death, although a few received lengthy
prison terms and some were acquitted. The Soviet judge expressed the
10. Makwanyane & Mchunu v. The State, 16 HUM. RTs L. J. 154 (1995); (Constitutional
Court of South Africa); Ruling 23/1990 (X.31) AB, Constitutional Court of Hungary, Judgment
of October 24, 1990, Magyar K6zl6ny (Official Gazette), Oct. 31, 1991.
11. Roger Hood, The Death Penalty (1996); William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the
Death Penalty in International Law (1997); Capital Punishment: Global Issues and Prospects
(Peter Hodgkinson, Andrew Rutherford, eds., 1996). On the death penalty in the United States,
see: The Death Penalty in America, Current Controversies (Hugo Adam Bedau, ed., 1997).
12. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (I.M.T.),
Aug. 8, 1945, art. 27, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
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minority view that all of those convicted should also have been sentenced
to death. Those condemned to death were subsequently executed within a
few weeks, with the exception of G6ring, who committed suicide hours
before the time fixed for sentence." A series of successor trials were held
in Nuremberg pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10.14 Again, large
numbers were. sentenced to death or to various lesser punishments,
including life imprisonment or lengthy terms of detention. The sentencing
provisions of the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal were similar to those
adopted at Nuremberg."s Of those convicted, seven were sentenced to
death and fifteen to life imprisonment. 6 The President of the Tokyo
Tribunal penned a separate opinion which seemed to favor sentences other
than death:
It may well be that the punishment of imprisonment for life
under sustained conditions of hardship in an isolated place
or places outside Japan - the usual conditions in such
cases - would be a greater deterrent to men like the
accused than the speedy termination of existence on the
scaffold or before a firing squad. 7
In response to arguments that these sentences breached the rule
nulla poena sine lege, it was said that "[i]ntemational law lays down that a
war criminal may be punished with death whatever crimes he may have
committed."'" The 1940 United States Army Manual Rules of Land
Warfare declared that "[a]ll war crimes are subject to the death penalty,
although a lesser penalty may be imposed." 9 A post-war Norwegian court
answered a defendant's plea that the death penalty did not apply to the
offense as charged by finding that violations of the laws and customs of
13. France et al. v. G6ring et al., (1946) 23 Trial of the major war criminals before the
international military Tribunal, 13 I.L.R. 203. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS, A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992); LES PROCtS DE NUREMBERG ET DE TOKYO
(Annette Wieviorka, ed., 1996).
14. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, December 20, 1945, Official Gazette Control Council for
Germany, 50-55.
15. Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, 4
BEVANS 20, as amended, 4 BEVANS 27 ("Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal").
16. R. JOHN PRITCHARD & SONIA MAGBANUA, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 854-858
(1981).
17. Id.; See also B.V.A. R&LING, ANTONIO CASSESE, THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND,
1993.
18. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, XV LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, 200 (1949).
19. FIELD MANUAL 27-10, Oct. 1, 1940, para. 357.
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war were always punished by death under international law.20 In 1948, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations suggested that the drafting
committee of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide might wish to provide that the crime of genocide be
subject to capital punishment.' This indicates the general acceptance of
capital punishment at the time. A group of three experts involved in
drafting the Genocide Convention, Donnadieu de Vabres, Pella, and
Lemkin, revived provisions from a 1937 treaty that never came into force
and that provided for capital punishment for serious international crimes.22
Even then, the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
rejected proposals that the death penalty be explicitly mentioned as an
exception to the right to life because this might pose an obstacle to the
growing abolitionist trend.2Y
Within a few years, international lawmakers were more
circumspect about the death penalty. A draft provision proposed by the
International Law Commission for its "Draft Code of Offenses Against
The Peace and Security of Mankind" avoided any categorical reference to
capital punishment: "The penalty for any offense defined in this Code
shall be determined by the tribunal exercising jurisdiction over the
individual accused, taking into account the gravity of the offense."24 A
general assembly committee subsequently recommended that the statute
contain only the most general of provisions dealing with sentencing and
suggested the phrase "the court shall impose such penalties as it may
determine." The General Assembly committee even stated that the statute
might exclude certain forms of punishment, such as the death penalty.2
The post-Nuremberg efforts by the International Law Commission
and the general assembly to establish an international court did not
progress as quickly as hoped.27 Ultimately, the international criminal court
project was shelved for thirty-five years. Following a 1989 request by the
20. Public Prosecutor v. Klinge, (1946) 13 I.L.R. 262 (Supreme Court, Norway).
21. "List of substantive items to be discussed in the remaining stages of the Committee's
session, Memorandum submitted by the Secretariat," U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/1 1 (1948).
22. "Establishment of a permanent international criminal court for the punishment of Acts
of Genocide," U.N. Doc. E/447, at 73-74, 82-83 (1948).
23. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2 (1947), pp. 10-11.
24. Yearbook 1951, Vol. II, at 134 et seq., U.N. Doc. A/1858, §59.
25. "Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction," U.N. GAOR 7th
Sess., Supp. No. 11, A/2136 §110-111 (1952). See draft art. 32: "The Court shall impose upon
an accused, upon conviction, such penalty as the Court may determine, subject to any limitations
prescribed in the instrument conferring jurisdiction upon the Court."
26. Id. §111.
27. G.A. Res. 898 (IX), G.A. Res. 1187 (XII).
53919981
540 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 4:535
general assembly, the International Law Commission (The Commission)
returned to the issue. In 1990, special rapporteur Doudou Thiam proposed
three different provisions of a sentencing provision, one which did not rule
out the death penalty, the other two expressly excluded the death penalty.
Thiam said "[it therefore seems appropriate to select penalties on which
there is the broadest agreement and whose underlying principle is generally
accepted by the international community."2 When the issue of sentencing
came before the Commission in 1991, special rapporteur Thiam then
proposed that the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind set out specific penalties. This time, the death penalty was
formally proscribed and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment was
provided.29  A few members of the Commission argued that capital
punishment should not be abandoned.0 However, the vast majority felt it
would be unthinkable to retain the death penalty, given the international
trend in favor of its abolition.' Several members also expressed their
reservations about sentences of life imprisonment, which they said were
also a form of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment2 After lengthy
discussion in the Commission, special rapporteur Thiam produced two new
draft sentencing provisions. Both of these drafts allowed for sentences up
28. "Eighth report on the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, by Mr. Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur," U.N. Do. AICN.41430/ Add.1 §§101-
105 (1990). See also "Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-
second session," U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.Aj1990/Add. 1 (Part 2), A/45/10 §§148-149 (1990).
29. U.N. Doe. AICN.414351 Add. 1, §29. For the discussion of this proposal by the
International Law Commission, see U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2207-2214, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1991/Add. 1 (Part 2), A/46/10, §§70-105.
30. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2211, §15; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2212, §19; U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/SR.2212, §28; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2213, §55. Special rapporteur Thiam promised
that the Commission's report would state that "two or three of its members" had expressed
reservations about exclusion of the death penalty: U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2213, §59. The report
eventually stated that "many members of the Commission" opposed the death penalty and
"[slome other members" supported the death penalty: U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1991/Add.1
(Part 2), A/46/10, §§85-85.
31. U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2207, §§23-24; U.N. Doe. AICN.4/SR.2208, §2; U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/SR.2208, §21; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2208, §30; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2209, §5;
U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2209, §29; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2210, §25; U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/SR.2210, §33; U.N. Doe. AICN.4/SR.2210, §46; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2212, §4;
U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2213, §12; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2213, §23; U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/SR.2213, §33.
32. U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2208, §10 (Graefrath); U.N. Doe. AICN.4/SR.2208, §21
(Calero Rodriguez); U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2209, §19 (Barboza); U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2210,
§47 (Njenga); U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2212, §4 (Solari Tudela). See also: U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1991/Add. 1 (Part 2), A/46/10, §88. The German Constitutional Court has
suggested that life imprisonment without possibility of parole constitutes cruel, inhuman and
degrading punishment: [1977] 45 BVerfGE 187, 228 (as translated in KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 316 (1987).
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to life imprisonment (which was square bracketed), or for a term of fifteen
to thirty years not subject to commutation. The draft provided for
additional sanctions including community work, total or partial
confiscation of property and deprivation of some or all civil and political
rights.
In 1993, as attention shifted to a draft statute of the proposed
international criminal court, it was necessary to include a sentencing
provision in that instrument also.33  The draft statute adopted by the
Commission stated that a person convicted under the statute could be
sentenced up to life imprisonment, but capital punishment was not
included. These provisions were reworked in the 1994 draft, although the
substance was not changed significantly.3 The 1995 discussion confined
itself to reiterating the importance of having a residual sentencing
provision in the statute in order not to run afoul of the nulla poena sine
lege principle, and once again eliminated the death penalty. 3
During the August 1996, session of the Preparatory Committee on
the international criminal court, some states with a predominantly Moslem
population argued that if the statute was to be considered representative of
all legal systems, it should include the death penalty .16 When work on the
draft statute of the proposed international criminal court was being
discussed by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in October
1997, several states seized the opportunity to insist that capital punishment
be excluded from the instrument. These states included Poland, Haiti,
Paraguay, Ukraine, and Italy. Kuwait, on the other hand, urged its
retention." Retentionist States are likely to insist upon the issue when the
Preparatory Committee discusses penalties during its December 1997
session. The recent history of these debates would suggest that they have
no chance of succeeding. What is more likely is that their silence might
imply acquiescence, something that human rights tribunals might later
interpret as evidence of the emergence of a customary norm.
While the debate had been underway in the International Law
Commission and the Preparatory Committee, the Security Council also
33. "Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session," 3
May-23 July 1993, GAOR 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/48/10), §84.
34. "Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session," 3
May-23 July 1994, GAOR 49th sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/49/10), 123-125.
35. "Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-seventh
session," U.N. GAOR 50th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/50/10), 183.
36. U.N. Doe. L/2805 (1996); see also U.N. Do. L/2806 (1996), U.N. Doc. L/2813
(1996).
37. U.N. Doe. GA/L/3044 (1997); U.N. Doe. GA/L/3046 (1997); U.N. Doe. GA/L/3047
(1997); U.N. Doe. GA1L/3048 (1997).
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addressed the issue of sentencing when it set up the ad hoc tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals
contain brief provisions dealing with sentencing. The provisions
essentially propose that sentences be limited to imprisonment (thereby
tacitly excluding the death penalty, as well as corporal punishment,
imprisonment with hard labor, and fines) and that they be established by
taking into account the general practice of the criminal courts in the
former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, as the case may be. 8 The exclusion of the
death penalty by the International Tribunal is a particularly sore point with
Rwanda. In the Security Council, Rwanda claimed there would be a
fundamental injustice in exposing criminals tried by its domestic courts to
execution if those tried by the international tribunal would only be subject
to life imprisonment. 9 Rwanda's representative said:
[S]ince it is foreseeable that the Tribunal will be dealing
with suspects who devised, planned and organized the
genocide, these may escape capital punishment whereas
those who simply carried out their plans would be
subjected to the harshness of this sentence. . . . That
situation is not conducive to national reconciliation in
Rwanda. 40
But to counter this argument, the representative of New Zealand reminded
Rwanda that "[flor over three decades the United Nations has been trying
progressively to eliminate the death penalty. It would be entirely
38. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 25, supra
note 9; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 24, supra note 9. On the
ad hoc tribunals generally, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996); VIRGINIA
MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996); Dai Tribunali Penali Intrnazionali ad hoc a
una Corte Permanente (Flavia Lattanzi, Elena Sciso, eds., 1996); D. Shraga & R. Zacklin, The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 360 (1994); Eric
David, Le tribunal international penal pour l'ex-Yougoslavie, 25 REV. BELGE DROIT INT'L. 565
(1992); M. Bergsmo, The Establishment of the International Tribunal on War Crimes, 14 HUM.
RTS. L. J. 371 (1993); Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of
International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1994); Karine Lescure, Le tribunal penal international
pour l'ex-Yougoslavie, 1994; Christopher Greenwood, The International Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia, 69 International Affairs 641 (1993); Jules Deschenes, Toward International Criminal
Justice, 5 CRIM. L. F. 249 (1994); David Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 401 (1994); M. Gordon, Justice on Trial: The Efficacy of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 ILSA J. INT'L COMP. L. 217 (1995).
39. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, at 16.
40. Id.
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unacceptable, and a dreadful step backwards, to introduce it here. "' Since
domestic trials began in Rwanda in December 1996, more than one
hundred people have been sentenced to death. These sentences have not
yet been carried out.42  In fact, Rwanda has not imposed capital
punishment since 1982. In 1992, President Habyarimana systematically
commuted all outstanding death sentences. 43  According to the United
Nations Secretary-General, Rwanda is now considered a de facto
abolitionist state because it has not conducted executions for more than ten
years." Even the program of the Rwandese Patriotic Front calls for
abolition of the death penalty. Furthermore, in the 1993 Arusha peace
accords, which have constitutional force in Rwanda, the government
undertook to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aimed at Abolition of the Death
Penalty although it has not yet formally taken this step.45 Recent legislation
adopted by Rwanda in order to expedite trials of genocide suspects
abolishes the death penalty for the vast majority of offenders, who would
otherwise be subject to capital punishment under the country's Code
pinal."
III. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
International organizations have played an important role in
promoting abolition of the death penalty, through resolutions, treaties, and
other initiatives. Foremost among them are the various organs of the
United Nations, notably the General Assembly, the Commission on Human
Rights, and European regional organizations such as the Council of Europe
and the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Union.
41. Id. at 5.
42. William A. Schabas, Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda:
Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 8 CRIM. L. F. 523 (1997).
43. Arritg prisidentiel no 103/105, Mesure de grdce, J.O. 1992, p. 446, art. 1.
44. Capital punishment and implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing the protection
of the rights of those facing the death penalty, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
E/1995/78 §36 (1995). See also: The Death Penalty, List of Abolitionist and Retentionist
Countries (September, 1985), Al Index: ACT 50/06/95.
45. "Protocole d'Accord entre le Gouvernement de la R6publique Rwandaise et le Front
Patriotique Rwandais portant sur les questions diverses et dispositions finales sign6 A Arusha",
Aug. 3, 1993, Journal officiel, Year 32, no. 16, August 15, 1993, p. 1430, art. 15.
46. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS & MARTIN IMBLEAU, INTRODUCTION TO RWANDAN LAW 44,
59-60 (1997).
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A. United Nations
In 1994, at the forty-ninth session, a draft General Assembly
resolution called for a moratorium on the death penalty:' The resolution
originated from a newly-formed non-governmental organization, "Hands
Off Cain - the International League for Abolition of the Death Penalty
Before the Year 2000," which obtained the support of the Italian
Parliament for the draft resolution. A series of introductory paragraphs
referred to earlier General Assembly resolutions on the death penalty: the
1984 Safeguards, relevant provisions, in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 48 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights9
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 10 the Statutes of the ad hoc
criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,5' and the draft
statute of the proposed International Criminal Court. 2 The first of three
dispositive paragraphs invited states that -still maintain the death penalty to
comply with their obligations under the International Covenant and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and in particular to exclude
pregnant women and juveniles from execution. The second paragraph
invited states which had not abolished the death penalty to consider the
progressive restriction of the number of offenses for which the death
penalty may be imposed, and to exclude the insane from capital
punishment. The final paragraph "encourage[d] states which have not yet
abolished the death penalty to consider the opportunity of instituting a
moratorium on pending executions with a view to ensuring that the
principle that no state should dispose of the life of any human being be
affirmed in every part of the world by the year 2000."
Italy launched the campaign with a request addressed to the Office
of the Presidency of the General Assembly that the item capital punishment
be added to the agenda. Pakistan, speaking on behalf of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference, argued that capital punishment was a highly
sensitive and complicated issue, and warranted further and thorough
consideration. Pakistan opposed modification of the agenda to include the
47. U.N. Doc. A/49/234 and Add. 1 and Add.2 (1994), later revised by U.N. Doc.
A/C.3149/L.32IRev. 1 (1994).
48. Supra note 1, art. 3.
49. Supra note 3, art. 6.
50. G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex (1989), art. 6, 37(a).
51. Supra note 9.
52. Supra note 34.
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item, adding that if the resolution were to be considered, it should be in the
Sixth Committee that deals with legal issues, not the Third Committee that
deals with human rights issues." The representative of Sudan described
capital punishment as "a divine right according to some religions, in
particular Islam. " Iran, Malaysia, and Egypt also opposed discussing the
draft resolution, while Uruguay, Malta, Cambodia, Austria, Burundi,
Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, France, Ukraine and Andorra urged that it be
included on the agenda of the Third Committee." The item capital
punishment was added to the agenda of the Third Committee not by
consensus, as many had hoped, but on a vote of the General Assembly,
with seventy States in favor, twenty-four opposed, and forty-two
abstentions.6
Italy eventually obtained forty-nine co-sponsors for the resolutionY.7
During debate in the Third Committee, Singapore took the initiative in
attacking the draft resolution. According to the Singapore representative,
it strongly opposed efforts by certain states to use the United Nations to
impose their own values and system of justice on other countries. He
added that it was evident, from the wording of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, that no universal consensus held capital
punishment to be contrary to international law. He also said that the
abolition of the death penalty did not necessarily contribute to the
advancement of human dignity. Rather, its retention served to preserve
and safeguard the interests of society, notably in the repression of drug
trafficking.- Other states opposing the resolution during the debate
included Malaysia, Jamaica, Bangladesh, China, Sudan, Saudi Arabia,
Libya, Egypt, Iran, Japan, and Jordan.
Germany spoke on behalf of the European Union, of which it was
the President at the time, supporting the resolution and noting that capital
punishment was not applied by any of its members. The German
representative cited its lack of significant deterrent effect, and a preference
53. U.N. Doc. A/BUR/49/SR.6, §2.
54. U.N. Doc. A/BUR/49/SR.5, §13.
55. U.N. Doec. A/BUR/49/SR.5-6.
56. U.N. Doc. A/49/610, §2.
57. Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cape Verde,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Sao Tomt
and Principe, Slovak Republic, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, Vanuatu and
Venezuela.
58. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.33, §§23-27.
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of European States for rehabilitation rather than retribution as a goal of
punishment. The text did not create new standards, but did urge that while
looking ahead towards abolition, the status quo of persons currently on
death row should be preserved.59  Slovenia, Sweden, Italy, Ireland,
Nicaragua, New Zealand, Andorra, Malta, Portugal, Cambodia, and
Namibia took the floor to support the draft resolution.
At the conclusion of the debate in the Third Committee, the Chair
attempted to summarize the debates:
[T]he Committee had clearly been divided into two camps
those favoring the abolition of capital punishment and
those wishing to retain it. Arguments in favor of
abolishing the death penalty had been the following: States
could not impose the death penalty as a means of reducing
crime because there was no evidence that it had a deterrent
effect; the right to life was the most basic human right and,
consequently, States did not have the right to take the life
of any individual; the death penalty sometimes veiled a
desire for vengeance or provided an easy way of
eliminating political opponents; the death penalty, once
applied, could not be reversed in the event of judicial
error; and capital punishment was excluded from the
penalties used by international tribunals, including those
established to deal with the situations in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and should consequently become
less prevalent in national legislation.
Arguments in support of maintaining the death penalty had
been the following: certain legislative systems were based on
religious laws; it was not possible to impose the ethical
standards of a single culture on all countries; there was a need
to discourage extremely serious crimes, and, in some
countries, capital punishment was a constitutional or even a
religious obligation.
At the same time, all members had agreed on certain
fundamental points: the death penalty should be applied only
in exceptional circumstances and subject to strict
59. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.36, §§7-15.
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preconditions, and its scope of application should be
extremely limited.6
Singapore initially attempted to block the resolution by proposing a
no action motion. This attempt was rejected, sixty-five states voting in
favor to seventy-four against, with twenty abstentions. Singapore then
proposed an amendment that distorted the original purpose of the
resolution, by adding the following preambular paragraph: "Affirming the
sovereign right of states to determine the legal measures and penalties
which are appropriate in their societies to combat serious crimes
effectively. "61 In order to save the resolution, Italy modified its original
text by incorporating the Singapore amendment. At the same time, Italy
added a reference to the Charter of the United Nations and to international
law, aimed at making Singapore's reactionary appeal to state sovereignty
subject to some recognition of international norms.62 By a close vote,
seventy-one to sixty-five, with twenty-one abstentions, Singapore's
amendment was adopted.6 3 Those voting in favor of the amendment were
retentionist states, essentially from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.
However, such an amendment made the resulting text unacceptable to
many abolitionist states. It constituted a setback to efforts within the
United Nations system dating to the 1950s to consider capital punishment
60. Id. at §§74-76.
61. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/L.73.
62. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/L.74.
63. In favor: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, China, C6te d'Ivoire,
Cuba, Korea, Egypt, Eritrea, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Against: Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Macedonia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Moldova, Romania,
Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America,
Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.
Abstaining: Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Niger,
Togo, Ukraine.
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as an issue of international concern, and not merely a domestic matter. In
the vote on the entire resolution, Italy continued to support the resolution,
even with the Singapore amendment, but most of its co-sponsors deserted
the camp and abstained in the final vote (a total of seventy-four states
abstained). The remainder, essentially retentionist states, tended to divide:
thirty-six voted in favor and forty-four voted against."4
Capital punishment returned to the United Nations agenda at the
1996 session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice, which considered a draft resolution entitled Safeguards
Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty.
The resolution is the latest in a series adopted by the body and by its
predecessor, the United Nations Committee on Crime Problems and
Control, dealing with the death penalty. 65 In 1984, the Committee drafted
the Safeguards Guaranteeing the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty
(Safeguards),,* a document which was inspired in large part by articles 6,
14, and 15 of the Civil Rights Covenant. However, it went further,
detailing the scope of the phrase most serious crimes and adding new
mothers and the insane to the categories of individuals upon whom the
death penalty could never be carried out. The Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held every five years, examined
the death penalty and endorsed the Safeguards, as did the Economic and
Social Council and the General Assembly. In 1988, the Safeguards were
64. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.61. In favor: Argentina, Armenia, Cambodia, Cape Verde,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia,
Greece, Haiti, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, San Marino, Slovenia,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.
Against: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belize, Brunei, Cameroon, China, Comoros, Egypt, Guinea, Guyana, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives,
Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates,
United States of America, and Yemen.
Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium,
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, C6te d'lvoire,
Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany,
Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Lesotho,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Micronesia,
Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Papua New Guinea,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
65. Roger S. Clark, The United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program,
Formulation of Standards and Efforts at Their Implementation 1994, 58-62.
66. E.S.C. Res. 1984/50. Subsequently endorsed by G.A. Res. A/39/118.
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themselves strengthened by a new resolution of the Committee on Crime
Prevention and Control, which addressed additional matters, such as the
prohibition of execution of the mentally handicapped.67
The 1996 resolution calls upon Member States in which the death
penalty has not been abolished to effectively apply the safeguards
guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty.
This will ensure that each defendant facing a possible death penalty is
given all guarantees to ensure a fair trial, that defendants who do not
sufficiently understand the language used in court are fully informed by
way of interpretation or translation of all the charges against them and the
content of the relevant evidence deliberated in court, to allow adequate
time for the preparation of appeals; for the completion of appeals
proceedings as well as for petitions for clemency, to ensure that officials
involved in decisions to carry out an execution are fully informed of the
status of appeals, for petitions for clemency of the prisoner in question,
and to effectively apply the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners," in order to keep to a minimum the suffering of prisoners under
sentence of death and to avoid any exacerbation of such suffering. The
resolution was subsequently endorsed by the Economic and Social
Council.69
Italy recovered from the frustration of the 1994 General Assembly,
and presented a resolution to the 1997 session of the Commission on
Human Rights calling, inter alia, for a moratorium on the death penalty. 0
The preamble refers to the right to life provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,'7 1 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights2 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child," as well as
relevant resolutions of the General Assembly 4 and the Economic and
Social Council.71 It notes deep concern that several countries impose the
67. E.S.C. Res. 1989/64.
68. E.S.C. Res. 663C(XXIV); as amended, E.S.C. Res. 2076(LXII), §§56-59. On the
Standard Minimnm Rules, see: ROGER S. CLARK, supra note 66 at 145-179
69. E.S.C. Res. 1996/15, July 23, 1996.
70. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/L.20 (1997).
71. Supra note 1, art. 3.
72. Supra note 3, art. 6.
73. G.A. Res. A/44/25, Annex (1989), art. 6, 37(a).
74. G.A. Res. A/26/2857 (XXVI) (1971); G.A. Res. A/32/61 (1977); G.A. Res.
A/44/128 (1989).
75. E.S.C. Res. 1574 (L) (1971); E.S.C. Res. 1745 (LIV) (1973); E.S.C. Res. 1930
(LVIII) (1975); E.S.C. Res. 1984/50; E.S.C. Res. 1985/33; E.S.C. Res. 1989/64; E.S.C. Res.
1990/29; E.S.C. Res. 1990/51; E.S.C. Res. 1996/15.
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death penalty in disregard of the limitations provided for in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, as well as the Safeguards guaranteeing protection
of the rights of those facing the death penalty.7 6 The resolution states the
Commission's conviction "that abolition of the death penalty contributes to
the enhancement of human dignity and to the progressive development of
human rights.""
In its operative paragraphs, it calls for accession or ratification of
the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty. States that
still maintain the death penalty are urged to comply fully with their
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Notably, the obligations
not to impose the death penalty for any but the most serious crimes, not to
impose it for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age, to
exclude pregnant women from capital punishment and to ensure the right to
seek pardon or commutation of sentence. It requests states to consider
suspending executions and impose a moratorium on the death penalty.
There was fierce debate within the Commission as a handful of
retentionist states struggled to resist this new initiative. The Philippines,
with the support of Malaysia and Egypt, attempted to subvert the resolution
by a number of amendments that, in effect, undermined its meaning.7 8
Denmark noted that the United Nations Security Council, in the statutes
governing the Tribunals for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, did not provide for the death penalty. Canada, although not a co-
sponsor of the resolution, commended Italy's leadership and announced it
would vote in favor of the resolution. Speaking before the Commission on
behalf of the non-governmental organization that originally promoted the
revolution, I noted that thirty states ratified the Second Optional Protocol,
and that international justice no longer tolerated capital punishment, even
for those responsible for genocide and war crimes. I expressed deep
concern about the number of executions taking place in many parts of the
world, particularly in countries such as Nigeria, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, China,
and the United States, and urged all States that maintained the death
penalty not to apply it to pregnant women, juveniles or the insane.7 9
Several opponents charged that the Italian draft was unbalanced, including
China, Egypt, India, and the United States. India and Malaysia argued
76. E.S.C. Res. 1984/50, Annex.
77. Id.
78. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/L.35 (1997).
79. U.N. Doe. HR/CN/770 (1997).
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that it was improper to present a resolution before the Commission that had
already been rejected by the General Assembly. Others who spoke against
the resolution were Japan, Republic of Korea, and Bangladesh.w The
resolution was passed by a roll-call vote of twenty-seven in favor and
eleven opposed, with fourteen abstaining.8 '
According to Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini, in a recent
interview:
We have to let some time pass, so that the abolitionist
victory in Geneva can sink in, and produce results.
Raising this issue prematurely with the General Assembly
could compromise our efforts. This is why Italy, and
other "like-minded" countries, prefer to avoid a
confrontation with the General Assembly, and wait until
the moment is right. We shall continue to closely monitor
the situation, however, to avoid draft resolutions being
presented by retentionist states.82
The terms of the 1997 resolution require that the matter return to the
Commission agenda in 1998. No death penalty resolution was presented to
the General Assembly during its 1997 session.
The Commission on Human Rights has not designated a special
rapporteur with specific responsibility for capital punishment. However,
its special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Senegalese lawyer Waly Bacre Ndaye, has taken a considerable interest in
the subject and clearly views it as part of his mandate. In his 1997 annual
report to the Commission on Human Rights, Ndaye reiterated his views on
the desirability of abolishing the death penalty. He stated that "given that
the loss of life is irreparable . .. the abolition of capital punishment is
most desirable in order fully to respect the right to life." He added that
80. U.N. Doc. HR/CN/788 (1997).
81. U.N. Doc. HRICN/789 (1997). The resolution is recorded as 1997/12. In favor:
Angola, Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Mozambique,
Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, South Africa, Ukraine, Uruguay. Against:
Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Republic of
Korea, United States. Abstaining: Benin, Cuba, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, India,
Madagascar, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Kingdom, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.
82. Alessandra Filograno, Italy's Greatest Triumph, Hands Off Cain, Review Against the
Death Penalty No. 3, October/December 1997, at 35-37.
1998]
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
"where there is a fundamental right to life, there is no right to capital
punishment. ""
In his report, Ndaye noted such positive developments as the
abolition of the death penalty by Belgium during July 1996. He expressed
concern about expansion of the scope of the death penalty in Estonia and
Libya, and regretted the fact that some states resumed executions after a
lull of many years, notably Bahrain, Comoros, Guatemala, Thailand and
Zimbabwe. The special rapporteur referred to the importance of
maintaining the highest procedural standards in capital trials, including
public hearings. He said he was disturbed by reports that the death penalty
was imposed in secrecy in some countries, such as Blears, China,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
Ndaye noted that:
[A]s in previous years, the Special Rapporteur received
numerous reports indicating that in some cases the practice
of capital punishment in the United States does not
conform to a number of safeguards and guarantees
contained in international instruments relating to the rights
of those facing the death penalty. The imposition of the
death penalty on mentally retarded persons, the lack of
adequate defense, the absence of obligatory appeals and
racial bias continue to be the main concerns.'
In his report, he said he:
[R]emains deeply concerned that death sentences continue
to be handed down after trials which allegedly fall short of
the international guarantees for a fair trial, including lack
of adequate defense during the trials and appeals
procedures. An issue of special concern to the Special
Rapporteur remains the imposition and application of the
death penalty on persons reported to be mentally retarded
or mentally ill. Moreover, the Special Rapporteur
continues to be concerned about those cases which were
allegedly tainted by racial bias on the part of the judges or
prosecution and about the non-mandatory nature of the
83. Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60 (1996). See also Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. EICN.411996/614, §§507-517, §§540-557.
84. Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60 (1996), §543.
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appeals procedure after conviction in capital cases in some
states."
In the course of 1996, the Special Rapporteur sent urgent appeals
to the United States of America concerning death sentences imposed on the
mentally retarded; in cases following trial in which the right to an adequate
defense had allegedly not been fully ensured; where individuals had been
sentenced to death without resorting to their right to lodge any legal or
clemency appeal; and where they had been sentenced to death despite
strong indications casting doubt on their guilt.16 Ndaye sent a special
appeal to the United States in the case of Joseph Roger O'Dell, who,
according to his report to the Commission on Human Rights, "has
reportedly extraordinary proof of innocence which could not be considered
because the law of the State of Virginia does not allow new evidence into
court twenty-one days after conviction."" Despite an international
campaign, O'Dell was executed in July 1997. Ndaye also noted that in
response to his urgent appeals, the Government of the United States
provided nothing more than a reply in the form of a description of the legal
safeguards provided to defendants in the United States in criminal cases."
Ndaye had inquired on several occasion as to whether the United
States would "consider extending him an invitation to carry out an on-site
visit."89 As a result of repeated initiatives, on October 17, 1996, he
received a written invitation from the government to visit the United States
and conduct his investigation.9 In October 1997, Special Rapporteur
Ndaye conducted a two-week mission to the United States, where he
attempted to visit death row prisoners in Florida, Texas, and California.
At California's San Quentin Penitentiary, he was refused permission by
authorities to meet with designated prisoners. Ndaye's visit provoked the
ire of Senator Jesse Helms, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, who in a letter to William Richardson, United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, described the mission as
an "an absurd U.N. charade."91 Helms asked, "Bill, is this man confusing
the United States with some other country or is this an intentional insult to
85. Id. §551.
86. Id. §544.
87. Id.
88. Id. §546.
89. Id. §§547, 548.
90. Id. §549.
91. John M. Goshko, Helms Calls Death Row Probe "Absurd U.N. Charade," THE
WASHINGTON POST, October 8, 1997; at A07.
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the United States and to our nation's legal system?" 9 Ndaye replied: "I am
very surprised that a country that is usually so open and has been helpful to
me on other missions, such as my attempts to investigate human rights
abuses in the Congo, should consider my visit an insult." 91
B. Council of Europe
The Council of Europe, now composed of forty member states
covering virtually all of the European continent as well as much of
northern Asia, was the first regional system to incorporate a fully
abolitionist international norm when, in 1983, it adopted Protocol No. 6 to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty Protocol.9 4 The
Protocol is an optional instrument, allowing states that are parties to the
European Convention on Human Rights" to extend their obligations and to
bind themselves as a question of international law to the prohibition of
capital punishment. The Protocol, although not without its shortcomings,
represents a seminal development in the abolition of the death penalty,
setting an example that goes well beyond its own borders. It provided a
model to drafters in the United Nations and the Organization of American
States, who followed Europe's example several years later.
In 1994, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
adopted a resolution calling upon member states that had not yet done so to
ratify the Protocol. The resolution praised Greece, which in 1993 had
abolished the death penalty for crimes committed in wartime as well as in
peacetime. It stated:
In view of the irrefutable arguments against the imposition
of capital punishment, it calls on the parliaments of all
member states of the Council of Europe, and of all states
whose legislative assemblies enjoy special guest status at
the Assembly, which retain capital punishment for crimes
committed in peacetime and/or in wartime, to strike it
from their statute books completely.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. PROTOCOL No. 6, supra note 6.
95. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. no. 5, entered into force Sep. 3, 1953.
96. Resolution 1044 (1994) on the abolition of capital punishment, October 4, 1994 (25th
sitting). See also C. of E. P.A. Doc. 7154.
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It urged all heads of state and all parliaments in whose countries death
sentences are passed to grant clemency to the convicted. It also affirmed
that willingness to ratify Protocol No. 6 be made a prerequisite for
membership of the Council of Europe. Significantly, in the Dayton Peace
Agreement, signed at Paris on December 14, 1995, the new state of Bosnia
and Herzegovina is held to the highest standard of compliance with
contemporary human rights norms, including ratification of the Protocol
and the incorporation of its terms as the fundamental law of the new
republic.w The irony is that the agreement was negotiated in Ohio, a state
that still retains the death penalty.
The Parliamentary Assembly (Assembly) also adopted a
recommendation that deplored the fact that the death penalty was still
provided by law in eleven Council of Europe member states and seven
states whose legislative assemblies have special status with respect to the
organization." An indication that the death penalty is far from a theoretical
issue in Europe, it expressed shock that fifty-nine people were legally put
to death in those states in 1993, and that at least 575 prisoners were known
currently to be awaiting their execution. The Assembly said that
application of the death penalty may well be compared with torture and be
seen as inhuman and degrading punishment within the meaning of Article 3
of the European Convention on Human Rights. It recommended that the
Committee of Ministers draft an additional protocol to the European
Convention on Human Rights, abolishing the death penalty both in peace
and wartime, and obliging the parties not to re-introduce it under any
circumstances. The recommendation also proposed establishing a control
mechanism that would oblige states where the death penalty is still
provided by law to set up a commission with a view to abolishing capital
punishment. A moratorium would be declared on all executions while the
commissions fulfill their tasks. The commissions would be required to
notify the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of any death
sentences passed and any executions scheduled without delay. Any
country that had scheduled an execution would be required to halt it for a
period of six months from the time of notification of the Secretary General.
During this time the Secretary General would be empowered to send a
delegation to conduct an investigation and make a recommendation to the
country concerned. Finally, all states would be bound not to allow the
97. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4:
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, art. II§2, Annex I, §7; General Framework Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 6: Agreement on Human Rights, art. 1.
98. Recommendation 1246 (1994) on the abolition of capital punishment, October 4, 1994
(25th sitting).
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extradition of any person to a country in which he or she risked being
sentenced to death and subjected to the extreme conditions on death row.
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in a
January 1996, interim reply, indicated that the proposals of the Assembly
were being examined. The Assembly adopted a new recommendation, on
June 28, 1996, calling for the Committee of Ministers to follow up on the
1994 proposals without delay."9 On June 28, 1996, the Assembly adopted
a resolution reaffirming its opposition to the death penalty. The Assembly
declared that all states joining the Council of Europe must impose a
moratorium on executions, without delay, and indicate their willingness to
ratify The Protocol. The resolution added:
[T]he Assembly reminds applicant states to the Council of
Europe that the willingness to sign and ratify Protocol No.
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and to
introduce a moratorium upon accession has become a
prerequisite for membership of the Council of Europe on
the part of the Assembly .... 10
Resolution 1097 (Resolution) was also an answer to reports that the
Russian Federation and Ukraine, which had recently joined the Council of
Europe, were not honoring their commitments. The Resolution
condemned Ukraine for apparently violating its commitments to introduce
a moratorium on executions of the death penalty upon its accession to the
Council of Europe. As for Russia, the Assembly demanded that it respect
its undertakings to stop all executions. The Resolution stated that further
executions could imperil the continued membership of the two states in the
Council of Europe. The Assembly extended its warning to Latvia, where
apparently two executions have been carried out since it joined the Council
of Europe. Amnesty International has reported that in 1996, Ukraine
carried out 167 executions and Russia carried out 140 executions. This put
the two states at the top of the list for executions world-wide, with the
exception of China, whose title to first place in the standings has been
undisputed for many years.'0 ' In order to advance the debate within
Ukraine, the Assembly of the Council of Europe held a seminar on the
abolition of the death penalty in Kiev, November 28-29, 1996, at which
99. Recommendation 1302 (1996).
100. Resolution 1097 (1996).
101. The Death Penalty Worldwide: Developments in 1996, Amnesty International, June
1997, Al Index: ACT 50/05/97.
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international experts debated the issues with members of the Ukrainian
judicial community. °0
Russia and the Ukraine have now signed the Protocol, on April 17,
1997 and May 5, 1997 respectively. These states must still ratify the
instrument, although pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed
the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the
treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until
it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party
to the treaty .... 103
It appears that both the Russian Federation and the Ukraine have, in effect,
respected the moratorium and that executions in those countries have
stopped.10 If they stay the course, it will be a compelling argument in
support of those who argued that it was preferable for the Council to admit
Russia and Ukraine as members despite their initial failure to meet the
basic conditions of the organization, the Council would be in a better
position to influence them to conform to its fundamental norms.
On October 11, 1997, at the Second Summit of the Council of
Europe, the Heads of State or Government of the Council of Europe
adopted a series of declarations, including one dealing with capital
punishment. In their declarations to the Summit, several of the leaders
insisted upon the importance of abolition of the death penalty as one of the
central human rights goals of the Council, including Romano Prodi of
Italy, Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxembourg, Alfred Sant of Malta and Poul
Nyrup Rasmussen of Denmark. Russian President Boris Yeltsin
announced: "Russia has introduced a moratorium on capital punishment
and we are strictly complying with this undertaking. I know that the
European public opinion was shocked by public executions in Chechnya.
Russia's leadership is taking all necessary measures to contain such
manifestations of medieval barbarity."' °  The President of Latvia, Guntis
Ulmanis, explained that a year earlier he had imposed a moratorium on
102. C. of E. Doc. AS/Jur (1996) 70-72.
103. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 18a, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
104. The Committee Against Torture recently urged Ukraine to make its moratorium on the
death penalty permanent: U.N. Doc. HR/4326.
105. C. of E. Doc. SUM(97)PV1 prov., at 65.
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executions and that it is still in force. °0 In the final Declaration of the
Summit, the heads of state and government call for the universal abolition
of the death penalty and insist on the maintenance, in the meantime, of
existing moratoria on executions in Europe.
C. European Union
Death penalty issues have frequently been raised within the
European Parliament, which has generated a number of resolutions over
the years. A resolution in 1981 called for abolition of the death penalty in
the European Community.1°" Following the coming into force of the
Protocol, the European Parliament called upon member states to ratify that
abolitionist instrument.'0 In 1989, the European Parliament adopted The
Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which proclaims the
abolition of the death penalty.1° In 1990, the President of the European
Parliament announced that he had forwarded a motion for a resolution on
abolition of the death penalty in the United States.110 Subsequently, the
Political Affairs Committee decided to prepare a report on the death
penalty and appointed Maria Adelaide Aglietta as rapporteur. In 1992, a
motion for a resolution was prepared that named those European Union
states whose legislation still provided for the death penalty in the case of
exceptional crimes, namely Greece, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom, to abolish it altogether. It also urged all member states that had
not yet done so to ratify the Protocol as well as the Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The
resolution also called upon member states to refuse extradition to states
where capital punishment still exists, unless sufficient guarantees that it
will not be provided were obtained. The resolution also stated that the
European Parliament:
106. Id. at 28.
107. E.C. Doc. 1-20/80, March 13, 1980; E.C. Do. 1-65/81; Official Journal of the
European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament, No. 1-272, Annex, pp. 116-129;
the Irish extremist Ian Paisley spoke against the proposal, as did some Greek members. The
Report was adopted on June 18, 1981: Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of
the European Parliament, No. 1-272, Annex, pp. 225-228; E.C. Doc. A 2-167/85, Doe. B 2-
220/85; Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament, No.
2-334, Annex, pp. 300-303.
108. E.C. Doe. A2-0187/85; Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the
European Parliament, C 36, February 17, 1986, at 214.
109. Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament,
Annex, No. 2-377, pp. 56-58, 74-79, 151-155; E.C. Doe. A 2-3/89.
110. E.C. Do. B3-0605/89. See also E.C. Doe. B3-0682/90; E.C. Doe. B3-1915/90.
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[H]opes that those countries which are members of the
Council of Europe, and have not done so, will undertake to
abolish the death penalty (in the case of exceptional
crimes, this applies to Cyprus, Malta, and Switzerland,
and in the case of both ordinary and exceptional crimes, to
Turkey and Poland), together with those countries which
are members of the C.S.C.E., in which the death penalty
still exists (Bulgaria, United States of America,
Commonwealth of Independent States, Yugoslavia,
Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Albania).1"
It urged the United Nations to adopt a "binding decision imposing a
general moratorium on the death penalty. ""2 Death penalty practice has
also been a factor in assessing human rights within states whose
recognition is being considered by the European Union. In its opinion on
recognition of Slovenia, the Arbitration Commission presided by French
Judge Robert Badinter took note of the abolition of the death penalty in the
Constitution of Slovenia."3
In October 1997, the European Union adopted the Treaty of
Amsterdam, which amends the various conventions concerning the body
and its components. The instrument is completed with a series of
declarations, the first of which concerns the death penalty. It states:
With reference to Article F(2) of the Treaty on European
Union, the Conference recalls that Protocol No. 6 to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4
November 1950, and which has been signed and ratified by
a large majority of Member States, provides for the
abolition of the death penalty. In this context, the
Conference notes the fact that since the signature of the
abovementioned Protocol on 28 April 1983, the death
penalty has been abolished in most of the Member States of
the Union and has not been applied in any of them."4
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Conference on Yugoslavia, opinion No. 7, on International Recognition of the
Republic of Slovenia by the European Community and its Member States, Jan. 11, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 1512, 1516 (1992).
114. Treaty of Ansterdam (visited February 21, 1998)
http://ve.ev.int/Amsterdam/en/amstera/en.htm7.
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IV. EXTRADITION
Extradition has become an important indirect way in which
international law promotes the death penalty. Since the late nineteenth
century, extradition treaties have contained clauses by which states parties
may refuse extradition for capital offenses in the requesting state unless a
satisfactory assurance will be given that the death penalty will not be
imposed. Such provisions can be found as early as 1889, in the South
American Convention, in the 1892 extradition treaty between the United
Kingdom and Portugal, in the 1908 extradition treaty between the United
States and Portugal, and in the 1912 treaty prepared by the International
Commission of Jurists.", These clauses have now become a form of
international law boilerplate and are contained in model extradition treaties
adopted within international organizations including the United Nations.1 16
Several important cases have been heard by courts in Europe and Canada
concerning extradition to the United States. Extradition to the United
States from Europe is now virtually contingent on such assurances, the
result of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, while in
Canada the position is not nearly as clear.
The European Commission of Human Rights (Commission) first
addressed the question of extradition to the death rows on the other side of
the Atlantic in Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, a case originating in
California. The United Kingdom was empowered to refuse Soering's
extradition to the United States because of a provision in the extradition
treaty between the two countries. This provision entitles either contracting
party to insist upon an undertaking from the other that the death penalty
would not be imposed. The text is drawn from Article 11 of the European
Convention on Extradition. Although the death penalty is ostensibly
115. P. Leboucq, Influence en matire d'extradition de la peine applicable dans le pays
requgrant, (1911) J.D.I. 437; J.S. Reeves, Extradition Treaties and the Death Penalty, 18 AM.
J. INT'L L. 298 (1924); American Institute of International Law, Project No. 17, 20 AM. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 331 (1926); Harvard Law School Draft Extradition Treaty, 29 AM. J. INT'L L.
21, 228 (1935); GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 99-100 (1991); Sharon A.
Williams, Extradition to a State that Imposes the Death Penalty, 28 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 117
(1990); Sharon A. Williams, Nationality, Double Jeopardy, Prescription and the Death Sentence
as Bases for Refusing Extradition, 62 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 259 (1991); Sharon A. Williams,
Human Rights Safeguards and International Cooperation in Extradition: Striking the Balance, 3
CRIM. L.F. 191 (1992).
116. Model Treaty on Extradition, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.14/28/Rev.1, p. 68 (1990), art. 4;
Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Feb. 25, 1981, art. 9, 20 I.L.M. 723 (1981);
European Convention on Extradition, (1960) 359 U.N.T.S. 273, E.T.S. 24, art. 11. The Italian
Constitutional Court has ruled that article 11 of the European Convention on Extradition does not
codify a customary rule of international law: Re Cuillier, Ciamborrani and Vallon, (1988) 78
I.L.R. 93 (Constitutional Court, Italy).
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permitted by article 2, section 1 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which subjects the right to life to limitations, the Commission
considered that it might raise issues under article 3, which is the
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment. Kirkwood's application
was declared inadmissible, not because the argument itself was flawed but
because he had failed to demonstrate that detention on death row was
inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of article 3.117
Implicitly, the Commission recognized that the European Convention on
Human Rights might intervene to prevent extradition from a state party.
The issue returned to the Strasbourg organs several years later in the
case of Jens Soering, who had been arrested in the United Kingdom under an
extradition warrant issued at the request of the United States!18  In a
judgment issued on July 7, 1989,119 the European Court of Human Rights
confirmed that circumstances relating to a death sentence could give rise to
issues respecting the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment. It addressed four of them: length of detention prior to
execution; conditions on death row; age and mental state of the applicant;
and the competing extradition request from Germany.
The Court noted that a condemned prisoner could expect to spend
six to eight years on death row before being executed. The Court agreed
that this was "largely of the prisoner's own making," in that it was the
117. Kirkwood v. United Kingdom (App. No. 10308/83), (1985) 37 D.R. 158, at 184.
118. C. Warbrick, Coherence and the European Court of Human Rights: the Adjudicative
Background to the Soering case, 11 Mich. J Int'l L. 1073, (1989-90); Vincent Berger,
Jurisprudence de la Cour europ~enne des droits de 'homme 12-13 (1994).
119. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser.A) (1989). For scholarly
comment on the Soering case, see: W. Ganshof VAN DER MEERSCH, L'extradition et la
Convention europienne des droits de l'homme. L'affaire Soering, 1990 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 5; Fr&I6ric Sudre, Extradition et peine de mort - arrit Soering de la
Cour europienne des droits de I'homme du 7juillet 1989, 1990 REVUE GINIRALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 103; Michael O'BOYLE, Extradition and Expulsion under the European
Convention on Human Rights, Reflections on the Soering Case, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BRIAN WALSH 93 (James O'REILLY, ed., 1994);
Ann Sherlock, Extradition, Death Row and the Convention, 15 EUR. L. REV. 87 (1990); David
L. Gappa, European Court of Human Rights - Extradition - Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Soering Case, 161 Eur.Ct.H.R. (Ser.A) 1989), 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463
(1990); H. Wattendorff, E. du Perron, Human Rights v. Extradition: the Soering case, 11 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 845 (1990); J. Quigley, J. Shank, Death Row as a Violation of Human Rights: Is it
Illegal to Extradite to Virginia?, 30 VA. INT'L L.J. 251 (1989); Christine van den Wyngaert,
Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box?,
39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 757 (1990); Susan Marks, Yes, Virginia, Extradition May Breach the
European Convention on Human Rights, 49 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 194 (1990); Henri Labayle, Droits
de l'homme, traitement inhumain et peine capitale: Rflexions sur l 'dification d'n ordre public
europien en matire d'extradition par la Cour europienne des droits de l'homme, 64 SEMAINE
JURIDIQUE 3452 (1990); L.E. Pettiti, Arrit Soering c./Grande-Bretagne du 8juillet 1989, 1989
REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PtNAL COMPARI 786.
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result of systematic appellate review and various collateral attacks by
means of habeas corpus. The Court said:
Nevertheless, just as some lapse of time between sentence
and execution is inevitable if appeal safeguards are to be
provided to the condemned person, so it is equally part of
human nature that the person will cling to life by exploiting
those safeguards to the full. However, well-intentioned
and even potentially beneficial is the provision of the
complex of post-sentence procedures in Virginia, the
consequence is that the condemned prisoner has to endure
for many years the conditions on death row and the
anguish and mounting tension of living in the ever-present
shadow of death.1' °
The Court took note of the exceptionally severe regime in effect on death
row, adding that it was "compounded by the fact of inmates being subject
to it for a protracted period lasting on average six to eight years."21 What
the Court had described is often labeled the death row phenomenon. ' As
120. Id. §106.
121. Id. §107.
122. The issue of the death row phenomenon has been litigated before many domestic
courts. For case law on the subject, see: Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 582,
A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 465; Rajendra Prasad v. State of Utter Pradesh, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 78, A.I.R.
1979 S.C. 915; Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1960); Arsenault v.
Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 575, 233 N.E.2d 730 rev'd, 393 U.S. 5, 89 S. Ct. 35, 21 L. Ed. 2d
5 (1968); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (1972),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958, 92 S. Ct. 2060, 32 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1972); Andrews v. Shulsen, 600
F. Supp. 408, 431 (D.Utah 1984), aff'd, 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
919, 108 S. Ct. 1091, 99 L. Ed. 2d 253, reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 1015, 108 S. Ct. 1491, 99 L.
Ed. 2d 718 (1988); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 131 L. Ed. 2d 304
(1995); et al. v. Carter N.O. et al, [1968] 1 R.L.R. 136 (A.), 1968 (2) S.A. 445; Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, Zimbabwe, et al., [1993] 4
S.A. 239 (Z.S.C.), [1993] 1 Z.L.R. 242 (S), 14 H.R.L.J. 323; Abbott v. A.-G. of Trinidad and
Tobago, [19791 1 W.L.R. 1342, 32 W.I.R. 347 (J.C.P.C.); Riley v. Attorney-General of
Jamaica, [1983] 1 A.C. 719, 3 All. E.R. 469, 35 W.I.R. 279 (J.C.P.C.); Pratt et al. v. Attorney
General for Jamaica et al., [1993] 4 AII.E.R. 769, [1993] 2 L.R.C. 349, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, [1993]
3 W.L.R. 995, 43 W.I.R. 340, 14 H.R.L.J. 338, 33 I.L.M. 364 (J.C.P.C.). On the death row
phenomenon in general, see: STEPHEN M. GETIINGER, SENTENCED TO DIE: THE PEOPLE, THE
CRIMES AND THE CONTROVERSY (1979); BRUCE JACKSON, DIANE CHRISTIAN, DEATH ROW
(1980); J. Alexis, M. De Merieux, Inordinately delayed hanging: Whether an inhuman
punishment, 29 J. INDIAN L. INSTITUTE 356 (1987); Lloyd Vogelman, The Living Dead: Living
on Death Row, 5 SOUTH AFRICAN J. HUM. RTs 183 (1989); J.L. Gallemore Jr., J.H. Panton,
Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, 129 AMERICAN J. PSYCHIATRY 167
(1972); Nancy Holland, Death Row Conditions: Progression Toward Constitutional Protections,
2 AKRON L. REV. 293 (1985); ROBERT JOHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIE, LIFE UNDER SENTENCE
OF DEATH (1981); HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING (1993); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE
DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL TREATMENT AND TORTURE 96-156 (1996).
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a result of the Court's decision, the United Kingdom sought and obtained
more thorough assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed, as
was noted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on
March 12, 1990.123 Soering was subsequently extradited, tried, and
sentenced to life imprisonment.'2 '
Although the Court has not revisited the question since Soering,
the European Commission on Human Rights has been called upon to
interpret the Soeing judgment. In January 1994, it ruled an application
from an individual subject to extradition to the United States for a capital
offense to be inadmissible. The Commission considered the guarantees
that had been provided by the Dallas County prosecutor to the French
Government, to the effect that if extradition were granted, "the State of
Texas (would) not seek the death penalty," to be sufficient. Texas law
stated that the death penalty could only be pronounced if requested by the
prosecution. The fugitive had claimed that the undertaking was "vague
and imprecise." Furthermore, she argued that it had been furnished by the
federal authorities through diplomatic channels and did not bind the
executive or judicial authorities of the State of Texas. The Commission
compared the facts with those in Soering, where the prosecutor had made
clear an intention to seek the death penalty.'2' The Commission found the
Texas prosecutor's attitude to be fundamentally different and concurred
with an earlier decision of the French Conseil d'Itat holding the
undertaking to be satisfactory.1'2
In Cinar v. Turkey, the applicant was sentenced to death in 1984,
and the judgment was upheld on appeal in 1987. In 1991, the applicant
was released on parole, pursuant to legislation that also declared that all
death sentences were to be commuted. The Commission recalled that
Article 3 of the Convention could not be interpreted as prohibiting the
death penalty. Moreover, it held that a certain period of time between
pronouncement of the sentence and its execution was inevitable. The
Commission added that Article 3 would only be breached where an
individual passed a very long time on death row, under extreme conditions,
with the constant anxiety of execution. Thus, the Commission adopted a
large view of Soering by not insisting upon the various extenuating factors,
such as young age and mental instability, which had been referred to by the
123. Council of Europe, Information Sheet No. 26, Strasbourg, 1990, 116.
124. Richard B. Lillich, The Soering case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1991).
125. Aylor-Davis v. France (No. 22742/93), (1994) 76B D.R. 164.
126. Dame Joy Davis-Aylor, C.E., req. no 144590, 15/10/93, D. 1993, IR, 238; J.C.P.
1993, Actualit6s No. 43, [1993] Revue franfaise de droit administratif 1166, conclusions C.
Vigoreux.
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Court.' 2 Furthermore, the Commission concluded that in Turkey during
the period (inar was on death row, there was not actually any serious
danger of his death sentence being carried out. Referring to the Court's
judgment in Soering, which observed that the death penalty no longer
existed in the states parties to the Convention, the Commission described
the threat of execution as "illusory. "12s
The Commission implied, in a decision issued in September 1994,
that it might be prepared to go further and find the death penalty itself to
be contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. That case involved an alleged
deserter from the Syrian army, who was contesting his expulsion from
Sweden. The Commission concluded that it was far more likely the
applicant was a draft evader, a crime for which capital punishment did not
apply. It stated: "Concerning his possible imprisonment for that offense,
the Commission does not find such a penalty so severe as to raise an issue
under Article 3 of the Convention even considering the general situation in
Syrian prisons."129 Interestingly, the Commission did not cite Soering, or
state that in any case, expulsion to a country where the death penalty
would be imposed would not per se violate the Convention, which
authorized capital punishment in Article 2. Was the Commission
suggesting it may be prepared to find extradition to a state where the death
penalty might be imposed, irrespective of whether it would be associated
with the death row phenomenon, to be contrary to Article 3 of the
Convention?
Still more recently, the Commission considered the case of Lei
Ch'an Wa, who was threatened with extradition from Macao to China for
trafficking in narcotics, which is a capital crime. The representative of the
Chinese news agency Xinhua, which unofficially represented China's
interests in Macao, had stated that the death penalty would not be imposed
in the event of extradition. This was allowed by the Portuguese extradition
legislation in force in Macao. Portugal's Constitution says that extradition
is forbidden for crimes for which the death penalty is provided in the
receiving state's legislation. Extradition was forbidden by the Constitution
despite the existence of an assurance from the representative of China.
The Constitutional Court held that under the circumstances extradition was
prohibited. In the meantime, Lei had registered an application with the
European Commission, which issued provisional measures pursuant to
Article 36 of its Regulations. However, once the Constitutional Court had
settled the matter, the problem was resolved, and the Commission decided
127. inar v. Turkey (App. No. 17864/91), (1994) 79A D.R. 5, at pp. 8-9.
128. Id. at 9.
129. (App. No. 22408/93), (1994) 79A D.R. 85, at p. 96.
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that it was unnecessary to further examine the application. 130  In another
case, involving extradition from Austria to the Russian Federation to stand
trial for murder, the Commission noted a maximum sentence of ten years
in the Penal Code of the Russian Federation. The commission also noted
the fact that the two accomplices had been sentenced to nine years,
concluding that "there are no substantial grounds for believing that the
applicant faces a real risk of being subjected to the death penalty in the
Russian Federation." 1 31
The Protocol has also been cited in domestic law in cases
concerning extradition of fugitives to states imposing the death penalty.
On two occasions, the French Conseil d'ttat has refused to extradite,
expressing the view that the Protocol establishes a European ordre public
that prohibits extradition in capital cases.1 2 The Supreme Court of the
Netherlands took a similar view. The court invoked the Protocol in
refusing to return a United States serviceman,", although required to do so
by the N.A.T.O. Status of Forces Agreement. ' ' The Court also considered
the European Convention and the Protocol took precedence over the other
treaty.
In 1996, Italy's Constitutional Court took judicial opposition to
extradition for capital crimes one step further when it refused to send
Pietro Venezia to the United States. The court refused despite assurances
from American prosecutors that the death penalty would not be sought or
imposed. Venezia's extradition to Dade County, Florida had been
requested by the United States, pursuant to the Treaty of Extradition, dated
October 13, 1983. Article IX of the treaty entitles Italy to request that
130. Lei Ch 'an Wa v. Portugal (App. No. 25410/94), unreported decision of November 27,
1995. See also: Yenng Yuk Lenng v. Portugal (App. No. 24464/94), unreported decision of
November 27, 1995; Cheong Meng v. Portugal (App. No. 25862/94), (1995) 83-A D.R. 88.
131. Raidl v. Austria (App. no. 25342/94), (1995) 82-A D.R. 134, at 145.
132. Fidan, (1987) II Receuil Dalloz-Sirey 305 (Conseil d'ttat); Gacem, (1988) I Semaine
juridique IV-86 (Conseil d'ttat). Fidan was cited by Judge De Meyer in his concurring opinion
in Soering v. United Kingdom, supra note 119, at 51.
133. Short v. Netherlands, (1990) 76 Rechtspraak van de Week 358, (1990) 29 I.L.M.
1378.
134. Agreement Between the Parties to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status
of Their Forces, (1951) 199 U.N.T.S. 67. Note that on June 19, 1995 the States parties to the
NATO treaty finalized the Agreement among the State Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and
the Other States Participating in the Partnership for Peace Regarding the Status of Their Forces
together with an Additional Protocol. Article 1 of the Additional Protocol states:
Insofar as it has jurisdiction according to the provisions of the agreement, each State
party to the present additional protocol shall not carry out a death sentence with regard
to any member of a force and its civilian component, and their dependents from any
other state party to the present additional protocol.
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extradition be conditional upon an undertaking by the United States that the
death penalty not be imposed. The United States government gave
assurances in the form of a note verbale on July 28, 1994, August 24,
1995 and January 12, 1996. However, this was not enough for the
Constitutional Court.
According to the judgment of the Constitutional Court, "the
prohibition of capital punishment is of special importance - like all
sentences which violate humanitarian principles - in the first part of the
Constitution." The right to life is the first of the inviolable human rights
enshrined in Article 2. The judgment continues: "The absolute character
of this constitutional guarantee is of significance to the exercise of powers
attributed to all public authorities under the republican system, and
specifically with respect to international judicial cooperation for the
purposes of mutual judicial assistance." The Court notes that it has
already stated that the participation of Italy in punishments which cannot be
imposed within Italy in peacetime constitutes a breach of the Constitution.
Referring to the mechanism by which the Italian authorities
consider the sufficiency of the undertaking by the United States authorities,
not to impose capital punishment, the Court states:
Such a solution has the advantage of providing a flexible
solution for the requested State, and allows for policy to be
developed over time based on considerations of criminal
law policy; but in our system, where the prohibition of the
death penalty is enshrined in the Constitution, the formula
of 'sufficient assurances' - for the purpose of granting
extradition for crimes for which the death penalty is
provided in the legislation of the requesting State - is not
admissible from the standpoint of the Constitution. The
prohibition set out in paragraph 4 of article 27 of the
Constitution and the values that it expresses - foremost
among them being life itself - impose an absolute
guarantee.'3-
As a result, the Court declared provisions of the Code of Penal
Procedure designed to give effect to the extradition treaty between Italy
and the United States to be contrary to the Constitution. It also declared
that the portion of Law 225 of March 26, 1984, implementing article IX of
the extradition treaty, was unconstitutional. It noted, however, that Italian
law allowed for Venezia to be prosecuted by Italian courts for crimes
135. Id.
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committed abroad.'3' Venezia had also filed an application with the
European Commission of Human Rights. The Commission decided to
strike the case from its docket as a result of the judgment of the Italian
Constitutional Court. 137
Canadian courts have been reluctant to follow the European
precedents, although a recent judgment suggests that they will be increasingly
severe in granting extradition in capital cases. In United States of America v.
Burns and Rafay, 38 issued on June 30, 1997, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal overruled the decision of the Canadian Minister of Justice to allow
extradition in a capital offense without seeking an assurance that the death
penalty would be imposed. Article VI of the Extradition Treaty between
Canada and the United States declares:
When the offense for which extradition is requested is
punishable by death under the laws of the requesting State
and the laws of the requested State do not permit such
punishment for that offense, extradition may be refused
unless the requesting State provides such assurances as the
requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty
shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not be executed.
Burns and Rafay were both eighteen at the time of the crime, a brutal
murder of Rafay's parents. They were charged by the State of Washington
with aggravated first degree murder, for which the Revised Code of
Washington, s. 10.95.030, provides a sentence of death. Canada abolished
the death penalty in 1976 for common law crimes. Although the death
penalty still exists under military law, it has not been imposed for more
than fifty years. A current revision of the National Defense Act will
probably eliminate capital punishment from the statute books altogether.
Justice Donald, writing for the majority of the Court, admitted that
he could not refuse extradition on the basis of section 12 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights of Freedoms,'3" which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment, or section 7 of the Charter, which enshrines the right to life,
given the 1991 judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kindler v.
Canada.1' However, he concluded that because Burns and Rafay were
136. Id.
137. Venezia v. Italy (App. No. 29966/96), (1996) 87-A D.R. 140.
138. (1997) 116 C.C.C. (3d) 524 (B.C.C.A.).
139. R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 44.
140. Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 84 D.L.R. (4th) 438, 6
C.R.R. (2d) 193, 129 N.R. 81, 26 C.R. (4th) 1. On the Kindler decision, see: William A.
Schabas, Kindler v. Canada, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1993); Sharon A. Williams, Extradition
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Canadian citizens, their extradition would violate section 6(1) of the
Charter, which declares: "Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter,
remain in and leave Canada."' 4
As Justice Donald noted correctly, section 6(1) is subject to the
limitation clause of section 1, which instructs the courts to subject Charter
rights to the test of "reasonable limits in a free and democratic society."
Following an analytical approach developed by the European Court of
Human Rights in the application of similar provisions, 42 Canadian courts
consider whether the legal rule that violates the Charter right has a
legitimate purpose, and whether it constitutes a minimal infringement upon
the right in question. The Supreme Court of Canada has already
determined that extradition constitutes an acceptable limit on the right of
Canadians to remain in Canada. 4 3 According to Justice Donald, execution
of Burns and Rafay would clearly violate their right to return to Canada
upon completion of their sentence, something that extradition for non-
capital offenses would not. Given alternatives, specifically a sentence of
life imprisonment, it was clear that extradition without an assurance the
death penalty would not be imposed failed the minimal impairment test.
He wrote:
The simple point taken by the applicants in the present
case, with which I am in full agreement, is that their return
to Canada is impossible if they are put to death. . .. By
handing over the applicants to the American authorities
without an assurance, the Minister will maximally, not
minimally, impair the applicants' rights of citizenship.'"
Although bound by precedent of the Supreme Court of Canada that
allows the extradition of non-citizens for capital offenses - caselaw that,
and the Death Penalty Exception in Canada: Resolving the Ng and Kindler Cases, 13 LoY. L.A.
INT'L COMP. L. J. 799 (1991); Donald K. Piragoff, Marcia V.J. Kran, The Impact of Human
Rights Principles on Extradition from Canada and the United States: The Role of National
Courts, (1992) 3 CRIM. L. F. 191; William A. Schabas, Extradition et la peine de mort: le
Canada renvoie deux fugitifs au couloir de /a mort, 4 REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME 65 (1992); William A. Schabas, Kindler and Ng: Our Supreme Magistrates Take a
Frightening Step into the Court of Public Opinion, 51 REVUE DU BARREAU 673 (1991).
141. Kindler, supra note 131.
142. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE
CANADIAN CHARTER, 2ND ED. (1996).
143. United States of America v. Cotroni, United States of America v. El Zein, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1469, 48 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 96 N.R. 321, 42 C.R.R. 101, 23 Q.A.C. 182.
144. Id.
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incidentally, has been criticized by other courts in other countries 54 -
Justice Donald is clearly opposed to extradition for capital offenses in
general. He writes:
With respect, the Minister appears to have given only lip
service to a fundamentally important aspect of Canadian
policy, namely, that we have decided through our elected
representatives that we will not put our killers to death...
Abolition reflected the will of the majority and their
concern for the sanctity of life and the dignity of the
person.'
He cites the reasons of Supreme Court Justice Peter Cory, who dissented
in Kindler, referring to the fact that Canada's Parliament rejected the death
penalty in two separate free votes. Criticizing the executive decision to
extradite Burns and Rafay without the assurance that capital punishment
will not be imposed, he says:
The Minister confesses his support for abolition but then
fails to act on his conviction. Apart from trying to have it
both ways, the problem with the Minister's thinking is that
he treats the policy question about the death penalty in
Canada as undecided and at large. This approach led him
to give effect to the minority view on the death penalty as
far as these applicants are concerned., 7
Justice Donald states that Article VI of the treaty "was drawn to
accommodate the difference between nations so that the requested State
could give effect to its policy of abolition.""'4 What he did not note is that,
ironically, Article VI was inserted in the Extradition Treaty in 1974 at the
demand of the United States, which had then abolished the death penalty
judicially. "4 9 This was at a time when Canadian law still allowed for capital
punishment."' Article VI was designed to protect Americans and not
145. Pratt et al. v. Attorney General for Jamaica et al., [19931 4 AII.E.R. 769, [1993] 2
L.R.C. 349, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, [1993] 3 W.L.R. 995, 43 W.I.R. 340, 14 H.R.L.J. 338, 33
I.L.M. 364 (J.C.P.C.).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).
150. Miller and Cockriell v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680, 31 C.C.C. (2d) 177, 38
C.R.N.S. 139, 70 D.L.R. (3d) 324, [1976] 5 W.W.R. 711, 11 N.R. 386.
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Canadians! Of course, since 1974 the United States has slid backwards'
while Canada has gone on to abolish the death penalty.
Burns is being appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. That
Court, in a four to three decision, authorized the extradition of Joseph
Kindler in 1991. Yet even the Kindler decision suggests its discomfort
with the death penalty, with six of the seven justices indicating that capital
punishment, were it to be imposed in Canada, would violate the right to
life and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
V. CONCLUSION
In his 1995 report to the Economic and Social Council,"' English
criminologist Roger Hood concluded that "there has been a considerable
shift towards the abolition of the death penalty both de jure and in
practice" in the years 1989-1993.11 After consulting other sources,
Professor Hood observed that "it appears that since 1989 twenty-four
countries have abolished capital punishment, twenty-two of them for all
crimes in peacetime or in wartime."'11 Over the same period, the death
penalty was reintroduced in four states.',5 Professor Hood stated that "the
picture that emerges is that an unprecedented number of countries have
abolished or suspended the use of the death penalty." 6  Amnesty
International issued revised figures in July 1997, which declared that
ninety-nine States have abolished the death penalty in law or in practice,
whereas ninety-four retain the death penalty. Amnesty adds that "the
number of countries which actually execute prisoners in any one year is
much smaller."' 7
Despite many decades of virtual indifference to international
human rights norms, and an unfortunate legacy of traditional isolationist
sentiments within the country's political constituency, in recent years the
United States of America has sought to ratify some of the major
151. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976).
152. Pursuant to E.S.C. Res. 1994/206.
153. "Capital punishment and implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing. the protection
of the rights. of those facing the death penalty, Report of the Secretary-General," U.N. Doc.
E11995178 (1995), §32.
154. Id. §33.
155. Id. §38.
156. Id. §87.
157. Facts and figures on the Death Penalty, Amnesty International, Al Index: ACT
50/08/97. For an even more optimistic assessment, see: THE INTERNATIONAL SOURCEBOOK ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1997 (William A. Schabas, ed., 1997).
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conventions and to play a role in treaty bodies, such as the Human Rights
Committee.' 8 President Jimmy Carter made an unsuccessful attempt to
ratify four of the principal instruments, but the issue stagnated during the
Reagan presidency. 9 President George Bush revived the matter and in
1988, the United States ratified the Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide."°0 Four years later, instruments of
accession were produced at United Nations headquarters for the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'6' These instruments
were accompanied by a series of reservations, understandings and
declarations, aimed in part at the international norms dealing with
limitation and eventual abolition of the death penalty. In 1994, similar
statements were made upon ratification of the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.'62
The American initiatives have been challenged by both its treaty partners
and by the Human Rights Committee, notably on the issue of the death
penalty.' 3 Indeed, the debate has undoubtedly given grist to the mill of
politicians who resent the entire international human rights system. The
consequences are that efforts to ratify other human rights treaties have
been stalled since early 1995. The issue of the death penalty stands as an
impediment to further efforts by the United States of America to play a full
role within international human rights institutions and treaty bodies. Given
public opinion that is largely favorable to the death penalty and a political
158. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
159. U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties: With or Without Reservations?
(Richard B. Lillich, ed., 1981).
160. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951.
161. Hurst Hannum, Dana D. Fischer, U.S. Ratification of the International Covenants on
Human Rights 1993; David P. Stewart, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 14 Hum. Rts. L.
J. 77 (1993); Ved Nanda, The U.S. Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for Juvenile
Offenders: An Appraisal under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42
Depaul L. Rev. 1311 (1993); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification by the United
States of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42
Depaul L. Rev. 1169 (1993); Aryeh Neier, Political Consequences of the United States
Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
1233 (1993); John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of the United States
Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
59 (1993); William A. Schabas, Les riserves des 9tats-Unis d'Am rique aux articles 6 et 7 du
Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, 6 REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME 137 (1994).
162. U.N. Doc. A/39/51, p. 197 (1984).
163. William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277 (1995).
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leadership that chooses to follow rather than lead its electorate,,"
international pressure may well prove to be of decisive significance in
advancing the abolitionist agenda within the United States.
164. William J. Bowers, Margaret Vandiver, Patricia H. Dugan, A New Look at Public
Opinion on Capital Punishment: What Citizens and Legislators Prefer, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 77
(1994).
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I. INTRODUCTION
My assignment is to consider the emerging international norms and
how they might affect implementation of the American Bar Association
(ABA) resolution calling for a moratorium on the imposition and
enforcement of the death penalty.' The American Bar Association
* Vice Provost, Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law, and Director of International
Legal Studies Program, University of Denver.
1. The language of the ABA's resolution follows:
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association calls upon each jurisdiction that
imposes capital punishment not to carry out the death penalty until the jurisdiction
implements policies and procedures that are consistent with the following longstanding
American Bar Association policies intended to (1) ensure that death penalty cases are
administered fairly and impartially, in accordance with due process, and (2) minimize
the risk that innocent persons may be executed; ...
(i) Implementing ABA "Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases" (adopted Feb. 1989) and Association policies intended to
encourage competency of counsel in capital cases (adopted Feb. 1979, Feb. 1988, Feb.
1990, Aug. 1996);
(ii) Preserving, enhancing, and streamlining state and federal courts' authority and
responsibility to exercise independent judgment on the merits of constitutional claims
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resolution calls attention to the unfair and unjust practices and procedures
with which the death penalty is carried out in the United States. I have
looked at the various aspects of the resolution's goals - providing
competent legal counsel at all stages of the conviction, sentencing, and
appeals processes; preserving due process, especially in adjudication of
constitutional claims in state post-conviction proceedings and in federal
habeas corpus proceedings; elimination of discrimination in death
sentences on the basis of race of either the victim or the defendant; and
prevention of execution of persons who were juveniles under the age of
eighteen or mentally retarded at the time they committed their offenses.
In my allotted time, however, I will begin with a glance at selected
recent major developments in international fora regarding capital
punishment. This will be followed by a comparison between the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other international human
rights instruments as they bear on the death penalty. Then I will discuss
primarily three aspects: racial discrimination, the execution of juveniles,
and the execution of mentally retarded persons.
Coincidentally, the day of the ABA vote, February 3, 1997, was
also marked by the decision announced in Gomez v. Acevedo, 2 in which a
panel of the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Federal Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 19963 narrows the scope of federal habeas
in state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings (adopted Aug. 1982,
Feb. 1990);
(iii) Striving to eliminate discrimination in capital sentencing on the basis of the race
of either the victim or the defendant (adopted Aug. 1988, Aug. 1991); and
(iv) Preventing execution of mentally retarded persons (adopted Feb. 1989) and
persons who were under the age of 18 at the time of their offenses (adopted Aug.
1983).
FURTHER RESOLVED, That in adopting this recommendation, apart from existing
Association policies relating to offenders who are mentally retarded or under the age
of 18 at the time of the commission of the offenses, the Association takes no position
on the death penalty.
See James Podgers, Time Out for Executions -ABA Action at the Midyear Meeting is Expected
to Stir Renewed Debate on the Death Penalty, 83 A.B.A.J. 26 (Apr. 1997); Gina Chon, ABA
Reinvigorates Death Penalty Debate, 24 HuM. RTS. 8 (Spring 1997). For a comprehensive
study on the implementation of the ABA's recommendation regarding the moratorium, see
Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding implementation of the American Bar
Association's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and Calling for a
Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3 (1996) [hereinafter Coyne &
Entzerothj.
2. Gomez v. Acevedo, 106 F.3d 192 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Oct. 6, 1997, 1997
U.S. LEXIS 4568.
3. 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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corpus review of state court decisions in capital cases. The panel held that
the new section 2254(d) of Title 28 (28 U.S.C. 2254(d))4 mandates that
federal courts give deferential review to state court decisions on claims
pertaining to sufficiency of the evidence., The court held that the new
section 2254(d)(1) requires only deferential review for reasonableness on
mixed questions in habeas proceedings.6 The court said that it was
compelled to hold that a writ of habeas corpus may be issued
for evidence insufficiency only if the state courts have
unreasonably applied the Jackson' standard. Federal review of
these claims, therefore, now turns on whether the state court
provided fair process and engaged in reasoned, good-faith
decision making when applying Jackson's no rational trier of
fact test., As we stated in Lindh, section 2254(d)(1), requires
federal courts to take into account the care with which the state
court considered the subject. . . . [A] responsible, thoughtful
answer reached after a full opportunity to litigate is adequate to
support the judgment. 9
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA REGARDING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
The movement to ban capital punishment worldwide has been
ongoing at the United Nations and in other international fora since the
1960s.10 In 1968 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a
resolution declaring the objective of gradually but progressively restricting
4. This section prohibits federal courts from granting a writ of habeas corpus on a claim
adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless such adjudication 1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 2) resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
proceeding.
5. Gomez, 106 F.3d at 193-94.
6. Id. at 199, citing Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870-71 (7th Cir.1996) (en banc),
cert. granted in part, 117 S.Ct. 726 (1997).
7. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (which expanded the availability of the writ
of habeas corpus).
8. There the court had said that a federal court may grant habeas relief only "if it is found
that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 324.
9. Gomez, 106 F.3rd at 199, quoting Lindh, 96 F.3d at 871.
10. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993); Ariane M. Schreiber, Note, States That Kill: Discretion and the
Death Penalty - A Worldwide Perspective, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 263 (1996).
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the range of offenses punishable by death." Two decades later, in 1989,
the General Assembly adopted the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2 obligating each state
party to "take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its
jurisdiction," and acknowledging a worldwide effort to abolish capital
punishment for all purposes. 3
In 1994 a United Nations draft resolution called for a worldwide
moratorium on capital punishment and for a global ban on the death
penalty by the year 2000.'4 Although the resolution was rejected by the
General Assembly's Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee by a
vote of 44 to 33, there were 74 abstentions," which left the door open for
such initiatives in the future. More recently, the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights has called for the abolition of the death
penalty.'6
In international fora, the American Convention on Human Rights
in 1978 forbade capital punishment for "political offenses or related
common crimes" and prohibited the execution of "persons who, at the time
the crime was committed, were under eighteen years of age or over
seventy years of age," or pregnant women. 7 The Convention limited the
death penalty to only the most serious crimes, and mandated that it "shall
not be reestablished in the states that have abolished it," and that its
application "shall not be extended to crimes to which it does not presently
apply."8 Subsequently, the 1984 Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty resolved "in accordance with
the spirit of Article 4 [of the Convention] and the universal trend to
eliminate the death penalty, [to] call on all countries in the Americas to
abolish it. "'9
11. UN GAOR 3rd Comm., 23d Sess., agenda item 59, U.N. Doc. A/Res./2393 (XXIII)
(1968).
12. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., supp.
no. 98, operative para. 2, U.N. Doc. A1RESI441128 (1990).
13. Id. at Annex, art. 1(2).
14. See E. Leopold, U.N. Panel Defeats Resolution on Capital Punishment, REUTERS
WORLD SERVICE, Dec. 10, 1997 (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library).
15. Id.
16. The vote last year was 27 in favor to 11 against with 14 abstentions.
17. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,
O.A.S.T.S. no. 36, at 1, art. 4 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
18. Id.
19. Inter-Am. Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 1984-1985, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser. L./V./II. 77 doc. 10 rev. 1, at 10 (1985).
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In Europe, Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,20 which was entered into
force in 1953, recognized capital punishment as an exception to the right to
life. In 1985, however, European states adopted Protocol No. 6 to the
European Convention Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty.2 ' It
declared the abolition of the death penalty in time of peace. Article 1 of
the Protocol explicitly states, "The death penalty shall be abolished. No
one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed." Its Preamble states
that the Protocol had its genesis in the recognition that several member
states of the Council of Europe had experienced an evolution which
"expresses a general tendency in favor of abolition of the death penalty." 22
Under the Protocol, parties are still allowed to impose death sentences for
acts committed in time of war or during a time of imminent threat of war.2 3
No reservations are permitted to any of its provisions.24 In October 1997,
the Council of Europe, meeting in Strasbourg, endorsed a moratorium on
capital punishment. Among the prior holdouts, Ukraine and Russia have
now signed the Sixth Protocol and are committed to abolition.
Among the fifty-three members of the organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, the United States now stands alone in opposing
the moratorium on the death penalty or its abolition. In extradition cases,
the United States is consistently being refused extradition by many
countriesP until it gives undertakings not to impose the death penalty on the
extraditee.
The United States, having ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 26 the Convention Against Torture and
20. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter European Convention].
21. Protocol No. 6 of the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, opened for signature April 28, 1983,
E.T.S. No. 114, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 538 (1983) (entered into force March 1, 1985).
22. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (1962).
In 1973, the Council adopted a resolution stating that capital punishment was "inhuman and
degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the European Convention." Eur. Consult. Assin.,
25th Sess., Doc. No. 3297, at 2 (1973).
23. Id. art. 2.
24. Id. art. 4.
25. See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE STATE KILLS THE DEATH
PENALTY, A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 85 (1989); John Palk, Note -Canadian Extradition and the
Death Penalty: Seeking a Constitutional Assurance of Life, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 239 (1993).
26. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment"7, and the
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD),2 is obligated under international law to comply with their
various applicable provisions pertaining to capital punishment. These
obligations exist notwithstanding the various reservations, understandings,
and declarations that relate to the practice and procedures of death penalty
sentencing within the United States, for example, the United States
reservation regarding imposition of the death penalty on juveniles.2 9 In
addition, even though the United States has simply signed but not ratified
the Convention on the Rights of the Child,1° since the signing was without
reservations, it could be argued under the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties3 that the United States must not violate the Convention
provision which bans execution of those who committed the offense while
younger than eighteen.
It may be recalled that the ICCPR includes the obligation on state
parties to "respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction" the basic right of nondiscrimination,3 2 the right
to a fair trial, 33 and specific rights in respect of death penalty sentencing3
Although the Covenant does not prohibit the death penalty, it restricts the
application of capital punishment with special safeguards and with a view
to its ultimate abolition .3  The Race Convention obligates parties to
"pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
27. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, U.N. G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1984/72, Annex (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987).
28. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)
[hereinafter ICERD].
29. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969, art. 19(c), 115
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980): the reservation must not be "incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty." [hereinafter Vienna Convention.].
30. Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda
Item 108, UN Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1457 (1989).
31. Vienna Convention, supra note 29, art. 18 (a) (a state that has signed a treaty "is
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of [that] treaty").
32. ICCPR, supra note 26, arts. 2, 26.
33. Id. arts. 2, 14.
34. Id. arts. 2, 6.
35. Id. art. 6.
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racial discrimination in all its forms." 36 It includes the right to equal
treatment before the courts.37
Two general comments are in order. First, in 1996 the
International Commission of Jurists sent a fact finding mission to the
United States to study the administration of the death penalty in this
country - to investigate both federal and state practices and procedures in
respect of capital punishment sentencing. 38  It found that almost no
attention was given to accepted international norms in the administration of'
the death penalty in the United States, specifically to United States
obligations under the ICCPR and the ICERD. 9 The ICJ urged "the United
States and other countries with death penalty sentencing . . . to take the
necessary steps to ensure that there is greater compliance with their
international obligations. "40
Second, in light of the United States ratification of these
instruments, it is necessary to revisit Justice Scalia's opinion in Stanford v.
Kentucky,'1 when he wrote for the plurality that sentencing practices of
foreign countries, if they did not reflect American conceptions of decency,
were not relevant. In his words,
we emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency
that are dispositive, rejecting the contention . . . that the
sentencing practices of other countries are relevant. While
the practices of other nations, particularly other
democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a
practice uniform among our people is not merely an
historical accident, but rather so implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, that it occupies a place not merely in our
mores, but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well,.
• they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment
prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our
people.' 2
36. ICERD, supra note 28, art. 2.
37. Id. art. 5(a).
38. For a report, see International Commission of Jurists, Administration of the Death
Penalty in the United States, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 165 (1997) [hereinafter ICJ Report].
39. Id. at 169.
40. Id. at 170.
41. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
42. Id. at 369 n.1, quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 n.4 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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It is useful to recall that a year earlier in Thompson v. Oklahoma,"
in which the question was whether the implementation of a death sentence
on a person who was fifteen years of age when he committed a capital
crime would violate the Cruel and Unusual Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, the Court held that the execution of any person under the age
of sixteen at the time of the offense would violate the Eighth Amendment
guarantees. Justice Stevens' plurality opinion held that "it would offend
civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than
sixteen years old at the time of his or her offense,"" and interpreted
evolving standards of decency in the light of standards under international
law as well as the practices of other nations,' 4 specifically citing the
practices of western European democracies. It was in Trop v. Dulles"
that, while analyzing and interpreting the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme
Court observed that the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society" must be considered.
47
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
"cruel and unusual punishments" shall not be inflicted. The comparable
language under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) is that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."" This language is identical to that
used in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Among other
international instruments of human rights, the European Convention on
Human Rights stipulates that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."10
Several decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights
and the European Court of Human Rights have interpreted the language of
Article 3 of the European Convention to develop definitional distinctions
43. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
44. Id. at 830.
45. Thonpson, 487 U.S. at 830-31.
46. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
47. Id. at 101.
48. ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 7.
49. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., at 71, art. 5, U.N. Doec. A/810 (1948).
50. European Convention, supra note 20, art. 3.
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between torture and "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."'
Also, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has interpreted Article
7 of the ICCPR's prohibitions on torture and cruel and inhuman
treatment . 2 It has also interpreted the ICCPR "to prohibit extradition to a
jurisdiction where the extradites faces a real risk, that his rights under
ICCPR will be violated. This position is consonant with the European
Court's interpretation of the European Convention in Soering v. United
Kingdom." In Soering, the Court ruled that the "death row phenomenon"
in the United States,5 ' which potentially faced the defendant were he
sentenced to capital punishment, would violate the accused's rights under
the European Convention.
These interpretations should inform the United States Supreme
Court in its analysis of the Eighth Amendment, since they are much
broader in their reach of what constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment
than the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the comparable
Eighth Amendment language of cruel and unusual punishment.
IV. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
In August 1988, the American Bar Association adopted the following
policy in opposition to discrimination in capital sentencing:
BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association
opposes discrimination in capital sentencing on the basis of
the race of either the victim or the defendant.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the American Bar
Association supports the enactment of federal and state
legislation which strives to eliminate any racial
discrimination in capital sentencing which may exist. 5
Several studies have shown how racial discrimination based on the
race of the victim or the defendant affects the imposition of capital
punishment. These include studies by the National Association for the
51. See generally David Heffernan, Comment- America the Cruel and Unusual? An
Analysis of the Eighth Amendment Under International Law, 45 CATH. U.L. REV. 481, 518-30
(1996).
52. See id. at 530-37.
53. Id. at 539, citing Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) (1989).
54. On the death row phenomenon, see ICJ Report, supra note 38, at 206-09.
55. ABA POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK (1988). For a thorough discussion, see
Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 1, at 34-40.
56. See id. at 34-37.
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Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and Educational Fund; a
comprehensive statistical analysis of racial discrimination in capital cases
by Professor David Baldus, who took into account 230 non-racial factors
and still found that even if they "might legitimately influence a sentencer,
the jury more likely than not would have spared [the defendant's] life had
his victim been black;" 7 and a 1990 General Accounting office report
reviewing twenty-eight different empirical studies that examined racial
discrimination in capital cases with its conclusion that these studies clearly
showed a pattern "indicating racial disparities in the charging, sentencing
and imposition of the death penalty."
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 59 the Court held that statistical evidence of
racial disproportion in death sentences does not demonstrate arbitrary,
capricious, or discriminatory application of the death penalty.6 The Court
held that the Baldus study, which demonstrated that blacks who kill whites
are sentenced to death "at nearly twenty-two times the rate of blacks who
kill blacks, and more than seven times the rate of whites who kill blacks. "61
In a five to four opinion, the Court held that the statistical study did not
demonstrate a risk of racial bias in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 6 It
also rejected McCleskey's Fourteenth Amendment claim for his failure to
show intentional discrimination.63
The International Commission of Jurists' Mission to the United
States found that "the Race Convention's prescription of effects-based
discrimination (Article 2(c) of the ICERD) extends to areas of disparate
impact-discrimination not currently proscribed under United States law in
the United States.""4
In response to the Supreme Court's finding in McCleskey that
problems of racism in death penalty cases "are best presented to the
legislative bodies, "0 there have been several bills introduced in the United
States Congress since 1988 to remedy the situation presented by these
studies. These bills are aimed at giving the condemned a federal right to
57. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 325 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting, citing Baldus
study).
58. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (1990).
59. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 325 (1987).
60. See id. at 292-93.
61. Id. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting, citing Baldus study).
62. Id. at 313.
63. Id. at 297-99.
64. ICJ Report, supra note 38, at 203.
65. McKclesky, 481 U.S. at 319.
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challenge any death sentence that "furthers a racially discriminatory
pattern" based on the race of either the defendant or the victim. The
defendant may support his or her challenge by statistical proof and without
the necessity of showing discriminatory intent, motive or purpose.
In 1994, the House of Representatives passed the Racial Justice
Act, under which proof of significant racial discrimination in the
administration of capital sentencing would have required the prosecutor to
show a non-race based explanation for the death sentence." However, the
bill has not yet been enacted into law.67 The ICJ Mission has said that a
failure to enact the Racial Justice Act "would constitute a breach of the
United States government's express ratification of the ICCPR and the
ICERD - particularly of Articles 6(1), 6(2) and Article 26 read with
Article 2(2) of the . . . ICCPR, and of Articles 2(1) and 5(a) of . . . the
ICERD."6 It added:
The mission is conscious of the final reservation taken, [by
the United States] to the [ICCPR] and to the [ICERD],
namely that their provisions are not self-executing [citation
omitted]. But this reservation touches upon the non-
enforceability of international instruments under domestic
law, and does not effect a conclusion based upon non-
implementation of the provisions of the [ICCPR and of the
[ICERD].
The Mission is of the considered opinion that in the
absence of a nation-wide law framed on the pattern of the
Racial Justice Act, the administration of capital punishment
in the United States will continue to be arbitrary, and
definitely not in consonance with Articles 6 and 40 of the
[ICCPR].-
The Mission's report concludes that:
(b) Change in United States law is mandated by the
provisions of Article 2(c) of the [ICERD], which was
ratified by the United States in 1984 without any
reservation being taken on this provision.
66. H.R. 4017, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994).
67. See generally E. Chemerisky, Eliminatina Racial Discrimination in Administration of
the Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519 (1995).
68. ICJ Report, supra note 38, at 204.
69. Id. at 204.
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(c) Even in the absence of such change, the Mission
submits that by virtue of the Supremacy Clause in the
United States Constitution (Article VI Clause 2) broader
treaty obligations under the [ICERD] would furnish the
Controlling Rule of the Law in the United States.0
V. EXECUTION OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS
In February 1989, the ABA adopted a policy prohibiting the
execution of mentally retarded persons:
Be It Resolved, that the American Bar Association urges
that no person with mental retardation, as defined by the
American Association on Mental Retardation, should be
sentenced to death and execution; and
Be It Further Resolved, that the American Bar Association
supports enactment of legislation barring the execution of
defendants with mental retardation."
The American Association of Mental Retardation adopted in 1992 a revised
definition of mentally retarded person:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in
present functioning. It is characterized by significantly
sub-average intellectual functioning, existing concurrently
with related limitations in two or more of the following
applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care,
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction,
health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work.
Mental retardation manifests before age eighteen."
In 1989, in deciding Penry v. Lynaugh," the United States
Supreme Court held that the execution of a mentally retarded prisoner
would not violate the Eighth Amendment. While a psychiatrist had
testified that the defendant was suffering from a brain disorder at the time
of the offense so that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his
70. Id. at 212.
71. ABA, Swumary of Action of the House of Delegates, 1989 Midyear Meeting, Feb.
1989.
72. Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 1, at n. 40.
73. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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conduct and was unable to conform his conduct to the law,"7 the Court said
that "in the absence of better evidence of a national consensus against
execution of the retarded, mental age should not be adopted as a line-
drawing principle in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence."71
Accordingly, the Court declined to hold that "the Eighth Amendment
precludes the execution of any mentally retarded person of Penry's ability
[with the reasoning capacity of a seven-year-old] convicted of a capital
offense simply by virtue of his or her mental retardation alone. "76 It should
be noted that the decision was five to four and Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens considered executing mentally retarded
persons as unconstitutional.
Examples show that some severely psychologically impaired
individuals have been executed in the United States." In one capital case,
Judge Fitzpatrick aptly observed:
No justification can be had for the execution of a child of
ten or eleven years of age in any society that considers
itself civilized. If a child of ten or eleven should not be
executed under any circumstances, then surely a person
who may have a chronological age of twenty, but a mental
and emotional age of ten or eleven, should not be put to
death.78
VI. DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS79
In Stanford, writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the
execution of two defendants, ages sixteen and seventeen, was permissible
under the Constitution. Rejecting the defenses argument that "juveniles,
possessing less developed cognitive skills than adults, are less likely to fear
death [and,] being less mature and responsible, are also less morally
blameworthy, "0 Justice Scalia stated that the juvenile death penalty would
fail under equal protection arguments, rather than the Eighth Amendment,
74. Id. at 308-09.
75. Id. at 340.
76. Id.
77. See Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 1, at 41-46.
78. Smith v. Kemp, 664 F.Supp. 500, 507 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
79. See Ved Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for
Juvenile Offenders: An Aippraisal Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Riahts, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1311 (1993).
80. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377.
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if such arguments could be conclusively proven.8' He stated that the will of
the majority should govern a court's consideration of punishments imposed
by a government. Thus, under the Stanford plurality's ruling, the fate of
juvenile offenders is to be decided solely by the voters of the 50 states.
Pertinent international agreements containing prohibitions on the
death penalty against juvenile offenders include the ICCPR, which states
that a "[s]entence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed
below eighteen years of age . ... "82 Similarly, the American Convention
on Human Rights states that "[clapital punishment shall not be imposed
upon persons who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18
years of age ... ."13 Among other pertinent internatinal instruments, the
Fourth Geneva Convention, the Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War8 states, "In any case, the death penalty
may not be pronounced against a protected person [one held by a party to
the conflict or an occupying force of which he/she is not a national] who
was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense.""
The 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions specifically
prohibit imposition of capital punishment on those who committed those
crimes while they were under the age of eighteen. The Additional Protocol
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) states in Article 77, paragraph 5, "The death penalty related to
the armed conflict shall not be executed on persons who had not attained
the age of eighteen years at the time the offense was committed."" Also,
the Additional Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of
NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) states, "The death penalty
shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of eighteen
years at the time of the offense ....
In 1989, the Convention on the Rights of the Child mandated that
states parties ensure that "[n]either capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences
81. Id. at 378.
82. ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 6(5).
83. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 17, art. 4(5).
84. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 286.
85. Id. art. 68.
86. Geneva Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 77, reprinted in 16
I.L.M 1391, 1425 (1977).
'87. Additional Protocol, Protocol II, art. 6(4), reprinted in Geneva Protocol I, supra note
86, at 1446.
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committed by persons below eighteen years of age. " u  As already
mentioned, in 1983, Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human
Rights abolished the death penalty in time of peace and, in December
1989, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aimed
at the abolition of the death penalty.90
Although the United States is not a party to the American
Convention on Human Rights, another organ of the Organization of
American States (OAS), the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, found the United States in 1987 to be in violation of a rule of jus
cogens because of its practice of executing juvenile offenders. 9 The case
involved J. Terry Roach and James Pinkerton, both seventeen at the time
of their crimes, who were sentenced to capital punishment. A complaint
filed by Amnesty International on behalf of Roach argued that the
execution of a juvenile would violate United States obligations under
customary international law and human rights provisions of the OASY
The Commission, and subsequently the OAS Secretary General, appealed
for a stay of Roach's executions.? However, these appeals fell on deaf
ears.
Although the United States has not ratified some of the
international human rights instruments mentioned above, and has made
reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it
can be persuasively argued under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties that the United States reservation is incompatible with the objects
and purposes of the ICCPR and that its signing the instruments obligates it
not to violate their provisions."
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States stands virtually alone among its peer countries in
its practice regarding capital punishment. The obligations it has assumed
under the international human rights instruments are unambiguous. The
88. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 30, art. 37(a).
89. Supra note 21.
90. Supra note 12.
91. Case 9647, Inter-American C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L/V/I.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987),
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 61, 73 (R.E. Norris & T.
Buergenthal eds., 1988).
92. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY
72 (1987).
93. Id. at 72-73.
94. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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call by the American Bar Association for a moratorium on the death
penalty, its concern over racial inequality in capital sentencing, and its
assertion of the impropriety of execution of mentally retarded and juvenile
offenders should renew the debate within the American legal community
on these critical issues, to the end that a more rational death penalty
jurisprudence emerges, informed as well by international law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the sources of pressure against the use of capital
punishment in the United States is foreign governments. Half the world's
states do not use capital punishment. Importantly, that half includes all of
Western Europe. The states of Western Europe, as a result of their
economic situation and their economic cohesiveness, are better positioned
than most other states in the world to put pressure on the United States on
human rights matters.
In Western Europe, not only is capital punishment not practiced,
but also the use of capital punishment is deemed a violation of human
rights. A European treaty outlawing capital punishment as a human rights
violation enjoys wide adherence. Western European states have often
refused extradition to the United States where the United States has sought
the surrender of a person to be tried for a capital offense. Popular
sentiment is so strong against capital punishment in many Western
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University; LL.B., E.D.M., M.A. 1966, Harvard
University. The author was counsel to the government of Mexico in its capacity as amicus curiae
in Ohio v. Loza and Murphy v. Netherland, both cited herein.
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European states that European citizen groups and government officials
have lobbied against the imposition of death sentences in particular cases.
Italy has played a leading role in this regard.
II. WESTERN HEMISPHERE PRESSURE ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In recent years, pressure against the use of capital punishment in
the United States has come from Western Hemisphere states as well,
typically in cases in which nationals of a Western Hemisphere state have
been sentenced to death in the United States. The number of foreign-state
nationals sentenced to death in the United States is not insignificant.
Presently, between sixty and seventy are housed in death row sections of
the prisons of various states, awaiting execution. Most are from this
hemisphere, a fact that is likely attributable to the large numbers of
immigrants to the United States from the hemisphere.
Capital punishment is little used in the Western Hemisphere. After
western Europe, the western hemisphere is the next region of the world
most strongly opposed to capital punishment. The United States is a major
exception in this regard.
The pressure by Western Hemisphere states has been exerted not
on the grounds of the impropriety or illegality of capital punishment. It
has been exerted on a basis that may surprise many in the United States,
namely, the unfairness of the criminal trials and sentencing of these
foreign-state nationals.
Prejudice against these foreign-state nationals has been suggested
as a factor in some of the cases. The principal point of challenge,
however, has been the alleged violation of a treaty provision. Under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to which 156 states are parties,
authorities who arrest a national of a high contracting party are required to
inform that person of a right provided in the Convention to contact the
person's consulate for assistance. The obligation is contained in Article
36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which
reads:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular
functions relating to nationals of the sending state:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with
nationals of the sending state and to have access to them.
Nationals of the sending state shall have the same freedom
with respect to communication with and access to consular
officers of the sending state;
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(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the
receiving state shall, without delay, inform the consular
post of the sending state if, within its consular district, a
national of that state is arrested or committed to prison or
to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.
Any communication addressed to the consular post by the
person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also
be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The
said authorities shall inform the person concerned without
delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officials shall have the right to visit a
national of the sending state who is in prison, custody or
detention, to converse and correspond with him and to
arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have
the right to visit any national of the sending state who is in
prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance
of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall
refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in
prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such
action.'
The critical aspect of Article 36, paragraph 1, is the final sentence
of subparagraph (b), namely, the obligation to inform a foreign national of
the right of consular access. The Western Hemisphere States whose
nationals have been sentenced to death in the United States have charged,
both in protest notes and in documents filed in court, that their nationals
were not afforded this information at the time of arrest, or, indeed, at any
time during the trial or sentencing. The governments of these states were
thus deprived of the opportunity to assist their co-nationals in defending the
charge that led to conviction and a sentence of death. Of all the foreign-
state nationals currently awaiting execution in the United States, few if any
were provided the information required to be given by the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations.
The result, argue these governments, is unfair trials. The function
of consular assistance is to allow a foreign national to present a proper
defense. The institution is based, in part, on the premise that a foreigner is
typically less able than a national to present a defense, because of less
familiarity with the culture and legal system. It is based as well, in part,
1. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, T.I.A.S. 6820, 21 U.S.T.
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on a concern that the person may be the object of discrimination as a
foreigner.
The United States does not question the importance of consular
protection in criminal cases. According to the Legal Adviser to the
Department of State, "[t]he United States attaches great importance to
ensuring respect for the consular notification obligation under the Vienna
Convention. In addition to being legally required, United States
compliance helps ensure our ability to protect United States citizens when
similarly detained abroad."2 The Justice Department has made a similar
affirmation of the effect and importance of the notification obligation: "the
United States firmly believes in and supports consistent adherence to the
consular notification provisions in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. . . . These provisions are very important to the
United States because they give significant protection to United States
nationals when they reside or travel abroad. "3
On several occasions in recent decades, the Department of State
has sent a circular letter to local law enforcement agencies around the
United States, advising them of the obligation to inform foreign nationals
of their right to contact a consul, and providing a list of the locations and
telephone numbers of embassies and consulates. 4
The Legal Adviser states that many detained foreign nationals are
given the required information by law enforcement authorities:
We have had many positive experiences with local, state,
and federal law enforcement authorities in cases raising the
Article 36 notification and access obligations. We regularly
hear from state and local law enforcement agencies in
widely separate parts of the United States that wish to
confirm information contained in our April 1993 Notice
for Law Enforcement Officials on the Detention of Foreign
Nationals or to seek clarification of these instructions. We
also hear routinely from foreign government
representatives about issues relating to foreign nationals
2. Letter to Robert F. Brooks, Esq., from Michael J. Matheson, Acting Legal Adviser,
(Aug. 20, 1997) (copy on file with author).
3. Brief for Allen at 1, Paraguay v. Allen (No. 96-2770)(4th Cir. 1997).
4. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, NOTICE: IF You HAVE DETAINED A FOREIGN
NATIONAL, READ THIS NOTICE, (Sept. 1, 1991) (copy on file with author).
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whose detentions have been notified to these
representatives through the Article 36 notification process.5
Nonetheless, in the current capital cases involving foreign
nationals, there is, as mentioned, little indication that the required
information was given. In none of the capital cases has the Department of
State, or a prosecuting attorney, asserted, in response to an Article 36
claim, that the required notification was given.
1H. REASONS COURTS HAVE REFUSED TO ENFORCE THE RIGHT OF
CONSULAR ACCESS
Since the Article 36 obligation reads in clear terms, one might
expect the courts to provide redress when the obligation is violated. To
date, however, courts in the United States have given a cool reception to
foreign nationals who have raised the lack of compliance to challenge a
conviction. In only one reported case, a non-capital case, has a court
granted relief. 6
The courts have found various ways to reject an Article 36 claim.
One state court judge presented with a post-conviction petition based on an
allegation of non-compliance with Article 36 said that Article 36 did not
require any notification. The judge said:
This court knows of no law, treaty, or judicial precedent,
which imposes on law enforcement officials an affirmative
duty to inform an alien detainee of a right to contact
consul, nor does this court recognize such an obligation.
While custodial personnel may not obstruct or deny an
alien detainee's right to contact his nation's consul, they
have no affirmative duty to inform him of that right.7
The court made this ruling after being presented the text of Article 36.
The judge did not provide any elaboration that would indicate how he
arrived at his erroneous reading of Article 36. His reading is in obvious
contradiction to the text, which, as the Department of State acknowledges,
requires notification of the right to contact a consul.
For the most part, however, the courts have recognized that Article
36 requires notification and that a foreign national to whom no notification
was given may raise the matter. However, the courts, confronted by
5. Letter to Robert F. Brooks, Esq., from Michael J. Matheson, Acting Legal Adviser,
Aug. 20, 1997 (copy on file with author).
6. United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980).
7. Ohio v. Loza, No. CA96-ID-214, 1997 WL 634348 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1997).
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foreign nationals raising Article 36 claims, have invoked one or another
procedural hurdle that has resulted in a denial of relief.
A. Limitation on Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
In a 1997 case, the Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari review after the court of appeals refused to review a district
court order denying a habeas corpus petition filed by a foreign national
sentenced to die by a state court. A Mexican national had been convicted
of murder in Virginia and sentenced to death there. Virginia authorities
had not informed him of his right to contact a Mexican consul. He sought
habeas corpus review in the United States district court on grounds of
Virginia's failure to comply with the obligation to inform him of the right
of consular access, challenging the conviction on that basis.
A claim based on a treaty may serve as a ground for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus. A federal statute provides that a writ of habeas
corpus may issue if a person is in custody "in violation of the constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States."8  The District Court denied
relief, however, after which he filed an appeal in the United States Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals refused to hear the appeal, in light of a
1996 statute providing that if a district court denies the habeas corpus
petition of a person sentenced in state court, there should be no appeal of
that denial, unless the petitioner can make a substantial showing of a
violation of a constitutional right.9  The Court of Appeals said that the
Mexican national was alleging a violation of a treaty right, not a
constitutional right.'I
In seeking review by the Supreme Court of the United States, the
petitioner, supported by the government of Mexico as amicus curiae,
argued, unsuccessfully, that the Court of Appeals had misconstrued the
1996 Act, because there was no indication in the legislative history of an
intent to preclude appeals based on treaty claims, which up until then had
been permitted. In addition, they argued, also unsuccessfully, that where
the effect of a statute on a treaty obligation is unclear, courts must construe
the statute in a way that does not result in a violation by the United States
of its treaty obligation."
8. 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (1997).
9. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, (codified as 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2)) (1997).
10. Murphy v. Netherland, Warden, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997) cert. denied, 1997 U.S.
LEXIS 4423.
11. Brief for Netherland, Murphy v. Netherland, Warden, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997).
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B. Default on Procedural Grounds
Another basis on which courts have rejected a Vienna Convention
claim is that the matter was not raised early enough in the proceedings. In
most of the litigated cases, the foreign national has raised the Vienna
Convention claim only in post-appeal review. In an Ohio case, the foreign
national raised the claim in post-conviction proceedings, under a statute
that allows review of a criminal conviction on constitutional grounds.' 2
The Ohio court denied review on the grounds that the Vienna Convention
claim was not a constitutional claim. 3
Federal courts too have denied Vienna Convention claims on the
ground that the claim was raised too late. These cases have involved
persons convicted and sentenced to death in state court. Even though
federal statute provides for habeas corpus review whenever a person is in
custody "in violation of the constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States,"' 4 the courts have invoked a rule that a person convicted in state
court must present all possible arguments to the courts of the state before
seeking federal review. If an issue that could have been presented in state
court was not presented, the federal courts say that the issue was
procedurally defaulted.'5
Foreign nationals challenging a conviction and death sentence on
Vienna Convention grounds have questioned this result, arguing that the
procedural default rule is based on considerations of federal-state relations.
The rule is designed to accord deference to the state courts.'6 The foreign
nationals have argued that this consideration is inapposite when a treaty
right has been violated. When that has occurred, any opportunity
presented to a court to correct the violation should be taken, because the
result otherwise will be that the United States defaults on a treaty
obligation.
C. A Prejudice Requirement
Most courts that have not refused to consider Vienna Convention
claims on procedural grounds have rejected them on the basis of a
requirement of showing prejudice. They have said that a foreign national
12. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.21(A)(1) (1997).
13. Ohio v. Loza, No. CA96-10-214, 1997 WL 634348 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1997).
14. 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (1997).
15. Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997).
16. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 432 (1963); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982);
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730
(1991).
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asserting a Vienna Convention claim must demonstrate that he or she was
prejudiced by the inability to have a consul's assistance."
The courts have created a prejudice requirement, without a clearly
stated rationale, but apparently by analogy to other defensive assertions
regarding which a showing of prejudice is required. The difficulty with
this approach, as applied to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
is that it is only the rare case in which a foreign national can demonstrate
to any degree of certainty that participation by a consul would have led to
an acquittal, or to a lesser sentence. A consul's functions are varied, and
one cannot know after the fact what a consul might have done that would
have affected the outcome. A prejudice requirement makes it highly
unlikely that a court will rule in favor of a Vienna Convention claim.
Under the Vienna Convention, the contracting states have
implicitly said that a person is prejudiced if required to defend a criminal
charge without consular assistance. Absent an assumption that a foreigner
is disadvantaged in the criminal process, there would be no need for
consular assistance.
In one case, a United States district judge reversed a conviction
because of a Vienna Convention violation without requiring the convicted
foreign national to demonstrate prejudice. The court of appeals reversed,
however, stating that prejudice must be demonstrated by the foreign
national.'" In the Court of Appeals, one judge dissented, arguing that
while prejudice was relevant, the burden should be on the government to
show that no prejudice occurred. The dissenting judge based his view on
the importance of meeting treaty obligations. He wrote:
This nation must manifest integrity in our treaties with
foreign countries. To honor the provisions of . . . the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations . . . mandates a
sense of justice and decency. To do anything less is a
severe erosive compromise of our very essence equal if not
greater than a Constitutional violation. 9
17. United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1979); Murphy v.
Netherland, Warden, 116 F.3d 97, cert. denied 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4423; Faulder v. Johnson, 81
F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996).
18. United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1979).
19. United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1979) (Takasugi, J.,
dissenting).
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IV. POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL ACTION
To date, litigation in United States courts has not resulted in any
success in challenging capital convictions on the basis of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. Approaches in the international arena
may result. Petitions have been filed with the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights.20 The matter has been taken up at the diplomatic level.
Mexico, in addition to filing protest notes with the United States in several
of the cases involving its nationals, has raised the issue at the United
Nations.
To date, the United States Department of State has rebuffed the
approaches of the Western Hemisphere governments who have approached
it. As far as can be known, it has taken no steps to encourage state courts
or state governors to comply with the Vienna Convention. Given the
obligation of the United States to comply with the Vienna Convention, this
lack of action puts the United States in violation of its Vienna Convention
obligations. Since the obligation to comply with the Vienna Convention
rests on the United States, one might expect more aggressive action from
the State Department than an occasional circular letter. Importantly, the
State Department acknowledges that rights under the Vienna Convention
have been infringed in the cases that have been brought to its attention.
The Justice Department has argued, so far successfully, that a
foreign state may not sue to force a United States to comply with Article
36, on the rationale that the matter must be handled at the state-to-state
level. Thus, the Justice Department asserts: "Assertions by foreign states
of treaty violations are properly resolved through diplomatic
representations between the foreign state and the Executive Branch of our
federal government, or through actions before appropriate international
bodies, not through suits brought by foreign states in domestic courts., 2
However, as indicated, every foreign state to date that has made
diplomatic representations to the Department of State regarding Article 36
has been politely shown the Foggy Bottom exit door. Litigation in the
International Court of Justice may ultimately result. The Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations does not include a provision for
compulsory reference of disputes to the International Court of Justice, but
a separate protocol to the Vienna Convention does so. The United States is
a party to the optional protocol, as are a number of Latin American states.
20. S. Adele Shank & John Quigley, Foreigners on Texas' Death Row and the Right of
Access to a Consul, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 719, 722-27 (1995).
21. Brief for Allen at 2, Paraguay v. Allen (No. 96-2770) (4th Cir. 1997).
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V. CONCLUSION
International pressure is being brought to bear on the United States
on the capital punishment issue. The United States increasingly is isolated
as a major state that continues to use capital punishment. Given this
international isolation on the issue, the execution of foreign nationals
becomes a lightning rod for mobilization of foreign sentiment and an
occasion for action by foreign governments.
Domestic pressure as well is being brought to bear on the United
States regarding capital punishment. The American Bar Association has
called for a suspension of executions in light of widely perceived inequities
in application of the death penalty.' Pressure by foreign governments
regarding capital punishment is being brought to bear at the same time as
domestic pressure is increasing. Pressure from abroad may ultimately play
a decisive role in the fate of capital punishment in the United States.
22. Darryl van Duch, ABA Asks Death Penalty Halt, Skirts Bond Reform, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 17, 1991, at A7 (calling for moratorium on executions until it can be demonstrated that the
process leading to execution is being handled fairly).
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ISSUES SURROUNDING THE CREATION OF A
REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM FOR THE
ASIA-PACIFIC
Kelly Dawn Askin"
The only major region of the world that does not have a regional
human rights commission or court is the Asia-Pacific. The Asia-Pacific
can generally be recognized to include not only the entire Asian region,
from Japan and the Philippines in the East to Pakistan and Afghanistan in
the West, but also areas of the South Pacific, including Australia, New
Zealand, the East Indies and the Pacific Islands, and Russia. These
countries are diverse in a wide variety of areas, including culture,
language, history, wealth, technology, development, and legal systems.
Yet they share not only a territorial commonality but also some similar
interests and problems.
There are currently three regional human rights systems: the
European, Inter-American, and African systems. The European
Commission and the European Court of Human Rights were established in
response to the atrocities committed during the Second World War. In
1950, the Council of Europe created the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which
entered into force in 1953. The ECHR subsequently created the European
Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.
Optional protocols afford additional rights. The European Commission
can receive complaints from state parties and individuals, but only states
can refer a case to the European Court, unless the Ninth Protocol is
ratified by the state to allow individuals to have standing before the court.
Ratification of the Eleventh Protocol by state parties to the ECHR, which
is expected to enter into force on November 1, 1998, will dissolve the
European Commission on Human Rights and allow individuals and states
to take a case directly to the European Court of Human Rights.
In 1948, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. In 1959, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights was created, and in 1969, the
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) was adopted by the OAS.
* Dr. Askin is a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Civil and Human Rights, Notre Dame
Law School, and served as the organizer and chair of this panel discussion.
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The Inter-American Commission may receive communications from
individuals, states, and others, such as non-governmental organizations.
Optional protocols to the ACHR provide additional rights. In 1978, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established by the ACHR,
despite lack of individual court standing.
In 1981, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. This charter established
the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. While discussions
have greatly progressed on establishing an African Court on Human and
Peoples Rights, this court is not yet a reality. The African Charter places
an emphasis on collective rights not recognized in the European and Inter-
American Conventions and imposes duties not only on state parties but also
on individuals.
There are strengths and weaknesses in the European, Inter-
American, and African systems. Any human rights system created in the
Asia-Pacific region can learn and borrow from the other systems and adapt
them to the special needs of in the Asia-Pacific region. Financial resources
may pose grave difficulties, and language will certainly be another
problem, as there are thousands of languages and dialects within the Asia-
Pacific region. Undoubtedly, many states will resist guaranteeing people
certain fundamental rights or resist submitting the state to any outside
authority.
Despite these and other obstacles, incentives abound. For
instance, a commission or court could provide impartial resolution of
disputes between state parties, possibly preventing escalation of tensions
into armed conflicts. A regional human rights charter or convention on
human rights principles could establish a more uniform minimum standard
of treatment for persons, based on principles agreed upon by and within
the Asian and Pacific arena. A human rights system would likely create
both international and domestic goodwill, as a result of efforts and
initiatives made by states to protect the basic human rights of people in the
region. The Asia-Pacific frequently complains about Western nations and
other areas of the world imposing its standards on them or interfering in
their activities, but a regional system would allow the Asia-Pacific
increased freedom to resolve international disputes and to keep internal
human rights accusations within its region. Such a system could stand to
educate citizens, states, corporations, and organizations on the importance
of respecting human dignity, and to serve as a deterrent for those who
assume that impunity is the norm.
For many years, various human rights organizations, and in recent
years the United Nations and various Asia-Pacific state representatives,
have participated in meetings and conferences concerning the establishment
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of a human rights system in the Asia-Pacific. The Asian Human Rights
Commission, a non-governmental organization based in Hong Kong, spent
three years working on a draft Asian Charter for Human Rights, which
was inspired by a desire to allow the people of Asia to live in peace and
dignity. In 1997, the final draft of the Asian Charter for Human Rights
was completed.
It remains to be seen whether any human rights mechanisms or
systems will have the support of states in the Asia-Pacific. Many problems
pervasive in this region, such as drug and sex trafficking, slave and child
labor, torture, and forced detention of prisoners of conscience are often
perpetrated, endorsed, or acquiesced to by the states that may have little or
no incentive to stop or prevent such abuses. Nevertheless, nations as
diverse as Russia, China, India, Japan, and Australia can and should work
together to create a strong contingency in the Asia-Pacific for protecting its
citizenry against human rights violations. It is important to emphasize that
creating a regional system for the Asia-Pacific will not necessarily obligate
states to increased legal responsibility, but the majority of states in the
Asia-Pacific have signed, ratified, or acceded to many of the international
human rights instruments currently in force, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Genocide Convention, the
Convention against Torture, and the Slavery Convention.
Issues surrounding the creation of an Asia-Pacific regional human
rights system are complicated and diverse. There will be no easy
solutions. However, articles by human rights scholars, lawyers, and/or
activists, Dr. Clarence Dias (India), Bina D'Costa (Bangladesh), and Ali
Qazilbash (Pakistan), provide greater insight into these issues. Their
articles review past and current efforts to create a regional human rights
system in the Asia-Pacific by non-governmental organizations, the United
Nations, and state actors; provide a descriptive analysis of obstacles to a
regional human rights system; report on human rights organizations and
systems already established in various Asian countries; compare a regional
human rights system in the Asia-Pacific with other human rights systems
already established in other regions of the world; and detail the final draft
of The Asian Charter on Human Rights.
• Askin
NGOS EFFORTS TOWARDS THE CREATION OF A
REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ARRANGEMENT IN
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Ali Mohsin Qazilbash"
1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE OTHER THREE
COMM ISSIONS ........................................................... 605
A. The European Commission .................................... 605
1. Supplementary law making ............................ 605
2. Protocol System ......................................... 605
B. The Inter-American System .................................... 606
1. The United States and the
Com m ission .............................................. 607
C. The African Commission ....................................... 607
II. ASIAN NGOs STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING ANY REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT ..................... 608
A. NGO Perspective ................................................ 609
III. ASIAN NGO ACTIVITES TO PROMOTE A
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT ........................................... 610
A. Drafting of a Declaration and Charter ..................... 610
IV. NGO STRATEGIES IN RAISING HUMAN RIGHTS
ISSUES AND AGENDA IN THE MEETING OF
EXISTING SUB-REGIONAL BODIES ................................... 611
A. Subregional Approach ......................................... 611
V. CREATING AND SUPPORTING NATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS ................................................. 612
VI. GOVERNMENT OBSTACLES AND NGOs'
RESPONSES IN OVERCOMING THE DEAD LOCK ................... 613
A. Government Obstacles ......................................... 613
B. NGO Responses to the Deadlock ............................. 613
I feel honored to be given an opportunity to speak at this panel on
an issue which has a lot to do with a part of the world I belong to. NGOs
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in Asia and the Pacific have been crucial to the struggle for a regional
human rights arrangement. Indeed it is they who have kept both the debate
over and the struggle for an Asian human rights system alive. It is they
who have exposed the sophistry, prevarications, evasions, and
contradictions that Asian governments have brought to the discussions
regarding a Regional System for the Protection and Promotion of Human
Rights in the Asia-Pacific region.
In my presentation, I will attempt to highlight some of the
contributions made by Asia-Pacific NGOs on the subject.
I think that the time has come that all the Asian States should take
necessary practical measures towards the creation of an Asian Human
Rights Mechanism. No doubt the Governments have reasons to remain
silent and not get exposed, though their silence is the silence of the lamb.
Today, large sections of our people continue to be exploited and oppressed
and many of our societies are torn apart by hatred and intolerance.
Increasingly, the people realize that peace and dignity are possible only
when the equal and inalienable rights of all persons and groups are
recognized and protected. They are determined to secure peace and justice
for them and the coming generations through the struggle for human rights
and freedoms. Towards that end they are committed as an affirmation of
the desire and aspirations of the peoples of Asia to live in peace and
dignity.
The problems in this region are typically of its own nature. For
example, in Pakistan, three martial laws brought an end to the political
life, reducing the political participation to zero. Fundamentalist religious
revivalism has prompted violation of human rights in certain parts of Asia.
Women's rights violations are also a major factor in the violation of human
rights. Above all, governmental lawlessness is an increasingly frequent
phenomenon in many Asian countries, as is the abuse of power and
authority by public officials entrusted with implementing the law, such as
local police, etc. Concentration of power in the executive branch of
government is resulting in increased arbitrariness and decreased
accountability. This proves that like all other regions of the world, this
region also has a variety of human rights violations. What is missing in
Asia compared with other regions is a Regional Human Rights
Commission.
The need for an Asian Human Rights Commission and its priority
first emerged in 1982, when a United Nations sponsored seminar was held
on this issue in Colombo, whereafter three workshops further examined
this issue in Manila in 1990, in Jakarta in 1993, in Seoul in 1994, and
more recently, in Kathmandu in 1996, and Amman 1997.
[Vol. 4:603
Qazilbash
I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE OTHER THREE COMMISSIONS
The other three Commissions: The European Commission, the
Inter-American Commission, and the African Commission are working in
their respective regions. Before moving further, I think it will be useful to
give a brief introduction of each of these three Commissions.
A. The European Commission
The development of a regional Human Rights system in Europe
was in critical ways a response to the genocidal horrors of the Second
World War. Michael Reisman, in his paper at the Fourth Workshop On
Regional Human Rights Arrangements in the Asian and Pacific Region at
Katmandu (Feb. 26-28. 1994), stressed that the post-mortem by elites and
scholars concluded, in part, that disrespect for the rule of law and
fundamental individual rights was a transitional destabilizing force with a
potentially strong regional reach. Post war European leaders promoted the
creation of a European Human Rights system as a way of checking at an
early stage the growth of regimes that based their rule on violations of
individual rights. Another factor which contributed towards making a
regional European system was a political stance against communism and
also the East-West differences. In 1948, at the Congress of Europe,
Winston Churchill called for a European Charter of Human Rights. Later,
the Council of Europe became the forum in which most of the discussions
leading to the creation of European Human Rights instruments took place
and finally the ongoing process was completed in 1950.
1. Supplementary Law Making
At the bureaucratic level, the law making process leading to the
adoption of European Convention was complex and quite unique. A
system of accommodation emerged when claims of minimalists, such as the
United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries, favored less
institutionalization, and the claims of maximalists, such as France and
Benelux countries, were reconciled. The drafting of relatively non-
controversial parts of the Convention was accelerated, and political
confrontation regarding the more controversial provisions of the so-called
political questions was avoided.
2. Protocol System
The protocol system has been used to add rights to the convention
or implement new procedural rules in an incremental optional fashion.
Presently, eight out of ten protocols submitted by the council have been
ratified by the parties. The European Commission of Human Rights, the
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committee of ministers of the Council of Europe and the European Court
of Human Rights are the bodies responsible for enforcement.
The task of the commission can also be divided into three
categories:
a) Determining the admissibility;
b) Fact finding; and
c) Resolving disputes.
There are certain limitations as well, such as:
a) The NGOs cannot file a petition;
b) European Commission is restricted to the states that
have ratified the European convention; and
c) The committee of ministers has no power to grant
specific remedies. Nevertheless, the ministers may order
publication of a commission report on violations and may,
although this is unlikely, expel a state from the council of
Europe for violations of article 3 of its statute requiring
observance of human rights.
B. The Inter-American System
In 1959, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was
created for overseeing national implementation of human rights
commitment. Composed of seven members elected in their individual
capacity, the Commission started operating in 1960 with a rather vague
mandate. In 1965, its competence was expanded to accept
communications, request information from governments, and make
recommendations with the objective of bringing about more effective
observance of human rights. In 1967, the Organization of American States
(OAS) Charter was amended and the Commission became a principal
organ of the organization. The American Convention of Human Rights,
adopted in 1969, incorporated the commission and assigned it specific
competencies.
The Convention also created the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. The commission has three forms of jurisdiction. Its conventional
jurisdiction applies to the twenty-five states that have, to date, become
parties to the American convention. Its judicial invocatory jurisdiction,
i.e. its competence to invoke the Inter-American court, applies to the state
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parties to the American convention that have declared that they accept the
Courts jurisdiction. While these two forms of jurisdiction depend on
adherence to the American convention, the Commission declaration
jurisdiction applies to all parties to the OAS Charter - indeed, to all states
in the Americas. Hence, every independent state in the hemisphere, even
those which have not yet become parties to the convention, is subject, in
some form, to the commission's jurisdiction. With the responsibility for
thirty-four countries and more than 600 million human beings, the
commission faces a daunting mandate with a staff of ten lawyers, a
secretarial staff of seven, and an annual budget of less than $1.6 million.
1. The United States and the Commission
The United States has not ratified the American Convention on
Human Rights, but as a party to the OAS Charter it remains subject to the
jurisdiction of the commission, which is an organ of the OAS. Complaints
that have led to formal decisions by the Commission on allegations of
human rights charges by the United States are:
a) Haitians applying for asylum in the United States;
b) Challenge to legalized abortion (the baby boy case);
c) Allegations that the death penalty is imposed in a
radically discriminatory manner; and
d) A complaint concerning police misconduct and alleged
murder of members of move organization in Philadelphia,
which was declared inadmissible for the failure to exhaust
domestic remedies.
The only case in which the commission has found a violation of the
American declaration by the United States, involved imposition of the
death penalty on persons who committed a crime when under age eighteen.
The commission found that in Member States of the Organization of
American States, there is a recognized norm of jus cogens, which prohibits
the state execution of children. It agreed with the United States that there
was no consensus as to the minimum age for imposition of death penalty.
It nevertheless continued.
C. The African Commission
The African Conference on the rule of law, held in Lagos in 1961,
gave an idea of a regional human rights system. The International
Commission of Jurists invited all the concerned states to study the
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possibility of adopting a regional Human Rights Convention. In 1969, a
seminar jointly sponsored by the United Nations and Egypt proved
instrumental in attaining general support for an African Human Rights
Commission. In 1981, efforts finally reached success when experts in
Dakar prepared a final draft.
At the end of this year, the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights was adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
In 1986, a simple majority of OAU membership ratified the instrument to
come into force.
The African Charter is consistent with its predecessors in Europe
and America. However, it goes well beyond civil and political rights,
covering economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as a number of
collective or peoples rights. The African Charter also explicitly lists
duties. The commission has 3 sets of responsibilities: Promotional,
Investigative; and Advisory.
The ambitious scope of rights mentioned in the charter makes it
difficult for the enforcement bodies because it requires significant
resources. The Commission in its first five years undertook no country
studies. One of the most serious problems is that human rights NGOs have
yet to take root in Africa. The commission received 100 petitions but had
not taken any steps. Some states failed to submit their reports and those
which have submitted did not meet required standards. The commission
has no function other than to attempt to settle, or, failing that, to pass the
matter on to the assembly. The Assembly may assign the case to
commission for reporting. The African system has no court. The
executions were condemned world wide, political influence on the
commission did not condemn the executions of nine leaders of the Ogoni.
II. ASIAN NGOs STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ANY
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT
This statement has been supported by 240 participants representing
110 NGOs who attended the historic event in Bangkok, of the Asia Pacific
NGO conference on human rights. (March 25-28, 1993). These
participants have addressed the question of the development of human
rights instruments and mechanisms in this region, and realize that this is
the only region which has not been able to achieve regional human rights
machinery for the protection and promotion of human rights. The
participants have reached the following consensus.
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A. NGO Perspective
Universal human rights standards are rooted in many cultures and
afford protection to all of humanity. The international, regional, and
national orders should complement one another. The specificity of each
context shall serve as constructive element to strengthen universal human
rights standards and mechanisms designed to achieve global respect for
human rights. Human rights are indivisible and interdependent. The
protection of human rights concerns both individuals and collectives.
Cultural practices which derogate from universal human rights and
women's rights, in particular, shall not be tolerated. Resources must be
used to promote human development, not militarization. Women's rights,
that are human rights, must be addressed in both public and private spheres
of life. All people have the right to self-determination. Promotion of
human rights and democracy requires both human rights education and
training of various sectors of society.
The effective promotion and protection of human rights in Asia
and Pacific regions requires governments in the region to ratify and
implement without delay the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, CEDAW & Torture Convention. In this regard, the Asia Pacific
NGOs recommend the following points about human rights charter and
implementation mechanism:
1) The charter should not permit any limitations or
derogations of rights from existing international human rights
norms and standards, for example on the grounds of national
security, law and order, state of emergency, or the equivalent. We
reiterate that states are bound to respect human rights in all
situations.
2) The charter must respect the principles of universality,
indivisibility, and non selectivity of human rights. In addition, it
must reflect the new sets of rights, for example, women's rights as
human rights, rights of children and the indigenous people, the
rights to develop as a human right, and the rights of refugees.
3) The Asian system of government, culture, and traditions
should not be used as a pretext for the continuation of authoritarian
regimes and the violation of human rights.
4) A Commission on human rights must have jurisdiction to
conduct fact finding missions, and undertake country, thematic and
other studies; to examine the reports of state parties under various
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treaty bodies; and to receive complaints by member states, NGOs,
victims, and other individuals against violations of human rights.
5) The Commission should be composed of independent
experts appointed in consultation with NGOs; its meetings and
reports should be accessible to the public, including NGOs; and
petitions or appeals under consideration should not preclude action
on the same issue by other United Nations human rights bodies.
6) There should be a separate Court on human rights with the
power to adjudicate complaints, and make binding judgments,
including compensation; and the court should have the power to
enforce its decisions through appropriate measures.
7) State parties must provide for adequate budgets and
personnel to carry out these budgets.
8) States of the Asia-Pacific region must establish adequate
national human rights institutions to enforce the existing
international human rights instruments and standards, including
regional human rights instruments upon their implementation.
I. ASIAN NGO ACTIVITES TO PROMOTE A REGIONAL
ARRANGEMENT
A. Drafting of a Declaration and Charter
The Declaration seeks to show the relevance of human rights to the
Asian and Pacific societies. Declaration and Charter are also meant as a
vehicle for human rights education to develop solidarity action. Thus, they
often tend to be reactive and drawn empirically from patterns of existing
human rights abuses and denials. The relevant articles of the Declaration
of The Basic Duties of Asian Peoples And Governments are herein under
summarized. It is clear from the title that the article only discusses the
duties of both, people and governments, unlike Western documents, which
would discuss the rights as well. In order to talk about the rights, it is not
wrong that they should be guaranteed by corresponding duties
[Vol. 4:603
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IV. NGO STRATEGIES IN RAISING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AND
AGENDA IN THE MEETING OF EXISTING SUB-REGIONAL BODIES
A. Subregional Approach
An effective regional arrangement is only possible where there is
an excellent understanding between the Governments as to the development
of a subregional machinery.
It is pertinent to mention that several of the human rights problems
in the region are of cross national boundary nature. Interestingly, there is
already a sub-regional co-operation on such problems, e.g. drug
trafficking, terrorism. As pointed out by Dr. Clarence Dias in his paper
that in areas where both redress and prevention of human rights violations
require trans-border co-operation, there is every incentive for human rights
co-operation on a Bilateral, sub-regional or regional basis as appropriate.
Four examples drawn from the South Asian Association for regional
Cooperation (SAARC) may help to illustrate this approach:
1) Trafficking in women.
2) Migrant workers.
3) Refugees.
4) Indigenous peoples.
In each of the above examples, the problems are of a transborder
nature and addressing them requires transborder cooperation.
Unfortunately these are not perceived as human rights problems and
therefore the only solution because addressing international human rights
standards are not considered an effective solution. The governments can
carefully examine the international human rights norms and standards and
select regional approaches which adopt the relevant norms and incorporate
them into a regional cooperation agreement. This would enable the
governments to apply the norm through their regional agreement without
having to ratify the related international instrument. This experience in
working with the norms could help the states to decide whether to ratify
the related human rights instrument and would give a state the incentive to
ratify. The experience of working together and regional cooperation could
help for an effective and broader human rights cooperation, also meant as a
vehicle for human rights education and to develop solidarity action. Thus,
they often tend to be reactive and drawn empirically from patterns of
existing human rights abuses and denials.
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V. CREATING AND SUPPORTING NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTITUTIONS
A strong regional program necessitates strong national human
rights institutions as well. Thus programs to strengthen national
institutions (e.g the judiciary, law enforcement officers, parliaments) could
be designed from perspectives of regional comparability and undertaken
concurrently, especially within a sub-region. This could lay a very sound
foundation for future regional co-operation.
National human rights institutions, as the international community
has defined, form a very particular species of organization. As pointed out
by Brian Burdekin in his paper for Kathmandu, national commissions can:
1) Firstly, encourage the creation of and work with similar
bodies at the state and provincial levels;
2) Secondly, they can do this consistent with the standards
prescribed in the international treaties, while accommodating
constitutional peculiarities and the extraordinarily different
challenges posed by local conditions and cultures, thus respecting
ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity;
3) Thirdly, they can do this in a more informed and sensitive
manner than any regional or international body;
4) Fourthly, they can do this without compromising a
vigorous defense;
5) Fifthly, national commissions can contribute to and
monitor the integrity of governmental reports to international
bodies; and
6) Lastly, they can provide constructive and well informed
criticism.
National commissions have now been established in the Philippines, India,
Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. These institutions are domestic
institutions, responding to the national realities of the countries they serve.
Their focus on alternative dispute resolution, mediation, and conciliation,
makes them particularly appropriate to the range of cultural traditions. In
some Asian countries, the national commissions are playing a central role
in training the military, for example, in the Philippines and India.
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VI. GOVERNMENT OBSTACLES AND NGOs' RESPONSES IN
OVERCOMING THE DEAD LOCK
A. Government Obstacles
Governments face many obstacles, including:
1) In consistency of the national laws with
International human rights law.
2) Ratification and incorporation in their constitutions
of covenants and conventions.
3) Governmental law breaking.
4) So called Asian values which are emphasized on
duties rather than rights.
B. NGO Responses to the Deadlock
NGOs provide several responses to the deadlock, such as:
1) We call upon the governments to pledge that they will
ensure that their national legal orders enshrine the basic
international human rights principles contained in the United
Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
2) Sign and ratify all the existing international human rights
covenants and conventions without reservations or derogatory
clauses which have the effect of nullifying the very act of signature
and ratification; call upon the governments to adopt in their
constitutions the principle that such covenants shall be deemed to
be automatically incorporated into domestic law by the very act.
3) Human rights in this region have also formed the basis of
struggles against authoritarian regimes and military rule. Mass
movements (e.g, for gender justice, for environmental protection)
have gained strength and sustenance from human rights. Such
movements have in turn empowered the peoples of this region to
not tolerate any attempts at turning the clock back on human
rights.
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4) Universality: So far as this region is concerned, we stress
that human rights is not a western concept but have been invoked
by the peoples in this region both historically and
contemporaneously.
5) Indivisibility: Both civil & political as well as economic,
social, and cultural rights have validity. In this region there has
been a woeful and willful neglect on the part of the governments to
recognize and implement each sets of rights. The governments of
this region are called upon to remedy their continuing neglect in
implementing and realizing both economic, social, cultural, civil
and political rights.
6) Individual and collective rights: Recognize the importance
and the role of both individual and collective rights. There is,
however, no hierarchy and no superiority between the two sets of
rights. There is nothing which stops governments from redressing
such imbalance at the national levels. If they have failed to do so
at the national level their criticism of imbalance at the international
level lacks credibility.
In the end it is important to state as provided in the task force
document (Bangkok, March 28, 1993) that human rights are already
universal for the people of Asia. It is they who press for more effective
human rights mechanisms even while their governments demur and desist.
So far as human rights are concerned, the people of South Asia are running
- their governments are crawling.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While there exists a solid body of principles and a wide-ranging
and growing number of institutions currently working to promote and
protect human rights in Asia, there have unfortunately been few
consolidated regional efforts for legal enforcement against violations. An
Asian Human Rights Commission is the most logical and sought after body
for this purpose. Despite its obvious benefits, the Commission will
invariably face challenges because of complexities surrounding the Asian
states regarding free press, democratic opposition, independence of
judiciary, and commitment to the rule of law. In my paper, I will point
out some of the challenges a possible Asian Human Rights Commission
will face in Asia. Due to the limitation of the paper, recommendations and
their feasibility will not be explored.
II. UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Asian Human Rights Commission will face the challenge of
comparing the national legislation with the international human rights law
because the laws of many Asian countries are not in conformity with the
fundamental principles of human rights. To understand this complex
situation, the Asian government's position needs to be explained.
Asia's Human Rights Annual Report points out that both the East
and the West are locked in a bitter conflict. The West's criticisms of Asian
state records on human rights and democracy are met by Asia's responsive
denial of the universality and inalienability of human rights. The West
* The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
regards human rights as essential to good and fair government and the
social and economic development of countries. Asian countries disagree
with this Western concept and offer an alternative viewpoint. They regard
human rights, when based on the theory of individualism, as inappropriate
for a number of reasons:
1) They are inconsistent with the Asian values, which place a
high priority on the community;
2) The principal need in Asia is economic development
contrary to the importance the West places on civil and political
rights;
3) Social and economic rights are more important for the
Asians and will receive higher priority; and
4) The West's attempts to impose human rights standards on
Asia is motivated by its desire to establish hegemony over the rest of the
world.
Now, what is described above is mainly the government's position
and does not necessarily embrace citizen views. The political systems in
most of the countries are not representing the people, do not respond to
them, and are not accountable. In the West, human rights serve the
function of fine tuning the system of government and administration,
whereas in Asia, they have a huge transformative potential and can topple
dictatorial regimes.
In most parts of Asia, communities are not consensual entities
which operate under concepts of justice and fairness. A wide range of
groups suffer under it, for example, indigenous people, women, minority
religious groups, ethnic minorities, etc. Governments often justify the
absence of open resistance as evidence of compliance, which is not at all
true. However, since there is no outlet for voicing public dissatisfaction,
local human rights groups are often branded not only anti-government but
also as against people's interest, as the architect of modern Singapore, Lee
Kuan Yew, calls them. Thus, the Commission's connection with local
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) will not be seen favorably by the
governments, which will make it difficult to receive funding from them.
III. DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS
The Asian Human Rights Commission will face difficulties when it
comes to monitoring the human rights violations of countries. The
countries in many cases may not allow the Commission or human rights
NGOs to monitor the human rights situation. For example, Bhutan is very
selective in issuing visas to human rights observers and journalists, and the
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lack of democracy within the country has helped the country get away with
abuses. Most visitors to Bhutan are those who buy expensive guided tours.
Foreign journalists are carefully screened, and the domestic media is state
controlled. According to a new report, about 105,000 Bhutanese of Nepali
origin, about one-sixth of the country's population, fled the country
between 1992 and 1995. International human rights groups observe forced
evictions, but the Kingdom's reclusive nature has made it difficult to
independently verify these claims. This is only one example. There are
numerous other examples where international human rights groups were
not allowed to monitor human rights situations. Even if the countries
allow them to enter, the work may be extremely dangerous, or the people
may not be able to speak freely with them.
Accountability of states is the other challenge for the Commission.
For example, from 1975 until May 1993, when United Nations supervised
elections were held, a single political party controlled most of Cambodian
society, and exercised direct influence on every aspect of life. Though the
political system was theoretically changed by the introduction of a new
constitution in September 1993, there has been great reluctance to introduce
any institutions that work on the basis of laws rather than as a consequence
of personal instructions. When there is no legal procedure to hold anyone
accountable, the Commission will be unable to do anything significant
about the human rights abuses.
In 1993, delegates representing forty-nine nations from Syria to
Japan met at the start of an unprecedented United Nations sponsored
conference to try and fix the Asian agenda for the World Conference on
Human Rights. During that time a significant number of state reports were
overdue. Government answers in many areas such as arbitrary executions,
disappearances, torture, arbitrary detention, sale of children, and religious
intolerance were too often unsatisfactory, and the lists of unresolved issues
were fairly long.
This example leads to slow moving bureaucratic machinery, which
is a major obstacle to the effective promotion and protection of human
rights in Asia. Asian bureaucrats often hold privileged positions and are
allowed to act arbitrarily in many areas, including those of economic rights.
For example, they can withhold public housing or dislocate people from
one geographic area to another without explanation.
With the concept of human rights perhaps not as broadly
understood in Asia as in the West, the Human Rights Commission should
focus on human rights education, whether it be in the schools of Hong
Kong or through street theater in Bangladesh. For example, Amnesty
International is trying to adapt its policies and activities to local conditions
by focusing on human rights education. The Commission may consider
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promoting human rights education by designing programs for universities,
schools, and professionals. The draft Asian Human Rights Charter
mentions:
there is a wide tendency in most parts of Asia to
discourage human rights education. Self-consciousness of
the peoples of their human rights is regarded all too often
as too dangerous a human phenomenon. Extreme forms of
violence including mass massacres had been used to negate
the effect of peoples' growing consciousness of rights.'
The Tiananmen incident of 1989 is only one example.
It will be difficult to use the media as a means to provide human
rights education. China, Malaysia, and Singapore have banned individual
ownership of satellite dishes to prevent direct reception of Western
programming, which they view as an assault on Asian values. The
Singapore government has restricted the circulation of Western newspapers
and magazines, such as Time and The Economist because officials dislike
their coverage of Singapore affairs. The Asian approach towards free press
is based on the premise that there can be no such thing as unbridled
freedom. Freedom stops where responsibility begins, it is often said. How
that responsibility is exercised is left to the individual or the media. But the
government, as the paternal authority, sets down the markers on the room
for maneuvering.
Lack of resources will be one major problem related to human
rights education. The local human rights NGOs, which must work as
vehicles to promote human rights, have funding problems. All of the
existing human rights groups operate on shoestring budgets, about $2
million a year for Asia Monitor, $800,000 for the Hong Kong based Asian
Human Rights Commission (AHRC) and only $320,000 for Asian Students
Association (ASA) which is largely a volunteer organization. Though they
are Asian run, these groups rely on funding from Western sources, such as
overseas development aid and contributions from church groups. Because
of the poor welfare structures as compared to the West, there is intense
competition with the hospitals, children's groups, and other groups for
funds. The Commission itself will face a financial crisis if the Asian
governments do not come forward to support it.
With this problem of fundraising is another related issue, which is
prioritizing the issues. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International
1. Asian Human Rights Commission, Our Common Humanity The Draft Asian Human
Rights Charter (visited Oct. 15, 1997) <http://www.hk.supre.net/-ahrchk/ahr-draftpart2
.htm >.
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lobby on behalf of political prisoners as a priority for Asian Human Rights
organizations. But in addition, with the rapid industrialization of Asia,
issues of an economic nature on behalf of a growing working class are also
very important. Many of the workers face appalling conditions, including
seven-day work weeks and horrendous safety conditions. These only get
attention when disaster strikes, such as the fatal factory fires in Thailand,
China, and Bangladesh in past years. As the AHRC Executive Director
Basil Fernando mentions, "if someone goes to prison, they [Western
groups] raise it. But if a particular dam is built and many people suffer,
they don't raise it. That is not to say that what they are doing is wrong, but
it's limited." 2 However, this is yet another issue on which Asia and the
West seem likely to collide. The United States and France have suggested
that a worldwide minimum wage be adopted by the World Trade
Organization to stop the exploitation of workers in poor countries.
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad said, "[t]he West's
professed concern about the worker's welfare is motivated by self-interest
because low wages are the developing world's only competitive advantage
against the industrialized West." 3
IV. REPORTING AND COMPLAINT PROCEDURES
The decisions of both the European Commission of Human Rights
and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights are not legally
binding. The Commissions first try to seek a friendly settlement between
the parties and second, make a judgement on the facts. The European
Commission is stricter than the Inter-American Commission about the
requirements of individual petitions. For example, it requires that the State
has accepted the right of individual parties, the domestic remedies of the
State have been exhausted, and the petition is sent on the proper application
form. If the Asian Human Rights Commission is to follow these
procedures, it may run the risk of ignoring a huge group of people. First,
many Asian states do not accept the rights of individual parties. Singapore,
China, and Indonesia are examples. Second, the domestic remedies may be
more difficult for individual parties to obtain due to corruption, unjust and
unequal legal systems, untrustworthiness, or insecurity. Third, it is going
to be very difficult to make the proper application form available to
individuals and to local NGOs if it can even be obtained from the
Commission office. Not having a common language is another problem.
2. John Kohut, Asian Equations for Human Rights, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Feb.
17, 1995, at 19.
3. Charles P. Wallace, Malaysian Censors Move to Ban 'ist,' L.A. TIMES, May 24,
1994, at 1.
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If the application is in English it will reach only a small group of people.
On the other hand, if it is written or even translated in one of the local
languages in a given country, the Commission's work may be delayed due
to the unavailability of translators.
The Inter-American Human Rights Commission requires that the
petition include a cover letter, summary of the facts, and the evidence
relied on in the form of Annexes. This procedure may be easier for the
Asian Human Rights Commission to follow. However, again there are the
problems of translation, preparing the required documents or having any
concrete evidence. The Commission will need to seriously consider how
much flexibility will be allowed concerning the petitions.
In some countries difficult conditions exist in making such
complaints. Such restrictions are limitations imposed on the practice of
popular and participatory democracy. In some countries, the information
relating to violations of rights, provided by or on behalf of the victims, is
passed on to the perpetrators of such violations, who in return resort to
further repressive measures, including assassinations in revenge.4
Decades of betrayal, corruption and insecurity have made Asians
suspicious. The Commission will face the challenge to prove itself
trustworthy, and working promptly on cases will help it to prove its
effectiveness.
V. CONCLUSION
The Commission should try to promote the idea that basic civil and
political liberties are essential, not only for the sake of individual freedom,
but also for the sake of social, political, and economic stability. Both the
advocates of individual human rights and business groups need to be
approached to support this. Asian people want just as much respect for
individual rights as the people of any other region. "Any claim for cultural
exceptionalism to exclude human rights is false, non-authentic, and is a
pretext to justify latent or blatant forms of repression and to legitimize the
action which violates the rights of all for the benefit of some individuals."'
Concerning the enforcement of human rights, effective
mechanisms to bring human rights violations to light and to protect
individuals are needed. Populations must be educated and mobilized to
create change through alternative thinking from within the culture. In
addition, the Commission may engage itself in identifying human rights
standards consistent with the Asian cultural conceptions.
4. Asian Human Rights Commission, supra note 1.
5. Kohut, supra note 2.
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The Human Rights Commission can work actively by enhancing
cooperative interaction among governments, NGOs, and international
organizations. In these cooperative arrangements, the Commission would
not only be responsible for monitoring and documenting violations, but also
for helping the government correct their actions. Cooperation by the
Commission with governments involves tension in maintaining a position
that can be perceived as political, motivated by no other interest but
commitment to human rights, advocating specific policies and measures to
advance human rights and human rights traditional protections.
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The question of whether diplomats should be fully immune from
criminal prosecution, no matter what the alleged crime, is one that is
neither new nor free from dispute. As a matter of international law and
United States domestic law, the source of the immunity and the extent to
which it extends is quite clear.' But with each new offense or tragedy, far
and apart as they may be, the public debate over diplomatic immunity rears
its ugly head once again.
* J.D., Albany Law School; B.A., University of Rochester. Mark Zaid is a Washington,
D.C. practitioner, who specializes in matters of international criminal law, public international law,
national security issues, and litigation under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts. He serves
as a Managing-Director of the Public International Law and Policy Group. The views expressed by
Mr. Zaid are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization or entity with
which he is or has been affiliated.
I. The notion of diplomatic immunity is ages old and relates back to the time when the
King could do no wrong, and theKing's messenger served as an extension of the King and his
authority. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. 7502,
500 U.N.T.S. 95 (recalling that peoples of all nations from ancient times have recognized the status
of diplomatic agents) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention was adopted in
1961 with the belief that an international convention in diplomatic intercourse, privileges, and
immunities would contribute to the development of friendly relations among nations, irrespective
of their differing constitutional and social systems. Id. Article 29 states that "[tihe person of a
diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention."Id.
Limited exceptions, however, do exist that effectively waive diplomatic immunity.Jd. art. 31. In
1790, the United States enacted legislation that provided diplomats with full immunity. These laws
remained in effect until repealed almost 200 years later in 1978, when the Diplomatic Relations
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 254 (1978) [hereinafter DRA], was passed to implement the Vienna Convention.
Although the DRA adopts the provisions of the Vienna Convention, the President retains the
authority to extend more or less favorable treatment when appropriate. Id. § 254c.
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This much is true: diplomatic immunity is a necessary evil, though
evil it truly rarely is. However, despite that concession, there are
improvements that can be implemented that would serve to possibly
prevent future offenses or tragedies from occurring. At the very least, the
public perception of diplomatic immunity may become more positive.
This article will briefly address four topics:
1) the American public's attitudes towards diplomatic immunity;
2) the use/abuse of diplomatic immunity within the United
States;
3) policy changes that have occurred as a result of specific
tragedies; and
4) suggestions to prevent future abuses or tragedies by diplomats
within the United States.
I. AMERICAN PUBLIC'S ATTITUDE
If the perception of diplomatic immunity in the United States had to be
summarized by one word, that word would likely be misunderstood. Most
instances where the topic of diplomatic immunity arises come from a
context unflattering to the diplomatic community: parking violation
abuses, apparent escape from criminal offenses, or drunk driving, to name
just a few examples.2
As a result of the January 1997 tragic death of a teenage girl, a victim
of a car accident caused by a drunk Georgian diplomat in Washington,
D.C. , and the simultaneously public dispute between officials of the City
2. This perception is not helped by Hollywood's portrayal of diplomats such as in the 1989
film Lethal Weapon 2 starring Mel Gibson and Danny Glover. In this film a South African
diplomat openly hides behind the shield of diplomatic immunity while committing various criminal
offenses, including drug smuggling and murder. Obviously, the overwhelming majority of
diplomats, usually the best, brightest, and most educated a country has to offer, are law abiding
guests residing in the United States.
3. See infra notes 21-24 and corresponding text for discussion: subsequent to delivering
these remarks, the author was retained by the family of Joviane Waltrick to initiate a civil action
against the Republic of Georgia, Gueorgui Makharadze and other responsible parties. An action
was filed in the United States Federal District Court for the District of Columbia on december 31,
1997. John A. Knab, as representative of the Estate of Joviane Waltrick v. Republic of Georgia
Case No. 1:97CV03118 (D.D.C. Dec. 31, 1997). See Bill Miller, Crash Victim's Mother Seeks
Damages from Georgian Diplomat, Others, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1998, at D4; Gerald Mizejewski
& Walden Siew, Accident Victim's Mom Sues Jailed Diplomat, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1998, at Al.
Both diplomatic immunity and sovereign immunity will be issues litigated in the proceedings.
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of New York and various diplomatic missions over parking violations,4 the
American public was consumed with the debate over diplomatic immunity.
The opinion polls, while reflecting the dissatisfaction with the results of
specific events, demonstrated an ignorance of the greater good obtained
through the use, of diplomatic immunity worldwide and a recognition that
some changes are necessary.
During a survey period of January 28, 1997 to February 4, 1997,
Americans were asked whether diplomatic immunity should supersede the
laws of United States, federal, state, and local government? Of the
respondents, five percent answered yes, fifty-three percent said no and
forty-two percent were mixed.' Sample responses included the following
retorts:
Yes, diplomatic immunity should be a matter of
international law. I suspect that such immunity protects
American diplomats abroad as much as it might allow
certain diplomats to commit crimes here. Moreover, even
it [sic] immunity should not override United States laws. I
do not think it is a matter that can be left up to individual
municipalities.
RC of Brooklyn, NY on 1/28/976
I believe for the protection of our diplomats we should
keep diplomatic immunity, but if a local law is violated
they should be immediately deported to their country.
JR of Union City, TN on 1/29/977
Diplomatic immunity shouldn't mean squat when it
concerns the US laws.
EP of Cuyahoga Falls, OH on 1/29/978
Yes. But in all categories except Murder, Manslaughter,
Child Molesting and Rape! If any diplomat in any country
did any of the offenses in the categories listed above, they
should be deem [sic] a criminal and dealt with accordingly.
RP of New York, NY on 1/30/979
4. See infra notes 23-27 and corresponding text for discussion.
5. The Official New York City Website (visited Oct. 25, 1997) <http://www.-
ci.nyc.ny.us/html/misc/htmi/qdipimm.html>.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
Zaid 625
626 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
This is a question that must be addressed between the
countries involves. Although it seems good on the face of
it would we want another countries [sic] strange laws to
affect our countries [sic] visitors there?
LF of Jamaica, NY on 2/2/9710
Diplomatic immunity should only be extended to
Ambassadors, Consul General. Only the top three
echelons of a diplomatic missions [sic] have any need for
immunity. All other employees are simply civil service
types and should not be entitled to immunity.
JM of New York, NY on 2/3/9711
Misconceptions over the notion of diplomatic immunity do not stop
with the average American on the street, but dangerously extend to local
law enforcement personnel. One commentator reported that:
State Department training sessions for local law
enforcement personnel begin by breaking down the
misconceptions and stereotypes about dealing with persons
who have diplomatic immunity. On a written test given
before the training, one question proposed:
Q. The U.S. Department of State (circle one)
A. Works with law enforcement and the court system to
protect U.S. interests.
B. Fix traffic and parking tickets for diplomats.,,
It was the objective of the State Department that anyone who initially
chose B would change his answer to A by the end of the training course.
II. USE/ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
One thing must be made clear. Diplomatic immunity protects
Americans more than it may cause harm to Americans. The fact is that the
United States has one of, if not the, highest number of diplomats stationed
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See supra note 5.
12. Id.
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around the world. Several countries, particularly during the Cold War,
would not hesitate to arrange for an accident or crime to occur in order to
harass western diplomatic personnel. This was particularly so when the
diplomat was suspected to be a covert intelligence officer. Charging the
diplomat with a crime served as a convenient manner in which to force a
diplomat to leave the country. Given that many foreign legal systems fall
far short of our notion of providing adequate due process, it is far
preferable to know that members of our foreign service, or intelligence
agencies, will not be subject to fraudulent prosecution or interrogations."
In exchange for protecting our personnel, foreign diplomats are
necessarily afforded the same courtesy. But is it a fair exchange? The
answer is yes when one considers the statistics. There are over 18,000
individuals in the United States area who hold some form of diplomatic
immunity." Rarely do any of these individuals commit a crime. For
example, from March 1986 to February 1988, out of 80,000 serious
crimes reported in the District of Columbia, only five were committed by
diplomats."
The State Department has attempted to aggressively react to diplomatic
incidents, particularly those involving alcohol offenses. Between 1993 and
1996, the licenses of thirty-seven diplomats were suspended.' 6 Local law
enforcement is supposed to report offenses to the State Department.
Unfortunately, this does not always occur. 7
13. In 1992, Uganda's ambassador to Washington, Stephen Kapimpina Katenta-Apuli, was
implicated in an arms-purchasing and smuggling scheme to buy 400 anti-tank missiles. He was
detained in Florida after a sting operation by customs agents, but not indicted because of his
immunity . .. . mhe State Department asked Uganda to life his immunity, but the envoy was
recalled home. Espionage cases tend to be different, even when suspected foreign spies do not
have official immunity. In general, officials said, foreign spies are simply expelled, to insure that
American spies, when caught, are treated equally. Steven Erlanger, US. Will Ask Former Soviet
Republic to Lift Diplomat's Immunity, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 6, 1997, A 15.
14. George Gedda, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 10, 1997.
15. According to State Department officials, serious cases involving diplomats are
relatively rare ... with about 10 to 15 cases a year that are nearly all questions of shoplifting or
drunken driving, and usually involve the dependents of diplomats. In about half of those cases,
immunity is waived and fines are paid. Steven Erlanger, Officials Defend Diplomatic Immunity;
New York Case Is Politically ChargedNEw YORK TImES, Jan. 7, 1997, at B3. Seventeen felonies
were committed by foreign diplomats in the United States in 1995, and 19 were committed the
previous year, according to the State Department. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 7, 1997.
16. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 13, 1997. Additionally, eight diplomats were expelled from
the United States in 1996 for repeated drunk driving. Ruben CastanedaDiplomat Got 3 Tickets
Before Fatal Crash, WASH. POST Jan. 19, 1997.
17. Following the accident it was discovered that Makharadze had previously been stopped
for traffic violations, including drunk driving and speeding, in Virginia and Washington, D.C., but
local law enforcement officials never notified the U.S. Department of State. Had they done so, it is
very likely that Makharadze would have lost his driving privileges and the accident might not have
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On January 3, 1997, in Washington, D.C., a car driven by Gueorgui
Makharadze, the second highest ranking diplomat for the Republic of
Georgia in the United States, was involved in a tragic automobile accident
that resulted in the death of sixteen-year-old Joviane Waltrick, a Brazilian
national residing in Maryland. Makharadze, who was said to have been
driving at eighty miles per hour, was intoxicated at the time.'8 However,
due to his diplomatic status, Makharadze was not given a breathalyzer or
blood test. The incident caused a public uproar, particularly when it
appeared Makharadze would be recalled back to Georgia and would escape
prosecution." As a moral gesture, but in part due to intense public
pressure, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze agreed to voluntarily
waive Makhardze's immunity.2° Makharadze subsequently pled guilty. 21
Most likely the biggest abuse of local laws by diplomats, and certainly
one that has caused much consternation among the American public, has
involved parking violations. This year witnessed an extraordinary dispute
between the diplomatic community and the City of New York, with harsh
words exchanged on both sides.Y Again, however, this is not a new
problem. In fact, former New York City Mayor John Lindsay
implemented an innovative and effective solution to the problems caused
by illegal diplomatic parking during his administration in the 1960s.
Although diplomatic immunity protected the representatives of foreign
governments from having to pay their tickets or the impounding of their
vehicles, police could tow an illegally parked diplomat's car to another
legal parking place, however. So New York police hooked up diplomats'
cars and hauled them to an undesirable part of New York. It took about
two weeks for illegal parking by diplomats to decline in mid-town
occurred. Id. The Washington Post determined that the system in place to report infractions was
not very systematic. A survey of local police officials found that they do notify the State
Department about serious violations, but how they defineserious varies. Many police officers
won't even write up a traffic infraction such as running a red light, if it doesn't cause an accident,
because they figure with a diplomat there's no point. EditorialDiplomats and Immunity, WASH.
POST, Jan. 19, 1997, at A.
18. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 4, 1997; Bill Miller, Diplomat Pleads Guilty, WASH. POST,
Oct. 19, 1997, at Al.
19. Ruben Castaneda & Karl Vicks, Diplomat Unlikely to be Prosecuted in Crash,
Officials Say, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1997, at B1.
20. Donna Abu-Nasr, Associated Press (visited October 25, 1997)
< http:llubockonline.com/news/021697/georgian.htm >.
21. Vicks, supra note 19. Makharadze was subsequently sentenced to 7-21 years on Dec.
19, 1997.
22. See David Stout, Diplomats' Tussle with Police Becomes an International Issue,NEW
YORK TIMES Jan. 1, 1997; John M. Goshko, In New York, Another Undiplomatic Dispute,
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 7, 1997, at B7.
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Manhattan." City officials today have sought to implement a less obtrusive
remedy.2'
III. SERIOUS DIPLOMATIC ABUSES INVARIABLY LEAD TO POLICY
CHANGES
In 1974, a respected Washington, D.C. physician was left a
quadriplegic after being involved in an automobile accident with a
diplomat.2 The D.C. police declared the attache was responsible for the
crash but immune from prosecution because of his diplomatic status.
Public outrage about this case led Congress to change diplomatic immunity
laws to require diplomats to carry automobile insurance. Diplomats are
now required to maintain at least $400,000 in liability insurance, a sum
greater than most Americans are required to maintain)6
The answer to resolving diplomatic incidences, however, is not to
overreact. Sadly, this is too often the case. Responses to diplomatic
abuses must be rational, and implementation should be consistent. The
development of international law from which diplomatic immunity extends
finds much of its roots in the notion of reciprocity.2 Thus, the action of
Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) to threaten to revoke foreign aid payments to
the Republic of Georgia if it did not waive Makharadze's immunity is ill-
advised, despite the fact that the United States, due to its international
status, finds itself in a position to make such demands. 2 The Republic of
23. Henrik Liljegren, the Swedish Ambassador to the United States, "remembered a case in
Stockholm when a drunken diplomat refused to leave his car after the police asked him to do so, so
they could drive him home. Instead, they towed him home in his car." NEW YORK TIMES, supra
note 15.
24. New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani hoped to implement a plan used with success in
Washington, D.C., where "diplomats with tickets that have gone unpaid for more than a year are
denied registration for their diplomatic license plates, preventing them from driving until they pay
up." Randy Kennedy, Giuliani Asks US. Help On Deadbeat Diplomats,NEW YORK TIMES Jan. 9,
1997, at B3.
25. Vicks, supra note 19.
26. Id. See also 22 U.S.C. Section 254 (e) ("Liability Insurance For Members Of Mission");
Castaneda & Vicks, supra note 19 ("As a result of previous car accidents involving immunity,
diplomats are required to carry insurance coverage of at least $400,000, and State Department
officials said yesterday that that is usually the extent of reparations available to victims.").
27. Reciprocity, of course, works both ways. Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze set a
commendable example by waiving the diplomatic immunity of Makharadze. However the hard-line
approach taken by New York City officials resulted in Russian traffic police launching a
crackdown on foreigners driving in Moscow. They issued more than 200 citations, the majority to
Americans. Lynn Berry, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 7, 1997. Whether President Shevardnadze's
example will be followed is yet to be seen.
28. REUTERS, Jan. 8, 1997; see also Abu-Nasr, WASHINGTON POST, supra note 20 (stating
that Senator Gregg urged President Clinton to withhold $30 million in aid to the Republic of
Georgia until it waives immunity).
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Georgia's decision to ultimately waive Makharadze's immunity should be
applauded, and, hopefully, a worthwhile example has been set.29 One
wonders, however, whether it is an example the United States will follow,
as it has not in the past.
As a result of the furor raised in the wake of the Makharadze incident,
it was discovered that in "a similar case in Moscow in 1993, the United
States refused to waive diplomatic immunity when an American envoy
struck and killed a Russian pedestrian on a dark street after midnight...
"0 The Russians accused the American diplomat of driving while under
the influence of alcohol. "But the United States determined he had not
been drinking and decided it would be best to recall him home.. . . The
diplomat . . . left Moscow within thirty six hours of the accident. No
disciplinary action was taken against the man, who remains in the foreign
service. "I'
Indeed, United States officials could only recall one instance in recent
years where the United States agreed to waive a diplomat's immunity to
allow prosecution. However, in that case, which occurred in Bolivia in
1995, the United States itself was the aggrieved party. The accused
individual was a contractor working for the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency and allegedly embezzled funds from the United
States.2
IV. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY, WHILE A NECESSARY POLICY, CAN BE
MODIFIED To BETTER PROTECT THE HOST STATE COMMUNITY
While diplomatic immunity must and should be maintained, there are
several policy modifications that can be taken to ensure fewer violations of
domestic law occur. As Congressman David Dreier recently stated,
29. Examples of states waiving diplomatic immunity are far and few in between. In 1989,
Belgium waived immunity after a sergeant posted at its embassy in Washington was charged with
and later convicted of two murders in Florida. Steven Lee Myers,Georgia Diplomat Told To
Remain In US. For Inquiry, NEW YORK TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1997, at 1. Apparently, however, the
defendant was judged mentally ill, Erlanger,supra note 15, at B3, and the waiver was conditional
on the United States not seeking the death penalty. ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 15. More often
than not, immunity is not waived. For example, in 1981, the teen-aged son of a Ghanaian diplomat
was held on rape charges. After being declared persona non grata, he was expelled. A North
Korean diplomat, in 1982, was charged with sexual abuse and was allowed to leave the United
States after pleading guilty. However, he did not possess full immunity. Steven Erlanger,US.
Wants Immunity of Car-Crash Diplomat Lifted, NEW YORK TIMES Jan. 6, 1997, at AI5.
30. REUTERS, Jan. 7, 1997; Myers, supra note 29.
31. Id. Former American Ambassador to China and South Korea, James Lilley,
remembered a few cases in which accredited Americans or their dependents had injured or killed
local residents while driving a car. In general, he said, an indemnity is paid to the family, and the
driver is sent back to America before the host country expels the driver. Erlanger, supra note 15.
32. REUTERS, Jan. 8, 1997.
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"while the concept of diplomatic immunity remains an important
underpinning of peaceful diplomacy, it is time, with the exponential
growth of the diplomatic corps, that we reexamine the procedures and
policies implicit in the doctrine of diplomatic immunity." 3  Therefore,
several suggestions include:
1) Bilateral treaties should be implemented with countries
which maintain similar legal systems with that of the United States
to allow for prosecution of diplomats. For example, there is no
reason why an American diplomat accused of a crime in Canada or
the United Kingdom should not stand trial. The systems are
comparable to those to which we are accustomed and the concerns
for a fair trial and prosecution of due process is minimal. 34
2) Procedures should be established between countries to
allow for prosecution of diplomats if the country presents sufficient
evidence to the sending State demonstrating that probable cause
exists to prove the diplomat may very likely have committed a
punishable offense. Rather than the sending State recalling that
diplomat immediately upon being accused, the diplomat should
then stand trial. Similar to requirements in extradition treaties, the
offense should be one recognized by both countries as illegal.
Should the nature of the punishment be too foreign (such as the
removal of a hand from a convicted thief which is a practice in
some Muslim countries but one not recognized by western States),
arrangements could be made to have the diplomat serve an
appropriate punishment back in his home State.33
33. Dreier Statement on Reform of Diplomatic Immunity (last modified May 1, 1997)
<http://www.house.gov/dreier/dipimmst.htm> (on file with author) [hereinafter Dreier Statement].
34. Congressman David Dreier (RCA) introduced legislation that calls upon the "State
Department to seriously study the proposal that the United States lead an international effort to
encourage every civilized government to hold their own diplomats accountable for their actions
abroad by prosecuting them in their own courts." Id.
35. Another alternative is to provide criminal jurisdiction in the sending State for crimes
committed by its diplomats in a receiving state. The 1997 State Department and Foreign
Assistance Authorization Act included a provision that the Secretary of State should explore, in
appropriate fora, whether states should enter into agreements and adopt legislation:
1) to provide jurisdiction in the sending state to prosecute crimes
committed in the receiving state by persons entitled to immunity from
criminal jurisdiction under laws extending diplomatic privileges and
immunities; and
2) to provide that where there is probable cause to believe that an
individual who is entitled to immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving state under laws extending diplomatic privileges and
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3) The United States State Department, before accepting a
diplomat's credentials, should require the sending country to
provide criminal background histories of that diplomat, as well as
any knowledge of acholohism and explanations for why the
diplomat left prior postings. Additionally, those countries where a
diplomat had served prior to being sent to the United States should
be contacted to inquire as to whether any problems arose involving
the diplomat. In the aftermath of the Makharadze case, it was
revealed that Makharadze had a history of serious traffic violations
in his homeland, including at least three citations for drunken
driving.3' Had this been known to the State Department, prior to
Makharadze's credentials being accepted additional consideration
could have been given to whether Makharadze should be permitted
to enter the United States or, at least, question whether he should
be allowed to drive a vehicle.37
4) State legislatures should be urged to adopt legislation that
would mandate their local law enforcement agencies to notify the
United States Department of State when a diplomat is involved in
any type of offense, criminal or civil, in order to monitor
unacceptable behavior and, if necessary, implement punitive
measures.
V. CONCLUSION
The concept of diplomatic immunity traces its roots back to ancient
times, and it is a practice that should remain intact. However, it is not a
practice to be abused, and appropriate precautions can and should be taken
to ensure that diplomats abide by the laws and regulations of the host state.
While it unfortunately often takes a tragic event to bring about policy
changes in the realm of diplomatic immunity, a balance must be achieved
immunities committed a serious crimes, the sending state will waive
such immunity or the sending state will prosecute such individual.
H.R. 1486, § 1706 (b) (1997).
36. Martin Sieff & Walden Siew, Diplomat Drove Drunk In HomelandWASH. TIMEs, Jan.
14, 1997 at Al. The information ' was publicly revealed by Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze in a radio address. Id. Makharadze also been cited on several occasions for traffic
violations in the United States. Id.
37. According to State Department spokesman Nicholas Bums, "most diplomats, including
those from the Republic of Georgia, are only required to pass a vision test and show proof of a
valid license from their country to get a State Department-issued license here." Id.
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that not only protects diplomats from harassment but also those citizens
that accord visiting diplomats the hospitality of their nation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Jessup Competition has awakened perspectives about decision
making in the students of international law. It has served in the legal
education of countless students, and it has even served the promotion and
perhaps the development of international law itself., In pursuit of its
objectives, the Jessup has grown to command major worldwide attention
and substantial prestige due to its inclusion of contestants originating from
all parts of the globe. The inclusion of these worldwide contestants is
enough evidence to show that the Jessup Competition has caught the
* Adjunct Professor, National Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of
Foreign Service, Georgetown University; formerly Senior Attorney, International Law, Office of
General Counsel, Department of Defense. B.S. Yale; B.Ch.E. Cornell; J.D. Harvard Law School;
LL.M. and Ph.D., with distinction in international law, London School of Economics, London;
Member, New York Bar; Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States; Barrister at Law, of Gray's
Inn, London. I extend my appreciation and thanks to the student editors of this article, Lorenzo
Level and Orville McKenzie.
1. Legal education was afforded a major impetus in the writings of Myres McDougal and
his associates. See, e.g., Harold Lasswell & Myres McDougal, Legal Education and Public
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943) [hereinafter Legal
Education]; Florentino Feliciano, Book Review, in MYRES McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES
IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1024 n.8 (1960); MYRES McDOUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION
OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (New Haven Press 1994) (1967)
[hereinafter INTERPRETATION). See generally MYRES MCDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960) [hereinafter STUDIES].
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imagination of law schools throughout the world.2  With the aid of
television, video cassette recordings, and the publication of Jessup
materials, the competition could expand its reach even further.,
Even given these past accomplishments and the present
praiseworthy state of the Jessup, it is not inopportune to make a reappraisal
at this time to determine whether we can strengthen the Jessup. In making
this appraisal, we can draw upon the experience of other devices operating
in reasonably similar contexts or situations to aid us.'
One device available to us is the art of gaming. Specifically, war
gaming offers us great potentialities: it can be conceived primarily as a
means for assembling and collecting information, data and intelligence in
groupings suitable or relevant to a given inquiry; for identifying outcomes
or potential outcomes; for working with problems that have a need for
urgent action; for promoting data access or retrieval; and for building a
data bank or even tapping other data banks. War gaming makes us data
conscious as no other technique does.
Of course, there are differing perspectives about the conceptual
element in making war. We look to this exercise as an art, while the
Soviet Union in their war gaming were said to consider it a science with
applicable principles, but including the application of complex
technological advancements and features such as those evidenced by
nuclear weapons and the high technology jet aircraft.'
Similar to the differing perspectives of the United States and the
Soviet Union about the concept of war gaming itself, war gaming and moot
court participants differ in their approaches to their respective games. War
gaming participants are eager to refine the power element in their games
2. The leading article on this subject expressed in comprehensive sweep, and in detailed
terms, is Legal Education, supra note 1.
3. Numerous other applications for more effective and powerful uses of simulation are
now beginning to appear. The Internet, for example, holds the promise of a wider audience, and
wider participation in the Jessup, and the impact of an increased amount of scholarly assessment
of the competition itself. Much will depend upon introducing the Jessup itself onto the Internet.
4. Various devices have been formulated for simulation of the symbolic framework of
reference and the real world decisions and actions. See generally A. H. HAUSRATH, VENTURE
SIMULATION IN WAR, BUSINESS, AND POLITICS (McGraw-Hill 1962). Hausrath says that war
games differ in many ways, but he lists the salient similarities to be found. Id. at 82-97. These
strongly suggest analogies and similarities to those found in the moot court competitions:
Every war game simulates a military operation (irrespective of phase or manner of
gaming); each game involves to or more opposing forces; each war game is conducted
in accordance with data, rules, and procedures acceptable to the military profession;
every war game represents an actual or assumed real-life situation.
Id. at 82.
5. See THOMAS ALLEN WAR GAMES 59-62 (McGraw-Hill 1987).
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whereas those engaged in Jessup Moot Courts tend to keep the rules of the
moot court game intact and unchanged. The attitude of the moot court
participants runs parallel with the prominent attitude about our courts and
their proceedings, but it interferes with the development of refinements,
which have only recently and slowly come into view in the interest in
alternative dispute settlement procedures. Borrowing from this recent
refinement, if encouraged by the adoption of gaming, the Jessup might
consider the possibility of alternative settlement devices tested in a
simulation framework.
Another interesting possibility that may be encouraged by gaming
is the intrusion or intervention of law as an element in the decisions to be
made when states are interacting with eachother in a global, even if
competitive, arena. Introduction of law as an element in the decision
process amounts to an introduction of a theory or concept of public legal
order, ambiguous to a large extent in this period of largely unorganized
organs for a global community.6  It also introduces the legal processes
applicable under this legal order, and the outcomes expected in introducing
law into the decision process. This possibility can be explored, through
the application of law in gaming, i.e., in the war games, or other conflict-
oriented games.,
But instead of limiting the discussion to war games, this paper will
look at war gaming on a conceptual level to determine whether the Jessup
might benefit from the experience that has accumulated through the use of
war gaming. My primary objective is clarification of the Jessup as an
instrument involving policy problems. I intend to consider standards that
might be applied to add useful modifications to the Jessup. 8  I have
6. See generally 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1984). This volume is a recommended
collection of academic approaches to problems of international law, introducing the use of the
incident as a decisional unit in international law, both the theoretical and operational dimensions.
The chapter on the claims in Canada relating to accident of Cosmos 954 is useful for illustrating
this approach, and for providing a future Jessup problem. Id. at 78. For a scientific counterpart
to public order in the communities or states, i.e., the conception of nature and the physical world
in terms of a scientific order, see generally ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE
MODERN WORLD (Cambridge Univ. Press 1926).
7. See ALLEN, supra note 5.
8. The Jessup practice might be appraised at this time as well: would it be advisable, for
example, to limit the appearances of judges in a given competition, particularly if it is likely that
they will appear at various stages in the competition and find the same adversaries before them?
Or would it be desirable to permit a one or two time modification and refinement of the Jessup
memorials during the competition itself to incorporate the growing sophistication of the
contestants? (This presupposes the use of a word processor). Or what steps should be taken to
prepare the judges, or to make the scheduling of the Jessup closer to the real time needs of the
law schools? Should the Jessup memorials be published and more widely circulated by the
American Society of International Law, or the finals televised, and the television rights extended
19981 637
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refrained from assessing the housekeeping or even major repair efforts for
running the Jessup at this time. Consequently, this inquiry is limited to the
possible cross-fertilization of gaming and moot court procedures.
II. STRENGTHENING THE JESSUP COMPETITION
A. The Jessup As an Instrument for Learning and Promoting Policy
What are the objectives of the Jessup Competition? Foremost
among the Jessup's objectives is to facilitate the learning experience for the
contestants, and, to a comparable extent, for the judges, faculty advisors
and others who participate.' But what does this learning experience entail?
Moreover, what learning experiences can be added to the presents ones,
partly as an effort to promote policy?
1. Present Learning Experiences
The Jessup offers a valuable instrument for improving the general
lawyer skills of the contestants, coupled with improvements in the
analytical skills of the observers of the moot court cases.'0 The Jessup also
provides a forum of deliberation and discourse for probing current
problems in law, especially when presented in the context of a legal
dispute. As such it enables those who participate or analyze the Jessup
cases an opportunity to see the perspectives of numerous participants at
play upon such problems, paralleling one of the ways in which the student
is introduced to practice in the law schools. It extends a student's effort
beyond the review of cases and appellate review into a complex, real-world
simulation where the performance is judged by the effective invoking and
appraisal of law, and the innovative effort in making law serve us, rather
to the public broadcast stations? These more sophisticated developments might be considered if
we move the Jessup closer to an instrument for probing or refining the practices of the real world
of the International Court of Justice, or other international tribunals.
9. The leading article on this subject expressed in comprehensive sweep, and in detailed
terms, is Legal Education, supra note 1.
10. Cf. ALLEN, supra note 5. Definitions are not essential in the development of
wargaming. We are concerned with a dynamic medium, a simulation of decision making with
respect to actions to be taken, pursuant to standards and conditions, inferences and assumptions,
law and standards of reasonableness. The primary outcome desired is that of command and
control over information essential at all levels of human experience: information, data and
intelligence for inputs; data banks and data sources readily accessible for data availability and
evaluation; data relevance, economy of data preservation, analysis of impact on goals; data
access or retrievability, with regard to what is time urgent, action urgent, action impact.
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than having us serve the law and the rigidities we might arbitrarily impose
upon it.II
In essence, the Jessup is a collegial effort, where reinforcement
and testing of learning arises from the interaction of the participants. Our
experience so far shows that this interaction has been strongly motivated
among them. Because the problems presented by the Jessup are problems
of global significance, the problems add to that motivation the element of
exhilaration. At least a major refinement of the competition would be one
which facilitates greater and deeper participation. This refinement would
be sharpened if we could apply the Jessup as an instrument to refine our
critical faculties.
Because the development of international law is in part an outcome
of attitudes and perspectives, the Jessup offers opportunities for practicing
lawyers, acting as judges, to gain working skills in a subject of major
importance. As in the war gaming exercises, there is also the possibility of
changing the format of the Jessup, adding to the overall, adjudicatory
setting of the Jessup a panel for the meetings of the American Society of
International Law that takes the output of the Jessup competition and then
provides comments and opinion.'
11. The Jessup may contribute to the shaping of law through its impact upon attitudes,
skills, enlightenment, and so on. How far that impact will reach is unclear, but in ALAN
WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 33 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1985), it is observed that:
"[law develops by lawyers thinking about the normative facts, whether in the abstract or in
relation to hypothetical or actual societal facts. A course becomes set which is difficult to alter."
Lawyers, he argues:
come to treat law as fact - normative fact, of course, but still something existing in its
own right. Faced with a legal problem, lawyers contemplate the societal facts of the
issue and the normative facts of the law that have to be applied to them to come up
with the answer. The societal facts and the normative facts may be equally hard to
discover.
Id. at 32, 33.
12. This proposal is preliminary; it presupposes that if the American Society of
International Law were to provide for such a panel commenting on and even critiquing the
Jessup, as well as mining it for its effectiveness and content, it would be necessary to have the
Jessup final early in the annual meetings rather than at the last day. The panel then convened
would be an ad hoc panel, but this drawback can be overcome if experienced panellists are
chosen, it would offer a chance to add a refining procedure to the Jessup and to strengthening its
policy content. A frame of reference, familiar to international lawyers, is that of HAROLD
LASSWELL & ABRAHAM KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (Yale Univ. Press 1950) [hereinafter
POWER]. These terms of reference relate to unraveling the ambiguities and uncertainties in the
decision and policy making activities of individuals, enterprise and governments. The approach
is that of the problematic, and aimed at future courses of action: "From the manipulative
standpoint, the problematic situation with which inquiry begins is resolved into alternative goals
possible in the situation, and the problem is formulated in terms of courses of action leading to
the goal." Id. at xi.
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2. Possibilities for the Future
Carefully designed Jessup problems can introduce social order
perspectives critical to the evolution of international law intended to serve
global public order.'" Hence the Jessup can serve other law and policy
oriented objectives.14 It can provide a valuable instrument for probing real
world disputes, the policies and competing claims entailed, and their
ramifications. Even real world courts do this: they consider various
situations that have not come before them, and they provide dicta to reach
situations or issues not before the Court.'" Their dissents reveal differences
in attitudes and perspectives among the judges, and so on. 6  Hence the
Jessup offers us an instrument to probe important, but oft-treated marginal,
issues that every international court must face such as whether a dispute
offers a legal issue or, instead, is too political or too involved in
The systemic standpoint, or the overall logic of the method is a separate point of departure -
referred to as the contemplative standpoint. The key point in the value system adopted is that of
power: "political science, as an empirical discipline, is the study of the shaping and sharing of
power." Id. at xiv. The dynamic features are characterized by perceptions that show change,
'patterns of succession of events," rather that fixed equilibria. The overall frame of reference is
readily adopted in the Jessup because both it and the framework of power and society speak to
the realities of human action and decision. Hence, decision making is forward looking,
formulating alternative courses of action extending into the future, and selecting among the
alternatives by expectations of how things will turn out. Id. at xv-xvi.
13. See generally Legal Education, supra note 1 (discussing the interaction of social policy
and law in the context of practicing international law).
14. See POWER, supra note 12, for a frame of reference familiar to international lawyers.
This frame relates to unraveling the decision and policy making activities of individuals,
enterprise and governments. The approach is aimed at the decision process in the context of
problems, and the overall goal is aimed at future courses of action.
15. The latest opinion of the International Court of Justice, an advisory opinion, relating to
the permissibility under international law of states possessing, or using, nuclear weapons includes
declarations of a number of the judges. This device enables the judge to step aside from handing
down a concurring or dissenting opinion, or, presumably from refraining from giving any
opinion at all, though this is controversial. It enables such judges to speak to all or any occasion,
for any purpose, simply because the declaration is that judge's perspective or comment on the
case even while he is refraining from any further participation in the case. See The Nuclear
Weapons Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. The larger problem of the declaration might be explored along
with advisory opinions by future Jessup competitions. See, infra, discussion on advisory
opinions in this paper.
16. See LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 7 (Harvard Univ. Press
1933). Though his inquiry primarily assesses the role of the courts in foreign policy, Jaffe's
remarks bring up the general problem of making decisions and policy in foreign affairs:
[tihe courts must move about in the spacious and dangerous realms of policy and
statesmanship; they are called upon to make a choice from among conflicting attitudes.
Such a choice will not only answer implicitly the given problem, but will also
transcend the results in individual case. Unless, then, a writer admits that below the
reasoned surfaces there is a question of attitudes, his objective legalism will rest on a
quicksand of subterranean compulsions.
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regulatory, administrative or discretionary matters for an international
court to tackle, let alone monitor or supervise."
The Jessup problem is a problem that should be designed so that it
can address a situation or events that have already been presented before a
court. Or, the Jessup can look at an array of real world problems and
situations to consider issues that might never be raised in the immediate
term of a court. Or it can look into a hypothetical problem working with
real world premises and assumptions. Or, we can even consider for the
Jessup a problem that is sub judice in international courts or tribunals.'8
All of these matters will eventually flow into the broader streams that make
up the great collegial effort that is part of the conscious shaping of
international law, its concepts, and its decision-making impacts. But to
achieve this expanded perspective for the Jessup we must adopt as its goals
wider missions, such as those mentioned here.
The Jessup is also a valuable and refined instrument of learning
and argument that can be used by others such as courts, schools,
advocates, working in or concerned with analogous cases. It offers a rare
opportunity to undertake with great care and in great depth an appraisal of
disputes and the applicable normative rules or principles. Clearly, the
effectiveness of the Jessup Competition depends upon the participants, but
in the hands of outstanding practitioners the Jessup and its contestants can
reach outcomes that match the efforts of experienced jurists. The Jessup
17. The notion of the political question and the practice of international courts to deny
adjudication of such questions is pervasive in the legal disputes brought before international
courts. However, the distinctions made between legal issues and political issues are not precise.
United States Supreme Court practice should be consulted. Jaffe considered this problem in the
context of the domestic courts of the United States, and in the context of a Constitution calling
for a separation of powers, but not laying down standards that determine precisely when and how
those powers are to be separated. The interaction and complexity of making this cut between the
authority of the executive and legislative branch is such that the Court, as Jaffe points out, has
frequently abdicated decision and left it a political question to be worked out by the other two
branches. With italics of his own, Jaffe cites Quincy Wright, and his observations that we can
make our distinction between the practice of the courts - constitutional understandings - and
the law of the Constitution, to wit:
The constitutional understandings are based on the distinction between the possession
of a power and discretion in the exercise of that power. The law of the constitution
decides what organs of the government possess the power to perform acts of
international significance [inter alia], but the understandings of the constitution decide
how the discretion or judgment, implied from the possession of power, ought to be
exercised in given circumstances.
Id. at 10.
18. In a sense a matter that is sub judice in the international tribunals simply is converted
into a hypothetical problem because the Jessup designers will not have what the court or tribunal
itself has by way of facts. Additionally, because the approaches of a real world court and a
Jessup differ the case will have the hypothetical element imparted by these factors.
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does include among the judges, especially in the final round, distinguished
jurists from the International Court of Justice and other high tribunals.
And perhaps more than the ICJ, the Jessup has the added competence to
question and probe issues from many points of view. The repetition of the
moot court trials upward through the Jessup competition tends to add
further refinements. To facilitate these refinements, the Jessup might
include a rule enabling contestants to modify their memorials several times
as they move forward.
The Jessup also provides us with a teaching tool. In praise of this
teaching aspect, the losing contestants have indicated that they benefited
from this feature even though they also saw the contest as one to be won.
Taking advantage of the Jessup is a teaching text about the law of war,
which makes use of a modified version of the Jessup. The text is open-
ended because a given problem in factual terms will always face changing
law, or changing attitudes about law. Thus, an instructor using a Jessup
oriented text is in the position to use an appropriately designed text over a
period of years, adding or eliminating situations or facts, and adding
supplementary materials of the instructor's own law or, for teaching
purposes, even facts that had not been included in the earlier versions.' 9
We can envision that this use of the Jessup might expand in the future
because the instrument it provides demands wide participation by the class
and instructor.
In this text the student learns from a form of practice. Through a
simulated unraveling of a problem dealing with a complex subject, the
student becomes familiar with the law of war and the law relating to the
use of force. The Jessup format is being used except that the facts are not
presented all at once, but in a sequential and simulated real time basis as
the conflict proceeds, uncovering a wide variety of legal issues to be
considered. This approach has some similarities to the briefings of high
ranking military officers at the Department of Defense in the various
exercises involving contingency operations, where the officers are briefed
in a real time combat situation, and then enabled in the game that follows
to engage in a simulation of a wartime situation.
19. I am suggesting here that this text might be able, appropriately designed, to remain as
the primary problem theme. If for example the Geneva Protocols of 1977 .(Publication of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Bern, 1977) had appeared after the text was in print, a
supplemental text could readily be added incorporating the impact of those Protocols, and the
documentary supplement could include the Protocols. Additional protocols have been concluded
concerning weapons of mass destruction, land mines and so on. In other contexts, such as the
games and briefings that make up the teaching techniques of a military staff there is now a wide
body of experience concerning the use of briefings and simulated actions taking place under
conditions very similar to those of an emergency or crisis.
642 [Vol. 4:635
Almond
Although beyond the scope this paper, we might raise a further
problem to be probed through Jessups in the future. The Jessup approach
might enable us to consider more deeply on a collegial basis the decision
and law-making processes and activities of governments. Because
disputes, disagreements and misunderstandings are natural features of
human interaction, we need to know continuously how far we can invoke a
court in such matters. It is evident that most of the law-making process,
especially those that involve trans-national activities, occurs outside the
courts, and much of this process involves dispute settlement and the
accumulation of a wide variety of dispute settlement mechanisms. 0 The
Jessup, modified in approach, might enable us to probe the new institutions
and practices accumulated.
The Jessup offers the opportunity, not yet explored, of tackling
legal questions where advisory or commentary opinions are demanded.
The traditional dispute format of the Jessup, following fairly closely the
practice of the International Court of Justice, involves two states with a
dispute that can be resolved under law, pursuant to Articles 36 and 38 of
the ICJ statute. Under this authority, the court is to resolve legal disputes
by applying the applicable or relevant law. But for an advisory opinion,
legal questions about law are raised before the ICJ by way of a request
from an appropriate organ of the United Nations.2 1  Because the Jessup
format does not precisely follow the ICJ, it would be possible, in the
Jessup context, to consider requests by almost anyone for advisory
recommendations concerning the implications of any legal question or
prospective courses of action. In short, the Jessup offers flexibility that is
20. See John Jackson, Dispute Settlement Techniques Between Nations Concerning
Economic Relations - With Special Emphasis on Gatt, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (T. Carbonneau ed., Univ Press of Virginia 1990).
This article, as well as the book in general, provides a valuable insight into the growing
competence for resolving disputes in the course of the decisions and the processes of claim.
Although I will not discuss them all, in a broad sense there a large number of GATT dispute
settlement procedures. In fact, one can identify over thirty such procedures. For example, there
are nineteen clauses that obligate the parties of GATT to consult with each other in specific
instances. Each of these might be termed a dispute settlement procedure. Likewise, there are
seven different provisions for what the GATT calls "compensatory withdrawal or suspension of
concessions." Id. These allow one party to withdraw concessions from, or alter its trade
relationships with, another party in the face of certain types of actions by that other party.
It is evident that an important procedure in dispute settlement is one aimed to achieve
accommodation of differences among the parties, and that a further goal is to ensure effectiveness
and enforceability of the procedures adopted in the GAIT context, by giving parties the authority
to impose sanctions on others who carry out "certain types of actions" not permissible under the
GATT. THOMAS E. CARBONEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE
LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS (Univ. of IIl Press 1989).
21. See the U.N. CHARTER, art. 96; I.C.J. Statute. art. 65-68.
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not available in the real world of the ICJ, but in return for foregoing real
world decisions in a real world context, we are given the opportunity of
testing such decisions where we can enjoy the luxury of trial and error.
Clearly, these are matters that require further review.
Accordingly, if in the future we were to develop a Jessup
competition to work with legal questions while following the practice of
the ICJ, we would be looking to the interesting yet complex problem of
working out an approach for future contests that would employ the
advisory opinion. This would open the Jessup to a number of important
possibilities in testing the contestants-and in testing the ICJ as an institution
to promote customary international law through its own actions in the
formulation or prescription process.Y We would also be coming face to
face with the matter of formulating international law through the court and
the practices established or institutionalized to ensure that even though
recommendatory, the advisory opinions would be expected to be
assimilated as part of the customary international law. This format, both
for the Jessup and for a more active ICJ involved in advisory opinions,
would require that the judges, and perhaps a staff to assist the judges, have
a more active role in the intended output.Y At the same time, while the
22. Professor M. Reisman observes as to prescription that we are looking at a function of
decision, pointing out:
[p]rescription or law-making.. .occurs when actors, with varying degrees of authority,
select and install certain preferences about policy as community law. This may be
accomplished by a legislature or some other organized law-maker; but it is usually,
and, especially in international law, largely accomplished in informal and sometimes
even chaotic processes whose outcomes are generally refererred to as 'custom.'
Michael Reisman, A Jurisprudence from the Perspective of the Political Superior, 23 N. KY. L.
REV. 605, 612 (1996).
Because decisions are effective when enforceable, the other functions of decision [six are
mentioned by Reisman] can be separately assessed for the law-making impact when they are
used. Law-making is a component of enforcement shaping new law or applying the existing law.
Id. Articles in depth relating to this approach are cited by Reisman in his footnotes.
23. This paper does not recommend the abandonment of the Jessup format, but is intended
to critique the format, seek other probing devices such as that proposed in coupling the gaming
and moot court approaches, and test such things as the declaration and codification of customary
international law under the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice. Law
especially as practiced among states or nations can be conceived as a policy instrument, a support
to policy, a support to the creation of public order, or the management of undesirable activities
such as aggression. In any event the advisory opinion has not been exploited either in the Jessup
or in the real world by the International Court of Justice and the contestants have so far not
exploited the opportunity to appraise the Court and its limitations in developing customary
international law by way of advisory opinions. A comparison of the law-making activities and
reciprocating support of such activities in the legislative sense of the Court under its advisory
competence and the legislative thrust in the formulations or prescriptions of treaty law has had an
ample assessment in the literature.
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opinion is the opinion of judges, the advisory opinion would take on a
legislative or prescriptive characterY
But this is not the place to critique the use of the advisory opinion,
in the real world, or in the Jessup. At the present time in the Jessups no
written opinion is handed down, and it is not proposed at this time that one
should be prepared in the Jessup contest. But such a proposal for the court
and its work in the real world is another matter. Opinions are provided,
complete with dissents, under conditions and under assessment procedures,
differing from those in which states come together to make law through
their treaties. But if we were to have the Jessup court pass on legal
questions, we would need to be assured that the legal question is
appropriately framed; that the differing perspectives of the advocates as to
the legal question be introduced to the court; and that the court be called
upon to issue its opinion.
Although a legal question may be the starting point for a variety of
responses, including those that may be contrary to each other, we might
arbitrarily break the problem involving advisory competence of the Jessup
Court into two sides, each presenting an opposing view as to the response
sought for the legal question. This format would be close to the war
gaming approach where an analysis and a report are made at the close of
the game.
If the Jessup court were given the competence to issue advisory
opinions for a future Jessup Competition, the report of the Jessup judges,
or even of a separately constituted panel of overseers and reporters, might
be simplified. Under this approach, the Jessup judges would consider and
pass upon the positions and arguments presented by the contestants, the
differing strengths of these, and the conclusion of the Court, operating as a
panel.
Of course, in the Jessup context, there is another possibility for the
Jessup court to review requests for an advisory opinion that is somewhat
less ambitious. The legal question for an advisory opinion could be
presented in the Jessup context by two sides, guided by the Jessup
24. It will be recalled that the judges of the United States Supreme Court, at an early
stage, advised that under the Constitution advisory opinions would not be advisable. The judges
pointed out that the Court was designed to adjudicate "cases or controversies" pursuant to Article
III Section 2. The cases involving the 'legislative courts," their distinctions and wider
jurisdiction have been widely analyzed. Advisory opinions are recognized in the adjudicatory
practice in other countries. For a general assessment see HENRY MELVIN HART & HERBERT
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (Foundation Press 1953).
25. The alternative would envision a panel of judges and a panel of reporters working
together: it is probably too difficult for the Jessup judges to act as their own reporters and to
expect them competently to handle the judging.
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guidelines to advocate differing or opposing points of view concerning the
legal question, and acting in place of the larger number of participants in
the real world of the ICJ. The Jessup Court could then consider the
opposing positions, and come down on the position that was best
presented. It might be required to provide a very brief statement
supporting its determination and no more.
The first approach might provide a more valuable output both for
the academic and the practicing community of lawyers and jurists, but the
second might be more appropriate for the decisions that are to be taken by
an ad hoc group of judges operating in the traditional form of the Jessup.
It should be borne in mind, however, that even with the traditional Jessup
competitions, the court provides only its views as to the persuasive or
argumentative quality of the contestants' presentations and it does not
provide an opinion. The Jessup court does not rely upon facts or materials
introduced from outside the problem, nor does it review the memorials,
which are reviewed by others. The second approach thus serves one of the
major objectives, to wit, an appraisal of the forensic capabilities of the
contestants and the selection of those that are superior in a given contest.
Of course, both approaches serve the learning objective mentioned earlier.
But if pursued, the venture into advisory competence offers the
Jessup an opportunity to undertake a further task of probing.26 The ICJ,
26. Pursuit of a theory of advisory opinions might also benefit by assessments or inquiry
into what is expected from a court that is providing such opinions. See, e.g., ABRAHAM
KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY (Chandler Pub. Co. 1964). According to Kaplan, we are
not compelled in social order inquiries, including inquiries into law and its jurisprudence, to meet
the standards of a pure and exact science, or those expected in the physical sciences. He points
out that "science itself manages quite well even though its own most basic principles are
something less than necessarily and unconditionally true." Id. at 13. If the preparatory work for
an advisory opinion in the ICJ or the Jessup Court requires new methods or techniques, there is
ample development of methodology to draw upon:
[m]ethods are techniques sufficiently general to be common to all sciences, or to a
significant part of them. Alternatively, they are logical or philosophical principles
sufficiently specific to relate especially to science as distinguished from other human
enterprises and interests. Thus, methods include such procedures as forming concepts
and hypotheses, making observations and measurements, performing experiments,
building models and theories, providing explanations, and making predictions.
Id. at 23.
Kaplan later observes:
[a] scientific concept has meaning only because scientists mean something by it. The
meaning is scientifically valid only if what they intend by it becomes actual: problems
are solved and intentions are fulfilled as inquiry continues. Since Kant, we have come
to recognize every concept as a rule of judging or acting, a prescription for organizing
the materials of experience so as to be able to go about our business. Everything
depends, of course, on what our business is.
Id. at 46.
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the object of such probing, is an institution that is gradually gaining
strength with regard to customary international law and the promotion of
treaty law. The global community stands to benefit from such efforts at
promoting a court that began its life in a weakened position. A
determination, even on the moot court-gaming dimension, may assist us in
finding what we can expect from the ICJ, and under what conditions these
expectations might become operative. Hence the venture can probe the
possibilities through moot court exercises of strengthening the competence
of the ICJ itself. The specific possibilities of this nature and even a
preliminary inquiry into the appropriate theory of advisory opinion
jurisdiction, either for the ICJ or the Jessup Court, are not explored here.
But such an inquiry might include in our objectives an expansion of the ICJ
and its panels to reach regional disputes, and a more sophisticated
competence for the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 21
"Recognition is the source of all our natural knowledge," Whitehead has said. "The whole
scientific theory is nothing else than an attempt to systematize our knowledge of the
circumstances in which such recognitions will occur." It is the enterprise of making those
identifications in experience which prove to be most significant for the control or appreciation of
the experience yet to come. Id. at 85.
Laws are not generalizations at which we arrive we have established the facts; they
play a part in the process of determining what the facts are. Indeed, we may without a
vicious circularity accept some datum as a fact because it conforms to the very law for
which it counts as another confirming instance, and reject an allegation of fact because
it is already excluded by law.
Id. at 89.
27. KAPLAN, supra note 26, at 89. Also see the discussion made in this paper infra. Whether
or not theory formation is the most important and distinctive scientific activity, in one sense of
the term theory this activity might well be regarded as the most important and distinctive for
human beings. In this sense it stands for the symbolic dimension of experience, as opposed to
the apprehension of brute fact. The content of our experience is not a succession of mere
happenings, but a sequence of more or less meaningful events, meaningful both in themselves
and in the patterns of their occurrence. They are consequential, that is - significant in their
bearings on one another. Id. at 294.
A theory is a way of making sense of a disturbing situation so as to allow us most
effectively to bring to bear our repertoire of habits, and even more important, to modify habits or
discard them altogether, replacing them by new ones as the situation demands. In the
reconstructed logic, accordingly, theory will appear as the device for interpreting, criticizing,
and unifying established laws, modifying them to fit data unanticipated in their formulation, and
guiding the enterprise of discovering new and more powerful generalizations. To engage in
theorizing means not just to learn by experience but to take thought about what is there to be
learned. To speak loosely, lower animals grasp scientific laws, but never rise to the level of
scientific theory. Id. at 295.
Theory puts things known into a system. But this function is more than a matter of what the
older positivism used to call economy of thought or moral shorthand, and what today is expressed
in terms of the storage and retrieval of information. It is true that the systematization effected by
a theory does not have the consequence of simplifying laws and introducing order into congeries
of fact. But this is a by-product of a more basic function: to make sense of what would
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Lastly, we can invoke the Jessup moot court framework for testing
and also teaching the use of models or theories to promote the assimilation
of common standards of policy and law.2 In short, it offers a setting
amounting to a meta-world setting: it offers us a chance to look at how we
and others look at real world happenings, and with sophistication of
technique, how we from differing cultures go about solving and working
the problems. Although the Jessup invokes law, it is not the means for
generating law. It might of course generate law for the problem, but this
is not the law we might anticipate will be applicable in the real world.
And it is evident that the Jessup does not provide us with precedents of law
either for future Jessups, or otherwise. But participating in the Jessup
assists in the promotion of scientific thought, and assists in shaping
effective mind sets of those involved in clarifying complex problems of
policy and strategy.
But, this is not the place for working out a theory of theories" or
for constructing a program that might help us break up and analyze policy
and legal problems as such. 0 Unquestionably our goals will call for
otherwise be inscrutable or unmeaning empirical findings. A theory is more than a synopsis of
the moves that have been played in the game of nature; it also sets forth some idea of the rules of
the game, by which the moves become intelligible. Id. at 302.
It might well be said that the predicament of behavioral science is not the absence of theory
but its proliferation. The history of science is undeniably a history of the successive replacement
of poor theories by better ones, but advances depend on the way in which each takes account of
the achievement of its predecessors. Much of the theorizing in behavioral science is not building
on what has already been established so much as laying out new foundations, or even worse,
producing only another set of blueprints. Id. at 304.
28. See discussion generally in the notes from Kaplan's study.
29. See POWER, supra note 12; KAPLAN, supra note 26. See brief introductory note in
the discussion of this paper. The commentators generally perceive strategy as a theory of
control, and military strategy therefore becomes a control over the weapons, methods of use, and
the war fighting activities.
30. For the interaction of concepts in theory and strategy, see J.C.WYLIE, MILITARY
STRATEGY: A GENERAL THEORY OF POWER CONTROL (Greenwood Press 1980). Although
discussed later in this paper, that discussion can usefully be anticipated here. Wylie uses the
term power as a term of value, following the usage adopted by Lasswell, McDougal and their
associates. See STUDIES, supra note 1. He observes that "while strategy itself may not be a
science, strategic judgment can be scientific to the extent that it is orderly, rational, objective,
inclusive, discriminatory, and perceptive." Wylie's definition thus contains two elements.
Strategy, he says, can best be defined as "a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end;
a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment." WYLIE supra at 13.
Wylie argues that his definition has two elements: the definition is not limited to war or even
military applications. And the definition involves the balancing of relevant factors that comprise
the definition. Hence the purpose and system of measures to achieve the purpose are included in
the single concept. His framework thus would assist us in using the Jessup moot or the
wargaming concepts and contexts or all of these. Wylie observes: "It should be recognized at
1998] Almond 649
achieving such a program or even a theory of control eventually." But the
purpose here is to introduce the gaming concept in the framework of the
moot case, and analyzing that framework to determine its potential in
shaping or at least testing attitudes. The Jessup offers us the opportunities
for exposing the attitudes of the participants in the context of a Jessup
context - the predispositions, biases, assumptions, inferences, and the
skeptical features in their decision making efforts. Our purpose, which is
scientific in nature, is to work toward finding the way to common
objectives and standards and a common vocabulary among the contestants
and others; toward installing trend thinking; and toward scientific
skepticism. These attitudes are likely to be most fruitful in pursuing a
scientific inquiry and the scientific and progressive development of the
decision-making art.32
the outset of this discussion that a strategy has no moral quality of its own. It is inherently
neither good nor evil; it is always normative or concerned with values." Id. at 15.
Wylie referring to principles of war observes a qualification to the effect that the wise
commander must know when and how to apply the principles and also when and how to violate
them. I think that what the principles really are is an attempt to rationalize and categorize
common sense. I suggest that worship of any such patter as the principles of war is an unaware
substitution of slogan for thought, probably brought about the by intellectual formlessness that
must inevitably exist when there is no orderly and disciplined pattern of fundamental theory from
which one consciously or unconsciously takes departure. Id. at 20. Wylie points out that he has
never come across the use of principles as the means to achieve a strategy.
31. See WYLIE, supra note 30, at 10 (discussing strategy a quest for control).
The basic patterns of strategic thought should not be looked on as any kind of a secret. The
more people who know about and understand these patterns, the more healthy will- be our
democracy in its strategic decisions. The Congressman voting on a military appropriation is, in a
very real sense indeed, making a fundamental strategic decision, and he does not need very many
secrets to lead him toward a sound decision.
The same could be said of the citizen's participation and enlightenment about the emergence
of a global law affording him as a major outcome the enhancement of his nation's - and his -
security. Hence Wylie, while speaking of military strategy, has reached the conclusion that the
McDougal-Lasswell approach provides the appropriate theory:
I have been talking about one form or another of military control. But I do hope that it
has come out clearly that military control, or military affairs in the broad sense, can
seldom be taken up in isolation. Military matters are inextricably woven into the
whole social power fabric. And this is why a general theory of strategy must, I
believe, be a theory of power in all its form, not just a theory of military power.
Id. at 110
32. See id., for a discussion of the interrelationship of theory and strategy for military
purposes: Wylie is on a continuous quest for control in the decision process that will enable his
strategy to serve military activities in a collegiate sense. In law the general approach is toward
the promotion of public order - global public order anong states. But as McDougal and his
associates have pointed out, we realistically seek immediate attainable goals, and carry this out in
the larger context of a comprehensive program for more remote goals. See STUDIES, supra note
1. The observations of Hausrath are enlightening:
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B. The Benefits of Gaming
So, to what extent can the experience of gaming benefit the
strengthening of the Jessup Moot Court as an instrument both for learning
and for promoting policy? Some experts to be sure have insisted that the
potential for prediction through war games or through moot competitions
are matters that are generally speculative. Allen, citing other authors,
points out:
I believe that models can be used for military gaming. But
political-military gaming? You can't predict. You can't
even predict what's likely to happen. You may get some
insights, but unless you have enough data that can be
quantified and enough data that will give you what I call
actuarial comparisons, you can't be sure of what is typical
and what is atypical. The model is useful only if it can
represent a typical situation.33
Despite these comments, combinations of gaming and the
adversary test of the moot court regime might be considered through a
joint effort among theorists for both approaches. The objective of
combining the two is to look into validation of a theory not possible by
pursuing one approach alone. The adversary environment of the Jessup
problems offers us an opportunity of testing the receptivity of claims by an
independent, objective tribunal. The data and intelligence flowing to the
war gaming center, appraised after the introduction of the military and
[flormal games attempt to investigate a particular group of questions or problems,
obtain an adequate amount of data from the game, and organize all into meaningful
comparisons or summaries. It is rare that the gross result of the game - as, for
example, Who won? - is a prime consideration. In this respect a war game is unlike a
sports contest. In a sense, all war gaming is undertaken for learning purposes, in
preparation for leadership and employment of military forces in real war. Therefore,
the emphasis is placed on finding ways to improve, or to use, resources for maximum
combat effectiveness.
So likewise the use of a gaming approach coupled with the moot court might serve us
in the future for the same purposes, but perhaps more for the purposes of extending
our use of the International Court of Justice, and the options available for expanding a
reasonable claim of jurisdiction. Hausrath pursues his inquiry into the use of war
gaming to reduce the costs as well as to refine the methods of warfare.
Idat 91.
33. See ALLEN, supra note 5, at 64. Writers such as Klaus Knoor and Oscar Morgenstern
have denied the scientific possibility of prediction. McDougal and his associates propose the use
in the social sciences at least of a value orientation and trend thinking. See STUDIES, supra note
1, at 51-58.
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other related instruments in the gaming context, can become an appraisal
of testing data by claims, and of compelling the adversary system to
produce its results by imposing the claims process on a changing
environment. In effect, the judges for the gaming action are not the judges
of the gaming process, but the judges and the process of adversarial claims
of the moot court. Adjustments to make this system operative, and to
introduce law as an element in decision will be required. The procedures
and process for working in the gaming setting as the setting that is the
precondition for the adversary setting of the moot court must also be
designed. But in doing this we must recognize that data banks are not
infallible. If there is no funding to keep them complete and current, or if
the personnel for producing and maintaining the data banks are untrained
or incompetent, they will fail us when we need them.
The experience so far with war gaming suggests that gaming
techniques might be coupled with the moot court in order to strengthen the
moot court as a probing or testing mechanism. When the Jessup
competition is considered in the gaming context; that is, when we perceive
a widened number of participants and situations involving legal disputes in
which a larger number of participants are involved, we can exploit
opportunities for testing or probing perspectives of the larger number of
participants much as we encounter these in real world conditions.
Although gaming differs whenever we shift the context of the games, or
whenever the policy content and context are varied, the gaming approach
can be refined by considering the experience of gaming in general,
especially war gaming.14 Allen describes the sophistication reached so far
in war gaming:
34. Wargaming might be expanded and in view of their similarities, the Jessup Moot
Competition might also be expanded where the objective is to get results not presently achieved
by the real world courts. War gaming for example might include the peacetime problems of
force planning. See ROBERT P. HAFFA, PLANNING U.S. FORCES, (Nat. Def. Univ. Press 1988).
He observes in a passage that suggests the similarities between the approaches to problems
concerning the use of weapons and military attack [wargaming in the pure sense] and the
preparation of military capabilities under force planning. There are further similarities in gaming
military exercises, and so on. Haffa states:
Paul Nitze distinguished between declaratory policy - statements of political objectives
with intended psychological effects - and action or employment policy - concrete
military objectives and plans employing current [military] forces in support of those
objectives. Nitze also saw the requirement to match the two levels closely, lest
declaratory policy appear hollow or employment capability inadequate. But that fit has
never been perfect ....
Force planning is the development of [military] forces flowing from the requirements
of declaratory policy or the shortfalls in employment policy. Force development
planning should, therefore, unite a declared strategy and the means to implement it...
1998]
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I really try to create the atmosphere of a White House; the
confusion, the leaks, [and] the turf problems. When I put
a game together I'm looking for certain decisions to be
made and I want to confront them with certain problems.
And then I want to give them out to these human beings
and I want them to get upset. Not too upset. It's not a
highly refined art form. And yet you can kind of predict
where it's all heading because you know what the options
really are.
I think the term art form is correct. I don't think there's a
science in this. It's not inferentially based. Nor are there
controlled conditions under which it's done enough to get
neat statistical evidence.
The search for that neat statistical evidence has led military
game designers away from human beings and toward the
most rational of all players, the computer."
The most appropriate appraisal can be made by considering the
widely adopted practice among military officers to become involved in war
gaming. The experience gained in gaming about war is useful in itself for
assessing the success of the Jessup Moot Court and similar dispute
* Declaratory policy is the strategy of the elected political leaders. . . . Employment
or action policy, on the other hand, lies in the domain of the military.
Id. at 4.
35. ALLEN, supra note 5, at 281-82. Consider the conclusions concerning the utility and
effectiveness of gaming as established by Allen. War gaming is at the stage where effective use
of the games is achieved by simulated solutions to real problems. Id. at 289. War gaming is
already used to test hypothetical but real world simulations as well as to provide experience and
teaching to those who participate in the game: Simulations are the next best thing to testing
weapons and defenses against real Soviet submarines or tanks. And here the spectrum [of
gaming] gets cloudy. Testing is a fine art that balances the reality of battle against the
abstraction of a would-be weapon. Testing is an art like other arts, for it attracts creators,
clients, patrons - and critics.
War gaming teaches that only the games that have a working framework of rules can be
played and if the problems are raised under the rules they can then be solved:
[w]e learn very early in life that games have rules. The value of a war game is that it
shows the results of a war when it is played as a game, with rules. Ever since the days
of the Battle of Maldon the warriors of Western civilization have tried to wage war by
rules. When nuclear war became the new kind of war, we tried to stick with the old
rules. If Ivan and Sam have taught us anything it is this: The nuclear threshold is the
place where war by the rules ends. Beyond that threshold, no war game can go, for
beyond that threshold there are no rules.
Id. at 350.
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settlement contexts when measured against their objectives, and it is also
useful because gaming is a process in which adversary positions are taken.
An imaginative group of participants may also be able to mine their war
gaming efforts to uncover new or innovative means of dispute settlement.
New process-oriented dispute settlement procedures might benefit us by
reducing the possibility of a failed enterprise, or the likelihood of
producing a controversy that might become more important than the
enterprise once entertained in an adversary setting such as an arbitration or
adjudicatory tribunal.
Gaming, in general, provides the situations and simulation for
working with perspectives and principles in an operational context, where
others are involved, and where differing perspectives are in contest. It
provides an operational setting for the vocabulary, concepts and symbols
that must be used for communications among opposing groups and within
the groups as well. But unlike war gaming, the gaming of legal disputes
through refinement of the Jessup would draw more deeply upon the
interaction of decisions and claims that reach into principles and theory;
the application of principles and theory; and the theory of application.
We can anticipate and draw upon fruitful experience from the war
gaming context, and work with conceptual elements that have their
counterpart in the struggles of advocates. In time, if adopted, the gaming
of the moot court situations will reinforce and strengthen the war gaming
process also.
War gaming is undertaken by military and political policy-makers
to investigate the processes of combat. The objective is not the real world
of combat in an effort to assist in calculating the outcomes of those
processes, but to provide a setting in which decisions are made, abstracted
from the real world, yet linked to it because the experience in gaming
decisions in itself is useful. But caution is needed. One writer on war
gaming, familiar with the use of such games at the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island observes:
The power of a wargame to communicate and convince,
however, can also be a potential source of danger.
Wargames can be very effective at building a consensus on
the importance of key ideas or factors in the minds of
36. According to PETER PERLA, THE ART OF WARGAMING (Naval Institute Press 257
1990), playing non-U.S. or threat roles in a professional wargame is not really much different
from playing friendly or Blue roles. Playing the threat well, however, requires special effort,
and often special training or expertise. Red players must understand not only the technical
capabilities of the opposition, but their tactical and strategic doctrine as well. To play Red, the
player must learn to think Red.
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participants. They attempt to create the illusion of reality,
and good games succeed. This illusion can be a powerful
and sometimes insidious influence, especially on those who
have limited operational experience. For example a poorly
designed game could allow players access to an unrealistic
quantity and quality of information and so give those
players a false picture of the worth of a weapon system
that relies on just such unattainable information to be
effective.
In wargames, as in any approach to study and analysis,
there is always a possibility that intentional or unintentional
advocacy of particular ideas or programs may falsely color
the events and decisions made in a game and lead to self-
fulfilling prophecies. The designer of a game has great
power to inform or to manipulate.31
Nevertheless, the experience of those involved in war games and
the practice that they afford can be probed for looking into the use of the
Jessup competition as a multi-faceted instrument. As such it can serve to
examine in depth the current problems of international law. It can serve to
provide innovative ideas for promoting that law. And it will serve in
honing the minds and thinking of the contestants and observers with regard
to that law. The final rounds of the Jessup, even in its present form,
without the added refinements that may be available in the war gaming
experience, deserves to be televised for broader public consideration.
To determine the concepts of gaming and their application to the
Jessup competition, we might look more closely at the experience achieved
in war gaming. The purpose of these games has been to acquaint those
who play with the past experience of others in military combat. The
predictability powers of war games in the past has been spotty, but the
utility of war games, as the only device that has been sufficiently refined to
approximately fit real world activities played out in real time, has been
recognized.18 And if it does not serve explanation, war gaming, in any
event, serves other purposes which will be discussed here.
37. Id. at 182.
38. Predictability through models may be something that cannot be expected scientifically
even when the models are used for the physical sciences. As part of an analysis in greater depth,
Abraham Kaplan, appraising explanation and prediction, points out:
In whichever way explanation is reconstructed [i.e., as a deductive model or pattern
model], prediction is at least a possibility. In both models, laws serve to explain
events and theories to explain laws; a good law allows us to predict new facts and a
good theory new laws. At any rate, the success of the prediction in either case adds
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According to one expert, the war game has many of the features
that were first caught up by Clausewitz, observing that warfare is the great
decision arena of the unpredictable, described in his metaphor of "the
friction of war."3 ' James F. Dunnigan, a consultant to the Department of
Defense on wargames, first notes that there are various ways to play the
wargame. However,
Basically, you obtain good games by paying attention to
past experience (history) and letting the chips fall where
they may. Combat is a dispassionate arbiter of what works
and what doesn't. If your games reflect political rather
than combat reality, you're likely to find yourself fatally
ill-prepared on the battlefield. . . However, current
peacetime illusions will always carry more weight than
future wartime reality. Unless someone is shooting at you,
immediate political demands take precedence over potential
military ones. This can change if you actually develop
realistic wargames, use them diligently, and widely
distribute the results.40
As mentioned earlier, wars are arenas replete with uncertainty -
with the murkiness of weather symbolizing the murkiness of the military
campaign. Hence, according to Dunnigan,
Nothing new here except that historically there has always
been a steady drift from reality in the peacetime military.
Warfare is a complex process that cannot be easily
credibility to the beliefs which led to it, and a corresponding force to the explanations
which they provide.
KAPLAN, supra note 26, at 346.
39. According to Clausewitz:
[e]verything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties
accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has
experienced war. Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the
factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. This tremendous friction, which
cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with
chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely
due to chance. One, for example, is the weather. Fog can prevent the enemy from
being seen in time, a gun from firing when it should, a report from reaching the
commanding officer. Rain can prevent a battalion from arriving, make another late by
keeping it not three but eight hours on the march, ruin a cavalry charge by bogging the
horses down in mud, etc.
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 119, 120 (Howard and Paret, ed. And trans. Princeton Univ.
Press, 1976).
40. PERLA, supra note 36, at xviii.
19981 655
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
understood when you can't actually do it. So it's
understandable that peacetime preparations, including
gaming, will 'drift' away from the unknown wartime
reality. Contributing to this drift are new weapons and
equipment, new tactics and doctrine, and new political
situations. Social changes also have an impact: things like
economic growth or decline, different partisan political
differences, and the replacement of conscription with
volunteers. These changes are complicated by changes
within potential enemy nations. All of this is further
clouded by secrecy. 1
Dunnigan's observations conclude with the general usefulness of
the wargame. In his view, the games provide a setting for exercising
thinking, perception, and decision making skills that no other device could
afford. Though warfare is fraught with uncertainty, he noted that the
usefulness of war games is in what it can accomplish in the decision-
process, experienced in practice with others. The quest is toward the
assimilation of the realistic patterns of behavior and conduct, and the
cautious assimilation of what the games can offer. "Before the Japanese
defeat off Midway Island in 1942, Japanese admirals dismissed wargames
that showed they could lose their carriers using their current plans. The
Japanese admirals went ahead, and lost four carriers and naval superiority
in the Pacific. You trifle with wargame validity at your own risk."' 2
We could add to the above the fact that war games extend back to
antiquity. Though the games of antiquity take different forms, as in the
Odyssey of Homer, and in those forms lack some of the precision,
predictability, or explanatory power of the present games, they afforded
much in common. Decisions and policies are made by human beings in
contexts that can be reasonably replicated, and the experience of making
those decisions, in itself, is a significant skill-oriented and skill-shaping
effort.
War games are thus mentioned here primarily to consider the
conceptual elements that may be common to games in general. These
41. Id. at xix.
42. Id. at xx. It should be borne in mind that the Japanese Chiefs of Staff did use war
games, but their assumptions and inferences, and their perceptions of the realities of the war,
were affected by outcomes that they insisted upon achieving. They had achieved great success in
using their intelligence sources to locate the United States naval fleet at Pearl Harbor, the
priorities to be attained as to military targets, etc. But they failed to consider the possible
outcomes especially when all of the outcomes might be materially out of control once the fighting
had commenced.
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common elements may be used to consider the Jessup competition, or the
moot court, used by lawyers, and to determine how the moot cases such as
the Jessup might be strengthened; thereby, strengthening the skills and the
exercise of perceptions over situations by jurists. The jurists' art when
faced with the legal order and decisions under law among nation-states,
perhaps more than that of the military commander, may be able to benefit
from war games concepts, adapted to the decisions of law even more than
the military commander under his war games, because so much of the legal
issues among states are issues that can only be approached or analyzed
through the symbolism of policy, or through high degrees of abstraction,
or by way of the generalities, and vague expressions and vocabulary of
principles that must be brought to bear for resolution among choices.
The nature of war games indicates much that can be shared in
common with the Jessup and other moot court games. To gain a better
base for the purposes of comparison, consider the war game and how it
operates at present. The war game, we have been told, is not analysis or
intended to provide analysis of real world situations.' It is not the means
for making comparisons among alternative solutions. Second, the game is
not part of the realities of state behavior; it is abstracted with changes
necessary for games and the compressed time span for decisions. Third,
the games are not things that can be duplicated.
The results, the nature of the play, the decisions and policies made
or adopted, the reactions and tactics will differ, the strategies, if similar,
will have been so broadly posited that they could encompass a variety of
tactics and possibilities, with a variety of chances for success or failure.
Though the non-duplication element reflects reality, the approaches taken
are unique, as they are in the real world. The game, as Thomas Schelling
has indicated, operates in the context of decisions and the decision process,
and the strategies and tactics are shaped in the interaction process, that is,
by the interaction of decisions.
In the war context, actions or decisions made by one side - new
weapons, new tactics or methods of attack, new uses of weapons, and so
on - lead to responses on the other side, not necessarily predictable.
Wars occur in conditions of such uncertainty as to lead to chaos as to the
choices and the conditioning factors that might determine the choices to be
made by the decision maker, both in the real world and in the game. Wars
are charged with variables and involve chaotic situations that affect
military choices or affect decisions and action, but this element of chaos
simply becomes a challenge for those involved to find innovative ways to
accommodate change. And its presence is such that it becomes a factor in
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the war game, or any other game of policy and decision, reflecting that
change and chance may affect the results.43
War games, we are told, have objectives, whose clarity determine
the effectiveness or success of the game. The overall context of the war
game should be considered briefly in order to determine whether
refinements to the moot court approach are possible, and whether, in
particular, we can adapt the approach to enable the Jessup and similar
moot court problems to provide a useful base for courts or other decision-
makers that might be concerned with a similar problem.
The war game is designed to place the participants in specific
situations - a context in which they make their decisions. The gaming
procedure involves a data base or the information needed by the
participants with regard to their making decisions. And it includes models
or tables that translate the data of the game into the events that are taking
place: these may be tables and mathematical expressions offering an
opportunity to reflect chance in the operation. Rules and procedures set
forth the means for applying the models. Finally, the game will have game
analysis as one of its essential elements but the use of analysis will vary
according to the purpose of conducting the wargame:
In a training game, analysis will usually consist of an
instructor's observation and critique of the student's play.
In a research game, analysis focuses on understanding why
decisions were made. A good analysis plan, outlining
where observers should be placed and what they should be
looking for, is essential, but the process of game analysis
not simply one of mechanics or even observation. The
data collected during game play are only the raw material
for the synthesis of insights and identification of issues."
Perla summarizes the usefulness of war gaming in terms of the
element of process: the role of the game is "to help human beings
43. Perla argues that among the objectives or services afforded through wargaming are
those that enable the participants to process information, to consider differing inputs and their
impacts on expected outcomes, to investigate processes involved such as those of the interaction
of belligerents to provide opportunities for learning, including the means to motivate or
encourage further learning, to supplement other measures for assessing future policy, and so on.
Wargames he warns are not to be confused with systems or operations analysis wargame analysis
must be based "on a careful and comprehensive observation of the gamining process."
Wargaming, he believes, resembles most closely exploratory science or historical research. Id.
at 1-12.
44. Id. at 167.
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investigate the processes of combat, not to assist them in calculating the
outcomes of those processes."4 -
Perla refers to the design as an art, pointing out that experience
alone of military officers, or others familiar with the workings of games,
will suffice. War gaming, he points out, is a form of communication and
resembles the construction of a historical novel. Gaming design requires
"the construction of a framework, the creative building of an internally
complete and consistent world whose broad contours are contained within
the bounds of its historical context. ""
The game, in play, arouses participants of the game itself, and, the
wargame calls for the sponsor of the game, the source of the messages put
to the players, to be involved in a communications flow actualized amongst
players and sponsor. Communications entail the transmittal of questions,
interpretations, inquiries for clarification, and even insights amongst these
two groups. 7
Design extends through the stages of concept development,
research, drafting of rules, and so on. The primary guidelines are: first,
those of an attempt to simulate accurately the historical events intended to
be the subject matter of the game; and second, the simulation materials
must be commensurate with that guideline. In a sense, these are the
requirements aimed at a degree of realism and playability, making the
game operative.
Other features in designing the game can be by-passed at this
point, or briefly mentioned. The sponsor seeks to learn about certain
outcomes through communications with the players: the sponsor thus has a
stake in the game though it may differ from that of the players. Perhaps
further analysis will show the nature of the stake of the judges of the
Jessup in learning about outcomes, as well as the stake of the advocates or
agents who argue the cases and seek to hone through their instruments of
persuasion. Various questions can be raised as to these features. But these
features resemble in many ways the framework of inquiry developed by
Lasswell and McDougal, and their associates." Objectives, participants,
strategies, conditioning factors, all enter into the design inquiry and make
the ultimate game more likely a successful exercise. The data should be
45. Id. at 179.
46. PERLA, supra note 36, at 183.
47. The discussion here draws heavily on the study by Perla, Chapter 5, "Designing
Wargames." That chapter, and the book itself, would need to be examined in greater detail,
along with other texts to provide a complete comparison and review of the wargaming and the
gaming in the Jessup competitions. Id. at 183ff.
48. See generally POWER, supra note 12.
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commensurate with the game - the data made available in the problem;
the data acquired during the moot trials; and the data molded and even
synthesized by the interdependency of a successful give and take of
argument in the trial itself.
9
Perla suggests some fundamental principles applicable, at least, in
the wargaming context:
1) Adapt the rules to the game, and not the game to
the rules.
2) Tell the players everything they need to know to
play the game by structuring the rules around the sequence
of play.
3) Provide plenty of examples to illustrate how the
rules are supposed to work, both individually and in
concert.
4) Explain the underlying rationale for particularly
important or especially unusual rules.
49. Perla refers to the use of "scenarios" or what might be called the situation in which the
game takes place. He argues that the scenarios must be designed to permit decision making
flexibility, minimizing restrictions on those decisions, and permitting as much freedom of choice
as is possible. PERLA, supra note 36, at 203, 204. Simply stated, a scenario should include all
essential information about the game's setting and subsequent planned modifications to it, and
should contain no superfluous information. Id. at 205.
The designer is in a unique position because he creates the environment for the play of the
game:
Good scenario-design practice involves four fundamental principles: understanding the
problem, building from the bottom up, documenting choices, and communicating results. d. at
207.
The expression "building from the bottom up" refers to a design that defines the decision
points, provides for a hierachy of information and assumption, flowing through those who are
made part of the problem, simulating their real world activities, and ensuring completeness,
coherence, and credibility of the problem. Id. at 211, and see previous pages for discussion.
Perhaps differing from the moot court situations a large data base is made available, and
then drawn upon by the players or contestants in the war game. The data base is constant, but
the base itself is a source to be tapped, and not provided as the data afforded all parties as in the
Jessup. If the Jessup had this data base, it would have a data source available to the Jessup
judges, and common to all of the proceedings, but it would be a matter for the contestants to
request and draw upon or be refused the data they request.
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5) Integrate the text explaining the rules with the
graphical play aids designed to help implement them. '°
Clearly, the format and the practice of play in war games is not
identical with that of the Jessup Competition. However, there are features
and experience, shown in this brief discussion that can be used to refine the
Jessup, or to provide us with standards to test and assure the effectiveness
of the Jessup. It might be possible in the Jessup, though not in the
wargaming enterprise, to consider the problems considered by the
international court in exercising its advisory jurisdiction. Hence, the
gaming plan and situations may be adapted so that the contestants and the
games can be adapted to the context of an inquiry into legal questions as
distinguished from legal disputes.
Other features make distinguishing contrasts between the objectives
of war gaming and moot court gaming; the differences in situations or
scenarios alone are sufficient to lead to these distinctions. Perla argued
that the war games results are validated best by the degree to which they
reflect reality "as opposed to the artificiality of the gaming environment."1
War games include a report of the game by third parties - a procedure not
adopted in the Jessup, though it might be considered - and analysis by
third parties as well. But even in the context of the military campaign or
combat, the analysis will not apply according to mathematical strictures:
While analysis focuses on systems, the true value of
wargaming lies in its unique ability to illuminate the effect
of the human factor in warfare. By their very nature,
wargames seek to explore precisely those messy,
'unquantifiable' questions that analysis must ignore.
Wargames teach us what we didn't know we didn't know.
To accomplish that, however, wargames must give up any
vain hope of achieving the detailed mathematical structure
and rigorous calculation characteristic of analysis. A
wargame is not and will not ever be a mathematical
experiment whose initial conditions can be recreated
precisely and varied at will. The fundamental initial
conditions of a game - the knowledge, talent, character,
50. Id. at 227.
51. Id. at236.
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and experience of the players - changes as players change
or as they play the game more.12
With growing use and familiarity of the wargaming techniques
consciously applied to the gaming elements of the Jessup competition we
might expect that we shall have new insights into the gaming process itself,
so that we can refine that process. To do this we would need to turn to the
possibility of adding to the moot court a program for analyzing the results
of the Jessups, and monitoring and appraising the process itself. This
would be aimed at the process itself, but also the process in a given moot
court case, to provide clarification and better understanding about how it
works and what would make it serve our objectives more effectively.
Though the element of analysis needs further assessment than that
given here, because it would require assessment in context of the moot
court cases, we can turn once more to Perla who catches a part of this
feature in his remarks:
Wargames allow for the continual adjustments of strategies
and tactics by both sides in response to the developing
situation and outcomes of specific engagements; such
adjustments are not seen in campaign analysis. Wargames
afford their players a measure of control over events
through the decisions they make during play. Unlike a
campaign analysis in which changes in strategy occur as a
result of calculating the outcomes of implementing the
strategy, wargame decisions are not based on a clear and
complete understanding of all the facts (much less the
results) but rather on how the players view the facts
through a cloudy and possibly incomplete frame of
reference that is often distorted by preconceived notions,
poor information, and the pressure of time - in other
words, the fog of war. In a campaign analysis, a strategy
that leads to disastrous losses is simply discarded; in a
wargame, most decisions cannot be recalled after they have
been made."
52. PERLA, supra note 36, at 284, 285. Perla further distinguishes in such games the
differing perspectives of the military player or military analyst, from the civilian. This derives in
part from differing experience or vocational cultures, and in part because the military officer is
placed in a military decision making rule, while the civilian is put in the role of the analyst. The
civilian is tempted at least to impose rigor, and to that end has invented the operations research,
the systems analysis, and other mathematically oriented analytical tools for that purpose.
53. Id. at 283.
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III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From a policy perspective, this paper is an inquiry into exploring
and reappraising the application of the Jessup competition as a means of
enhancing legal education. But it also provides a preliminary look at other
uses. With regard to legal education, as Professors McDougal and
Lasswell had observed:
A first indispensable step toward the effective reform of legal
education is to clarify the ultimate aim. We submit this basic proposition:
if legal education in the contemporary world is adequately to serve the
needs of a free and productive commonwealth, it must be conscious,
efficient, and systematic training for policy-making. The proper function
of our law schools is, in short, to contribute to the training of policy-
makers for the ever more complete achievement of the democratic values
that constitute the professed ends of American polity. '
The two authors supported the moot court as a key device for professional
training:
One principle of professional training is to project the
student into situations that resemble as closely as possible
the circumstances of his future career. One well-
established pattern of this type can, in the reformed law
school, be turned into a more productive instrument of
legal education. We refer to the moot court. It is common
in some places to conduct various autopsies on the
performance of students before these tribunals. What we
propose is that the appraisal should be conducted not only
in terms of legal technicality but for the purpose of
revealing the total effectiveness of the participant in
handling himself in the situation."
Experience with war gaming indicates that a key refinement
involving policy can be made with the Jessup moot case by increasing the
number of participants and by specifying the appropriate objectives in
designing both the problem and the conduct of the competition. By adding
on participants that critique the Jessup as well as others that might draft a
report on the Jessup's findings, or by including additional competence for
the Jessup format, such as the preparation of advisory opinions, the Jessup
has the possibilities of providing a more substantial contribution to
54. Legal Education, supra note 1, at 46.
55. Id. at 149. Lasswell and McDougal note the potential use of recording measures,
motion pictures, testing facilities, and intensive coaching, applying some of the procedures to be
found in modem clinical psychology.
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international law itself. Finally, the Jessup format can be used by
experienced lawyers or jurists. If they are used, the differing or matured
perspectives of the practitioner or scholar can be added. In all of these
refinements, we bear in mind that the Jessup is a simulation, not a real
world exercise, but, as such, it has the advantages of operating in a
framework that can focus on the law and its impacts.
The Jessup is conceived in this paper as an instrument; that is, it is
an instrument that is aimed at policy or strategic objectives. Seen in that
light, law, especially international law, is a strategic instrument in itself,
coupling in some instances, diplomatic, economic, ideological or even
military strategies. Thus, law beyond the Jessup, extending to
enforcement, includes resort to permissible force, where force is perceived
as an essential means to maintain or protect public order.
Hence the Jessup can be used as an instrument that enables us to
probe either past policy or prospective policy that is involved with the
impacts of law. Second, the Jessup is an instrument that enables the
participants to learn about law, policy and decision-making. The
effectiveness of this depends upon the problem design and upon the
motivation and capabilities of the participants. Problem design thus
requires separate attention so that the design is aimed at specific objectives
- probing law, testing law and its applications, and so on.
Third, the Jessup can be used to review cases that have taken place
in the ICJ, thus affording another vehicle for critiquing those cases. Such
critiques have greater strength than those that are in the form of
commentary, and should produce publishable material for learned and
practicing lawyer journals.
The Jessup necessarily is an instrument to promote international
law. And the law it promotes is then perceived as a strategic instrument
with strategic goals of its own to attain. Moreover, it is then perceived as
part of the larger, collegial, global strategy to establish and strengthen
global public order and its law. Hence it can also serve to probe and assist
the law-making process; to condition or alert the attitudes of the
practitioners; to hone the minds and analytical skills of the jurist involved
in international law; and to arouse the interaction of theory and practice,
and the choices that are available for the pursuit of goals and action.
56. Compare the warning of McDougal and Feliciano:
Inasmuch as an absolute prohibition of coercion has not been feasible, the historical
alternatives of the general community have been either to permit complete disorder or
to aspire to minimum public order. Complete disorder, failure to forbid even the most
intense and comprehensive destruction of values, is not only possible, but has in fact
long characterized the perspectives of traditional international law. If, on the other
hand, the deliberate choice is made to pursue at least a minimum of order in the world
[Vol. 4:635
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Some emphasis should be given to the collegial element that it applies; this
is the element that we find in operation in the law making context. Those
who participate in the Jessup become familiar with what the collegial
aspect is all about. Law is not the output of a single scribe.
Fourth, the Jessup can operate as the simulation of an instrument,
or vehicle, that works with other strategies. It is in a sense a diplomatic
strategy, but as a vehicle, with varying policy content, it can include
diplomatic, economic ideological strategies, or strengthen these. The wide
variety of international institutions attest to the effectiveness of this.
Finally, implicit in the other observations above, the Jessup is an
instrument that can sharpen the critical skills - the skills of the scientific
mind - applied to the complexities of human action. We can anticipate
that those motivated or stimulated by such an activity are likely to continue
with their self-development, but will be stimulated toward an environment
in which law-making actually takes place.
The brief excursus in this paper into strategy, theory, and
wargaming highlights some of the possibilities of pressing the Jessup
format into new uses, into texts for teaching, and into exploratory efforts
that may lead to uncovering further applications. In some respects, the
Jessup will gain in strength and effectiveness once it is perceived that
whatever its shortcomings, the potentials are large, and open-ended. The
need to have greater participation in law-making at all levels of human
activity is widely acknowledged. The Jessup serves this need.57
To this end, the Jessup is a simulation of decision and policy-
making and operates as the means to enable us to refine, correct, and
amplify the jurisdiction of the Court, including the reduction of the impact
of the denial of jurisdiction by the court's invoking the political question,
enabling those involved in the Jessup, like those that were involved in war
gaming, to pursue what the ICJ and other international tribunals are now
arena, the coercion that is to be prohibited clearly must be distinguished from that
which is to be permitted. The conceptions both of impermissible and of permissible
coercion are thus necessary in the theoretical formulation of authoritative policy as
well as in the practical application of that policy to interacting human groups.
MYRES McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD ORDER 128-29
(Yale Univ. Press 1961).
57. There are other instruments to attain this goal. Standardized terms for contracts and
adherence to the policy if not the form of such terms and of contracts relating to trans-national
activities is one of them. A participatory effort for developing and testing such terms might be
conceived to support the aims of the Jessup. See Harry H. Almond, Jr., papers presented at the
meetings of the I.A.F. published in part in Montreal, 1991, Washington 1992, and Graz, 1993,
and Beijing, 1996. Some of these approaches calling for the use of recommendations, joint
adherence to common guidelines, advisory opinions and inquiries, and so on are sometimes
called "soft" law because they are to be distinguished from the work that enters into
undertakings, commitments and the like.
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actively doing. But with the growing appeal of cooperative and joint
enterprise among states, their disputes and disagreements in the future will
tend to disrupt their common enterprise, or even endanger the neighborly
approach to achieving common goals.
Thus, the Jessup, with some of the refinements proposed in this
paper, can first be fashioned into an instrument reaching beyond the
traditional moot court format to serve us in more effective ways, such as
the treatment of issues through alternative dispute settlement procedures.
Perhaps the future combinations might include both gaming and moot court
approaches so that the Jessup Moot Court, no longer rigidly tied to the
traditional confrontational and adversary entity, will be exploited for the
invention and adoption of more appropriate means for shaping our needed,
future law. 8 Or it may be made available for testing the work of the courts
themselves so that the current debate over the law promoting efforts of the
advisory opinion courts can reach more substantial results and even
substantive outcomes. 9  Assessment 'of such alternative settlement
procedures may ultimately lead us to using them in place of the traditional
courts and tribunals, or to supplement the work of those tribunals. 60 A
similar assessment of the application and use of general principles of law
as a means for strengthening the law of the global community may prove to
58. Cf. Myres McDougal and Michael Reisman, International Legal Essays, at 306:
In a community which recognizes knowledge as a crucial scope and base value, an
increasing numer of individuals will tend to perceive themselves as participants in the shaping
and sharing of intelligence.
As the pattern of science-based technology moves toward universality, traditional careers
are abandoned for careers generated by the new knowledge. [Citation omitted]
The two authors in further clarification suggest that competent and experienced policy
scientists may mediate between groups of physical scientists, for example, who have competing
claims to authority.
59. The use of the traditional adversary process of litigation is likely to require alternatives
to avoid the confrontational element of the tribunal. States assessing confrontation as an option
are quick to discern that other means of confrontation may be more desirable in attaining their
goals. The rise of the new institutions - fact-finding in the context of the law of war, the
standing consultative commission of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to recommend the various
paths to agreement, the institutions of numerous agencies and their authority to reach deeply into
promoting the process of negotiation, concession and bargaining - are all familiar techniques that
may replace adjudicatory and arbitrational procedures in the future. Numerous studies are
available on the advisory opinion, its potential for shaping future "legislation," the overlap of
problems concerning the concept of forum non conveniens, and so on.
60. Alternative dispute settlement procedures mentioned earlier in this paper may include
those that take place in an adversary setting, or those in a cooperative or friendly setting. The
latter may be designed to provide for greater party participation through the negotiation and
guided negotiation stage, and less of party confrontation in tribunals and adversary settings. Also
it is possible to design the procedures to afford greater participation in general in resolving
disputes while the enterprise is on-going so that the delays and other problems will not be raised,
or the obstacles of resentment will not occur.
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be as valuable.6' The call of these demands is therefore a call for
imaginative and innovative collegiate efforts that will best serve a global
community of growing interdependence. 2 For these purposes we can look
for analogies, simulations, and models in the municipal legal system,
particularly as it has grown to serve a more complex community, and a
greater, more incessant, interaction of activities. 6
61. The application and standing of general principles of law as law to be applied by the
International Court of Justice pursuant to its Statute's Article 38 has not been fully or
comprehensively explored either by the Court or by commentators. See STUDIES, supra note 1,
at 987-1019, for an important study of principles crucial to the framework of inquiry into the
decision process. The authors describe this framework - and then later the favored principles - as
follows:
I will rather simply recommend the continuous employment, in all our specialized roles, of
a certain process of thought - a frame of reference, a method of inquiry, a disciplined and
contextual mode of analysis - intended to promote the most effective use of our minds in bringing
to bear upon inquiry and specific choice the most relevant findings and techniques of
contemporary science and knowledge ....
Though my principal emphasis will be upon the importance of maintaining a flexible,
policy-oriented, contextual approach to all problems, in an effort to attain the most direct and
immediate contact with contemporary reality, I will develop in some detail certain suggested
alternatives of policy which express my appraisal of the relevant goals, conditions, trends, and
probable future developments. Id. at 990, 991.
The six primary principles are not principles of law in the traditional sense but are
organizing principles enabling the shift toward strengthening public order to meet desired
standards and outcomes, and to be facilitated by the adoption of common concepts. Id. at 999-
1010.
62. A part of these efforts may require the adoption of interviews of past contestants and
past participants in general to establish the Jessup moot courts and their refinements in the future.
It might also benefit from those who have had experience in legal disputes brought before the
International Court of Justice. The overall purpose of such efforts should be kept in view: the
Jessup need not be a simulation of the practice before the ICJ, and, in operation, it is not such a
simulation, but only an approximation. This leaves the way open to refining the competition and
its rules to make it serve more emphatically the learning and probing processes.
63. The essays in the collection An Introduction to Law, 76 HARV. L. REV. (1962) might
serve this purpose in part. The articles taken from various issues of the Review include Felix
Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1924) (looking into the
legislative implications of the advisory opinion and distinguishing the opinion from those that
involve directly the case or controversy in the jurisdictional principle for subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts); see also JAMES B. THAYER, ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE
AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 435 (1893) (considering the formal constitutive
or constitution building processes in American practice). Thayer's article also contains a study
with regard to advisory opinions. Id. at 459. For differing approaches, but showing the
flexibility and innovative quality of American law, see Robert H. Jackson, A President's Legal
Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353 (June 1953). President Franklin Roosevelt's own opinion as
to the Lend-Lease Bill that by-passed the Congress and perhaps the Constitution as well to
establish a binding obligation with Britain during the second World War. Id. Other approaches
are suggested in Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV.
LAW. REV. 193 (1952); the Brandeis dissent in Myers v. United States 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926);
and, BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
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I. INTRODUCTION
I define an in-class simulation as any classroom exercise that
attempts to depict real-life events. Simulations can be extremely elaborate
attempts to enact complex proceedings, or they can be as simple as having
two students spontaneously represent lawyers making opposing arguments
during class discussion. What follows in this piece is an attempt to
describe my own experience with certain kinds of simulations and to relate
from that experience some lessons on conducting simulations. For those
who conceptualize their simulations in ways very different from my own,
what I have to say may be of limited application. I have chosen to
organize this article using the metaphor of producing a show because I
believe it is evocative of the drama intrinsic to making simulations exciting
motivational tools for learning.
In Part II of this article ("Defining the Creative Mission"), I will
begin by identifying what my goals are in constructing simulations. In Part
III ("The Script"), I discuss the institutional settings in which I have
chosen to place my simulations ("Finding the Right Setting"); the
essentials of creating the simulation problem ("Identifying a Good Plot");
and constructing the procedural foundation for the simulation ("Defining
Plot Structure"). In Part IV ("Casting the Simulation"), I address how I
involve the maximum number of students in various active roles in the
simulation. In Part V ("Directing the Simulation"), I discuss my role in
helping students prepare for the simulation ("The Rehearsals") and in the
actual conduct of the simulation ("The "Performance"). In Part VI
("Costumes and Staging"), I suggest what students should wear during the
simulation as well as how to prepare the classroom for the simulation. In
Part VII ("The Reviews: Assessing the Performance"), I discuss how to
give feedback to the students on their performance ("Constructive
Evaluation") and how to grade the simulation ("The Grade"). Finally, in
Part VIII ("Avant Garde-Looking Toward the Future"), I briefly allude to
some creative possibilities for the next generation of simulations.
II. DEFINING THE CREATIVE MISSION
In-class simulations can be, and have been, usefully employed in
law school courses for some time. I believe they are particularly well-
suited to public international law. While there are many possible reasons
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for using simulations in international law, I am particularly concerned with
meeting three primary objectives: first, to encourage active, dynamic
learning; second, to improve student review and integration of doctrine;
and finally, to demonstrate the range and vitality of international law.
A. Active, Dynamic Learning
I find simulations a very useful device to encourage active,
dynamic learning. Simulations require students to think through legal and
policy issues to applied ends. By actually being responsible for
comprehensively applying the law in different contexts, students are
pushed to integrate material and think creatively in ways that go far beyond
discrete responses to traditional Socratic questioning. Simulations help
develop such legally important skills as the ability to think spontaneously,
to spot issues, to organize disparate ideas, and perhaps most importantly,
to take personal responsibility for a comprehensive real-life-like work
product.
B. Review and Integrate Doctrine
By concluding each substantive section of the course with a
simulation, I am able to meet the additional objective of getting students to
periodically review and integrate the doctrine covered in the course.
Compared to traditional cramming for semester-end exams, this approach
has the pedagogical advantage of encouraging students to assimilate the
course material in manageable components. Overall learning is enhanced
as students build throughout the course on their superior knowledge and
understanding of previous doctrine.
C. Demonstrate Range and Vitality of International Law
Finally, I believe that it is important for students to see that
international law, despite its differences from municipal law, is useful. I,
therefore, additionally employ simulations to demonstrate concretely the
range of uses for public international law. In the next section I will turn to
explaining how I do this through my choice of simulation settings.
III. THE SCRIPT
In scripting the simulation, the first step is to settle on an
institutional setting and subject matter for the simulation. One must then
formulate the plot or devise the scenario upon which the simulation will be
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based and then Define the Creative Mission or establish the procedures
which will give the plot form. What follows is first a summary of the
settings and subject matter I use in my own simulations and then a
discussion of the requirements for identifying and developing a successful
plot.
A. Finding the Right Setting
I demonstrate the range and vitality of international law by placing
my simulations in a number of different institutional settings where
international law is used. For example, my first simulation enacts
testimony before a United States House of Representatives subcommittee
where international human rights law and related policy issues are relevant.
The question for subcommittee consideration is whether to cut off United
States foreign aid to Kenya in response to violations of human rights. My
second simulation presents students with the need to use international law
in the conduct of international negotiations. In this simulation students
represent, respectively, either the Israeli government or the Palestine
Liberation Organization in negotiations leading up to the Oslo Accord. My
third simulation gives students the opportunity to use international law
before an international tribunal, specifically the International Court of
Justice. In this simulation students debate before the Court the legality of
the 1989 United States invasion of Panama. The fourth simulation requires
students to use international law to inform a United Nations Security
Council debate. In this simulation students recreate the Council's debate
over whether to authorize the use of force to eject Iraq from Kuwait.
Finally, the fifth simulation presents students with the opportunity to use
international law before a domestic tribunal. Students are charged with
arguing before the United States Supreme Court the legality of an
American assertion of adjudicative jurisdiction over a fugitive who was
abducted by American agents in Mexico.' These simulations, taken
together, present students with the opportunity to review many different
substantive areas of international legal doctrine as applied in a wide range
of different institutional settings.
1. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992).
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B. Formulating a Good Plot
1. Clash of Interests
As every writer knows, good character development requires a
sound plot. Student character development in the context of in-class
simulations is no different. The primary imperative is that the views that
students represent are well-defined and divergent. Without this, the
dialectical tension that allows for legal and related issues to be fleshed out
will be lacking. This divergence of views is intrinsic to certain types of
simulations such as oral arguments before courts. It, however, needs to be
consciously structured into other types of simulations. For example, from
my repertoire, divergence of views in hearings before congressional
committees or in Security Council meetings must be explicitly built into
simulations.
2. Fact or Fiction
The other primary issue that must be confronted in constructing
simulations is whether, or to what extent, scenarios should be based on
real events. I believe that using real events offers significant advantages.
Not only is it more interesting for students to deal with topical issues, but I
also believe students better use their scarce study time assimilating real-life
historical and social facts than details from artificial hypotheticals.
There are, however, several issues that must be confronted when
using real-life situations. When using fictitious scenarios, the professor as
creator has the absolute ability to define the contours of the problem and to
artificially decide exactly the amount of information that all students will,
on an equal basis, receive about that problem. Out of the complexity of
real-life problems, different students will quite possibly identify very
different facts and issues as relevant to the designated simulation. If this
happens, students will, in the conduct of the simulation, very likely end up
talking past each other. In the worst case, certain students will have no
information about, and even difficulty understanding, the situation as the
other students have defined it. Efforts to get the simulation on track will
then be very difficult. This can be avoided by tailoring the topic to the
requirements of the simulation and then carefully communicating to the
students the contours of the topic as adapted. This, however, is somewhat
of an art because over-definition will rob the students of the chance to
identify and characterize the issues on their own. When doing this, I
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therefore attempt to define in great detail the negative parameters of the
adapted topic - in other words, what the topic is not about. I then
describe in very general detail the range of possible legal issues that may
be involved.
When dealing with simulations based on real events, a related issue
that should be specifically discussed with students is the extent to which
license can be taken with the facts of the real situation as it exists. For
example, in the Israeli/PLO negotiations, to what extent are the students
limited to articulating positions that the parties have or would realistically
have articulated in the past? Likewise, in the Security Council debate over
ejecting Iraq from Kuwait, how restricted should the students be to
furthering positions like those of the countries they are representing? It is
important, I believe, that great liberties are not taken. Not only does part
of the interest and challenge of a simulation based on real life events lie in
the students attempting to identify and articulate the position of the parties
they are representing, but also the underlying structure of the simulation
game is dependent on the basic clash of positions between the various
parties. Having said this, I also believe that students must have some
flexibility in how they interpret these interests, so that their opportunity to
work creatively within the structure of the simulation is not inhibited.
Students should, for example, be able to come up with inventive solutions
to sticking points in negotiations. Again, the latitude that students have in
this area should be discussed with them before the simulation.
When reenacting proceedings such as appellate arguments,
negotiations, or meetings that have actually transpired, students must be
given an answer to the companion question of exactly how closely they
should follow or not follow the proceedings as they actually occurred. I
make it easy for students to see what happened. When students simulate
the Security Council debate over Resolution 678, authorizing the Gulf
War, I include the transcript from the relevant Security Council meeting in
their materials. Likewise, when the students simulate the argument before
the United States Supreme Court on the legality of exercising jurisdiction
over a man who was kidnapped from Mexico by agents of the United
States government, I include the Supreme Court briefs from the actual
Alvarez-Machain case. It goes without saying that students should not be
memorizing lines but should use references to actual proceedings, as a
guide to understanding the types of arguments that can be made as well as
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to styles of presentation so that they might better develop their own
independent approach.
Finally, negotiating between fact and fiction in real-life situations
can sometimes be an issue in the structuring of the simulations themselves.
For example, in the Panama simulation, I address the need to create the
context for litigation by postulating that Manuel Noriega escapes from
federal prison in the United States, reassumes power in Panama, and
brings a suit before the World Court against the United States. 2 A critical
component of such postulation, of course, is stating clearly what is fact and
what is fantasy. Even with respect to high profile events, one should not
assume that all students will necessarily make the distinction on their own.
C. Defining Plot Structure
Plot structure for purposes of this article connotes the procedural
underpinnings that give definition to the simulation. A primary question
that arises when addressing simulation procedures is how elaborate such
procedures should be. Depending upon what one wishes to accomplish,
simulations can be constructed either to approximate only a loose rendition
of procedural reality or to directly mimic real life intricate protocols,
conventions, and rules. Because I am trying to emphasize substantive
international law and not legal, diplomatic, or bureaucratic practice, I
generally keep procedure as minimal and simple as possible. No
simulation, however, can proceed without some basic defined procedures.
The instructor must think through in detail what those procedures are and
communicate them clearly to the students. Without a clear, shared idea of
procedure, the basic structure of the simulation will crumble.
The nature of the procedures, of course, depends upon the type of
simulation being offered. When, for example, simulations require oral
argument, the following procedural considerations need to be resolved: in
what ways may team members3 divide up their argument; 4 whether the
2. In addition to this scenario being of course, completely fanciful, this type of suit
would be impossible as the United States has withdrawn its acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction.
3. I use the typical moot court formula of assigning two students to advocate as
teammates for each side.
4. Team members can divide responsibilities between, for example, argument and
rebuttal, or alternatively, each one can be responsible for particular arguments. I usually leave it
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facts of the case should be repeated to the court;' if there is to be a rebuttal
(which I think is a good idea), how should time be allocated between
argument and rebuttal; how soon after an advocate begins her argument
should judges start their questioning; how should judges' questioning be
coordinated; whether judges should be required to issue opinions; if so, in
what form? I strongly emphasize that, whatever the nature of the
simulation, you need to identify and resolve all possible procedural issues
and clearly communicate these procedures to the students in advance of
their preparation for the simulation.
IV. CASTING THE SIMULATION
A. A Cast of Thousands?
Deciding who and how many students get to participate,
particularly in a larger class, is a difficult issue in simulations. As I have
discussed, one of the great advantages of simulations is that they provide
students with an opportunity for active learning. If only a few students out
of a very large class are actively involved in a simulation, this advantage is
easily defeated. I deal with this problem in several ways. First, if a class
becomes too large, I simply do not use simulations. If the class is small
enough to make simulations viable, I attempt to give major roles in each
simulation to as many students as is workable. I find that the upward limit
is usually about ten. For example, a litigation simulation can involve two
teams of. two litigants and a bench of six members. When I have the
Security Council debate the Gulf War, I find it workable to permit a few
more students to participate, allowing me to reproduce the fifteen members
of the Security Council plus Iraq.
B. Dealing With "Extras"
One technique I have developed, to keep the whole of the class at
least somewhat actively involved in the simulation, is to assign subsidiary
roles to the students who are not assigned major roles. For example, in
up to the students to decide how to allocate responsibility, but they should inform the Court as to
the division of responsibility at the beginning of their argument.
5. I feel that they should not. While learning how to present the facts effectively is a
valuable skill in itself, given the limited class time available, I prefer that students get right to the
argument.
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my Security Council deliberations, I have the members of the class who
are not directly involved play the role of the press from delegates'
respective countries. I give them time at the end of the class to ask
delegates pointed questions about their representation of their country's
interest. I instruct these students to view the proceedings actively and
critically with an eye towards their participation in the d6nouement. In my
Congressional testimony simulation, the class members who are not
directly involved act as non-subcommittee members of Congress
performing a function similar to that of the press above. Finally, to
democratize student involvement, I have every student play a primary role
in at least one simulation during the semester. To make sure the class gets
off on the right foot, I often recruit students to do the first simulation who
I think are likely to be the best performers. If they live up to my
expectations, a high initial standard is set.
V. DIRECTING THE STUDENTS
A. The Rehearsals
1. The Role of the Professor
What is required of the professor will differ with the various stages
of the simulation. Before students begin their preparation for the
simulation, the professor should either orally and/or in writing explain the
simulation and let students know what will be expected of them. In
addition to topics that have already been covered (clearly defining the
parameters of the simulation topic, identifying the extent to which students
can or should take liberties with the topic as defined, and clarifying the
simulation procedures and protocols), the professor should explain what
constitutes good student performance. While performance demands will
vary depending upon the general nature of the simulations being conducted
and the specific roles that individual students play, there are certain basics
of good performance that are constant and can be generally emphasized.
Clear understanding of the facts, coherent integration of legal doctrine,
rigorous application of facts to the law, and clear communication, both
orally and in writing (if there is to be a written component), are the basic
skills of lawyering that should, of course, always be emphasized.
In addition to giving general directions to the students as a whole
about the simulations, I believe that it is very helpful to meet with the
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simulation participants privately, before the simulation, to go over their
preparation and planned presentation. Any doctrinal problems the student
are having integrating the factual and legal issues, as well as tactical and
strategic issues, can all be addressed. This helps encourage advance
preparation and ensures that both the students and the professor are reading
from the same page. Obviously students representing conflicting parties
should be met with separately.
2. The Provision of Props
By props I mean the various research materials, which provide
relevant factual and legal background that may be given to the students in
advance of enacting simulations. I distribute sufficient props to the
students to conduct the simulation, while allowing them, if they desire, to
engage in further research on their own. I have settled on this approach as
a compromise between limiting student research to a closed universe of
provided materials and requiring that they engage in independent research.
Both the closed universe and independent research approach have
relative advantages and disadvantages. The closed universe approach helps
promote uniformity in student understanding and interpretation of events,
which, as I have already explained, is important to the coherence of the
simulation. In addition, it economizes on the amount of scarce study time
students must spend preparing for the simulation. This, however, denies
students a potentially valuable opportunity to practice research. By my
compromise, I hope to provide a corpus of materials that will define the
basic scope of the problem and allow students to focus their efforts on
assimilation and presentation of materials. However, I do not want to deny
interested students the opportunity to engage in focused research to
enhance their arguments.'
3. Requiring a Written Product
Another major rehearsal or advance preparation question is the
extent to which students should prepare a written product in anticipation of
the in-class event. The advantages of requiring such a product are two-
fold. Student preparation is probably the most important component of a
successful simulation, and requiring a written product in advance of the
6. As I have previously discussed, I independently attempt to be very clear about the
overall definition of the problem.
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classroom performance forces students to give thought to what they wish to
accomplish in the simulation and/or how they wish to accomplish it. A
writing assignment also has the potential to provide a valuable opportunity
for students to practice and improve their writing skills. I require students
to hand in a written product in advance of the in-class exercise, the
character of which varies depending upon the nature of the simulation, and
roles students are to play within it. For example, in judicial simulations I
require each student making an oral argument to submit a short brief that is
copied and distributed to opposing counsel and judges.7 I require each
student playing the role of a judge to submit a list of strategically organized
questions for potential use in oral argument.
B. The Performance
The professor's directorial role during the in-class portion of the
simulation must also be considered. I limit my direct interventions in the
in-class exercise to times when student interchanges begin to disconnect to
the point that effective communication has broken down. I will then
intercede remedially to try to give coherence to the discussion, on the
order of
Mary, can you see how Carol said X and John said Y and
that your point Z had nothing to do with the conversation
even though you were using the same linguistic categories.
Now try to make your idea responsive to what has been
said. Other people should attempt to do the same.
Mitigating against liberally intervening is the importance for
students to experience the independence of being responsible for their own
errors and for recovering from them without the benefit of a safety net.
On the other hand, given the need to make the class a beneficial learning
experience for all of the students, I find that it is best not to let the
discussion stray too far afield before intervening to give it structure. I
explain to the students before the simulation the role I will be playing
during the in-class exercise.
7. As in the real world, this helps all sides in their preparation and aids in the creation
of an intellectually coherent proceeding.
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VI. COSTUMES AND STAGING
I find that it is helpful to have students dress in character (i.e., in
business clothes). It encourages them to take the simulation seriously and
to stay in role, and it helps set the class off as something special.
Before class on the day of simulations, I will erect a simple set in
the front of the classroom. For example, for oral arguments I will
construct a simple courtroom with a podium from which counsel can
address the court, and tables behind which the judges and the lawyers can
sit. For a Security Council session, I will arrange the chairs for Council
members in a semi-circular formation in front of the class. So that the rest
of the students can best view the action, I place all seats so that none of the
participants have their backs to the audience.
VII. THE REVIEWS: ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE
A. Constructive Evaluation
I believe that an important part of the learning experience is for
students to receive constructive feedback. One colleague of mine who uses
simulations gives feedback privately in his office, so as to avoid the
prospect of students feeling embarrassed before their classmates. I give
feedback before the whole class (hopefully in as non-threatening a way as
possible) so that everyone can benefit from hearing my interpretation of
what transpired. In addition to making comments specific to particular
simulations, I emphasize the criteria I have previously laid out to the
students for general effectiveness: clear understanding and integration of
the facts and the legal doctrine, and effective communication.
B. The Grade
Student performance in simulations can be assessed for purposes of
giving constructive feedback and/or for purposes of helping determine
course grades. In the past, I have only made simulations one component
of the student class-participation grade, which itself only counts marginally
toward the final grade. I have not found that I have needed to use grades
as an incentive to make students take simulations seriously, and I have
preferred not to impose stress on students additional to the anxiety of
performing in front of their classmates. In addition, given the kinds of
simulations I have constructed, I would find it difficult to apply fair and
uniform grading standards to students whose roles may have required
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varying levels of participation. I know some professors who exclusively
use simulations of the moot court variety and make student performance in
them a major part of the students' final grade. They have reported success
in doing so.
VIII. AvANT GARDE - LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE
What I have described in this paper is only one particular approach
to creating simulations. While it is beyond the purpose of this paper to
seriously explore alternatives I have not tried, I would like to conclude by
suggesting possibilities that technology makes feasible for international law
simulations of the future. I have always thought it strange that despite the
alleged universality we claim for international law we, through our use of
national casebooks and other materials, maintain a curiously parochial
approach to teaching the subject. Applying communications technology to
simulations could help us overcome this provincialism. American students
could have joint simulations with students from other countries via the
Internet. One of my colleagues in an advanced business class is trying
something similar with students from elsewhere in the United States.
Direct audio-visual contact is even a possibility. While this is now
available in a rather primitive form over the Internet, existing non-Internet
video conferencing technology makes high quality transmission possible.
For example, my law school, which has two campuses, utilizes an
interactive video system to link classrooms and other activities between our
campuses. Such equipment (which uses phone lines) can be adapted for
international use.' Advanced communications technology will undoubtedly
have a major impact on legal education. This should be particularly true in
international law courses, where communication between the remotely
situated peoples of the various states that make up the global village is- at
the heart of the endeavor.
8. The national telephone lines of the participants must be capable of carrying digital
communications.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Crimes of war pose an inherent contradiction. They demand
justice, but we find ourselves uneasy at putting our enemies on trial. Since
Nuremburg, such issues have challenged our morality and confronted our
conscience. Is it that we recoil from the spoils of the victor, taking
illegitimate advantage of the vanquished? Is it that we do not wish to look
too deeply at the crimes of others fearing in the process that our own may
be discovered? Or is it that we do not wish to face the reality of what we
do to eachother in war?
There are always reasons why it seems better to leave matters
alone, one reason being to avoid disturbing an uneasy peace. For
example, after the Second World War the Ratline, as it became known,
was a route to freedom for many of our former enemies. Soldiers,
scientists, butchers and torturers, who shortly before had been our sworn
enemies, were welcomed to our shores. The function of the Ratline was
* Peter Watson, B.A., LL.B., SSC, is a partner in the firm of Levy & McRae located in
Glasgow, Scotland.
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not to protect the innocent, but rather to conceal the guilty. As stated by
Philip Noel Baker, "In our view, the punishment of war criminals is more
a matter of discouraging future generations than of meting out retribution
to every guilty individual. It is now necessary to dispose of the past as
soon as possible."'I
But the past was not disposed of, nor has it ever been disposed of
in any of the wars and conflicts which followed. We can look at wars
from Vietnam to Bosnia. The cry after the war is the same. It is a cry for
justice; an eternal cry that will not be silenced. A cry which may be
ignored in the short term, but at what price? Why does this cry for justice
haunt us? Perhaps the answer is a selfish one: The love of justice in most
men is simply the fear of suffering injustice.
The case I am about to discuss is a curious case. It can be termed
many things: an indescribable brutality; an unbelievable horror; an
acknowledgment of a forgotten holocaust; one of the -greatest detective
stories of the latter part of the 20th Century; the first British War Crimes
trial since William the Conqueror; and, most importantly, a moment when
a nation heard the cry for justice.
That same nation, Great Britain, which had at one moment in
history stood alone against the might and power of Hitler, isolated in
Europe as the last bastion of freedom and decency, was yet a home for
those who had committed the worst atrocities imaginable. Britain the
Victor had become Britain The Nazi Safe House. Then, a T.V. company
and a journalist, unlikely champions of justice you may think, responded to
a cry for justice which had been met with a deafening silence for almost
half a century. Two documentaries were made, facilitating a change in
Britain law. For the first time the retrospective prosecution of crimes
committed outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United Kingdom was
allowed. More significantly, Britain faced the issue of war crimes: crimes
against humanity, crimes against men, crimes against women and children
- the forgotten holocaust in Lithuania.
On a more personal note, this was the most important, rewarding
case I have ever dealt with, and also, unfortunately, the most horrific case
I have ever dealt with. If an attorney is fortunate, she will have a chance
to do something that has worldwide significance. She will have the chance
to do something honorable. Simply, she will have a moment to do
something right and worthwhile. This case was such a moment for me.
1. Philip Noel Baker, 1948 British Cabinet Minister.
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II. THE STORY
A. Enacting the War Crimes Act
In 1986 Robert Tomlinson was a television journalist for Scottish
Television, Scotland's major independent television company. As an
award-winning journalist, he was well regarded within his profession. He
noticed newspaper clippings suggesting that Britain had up to seventeen
Nazi War Criminals living in the country under false names. One was said
to live in Scotland - so the story began.
Like Watergate, this story was only expected to be a short piece
that would fill airspace on a slow news night. Instead, it led to Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher fighting one of the greatest battles of her
political life to force a change in our law which was said to go to the heart
of our unwritten constitution. It saw at first a governmental defeat, and
then ultimately the use of the Parliament Act for the second time in British
Parliament history to overrule the opposition of the House of Lords.
Tomlinson discovered a man called Gecas was living in Edinburgh
who, it was said, was a war criminal. It was claimed he had participated
in the hangings and shootings of men, women, and children, in the mass
exterminations of Jews in Lithuania and he was on the wanted list of the
Weisenthal Centre. Britain accepted him to her shores by the Ratline, and
he lived comfortably in the Scottish Capital, safe from prosecution, since
we could not prosecute a man for a crime which took place in 1941 in
another country.
The story became much more important. Gecas had been
interviewed by the United States Department of Justice, Office of Special
Investigation (O.S.I.) in relation to their efforts to deport members of
Gecas' battalion living in the United States. The Soviet Union sought
extradition of Gecas in relation to their own war crimes investigation yet
Britain not only gave him a home, we gave him protection from those who
sought to punish him. This seemed bizarre to Tomlinson. He left for the
Soviet Union with a film crew. Months later two documentaries would be
shown across the United Kingdom: Britain - Nazi Safe House and Crimes
of War. The latter became an international award winner.
This effect was one of disbelief and shock. Parliament debated.
Newspapers chased after Gecas. The conscience of a nation was
challenged. Many said, as the Government had in 1945, that these things
were best left alone. What was the point of stirring up old memories after
so many years? What could be done now? How could we prove these
allegations? Perhaps these allegations were false anyway. However, the
documentaries revealed some of the evidence gathered by the KGB, and
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held by the Soviet Union. Survivors had been interviewed. Some who
had taken part in these horrible events had spoken on camera. The United
States was then, as it is today, pursuing soldiers of the same battalion.
Enough was enough. Margaret Thatcher, a Prime Minister with her own
view of what Britain stood for under her leadership, moved to do the
unthinkable - change the law which prevented retrospective prosecution, a
protection deeply rooted in our unwritten constitution. In the face of great
opposition, and after much debate, the War Crimes Act was enacted.2
B. The Gecas Gamble: A Response to the Threat of Prosecution
Gecas now in his late 70's was astute. He had a plan. The Gecas
Gamble was clever. He decided to sue Scottish Television. He had just
successfully sued the London Times, which had been unable to overcome
the legal presumption that what they printed was untrue. Fortified with
this victory, he gambled Scottish Television would also fail to prove the
truth of their allegations. He gambled that Scottish Television would never
get its witnesses to Britain, being that the witnesses were old or dead. He
gambled that many obstacles lay in the path of Scottish Television,
including that the documents were in the hands of the KGB. If there was a
civil trial it would allow him to argue that any criminal trial should not
take place due to the prejudice created by the civil case.
It was a clever answer to all his problems. He issued his writ -
his luck was in! The Soviet Union was in political turmoil and with it the
role and influence of the KGB was waning just at a time when their
cooperation as a source of evidence was crucial. The new emergent
Lithuania was not keen to become involved in raking over old wounds,
exposing its role in this holocaust. In any event, the country had more
important matters before them.
In July 1990 the writ was served; the battle had begun. The first
question when sued is, do you settle? Fortunately this proved easy to
answer, even for the insurers of Scottish Television. The allegations were
so substantial that no one would be party to such a deal. This decision
made, the hard part began. We had no idea how hard.
C. The Investigation
The first team of lawyers and investigators were dispatched to
Lithuania. In January 1991 the team was hard at work in the Lithuania
capital, Vilnius. They were awakened at about 2:00 a.m. on a Sunday
morning by the rumbling of tanks. The Soviet Union was breaking up;
2. War Crimes Act, 1991, ch. 13 (Eng.).
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their army of occupation was leaving, and with it their grip on power. The
KGB, who had been supplying information and finding witnesses, sent 4
cars to Lietuva Hotel to evacuate our team to Russia. All of our sources of
evidence; leads; and witnesses had gone.
Our team returned to Scotland, where the case against Scottish
Television gathered pace. The time available to prove our case was
narrowed to a matter of months. We needed a plan. The plan was the
most ambitious and expensive I have ever been involved with. It required
spending 2 million dollars in 5 months.
The 12th Lithuanian Police Battalion, Gecas' Battalion, had spread
itself across the globe as the war ended. This was both an obstacle and an
opportunity. Yes, we had the difficult task of finding them, but they were
now isolated old men perhaps easier to extract information from.
We got help from the O.S.I. in the United States, the Weisenthal
Centre in Israel, and many others. We dispatched a team of researchers to
Nuremberg, and then hired an excellent firm of German attorneys. Names
began to appear. Within 4 months we had inquiries running in Russia, the
Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, West
Germany, Australia, Israel, Lithuania, Canada and the United States. We
had attorneys in most of these countries as well as teams of researchers -
easy to see you can spend 2 million dollars!
The task was just a little daunting! We were investigating murders
which happened in 1941, looking for evidence which would hold up in
court. We decided the plan for evidence collection had to be twofold:
documentary evidence and witness evidence. Given the passage of time
and our pessimism about finding reliable eyewitness testimony, we needed
documentary evidence especially.
The horrible story began to unfold as we ploughed our way
through reams of documents and historical records. Some sources were
well known and documented, such as the records at Nuremberg, but some,
like the papers recovered from sealed vaults of the now former KGB
offices in Lithuania, were a first.
Our hope was to uncover the origins of the 12th Lithuanian
Battalion, and discover its role in what had taken place. We sought to
document a history of killings, but found instead a holocaust. A picture
began to emerge.
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1. Documentary Evidence: A Story Told by Old Reports and
Orders3
Gecas was the commander of the 12th Lithuanian Auxiliary Police
Service Battalion. He was in command in Kaunas in 1941 and moved with
his Battalion to Minsk in October 1941.
The German military command at Minsk associated Jews with anti-
German partisan activity. It was the military view that the destruction of
the Jews' was necessary for the proper pacification of the area. In August
1941 Himmler announced in Minsk that Hitler had declared as policy the
annihilation of Jews and this was to include men, women and children.
When the 12th Lithuanian Battalion arrived in Minsk the German military
command had two complementary grounds, as they saw it, for killing
Jews, that of pacification and to fulfill the policy of Hitler.
It was observed with the Jews that they often leave their
residences in the flat country, probably emigrating towards
the south, attempting to evade the operations initiated
against them. Since they are all still making common
cause with the communists and partisans, the total
elimination of this element alien to the nation is being
undertaken ....
During a purge in the area Slutsk-Kleck by the 1 1th Police
Battalion 5,900 Jews were shot.5
By persuading the Jews it was for their own safety, the Germans at
this stage aimed to concentrate the Jews of Kaunas into a ghetto. The
marking of all Jews with a yellow Star of David was required. Prior to the
German invasion, about 20% of the population of Kaunas had been Jews.
After what took place, they were virtually wiped out.
We established that 150 Lithuanian officials had been assigned to
screen all towns, even prison camps, to ensure the arrest of Jews and have
them taken to concentration camps where they were subject to what was
3. For our purposes one feature of the Germans was to become crucial in underpinning
and making possible our eventual success. I refer to a preoccupation with keeping detailed
records. In the account to follow, various reports collected during our investigation will be
discussed.
4. When references were made to Jews, this referred to the indiscriminate gathering of
Jews of both sexes and all ages.
5. See supra text accompanying note 4.
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described as special treatment, namely execution. Reference was made in
a Report in 1941 to it being possible very quickly in Lithuania: to bring
Lithuania circles to self-cleanse themselves so that the complete exclusion
of Jews from official life was attained.
Self cleansing meant an action undertaken by indigenous people,
rather than the Germans, to kill Jews in their territory without the active
participation of Germans. The report went on record with some
satisfaction that spontaneous programs were occurring in all cities.
In what has become known as the Jager Report, Jager, the
commander of Eisatzkommando No. 3, recorded that by October 1941
about 70,000 souls had been executed. This figure includes killings
outside Kaunus in many other small towns in Lithuania. Jager records on
December 1, 1941:
I can now say that Einsatzkommando 3 has achieved the
objective of solving the Jewish problem in Lithuania.
There are no longer any Jews in Lithuania with the
exception of these Jews and their families under forced
labour.
I also wish to kill these Jews and their families. However,
this brought sharp criticism from Civil Authorities . . . and
the Army, resulting in an express direction: 'These Jews
and their families may not be shot.' This was because of
the economic considerations which required their services
in the occupation, for the moment at least.6
So far as the killing of Jews was concerned, it was envisaged that
the Jews would disappear completely by the end of 1942. By letter dated
August 7, 1941, Major Franz Lecthtaler wrote from Kaunas to the
Lithuanian Commandant requesting two new battalions. A specific request
was made and approved for the transfer of Lieutenant Gecevicius7 (Gecas).
He became the Commander of Platoon 3 of the 2nd Company of the 12th
Lithuanian Battalion. We established that on August 27, 1941, Gecas was
on the job.
By order No. 42 dated October 6, 1941, Gecas and his men were
ordered to the areas of Minsk, Borisov and Slutsk, reference being made in
the orders to the final extermination of Bolshevik partisans. Within 4 days
of arrival in the area, Gecas' battalion was in action in the area of
Rudensk. Six-hundred thirty persons, including communists, Jews and
6 Id.
7. Once in Britain, the Lieutenant changed his name to Gecas.
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other suspicious elements without identity papers were recorded as having
been shot. Jews were in a category of their own, and only had to be Jews
in order to be shot. There was no way that a Jew could demonstrate a
right to live. It was understood Jews were to be shot partly because of a
presumption that they were connected with the partisans, but mainly
because Jews were to be killed in any case.
By October 1941 Gecas' battalion was primarily used to shoot
Jews and communists. In a Report of the Smilovicze Operation of October
14, it is recorded that 1,300 heads were liquidated. The victims were
specified as Jews, communists and elements hostile to Germans.
A further order dated October 16, 1941, refers to operations
involving Gecas' battalion carried out in the Rudensk area. Specifically, it
refers to 800 partisans, communists, Jews and other suspicious riff-raff
who were detained and shot.
There was reference to the clearing out of a civilian prison camp in
Minsk where 625 were liquidated. On the 18th of October, another prison
camp was cleansed and 1,150 communists were shot. On October 21st,
two companies of the police battalion were involved in an operation in
Kojdanow, where 1,000 Jews and communists were liquidated.
When we examined the Reports of the Wermacht Commander for
this area and time period, we could establish with mathematical certainty
that six German or German Allied troops had been killed in combat with
partisans and 10,940 partisans were captured. Of those captured, 10,431
were shot. It was also recorded that during a purge in Slutsk - Kleck an
additional 5,900 Jews were shot.
There was great controversy over the massacre at Slutsk. On
October 30, 1941, Carl, the Commissioner for Slutsk, wrote to the
Commissioner General at Minsk as a follow-up to a telephone call on the
27th of October. He complained that a Lieutenant of a Police Battalion
from Kaunas appeared at 8:00am on the 27th October explaining that he
had an assignment to effect the liquidation of all Jews in Slutsk within two
days. Carl had demanded to discuss the matter, but was told this was not
possible. He was told that this action was to be carried out in all towns,
and that two days had been allocated for Slutsk. Within those two days the
town of Slutsk was to be cleared of Jews. There were an estimated 7,000
Jews in Slutsk. Carl protested violently, pointing out that such a
liquidation of Jews must not be allowed to happen in such an arbitrary
manner. He tried to intervene, but went on to record that all Jews without
exception were taken out of the factories and shot or deported in spite of an
apparent agreement to the contrary. We later established that deported
meant taken just outside of town, out of earshot, to areas where pits were
prepared and then they were shot.
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Carl went on to complain that the shooting was chaotic. He
referred to it as a picture of horror. He complained of indescribable
brutality. He reported that some souls shot and buried in pits had not died,
but had dug themselves out of their graves.' Carl concluded by asking
that the police battalions be kept away from him in the future.
2. Eyewitnesses
We had reconstructed the history of the period, pieced together
from documents available from many sources. We painted for the first
time an outline of a largely forgotten holocaust. We were ably assisted
throughout by Professor Hilberg of Chicago University, a world authority
on the holocaust. He sent us out to find the people to prove the picture
thus far sketched. We now had to find witnesses to test the documents
against recollections; confirm that our reconstruction was right; and prove
that we were not being conned by some fiendish KGB plot of
misinformation - as Gecas was ultimately to claim in court as a last
recourse.
This task was not easy. With the fall of the Soviet Union the KGB
were no longer in place to provide witnesses. We started from the lists we
had. I had a very fortunate meeting with a former KGB officer in need of
some work. A short commercial exchange delivered a name; it was an
early and exciting lead. He had been in a Police Battalion and was in a
position to confirm or deny the horror revealed in the host of reports and
documents now amassed. We set out for Alytus to meet a monster.
Instead, we met, as in all cases, a grandfather. We met ordinary men.
We learned the holocaust was not the act of madmen or butchers from hell;
the holocaust hid been at the hands of ordinary men.
a. Lenous Stonkus
Lithuania was as short of food and fuel as it was of evidence! We
had to travel out of Vilnius to find our witness Stonkus, and after a four
hour drive in a car with no heater in temperatures of minus 20 degrees
Celsius, we reached the address we had been given. Our first lesson in the
murky duplicitous world of post-communist Lithuania was about to be
learned.
8. We were even able to find an eyewitness who fully implicated Gecas in the Sluntsk
massacre. The eyewitness, which we thought might prove difficult to obtain, and even if
obtained, probably so unreliable as to be worthless, turned out to be quite the opposite. This
involved, for the first time in the United Kingdom, persuading the Court to travel from Scotland
and sit in Lithuania and hear some eyewitness testimony. The logistics of this alone could keep
me speaking for another day. I leave that for another time!
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We knocked on a door flanked by our translator and asked to speak
with Lenous Stonkus. "He's dead," we were told. We were about to
leave when I noticed an unhealthy interest in our presence being shown by
a neighbor who was ostensibly working under the hood of his car. I
approached, and, in a classic moment of Scottish legal thinking, extracted
a ten dollar bill. I ripped the bill in half and had my translator explain that
I wanted to meet Stonkus. The other half of the bill was his if this could
be arranged. Ten dollars represented about two months wages, more than
enough to persuade any neighbor to inform on another, especially in a
country where informing on your neighbors was part of the culture.
Within minutes we were on the road to the Stonkus hideaway. He had
served twemty years in Siberia for war crimes at the hands of the Russians.
The ex-KGB man who had sold me his name had also sold Stonkus a
warning we were coming! The lesson was learned. Always ask how dead
is dead?
Stonkus gave us background information and further names. He
confirmed from our list who he thought was alive and those he knew to be
dead. Perhaps for the first time since he had been released from a Siberian
prison he confronted his past. Almost mechanically he recounted the sins
of his youth. When asked about the Jews he looked both ashamed and
fearful - fearful perhaps of retribution yet to come. I have no doubt the
chill of Siberia revisited him at that moment. We left Stonkus frightened
and surrounded by his grandchildren. We had wanted to hate him, detest
him, and see him shamed. Instead, we left behind an old man - a
grandfather loved by his family. The experience dissipated our anger, and
left us confused.
b. Antanas Aleksynas
In our continuing search for eyewitnesses, one document we had
trawled from our research proved crucial. A railroad manifest contained,
with true obsessive detail, the movements of troops, including the seating
assignment of each soldier. When placed against a map from that time
period, which revealed many villages long since destroyed or renamed, we
could use the manifest to trace the journey of the 12th Lithuanian Police
Battalion. This confirmed the names of the soldiers, but we discovered
something much more important. The train had stopped at places where
we already knew massacres had taken place. Closer examination and
further research revealed that this train took the 12th Battalion on its
Journey of Death. Each time the train dropped off the battalion whether
for a day or for a few days,, the local town records would reveal a
massacre. They would then re-board and this machine of destruction
would move on. We sought out the soldiers who had traveled this journey.
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Antanas Aleksynas was such a soldier. We found him, now in his
late 70's, living in a shack outside Kaunus, bringing up two young children
following the death of his son and daughter-in-law in a road accident. He
had been at the very heart of what we were interested in. He was
remarkably frank and forthcoming. He was prepared to give evidence
against Gecas, but on two conditions. First, he would not leave Lithuania.
Second, he needed a pig sitter for his pigs! The dollar can achieve
wonders in such countries. It did so in this instance. A pig sitter was
found.
He identified Gecas as the Platoon Commander, he confirmed that
Gecas spoke German and took all his orders from the Germans. On their
first operation they were taken to a small township. Local Russian police
pointed to Jewish residents. Gecas ordered Alexsynas and others to round
them up. The Jews were taken to a gravel pit - men, women and
children, about twenty or thirty in all. They were told to lie down, and
then, they were shot. On another occasion they were taken to a POW
camp. The POWs were taken out of the camp to pig pits. Two pits were
dug. They measured about fifteen to twenty meters long, two meters wide
and 1.5 meters deep. After the pits were dug, the lorries went back with
the prisoners and returned, this time with Jews. The Jews were lined up at
the pits and shot. Afterwards, the officers would go and check for
survivors and shoot them, finishing them off. Hundreds were involved on
this occasion. Gecas was there giving orders. The killing started in the
afternoon and went on until the evening.
Aleksynas described the two day operation at Slutsk as being part
of a long catalogue of horror which involved the whole battalion. Gecas
was in charge of his platoon. On this occasion over 1,000 men, women
and children were killed. He went through incident after incident
chronicling the mass annihilation of the Jews. He recalled that the order
given by Gecas was to shoot at your own discretion.
c. Mignos
Mignos was the next to be interviewed, another grandfather,
another ordinary man. He too remembered the operation at the pits. He
agreed to give evidence. He identified Gecas, and gave an equally chilling
and detailed account of these horrors.
d. Goga
Goga, another soldier, was actually born in the United States, but
returned to Lithuania as a young child. He was very articulate and precise.
He was to travel to Scotland to give his evidence. He recalled an incident
in Rudensk at the end of November 1941, where the battalion had traveled
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by train. They were told to encircle a town, and to round up the Jews -
men, women and children. Within forty minutes the Jews had been herded
to a gravel pit and shot. He remembered the whole battalion going to a
POW camp in Minsk, where close to 10,000 prisoners were held. The
prisoners were to be taken to pits and shot. The Germans formed a
corridor, which the POWs would be forcefully marched through in small
groups. Leaving their clothes behind, each group was taken to a pit, and
then. shot in the nude. This operation took about two days. When the
soldiers had finished, the officers stood at the pits, and finished off those
alive. It took place like a conveyor belt operation. All ten thousand souls
perished.
e. Mrs. Pickholz
As I indicated at the outset, we had investigations going on almost
anywhere we thought we could find a Lithuanian from this time frame.
Our luck was now turning. We found a key witness in Florida, Mrs.
Pickholz.
In 1941, she was sixteen, and living in Slutsk. Since her mother
was dead, she lived with her father, three younger sisters, and her five-
year-old brother. The Germans entered Slutsk in June 1941. Restrictions
were immediately placed on all Jews. In August her father was taken away
never to be seen again. She was then head of the household. On October
26, 1941, she was working when soldiers suddenly flooded the town. Jews
were being rounded up. She saw her own family amongst those rounded
up. One of her younger sisters saw her and tried to run to her, but was
struck down by soldiers with rifles. These soldiers were Lithuanian. She
blacked out.
She awoke to find herself concealed in a barrel; she had been
hidden by friends. As she peered out between the cracks in the barrel, she
watched and listened to shooting going on. Later, she got out and found
many had been taken to camps nearby. She went to the camps, not
wearing her Star of David. She was to find all were shot. She never saw
her sisters or brother again. No Jewish children were left alive. The
soldiers left. This all took place in only two days.
f. Luba Fisk- The schoolteacher '
9. We had many other leads and investigations, some fruitful and some not so fruitful.
Some like this one proved to be of no use to our case, but revealed another chapter of horror and
human misery that must be told today if for no other reason than to bare witness to this human
tragedy.
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I received information from a confidential source that there
possibly existed a key witness in Israel. All I was told was that she was a
retired school teacher in her 70s, Lithuanian, and had one leg. That was
it. I contacted a law firm that my firm uses in Tel Aviv, and placed my
request. They hired a detective. Within forty-eight hours I got a call that
such a woman was living in Afula in lower Galilee. We had been lead to
believe she might identify Gecas as being involved in killings at the 9th
Fort in Kaunas, a grim Lithuanian Belsen where thousands had been put to
death.
Bob Tomlinson and I flew out to Ben Gurian Airport and rushed
by car to Afula. We were met by Luba Fisk who indeed was a one legged
retired school teacher originally from Lithuania. She told a heart-
wrenching story. She had been a linguist; was married; and had a four-
year-old child. They were confined to a ghetto. One day the soldiers
arrived and people were being taken away in buses. The soldiers said that
if the women could raise enough money or fetch enough gold, they would
spare the children. They all ran in a frenzy bringing all they could find. It
was taken, but so were the children and their parents. At the place of
execution they were lined up to have their papers checked. The soldiers
discovered that Luba spoke languages; there was a hasty discussion, and
she was asked to stand to the right. Her four-year-old son was taken to
rejoin the others. Moments later he was shot as she looked on. Luba lost
her husband as well. She is now remarried and living in Israel.
Regrettably for us this was an operation unconnected with Gecas.
However, it was, and still remains for me, a chilling memory of a woman
reliving pain beyond my imagination.
3. Piecing Together A Horrific Puzzle of Information
We moved on and unearthed all that Gecas had ever said in every
interview and in every form ever recorded. He had been interviewed by
the O.S.I. years before, and had given a deposition. He had subsequently
given some stories to the press. We revealed a chain of lies, deceit,
contradiction, and inconsistencies beyond repair or explanation. We
compared these pathetic lies to our documents and witnesses as we
prepared for court.
In Lithuania and in Scotland, it all began to come together: the
proof of murders which occurred before I was born; the names of those
killed; the names of the killers; and the records of the destruction. A
holocaust was uncovered and revealed in all its horror.
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III. CONCLUSION
We won our case. The judgment was uncompromising.
I am clearly satisfied on the evidence as a whole upon the
standard of proof agreed to apply to this case that the
pursuer participated in many operations involving the
killing of innocent Soviet citizens, including Jews in
particular, in Byelorussia during the last three months of
1941, and in doing so committed war crimes against Soviet
citizens who were old men, women and children. I further
hold it proved that the pursuer was the Platoon
Commander of the platoon in which Antanas Aleksynas
served . . and that that platoon participated specifically
in the [operations mentioned in the documentary] .... "10
But what did all this achieve? It did not achieve a prosecution, for
reasons I yet do not comprehend, the Prosecution authorities decided there
was insufficient evidence for a criminal trial. Did we have a pyrrhic
victory, serving only to open up old wounds, excite the press, and cause
grief? Or did we serve the purpose of telling a story lost on a generation
which looked on these matters as only history?
My answer is the answer given to me by Professor Draper who
had given us much help. I hope you will agree with me it is the only
answer:
If you, but think, of the talent, of the geniuses, of the
scientists, of the artists, of the writers, of the poets, and of
the tens of scores of thousands of ordinary, decent human
beings who perished in these genocide acts, one is moved
to say: By God, what right does any man order this to be
done to people? It is so ghastly that I do not think that
posterity can afford to forget it."
10. Gecas v. Scottish Television PLC, Sess. Cas., July 17, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Scot Library, Cases File.
11. Draper, Law Professor (1991).
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"If you're a scientist, you believe that it is good to find out how the world
works; that it is good to find what the realities are; that it is good to turn
over to mankind at large the greatest possible power to control the world
- Robert Oppenheimer on the Manhattan Project
"Thou shalt have no other gods before me ... 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a child, about eight years old, playing touch football in the
front yard with a group of neighborhood kids; a model youth, cute, kind,
and relatively bright for his age. A pass is overthrown and bounces into
the street; a street, like any other, located in the middle of a quiet
neighborhood, in any city, anywhere. As the child chases the ball, he runs
into the path of an unexpected car driving down the road. Killed on
impact, the parents of the child, their only child, are devastated. They are
unable to have anymore children, and feel they have lost their one and only
chance to have a child. After a few months, the grief stricken parents are
approached by a local fertility clinic and are given a proposal that could
afford the couple an opportunity to not only have another child, but to have
their child recreated. The procedure they described would use stem cells
from the blood taken from the woman's umbilical cord, which was
extracted and preserved at the time of her child's birth. The cells would
then be placed inside an enucleated egg cell and implanted in the woman's
uterus, where it would be allowed to develop naturally. Although wary of
the process, but still stricken over the loss of their only child, the couple is
assured of the safety of the procedure and elects to proceed. Nine months
later, a beautiful baby boy and identical genetic copy of the deceased child,
is born.
Now imagine this same situation, but instead of promising an
identical genetic copy of the deceased child, the clinic offers to manipulate
the genes and perhaps produce a girl, or another boy, but one with blue
eyes and blond hair. Even more convenient, the clinic has a special menu
allowing the couple to choose which traits the child will have, with choices
available for intelligence, hair color, physical build, etc. Instead of being
hit by a car, say the child dies due to a serious genetic disease. The
opportunity may be available to produce an exact clone of the child, less
those genes that are susceptible to the disease, or if need be change the sex
of the child so that the disease will not become viable. Is this the future of
child birth which we can expect with regard to the new technologies now
under public and legislative debate?
Man is on the threshold of a new world, in which the ability to
alter the very essence of humanity and its interaction with nature, is upon
us. Through the science of genetic engineering the manipulation of the
genetic composition of man, and that of all future generations, has
advanced to the point where serious rational thinking must direct the
potential course of progress in the areas of cloning and genetic technology.
The goal of science is to produce the truth, and not peace of mind. Due to
the conflict with moral, ethical, legal, and social issues, the pursuit of
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scientific research must be limited within the bounds declared by all of
mankind. These technologies, if applied to humans, will significantly alter
the direction of the whole of humanity, in its efforts to improve upon the
overall health and condition of society. For those who are concerned with
the future debate over human rights, awareness of the potential scientific
and technological advances must be achieved. If not, a lack of
understanding on which questions should be asked, and what answers must
be given will ensue. The sooner these issues are brought to the attention of
every individual, the more beneficial the technology will become to all of
humanity.
II. ADVANCEMENTS IN CLONING TECHNOLOGY
Experimentation with animals utilizing cloning technology has
been going on since the 1950's when scientists began to attempt the cloning
of frogs. These early scientists used a procedure in which they took the
nuclei, which harbors the DNA, of cells from tadpoles and in turn
implanted them into nuclei-free fertilized frog eggs.I Attempts using this
process resulted in many of the frogs dying soon after emerging from the
eggs, and those that survived were grotesquely deformed or sterile. 2
Within twenty years, scientists reached the level of successfully cloning
frogs, although prior to reaching adulthood the frogs were killed.3 As the
success in the cloning of frogs was achieved, scientists began to
experiment with the cloning of other animals. During the 1980's, the first
cattle, lambs, and piglets were cloned from the splitting of embryos.,
However problems still exist. For example, cattle embryos grow twice as
large as normal in the womb; sometimes killing both the calf and the
motheri
A major breakthrough was accomplished in the 1980's by Robert
McKinnell at the University of Minnesota. Mckinnell was able to clone
frogs from 2- to 4-celled embryos using nuclear transfer.6 Scientists
extracted the nucleus from an embryonic cell of one species of frog and
fused it with an egg from another species of frog whose nucleus was
1. Charles Seabrook, ScienceWatch A Mirror Science, ATLANTA J. & ATLANTA CONST.,
Mar. 9, 1997, at C4.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Clair Wood, Here a Sheep, There a Sheep .. And Human, BANGOR DAILY NEWS
(Me.), Feb. 28, 1997.
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previously removed.' The resulting frog was an exact clone of the species
providing the nuclear material. By 1984, nuclear transplantation had been
used to successfully clone mice.,
In 1993, the advancements accomplished in cloning techniques
reached world wide attention with the announcement by researchers at
George Washington University. Utilizing an embryo splitting procedure,
scientists created four individual human embryos by splitting a single
human embryo at the 4-cell stage. Once the original embryo was split,
each individual embryo was covered with an artificial zona pellucida, the
protein covering an egg, and allowed to continue to divide, with some
reaching the 32-cell stage.9 Upon reaching the 32-cell stage, the embryos
would have been able to be implanted into a woman's uterus. 0 In order to
ensure that these embryos would not be able to develop into human beings,
scientists selected embryos that were fertilized twice. Thus, these embryos
co ntained an extra set of chromosomes which ensured that they would die
sometime during their development." Theoretically, this technique could
potentially be used to create an infinite amount of clones, all derived from
one original cell, and developed into genetically identical human beings.
Although these embryos were never implanted, and were destroyed after
six days, the breakthrough caused a public uproar over the ethical
implications of the procedure. '2
According to scientists involved with this research, one of the
purposes for proceeding with this procedure was to elicit public debate
over whether this type of cloning is acceptable.'3 Although the scientists
were successful in gaining the attention that this research attained, the
responses may not have been exactly what they were looking forward to.
Negative reactions were received from fellow scientists, ethicists, and the
general public. Because of this public reaction and until some type of
concrete guidelines are developed, the scientists stated that they would
suspend further research into the cloning of human embryos."1 In defense
of the research, project leader Dr. Hall responded, "We have not created
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Cloning: Where do we Draw the Line, TIME, Nov. 8, 1993, at
64.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Mona S. Amer, Breaking the Mold: Human Embryo Cloning and its Implications for a
Right to Individuality, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1665 (1996).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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human life or destroyed human life in this experiment.", Furthermore,
scientists involved in this type of cloning research believe that as the
logical progression that began with in vitro fertilization, human cloning is
the next step in relieving human suffering from infertility, as well as many
other therapeutical needs.6
International reaction to the research conducted at George
Washington University was also mainly negative. The majority of
countries, as well as international organizations, condemned the
experiments and set forth an international debate on whether these types of
experiments should be conducted on human beings. Prior to this, only a
handful of countries had regulations that would prohibit these types of
experiments on humans, but even these regulations were not specific
enough to prohibit all types of experimentation. Germany stood out and
had this research been conducted there, the scientists would have the
potential to face up to five years in prison. 7 Other countries, such as
England, had regulations that were thought to protect against human
cloning by requiring a governing body to issue a license prior to any
research being conducted.'8 But, as will be shown, the regulations were
not prepared to cover all types of cloning techniques.
In 1997, at the Roslin Institute in Scotland, researchers, led by Dr.
Ian Wilmut, performed what was thought of as an impossible task, and
thus brought the world into a new dimension in cloning technology.
Scientists there, were able for the first time to clone an adult mammal
utilizing somatic cell nuclear transfer. Beliefs, prior to this experiment,
were that DNA would not be able to guide the development of an embryo
more than one time.' 9 Thus, it was thought that cloning an adult mammal
would be an impossible process. But with the birth of Dolly the sheep,
scientists and the world are now confronted with a new technology that
will most likely alter the future of human life.
What the scientists created was a sheep that contained the genetic
material of only one parent and is basically a delayed twin of the adult
sheep that donated the genetic material. To accomplish this task, scientists
fused a normal adult cell and an unfertilized egg with no nucleus and
allowed the new genome to began its dividing process. A viable embryo
was created after 277 attempts, and was reimplanted into another ewe. In
15. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 9, at 64.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Clive Cookson, FT Guide to: Cloning, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1997, at 10.
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all, eight lambs were created, including Dolly, out of 834 fused pairs, one
of which died immediately after birth?
The success accomplished by the scientists at the Roslin Institute
has the possibility to lead to great gains in the breeding of animals. With
the ability to clone an adult mammal, scientists can replicate an animal
with already known desirable traits. The breeding of sheep with fine wool,
horses with great speed and power, cows with desirable milk qualities and
nutrients, are some of the endless possibilities. Speculation within the
scientific community is that within ten years, the breeding of animals with
the capability to produce organs that are fit for human transplantation
without the possibility of rejection is possible.2 1
Applying this technique to other mammals, including human
beings, does not seem feasible at this time because many problem areas
arise. First, there are many differences that exist between mammalian
species in how they develop during the first few days of growth. The
DNA of mammals differ in how quickly they take charge in the embryo's
development process.? The embryos of different species will also differ in
how they implant in the uterus and develop the placental connection.3 A
second problem area exists with current knowledge about the
reprogramming abilities of the fused DNA.2' At the present time, scientific
knowledge of how normal programming occurs during development is
lacking; thus, one can imagine the uncertainty in the reprogramming of
DNA when it is stripped of its old proteins and replaced with the new ones
inside the egg cell.?5 Other problem areas include the current success rate
of attaining a viable embryo from the fused egg cells, 2' and the risk of
mutated DNA being transferred from the adult into the new embryo.27
I1. TECHNIQUES USED IN CLONING
There are two main techniques utilized when researching cloning
technology. The first is called blastomere separation and consists of
20. Prohibition of Fed. Funding for Human Cloning Research, 1997: Hearings on H.R.
922 Before the Subcomm. on Tech. of the House Comm. on Science, 105th Cong. (1997).
21. Mona Charen, Is Cloning a Victory over Death, DET. NEWS, Feb. 27, 1997, at A15.
22. Elizabeth Pennisi & Nigel Williams, Will Dolly Send in the Clones, SCIENCE, Mar. 7,
1997, at 1415.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The success achieved in Scotland occurred in only 1 out of 277 attempts.
27. See Mark Ward, The Sheep that Shook the World 'Dolly' Offers Much More Hope than
Hazard, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Mar. 2, 1997, at 1.
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splitting an original embryo; thus, creating multiple embryos, each
containing the identical genetic composition. This technique has been used
since the fifties to clone plants and animals and was the process behind the
experimentation conducted at George Washington University on human
embryos. The second technique, and the one which created the recent
public debate over cloning technology, is somatic cell nuclear transfer.
This cloning process basically entails replacing the nucleus of an
unfertilized egg cell with the nucleus from another person's cell,
containing their DNA; thus, allowing the replication of desirable traits in
the resulting offspring. It is this technique, which was successfully
performed in Scotland on the sheep, which has called for the countries of
the world to enact regulations restricting the area of genetic research.
Embryo splitting, also called blastomere separation,3 is the older
and somewhat simpler of the techniques used in cloning. This technique
creates multiple embryos with identical DNA by splitting the original
embryo; thus, creating the possibility of implanting these newly created
embryos into a woman's uterus and allowing them to develop into identical
human beings. 9 In a theoretical sense, embryo splitting can be utilized to
produce an infinite amount of identical humans, each one derived from an
embryo which -is either natural or one that is artificially created.
Currently, this type of cloning is done from embryonic cells, which are
removed from an animal's embryo at an early stage when it is still
developing.0 Because of this, predetermining the genetic traits for those
that are desirable is not available.
Blastomere separation is the technique that was used by scientists
at George Washington University to clone human embryos, and is readily
available at many laboratories and fertility clinics around the world.3' The
technique involves acquiring an embryo and allowing it to develop in a
petri dish until the 2- to 8- cell stage.3 A chemical solution is then added
to the dish that dissolves the zona pellucida covering the embryo. 3  Once
the zona pellucida is dissolved, the cells contained within the embryo are
28. Amer, supra note 12, at 1660.
29. Elizabeth Ann Pitrolo, The Birds, the Bees, and the Deep Freeze: Is There
International Consensus in the Debate over Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 19 HoUs. J.
INT'LL. 147, 157 (1996).
30. Human Cloning Techniques (last updated Feb. 29, 1996) <http://cac.psu.edu/-gsg109
/qs/emOlOO2.html>.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The zona pellucida is a protective protein and polysaccharide membrane that covers
the internal contents of the embryo, and provides the necessary nutrients for the first several cell
divisions that occur within the embryo.
[Vol. 4:697
Corsover
freed 4 These embryonic cells, also known as blastomeres, are then
collected and placed in separate petri dishes.,' An artificially produced
zona pellucida is then used to coat the embryonic cells and each cell is now
considered to be a new embryo. Each embryo will contain identical
genetic information and if allowed to develop, they will divide and
eventually form a human being.3'
There are many benefits that arise from this type of splitting
procedure, as well as many detrimental effects that may ensue. The moral,
legal, and ethical issues will be discussed in more detail later in this article,
but some of the more prevalent benefits and problem areas deserve
mention here. For example, through the research conducted at George
Washington University, scientists were able to gain some knowledge on
how to achieve the best results in dividing embryonic cells.37 Studies
showed that embryos that were split during the 2-cell stage achieved
greater success in reaching the 32-cell stage, which is the stage at which
implantation in a uterus is available. Those embryos that were split at the
4- to 8-cell stage were fortunate to reach only a 16-cell stage. 9 As
mentioned earlier, the embryos experimented on at George Washington
were destined to die at an early stage and were denied the possibility of
producing a human being because they were fertilized twice by more than
one sperm cell.40
Another area of debate is that if this procedure is performed
successfully on viable human embryos, cloned embryos could be stored
frozen and then later thawed out for use in fertility procedures. The
thawed embryo could be used by some parents to create a later born
genetic twin or used to develop a replacement for a child who prematurely
died. Embryo splitting may also increase the amount of embryos that are
available for use during fertility procedures by limiting the need for putting
the woman at extended risk during additional egg retrieval surgeries.
Blastomere separation can at least double the amount of embryos that are
retrieved during one embryo retrieval surgery.41 Apart from the potential
benefits that may arise, there are many issues that must be resolved
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Human Cloning Techniques, supra note 30.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 9.
41. June Coleman, Playing God or Playing Scientist: A Constitutional Analysis of State
Laws Banning Embryological Procedures, 27 PAC. L.J. 1331, 1357 (1996).
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concerning the ethical and legal effects of this procedure. First, this type
of research is still highly experimental and potentially risky for the
embryo.42  Also moral issues surrounding the creation of life and
psychological effects on the cloned child and donor child, as well as those
for the parents and society at large must be considered.
The second and more difficult procedure is nuclear transfer, also
called somatic cell nuclear transfer. According to scientists, the cloning of
an adult mammal utilizing this technique was thought to be impossible until
early in 1997. At this time a research team at the Roslin Institute in
Scotland performed successful nuclear transfer to clone an adult sheep.
Making the experiment even more dynamic is that three breeds of sheep
were used in the process. The cell nucleus from a Finn Dorset sheep was
substituted for the nucleus of an egg from a Poll Dorset, which was then
implanted in a Scottish Blackface ewe.4 3  The success of this research
brought the debate over cloning technology, and the scientific and medical
possibilities that may now be available, to front page news and elicited a
furor of public and governmental debate over this new technology.
Ethical, legal, and moral issues concerning the implications of utilizing the
new biotechnical advances on the human race were, and continue to be,
debated in legislatures, laboratories, and public places throughout the
world. Somatic cell nuclear transfer of adult mammals now opens the door
to the possibility of producing human beings with predetermined desirable
traits.
Nuclear transfer, unlike embryo splitting, is a difficult procedure
with a much lower rate of success." As of the beginning of 1997, there
were only six research facilities around the world with the capability of
performing the same procedure as researchers at Roslin.4- The procedure
was accomplished by transferring the nucleus from an udder cell into an
egg, whose DNA had been previously removed." In order to be
successful, scientists had to make the donor cell DNA behave much like
the DNA of a sperm or unfertilized egg. This was achieved by depriving
the cells of the full amount of nutrient-laden serum that is naturally
supplied and in effect caused the cells to remain in the beginning stages of
the cell cycle.4 7 Causing many of the genes to shut down, this deprivation
42. Id.
43. Christopher Wills, A Sheep in Sheep's Clothing, DISCOVER, Jan. 1998, at 22.
44. See Ward, supra note 27.
45. Id.
46. Pennisi, supra note 22.
47. Id.
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ensured that the DNA had not replicated just prior to being transferred."
Using an electrical charge, the researchers then fused the donor cell with
an unfertilized chromosome-extracted egg.4 9 This new fused egg was now
provided with a full complement of DNA from the original donor sheep
and the egg began to divide and develop.?0
In applying this technique to humans, as well as other mammals, a
potential problem arises in how fast, in individual species, the DNA takes
control of the development process. In this procedure with sheep, the first
three cell divisions, the 8-cell stage, of the egg replicates its DNA without
expressing any of the new genes, and all the work necessary for cell
division comes from proteins and messenger RNAs contained in the
original egg's unextracted cytoplasm.' During this process, the DNA
loses its attached proteins and picks up the proteins contained in the
cytoplasm, which in turn reprograms the DNA so the normal development
of the embryo can occur. 2 While in sheep the DNA apparently gained
control in the 8-cell stage, in humans, on the other hand, the new DNA is
thought to take charge only after the 4-cell stage." Overcoming this
difference is detrimental to having success in this technique for human
beings. Scientists also believe that the mammary gland cells used to attain
the transferred DNA for the sheep included stem cells. Stem cells have a
greater potential for development because they are an indifferentiated
progenitor cell as compared to an ordinary epithelial cell.-'
While negative reaction to the success achieved in this research has
caused many countries to pass laws outlawing the use of this technique to
clone human embryos, most of the current regulations use language that is
too broad to condemn all experimentation. For example, under Britain's
Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990, human cloning is
prohibitedY.5 But the language used relates to the replicating a nucleus of
an embryo with a nucleus taken from the cell of a person." Furthermore,
in defining an embryo, the Act states that an embryo means a live human
embryo where fertilization is complete, or an egg in the process of
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Cookson, supra note 19, at 10.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 1990, § 3(3)(d), (UK).
56. Id.
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fertilization." Therefore, based on the language of this Act, the research
conducted at the Roslin Institute may not have been included in the
prohibition, if proceeded on with humans, because no embryo was
involved in the creation of the sheep.- Also, the cell that developed was
not a gamete, a combination of sperm and egg, nor did it undergo
fertilization." In order to ensure protection from this type of cloning,
regulations must become more specific in what exactly it is trying to
prohibit.60 Language used should also not be too over-reaching and
overbroad; thus, preventing other types of research from being conducted
that does not necessarily involve cloning.
IV. GENETIC ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY
As a way to more completely understand a majority of, the issues
that are raised in proposing legislation regarding the restriction of cloning
technology, a short introduction into other methods of genetic manipulation
is discussed under this topic. Some of the procedures are currently utilized
in genetic research by scientists, while others have the potential to be used
in the near future. The relation of these technologies with that of cloning
will become apparent as people understand the capabilities of science, even
at this infant stage of knowledge. The dangers associated with utilizing the
advancements in genetic manipulation by altering the constitution of the
human genome, with that of cloning, creates fears of a mass produced
predetermined society. This topic will provide only a limited discussion in
these areas; highlighting the areas in which they relate to subject of
cloning.
A. IN VITRO FERTILZATION
In vitro fertilization is the process of uniting an egg and sperm
outside the woman's body. During the procedure, usually seven or more
eggs are surgically removed from a woman's ovary and, after maturing for
approximately six hours, are combined with sperm and allowed to incubate
for another twelve hours.61 The removal of excess eggs is done to protect
the woman against the future risks of repeat surgical procedures and
57. Id. at § I(a), (b).
58. Sharon Korek, Following Dolly, 47 NEw L.J. 428, 429 (1997).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 430. Such a rewording might read, "embryo means a live human embryo where
fertilization is complete or where a cell has been modified, created, or altered such that it has the
potential to develop into an embryo or fetus."
61. Coleman, supra note 41, at 1337.
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hormonal therapy.62 Two to four of the fertilized eggs are then implanted
into the woman, who has undergone hormone therapy to prepare her uterus
for the procedure.'3 All steps included, the complete procedure will take
approximately two weeks with a basic cost of around $8,000.61 The unused
fertilized eggs are then frozen-" for use in the event a live birth does not
result from the first implantation, or future pregnancies are desired. The
eggs could also be used for research or for donation to another woman.
Internationally, in vitro fertilization, when used as a remedy for
infertility, seems to have become a sanctioned technique and is regarded as
a routine commercial transaction.61 There are still differing views on the
legal and moral status of pre-implantation embryos and embryo research
between the nations of the world and until a consensus opinion is derived
worldwide many problems will continue to persist. Currently, most
research and experimentation on human embryos is financed with private
funding, including funds from the IVF industry; thus, any government
legislation should be focused on the procedures themselves and not on the
funding the research receives. 7 With only about a ten to twenty percent
chance of achieving a pregnancy with one embryo, proponents of in vitro
fertilization and cloning technology argue that the odds for a successful
pregnancy would increase significantly, if that one embryo can be cloned
into three or four. 6
B. GENE THERAPY
Gene therapy consists of attempting to alter the genetic makeup of
an individual by either deleting or inserting specific genes in order to
enhance one's genetic profile."9 Alteration takes place by adding or
removing DNA to, or from, a defective gene in order to overcome the
consequences of disease.70 Through the efforts of projects, such as the
Human Genome Project, scientists will be able to identify and locate the
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1338.
64. Pitrolo, supra note 29, at 152.
65. See Coleman, supra note 41, at 1338. Remaining embryos are frozen in liquid nitrogen
at -196 degrees centigrade in a process called cyropreservation; Pitrolo, supra note 29, at 152.
Storage life of preserved human embryos may be from five to ten years.
66. Pitrolo, supra note 29, at 152.
67. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 9.
68. Id.
69. Ralph C. Conte, Toward a Theological Construct for the New Biology: An Analysis of
Rahner, Fletcher, and Ramsey, 11 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 429, 435 (1995).
70. Id.
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genes that are responsible for the development of humans. While many
will infer a eugenic philosophy is behind such a procedure, proponents of
this technology state that the overall quality of human life is improved
because individual and societal suffering will be reduced and in turn the
individual and subsequent offspring are genetically more viable.7 '
Currently, there have no been no reports of using gene therapy on human
subjects, but the use of these types of procedures is becoming increasingly
possible and probable.2 Gene therapy does have the potential to help cure
many diseases such as sickle-cell anemia, hemophilia, and cancer.7"
Depending on the type of cells being altered, gene therapy can take
two forms. Somatic cell alteration is the first type of gene therapy. In this
process, alterations are made to those cells which make up a person's
tissues or organs, known as somatic cells, and results in changes to only
that individual and not their subsequent offspring.7 4 Of the techniques used
in gene therapy, somatic cell alteration poses less of an ethical problem
because the process is complete with the individual, rather than altering
future generations of humans, and provides a beneficial and therapeutic
result.75 The second and more controversial of the techniques is gametic
genetic therapy. This type of gene therapy seeks to alter the genetic profile
of both the individual and subsequent offspring by modifying the gametes,
the sperm and egg used in fertilization. 6 By replacing a defective gene
from an individual's genetic profile, the goals are to help either cure or
alleviate the effects of a disease and also prevent the passing of the gene to
future offspring. Besides the highly debated issue of interfering with
human evolution, gametic genetic therapy also possesses the risk to
nonconsenting individuals of contracting previously made errors from the
original procedure.
C. GENETIC SCREENING
Through technological advances, preimplantation genetic screening
is available to prospective parents to evaluate human embryos for genetic
defects and disease. For example, screening can be used to determine if a
child is the recipient of a defective gene caused by the parents' genetic
profile containing an inheritable disease. Because of success in the fields
71. Id. at 437.
72. Coleman, supra note 41, at 1354.
73. Id.
74. Conte, supra note 69, at 436.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 435.
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of in vitro fertilization, cyropreservation, and embryo biopsy, human
embryos can be screened prior to implantation, for genetic defects and
disease."
Similar to a normal in vitro fertilization procedure, the woman's
egg cells are removed and fertilized with sperm outside the body.78 Upon
achieving the 8-cell stage, one cell is removed from each embryo, through
a vacuuming procedure, and DNA analysis is performed. From the
genetic testing, scientists are able to identify the embryos that are free from
disease and these embryos are then implanted back into the uterus to
continue development.7 9  Currently, screening procedures have been
successful in locating diseases such as cystic fibrosis, Duchenne muscular
dystrophy, Tay-Sachs disease, and thalassemia ° With continued research,
scientists may be able to detect more diseases and work towards methods
of prevention and as an ultimate goal, their extinction.
D. EUGENICS
Eugenics can be described as a process in which technology is
utilized to improve the human genetic profile and in turn improve the
human species as a whole. This can occur positively, through the
development of desirable or superior traits, or negatively, by reducing or
eliminating less desirable genes." Although the mere mention of eugenics
connotes the memory of the atrocious experiments conducted by the Nazis,
eugenic practices currently take place in the United States and throughout
the world. Required testing for couples with inheritable diseases, statutes
prohibiting incest, and pre-birth knowledge of the child's sex or genetic
defects which may result in an abortion, can all be described as negative
eugenic practices.82  The detection and sterilization of many unwanted
genetic diseases, such as sickle cell anemia or Tay-Sachs disease, allows
the parents the choice of whether or not to reproduce or avoid a
pregnancy.
Eugenic ideology has been present in society dating back to Plato's
Republic, in which he sponsored the ideal that through selective breeding,
77. KARL DRLICA, UNDERSTANDING DNA AND GENE CLONING 275 (John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. 1997).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. John R. Harding Jr., Beyond Abortion: Human Genetics and the New Eugenics, 18
PEPP. L. REV. 471, 477 (1991).
82. Id. at 478, 479.
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the foundation of a superior class of beings can be formed.8 3 In the 1800's,
Sir Francis Galton, cousin of Charles Darwin, chose the term eugenics to
describe the process of selective breeding in humans, which would allow
those superior blood lines to prevail over less suitable breeds." During this
time, Gregor Mendel began the ground work for today's genetic research
by experimenting with the selective breeding of pea plants.8
Scientists in the United States became involved in eugenic
philosophy and genetic technology in the early 1900's. The fear that
immigrants and lower class people would overpopulate the United States
and cause a social decline flourished and prevention of their procreation
was advocated. In 1912, the United States Public Health Service began
testing incoming foreigners to determine intelligence and the extent of their
feeblemindedness. ' As a result, the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924
was enacted and mandatory quotas were selected limiting the amount of
immigrants from a particular country from entering the United States.7
Eugenically motivated, laws permitting involuntary sterilization of certain
groups were enacted in thirty-two states by 1932.u
The decline of the eugenic movement began with the decision
handed down by the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell, upholding the
constitutionality of a Virginia compulsory sterilization statute. 9 Although
the statute was upheld, the popularity of the movement began to fade and
several states began removing these types of laws from their books.
Around this same time, researchers in psychology and sociology began to
associate the influence of the environment with genetics in determining
one's characteristics. 9 With the publicized eugenic experimentation
conducted by the Nazis, the movement was all but dead and research
seemed to be headed into a different direction. That was until 1953 and
the postulation of the double helix of DNA as the chemical basis of
hereditary was discovered by Watson and Crick. 9 This event, included
with the success achieved in breaking the DNA code, began what is known
83. Id. at 480.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 481. According to the tests - 83% of Hungarians, 87% of Russians, 83% of
Jews, and 79% of Italians demonstrated a source of feeblemindedness.
87. Harding, supra note 81, at 481.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
90. Harding, supra note 81, at 482.
91. Id. at 483.
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as the New Eugenics and brings us to the advancements that were recently
achieved.
E. HUMAN GENOME PROJECT
The Human Genome Project is an international collaboration of
countries and scientists working together in an effort to map and sequence
the entire human genome. It is intended bring together and organize the
work produced by hundreds of laboratories in dozens of countries, in order
to decode the secrets of the human genome. Among the many goals of this
project are to discover more effective ways to treat and prevent disease,
increase genetic screening abilities, and of greatest importance, reduce pain
and suffering throughout the human species. Theoretically, once a map of
human genome is complete, scientists and physicians will be able to screen
an embryo for both beneficial and deleterious genetic characteristics.-
Medically, potential genetic disorders could thus be predicted and
prevented and normal genes identified in order to augment current
scientific knowledge. 93 Because of a rekindled belief that genes, rather or
at least to a greater extent than environment, determine an individual's
intelligence, longevity, health, and other personal characteristics, the
project looks to a future of parental selection and control over offspring
characteristics and greater screening capabilities, which will in turn lead to
an increase in the abortions of fetuses containing genetic disease.9
Internationally, countries are working together to organize their
respective works in order to rapidly gain success in the mapping and
sequencing of the human genome. The United States, which began the
Project, is the largest contributor and has allocated at least three billion
dollars to the fifteen year initiative, making it the most expensive biology
study ever conducted by the United States. 95 The United States had initially
focused their research in the mapping of the genome rather than the
sequencing,9 but because of positive assessments, new goals for the project
92. Conte, supra note 69, at 434.
93. Id.
94. John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV.
421, 422 (1996).
95. Human Genome Project (visited Sept. 26, 1997)
< http://cac.psu.edu/-gsgO9/qs/emO2OO2. html >.
96. G. Kenneth Smith & Denise M. Kettelberger, Patents and the Human Genome
Project, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 27, 29 (1994). The decision to initially focus efforts on mapping the
human genome rather than total sequencing was based on the enormous size of the human
genome, which comprises approximately three billion basepairs, with the specific order of the
basepairs encoding genetic information. The necessary technologies were already available to
map genes onto chromosomes, thus increasing map resolution was given priority, with
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have been drafted." In Great Britain, the thrust of the research has been in
creating cDNA libraries and the mapping and sequencing of cDNA
clones." France has been a major contributor to the research by working
on the construction of a human genetic map based on known DNA
markers. Italy has also pitched in spreading around their research into the
fields of preparing cell lines and mapping, gene sequencing, and working
on improving the speed of current gene sequencing.'
Varying opinions on the legitimacy and moral implications
concerning this type of project have kept some countries from
participating, but others are beginning to contribute. Japan, who
previously thought the project was not "pure science," has recently been
active in developing and improving instrumentation and techniques for
automated DNA sequencing.'°° While a total genome project has been
discouraged because of its possible eugenic implications, Germany has
even begun to participate, focusing their study on genetically inheritable
diseases.'0 ' The United Nations became involved in the international effort
in 1988, with the creation of the Human Genome Organization. The
organization, referred to as HUGO, was established to coordinate the
researchers from different countries in order to avoid duplication of efforts
and unnecessary competition. HUGO was also created to foster public
debate on the issues of scientific, ethical, legal, and commercial
implications of the various genome projects.'°2
The Human Genome Project has not escaped heavy criticism and
legal and moral challenges have been presented against the funding of such
a study. Although the Project has been successful in locating the genes for
some diseases,' 3 opposition is strong and persistent. The lack of respect
towards individual autonomy and uniqueness are the most frequently
presented arguments, but other concerns do arise. Criticism over the
enormous funding this project has garnished is another issue that is much
debated. Because only approximately two to five percent of the human
genome is supposedly of potential use to scientists, critics argue that
sequencing of known genes to follow. Total genomic sequencing would complete the latter stages
of the project.
97. Id. at 29.
98. Id. at 34.
99. Id. at 32.
100. Id. at 34.
101. Id.
102. Kettelberger, supra note 96, at 37.
103. Id. at 42. As a direct result of the Human Genome Project, the locus for myotonic
dystrophy, a form of muscular dystrophy that affects 1 in 8500 people, was recently discovered.
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funding should be allocated to lesser fields of study that are fundamental to
the research of these larger more expensive projects.'°0
V. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEGISLATION
In evaluating the existing and proposed legislation from around the
world, it must first be understood that any success achieved in the areas of
cloning human beings and other biotechnologies will have an enormous
impact on all of humanity, including all future generations. The potential
ability to produce and control the development of human beings, enhancing
the favorable genetic characteristics, while eliminating unwanted traits,
will enable man to not only exhibit God-like powers, but to determine the
fate of humankind, as we know it today. These are issues which concern
every person, in every walk of life, throughout the world, and which all
countries must work together, as one, to ensure that mankind as a whole is
capable of handling this awesome power. In today's world, described as a
global-community, ease of communication and transportation must force
countries to work in unison to ensure that the best result for the benefit of
all of humanity must prevail. Anything less would create an atmosphere of
procreative tourism, in which people will travel to those countries offering
less restricting reproductive choices. o
Currently, legislation is based on the ideological beliefs expressed
within a particular country. For example, legislation in Great Britain is
based on the principle of individual freedom. I  Thus, human embryo
research and the availability of artificial reproductive technology is
permitted, and in some cases encouraged. °'7 German legislation, on the
other hand, is inspired by the principle of human dignity, and as such
research on human embryos is severely restricted or completely
prohibited.8' Religious beliefs also play a major role in this area of
legislation, contributing to the moral and ethical implications that must be
protected against. In France, Christianity has been influential in legislation
protecting the principle of human dignity. °0
104. Id. at 38. Only 50,000 to 100,000 genes are estimated to be contained within the
human genome. The remaining 95-98% of the genome is defined by some as junk and of little or
no use.
105. Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted
Conception: Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues, 17 AM. J. L. & MED. 329, 333 (1991).
106. Noelle Lenoir, French, European, and International Legislation on Bioethics, 27
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (1993).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1259.
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Similarities do exist among the laws of many countries, although it
must be reiterated that with these technologies it is the differences that are
most important. Currently, a majority of countries prohibit extreme forms
of genetic engineering, such as cloning or creating chimeras and any non-
therapeutic interventions on a human embryo that seeks to alter the genetic
patrimony of an individual. 10 Eugenic practices and sex selection, except
in cases of sex-linked diseases, are also prohibited by many countries."'
Therapeutic experimentation on human embryos, within the first fourteen
days of development, is legal in many countries, although there are
internationally recognized standards which must be met."2
Included in the following sections are legislation,
recommendations, and proposed regulations from individual countries and
international organizations.
A. European Organizations
1. European Parliament
The issues of cloning and other new biotechnologies have been
addressed by the European Parliament since 1989. In that year, the
European Parliament passed a resolution stating a concern that embryo
research should be limited to only those circumstances where a benefit to
the welfare of the endangered child can be demonstrated and any arbitrary
experimentation should be prohibited."' Human cloning, industrial and
commercial use of embryos, and trade in frozen embryos were also
prohibited and must be subject to criminal penalties.11 In another
resolution that year, the European Parliament recognized that human life
should be protected from the moment of fertilization and that waste
embryos remaining from in vitro fertilization procedures should be
eliminated." 13
110. Knoppers, supra note 105, at 329.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 340. The four conditions that research must meet are: 1) scientific validity as
verified by a review committee; 2) the free and informed consent of the participants; 3) the
balance of the risk-benefit ratio; 4) conformity of the research with the notion of public order.
Provided that these conditions, the majority of countries, except for Germany, Denmark,
Austria, and Norway, would allow therapeutic research on the human embryo.
113. Resolution on the Ethical and Legal Problems of Genetic Engineering, 1989 O.J. (C
96) 165, 169.
114. Id. at 170.
115. Resolution on Artificial Insemination, In Vivo, and In vitro Fertilization, 1989 O.J. (C
96) 171, 172.
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The European Parliament further defined their recommended
restrictions and expanded upon the procedures that it deemed to be
prohibited in a resolution passed in 1996. Here, any form of manipulation
on the human genome which modifies or seeks to modify the germ line, as
well as any consumptive research on and production of human embryos for
research purposes only must be banned by law.' Furthermore, developing
tests in the future that may predict behavioral traits or genetic testing for
disease, except for those circumstances in which there is currently effective
treatment or preventive measures regarding that particular disease, must be
strictly prohibited.,"
2. European Commission
In 1994, the European Commission reconstituted its Group of
Advisors on the Ethics of Biotechnology and instituted a mission whereby
the ethical aspects of biotechnological experimentation within the European
Union should be assessed and the potential implications that such activities
would have on individuals and'society identified."8 In coordination with
the European Parliament, the European Commission has denounced
attempts to clone human beings and is considering whether to seek a strict
moratorium on the level of the Council of Europe or the United Nations." 9
Attempts to patent discoveries and knowledge in the area of
biotechnology have also been addressed by the European Commission and
the opinions handed down have denied patentability to the human body or
any of its elements.1'2 Specifically, the simple knowledge of the complete
or partial structure of a gene and the human body, at any stage of
development or constitution, does not constitute patentable elements.2, On
the other hand, patentability may be afforded to the identification of the
function attached to a human gene if it offers new possibilities such as the
production of new drugs, or if the intended use of the patent is sufficiently
identified and specific. ''
116. Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity with Regard to the
Application of Biology and Medicine, 1996 O.J. (C 320).
117. Id.
118. Bioethics: Greens Call for Public Debate, EUR. ENV'T, Mar. 15, 1994, § 48.
119. European Union and European Parliament Denounce Human Cloning, DEUTSCHE
PRESS-AGENTUR, Mar. 11, 1997.
120. Group of Advisors on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology of the European
Commission Opinion on the Ethical Aspects of Patenting Inventions Involving Elements of Human
Origin, 48 INT'L DIG. OF HEALTH LEGIS. 91, 92 (1997).
121. Id. § 2.2, 2.3.
122. Id. § 2.5.
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3. European Union
The European Union, made up of twelve major European states,
encompasses an economic dimension and has broad power to enact strict
and precise regulations concerning industry and research. Working
through the European Commission's Advisory Group on Ethics in
Biotechnology, the European Union has sponsored recommendations which
are to be issued at the end of May 1997.111 Of the main issues discussed by
the Group, the first is that the position to condemn human cloning is
basically unanimous in European nations. Through a comparison of
national legislative systems, bans of human cloning are in some countries
expressly prohibited, while in others it is approached implicitly from other
principles demonstrated in the law.'1' The cloning of Dolly has led to an
increased awareness that an international agreement on the condemnation
of human cloning is necessary.'2 - A second issue discussed is in regard to
animal cloning and its commercial applications. While the Group has
stated that no commercial application has been applied to animal cloning,
the feasibility of such an application is growing near.'12 The Group has
expressed concern that the well-being of the animals and the ethical
principles of animal protection must be reaffirmed with regard to the
aspects of cloning.'12
According to the joint European Parliament/Council of Europe
decision of April 26, 1994, financing for germinal gene therapy, as well as
research for human cloning, was prohibited by any Community. While
the Union was within their legal competence in prohibiting these acts, there
are no penal or ethical prerogatives attached. 29
4. Council of Europe
With a membership of forty countries, the Council of Europe has a
focused participation in the issues of human rights. Beginning in 1990, the
Council has adopted many policies and recommendations concerning the
application of science and technology to the human genome. In that year,
the Council adopted guidelines outlining the scope of the analysis into the
123. First Guidelines of Advisory Group on Ethics in Biotechnology at end of a Hearing
with Parliamentary Experts and Interest Groups, AGENCE EUROPE, Apr. 30, 1997.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. First Guidelines, supra note 123.
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human genome in order to promote harmonious development in the
European Community while pursuing scientific and technical excellence.' °
The goals of these guidelines include the encouragement of cooperation
between European research facilities in furthering the development of
existing technologies, while promoting the generation of new lines of
research. 3, The overall objective of the program is to gain a better
understanding of genetic functions and to fight against diseases arising
from genetic variation, through the use of early diagnosis, prevention, and
improvement of prognosis and therapy.'32 While the goals seem to allow
for a broad range of experimentation to be conducted, some forms of
research are specifically excluded. Any alteration of germ cells or any
stage of embryo development with the aim of modifying human genetic
characteristics in a hereditary manner is prohibited, as is somatic gene
therapy, except in cases of somatic actual or potential medical
applications. 33
Many issues concerning research and experimentation were left
unresolved by the decision in 1990. Among these issues are the rights that
are afforded to the embryo and at what point should research on embryos
be prohibited. A number of countries consider the embryo to be a human
being at the time of creation and ban all nontherapeutic research, while
others authorize research to be conducted until the fourteenth day of
development. 3'  Some countries permit the creation of embryos for
research purposes, while others allow only nonviable embryos to be
used. "I The Council began addressing many of these issues, beginning
with human cloning, in July of 1997. On July 1, the Council agreed to
adopt a proposal prohibiting any act aimed at creating a genetically
identical being, whether dead or alive.'36  This amendment to the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine will apply to only those
who are signatories to the Convention, and at present time only twenty-two
countries have agreed to their ban on human cloning.'37 Further discussion
regarding this amendment is scheduled for September of 1997.
130. Council Decision 90/395/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 196).
131. Id. Preamble.
132. Id. § 4. 1(Evaluation Criteria).
133. Id. § 4.4(2), (4), (5) (Evaluation Criteria).
134. Lenoir, supra note 106, 1260.
135. Id.
136. Council of Europe Agrees to Ban Cloning of Humans, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR,
July 1, 1997.
137. Id.
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Later, in July of 1997, the European Council adopted the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. As a basis for this
Convention, the interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over
the sole interest of society or science and the respect for individual
integrity and the fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of
biology and medicine is guaranteed. 38 Each party to the Convention shall
conform their internal law to the provisions of the Convention, either by
directly applying them in domestic law or by enacting the necessary
legislation to give them effect.' 9
According to Chapter Four of the Convention concerning the
human genome, only interventions undertaken for preventive, diagnostic,
or therapeutic purposes are permitted.1'" Predictive testing of genetic
diseases or to detect a genetic predisposition towards a genetic disease may
be performed only for health purposes or scientific research linked to
health purposes."' Developments in genetics now make it possible to
detect those who carry specific genes for major single gene disorders,1'
and also those who are at risk of developing major disorders later in life.'
Any intervention of the human genome which seeks to modify the genome
of any descendants, modify genetic characteristics not related to a disease,
or select the sex of the future child is prohibited, except for situations
where a sex-related hereditary disease is present.'"
As a general rule, scientific research in the fields of biology and
medicine shall be carried out freely, subject to provisions ensuring the
protection of the human being and the conditions set forth by the
Convention.' The protection of persons undergoing research is expressed
by conditions which must be met, including: there is no alternative of
comparable effectiveness to research on humans, the risks which may be
incurred by that person are not disproportionate to the potential benefits of
the research, and the research project has been approved by a competent
138. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and Explanatory Report, Apr. 4, 1997, -
Art. 1, 2, 36 I.L.M. 817, 821 [hereinafter Convention on Human Rights].
139. Id. at 829, Art. 2(20).
140. Id. at 822, Art. 13.
141. Id. at 822, Art. 12.
142. Id. at 833, Art. 12(78). Examples of major single cell disorders that can be detected;
cystic fibrosis, hemophilia, and Huntington's disease.
143. d. at 834. Examples of disorders that may develop later in life; heart disease, cancer,
and Alzheimer's disease
144. Convention on Human Rights, supra note 138, at 822, Art. 13, 14.
145. Id. at 822, Art. 15.
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body after an independent examination of its aim and scientific merit.'4
The creation of embryos for research purposes is prohibited, but where
domestic law allows for research on embryos in vitro, the law must also
ensure adequate protection of those embryos. 1' 7 Thus, while domestic law
may allow research to be conducted on embryos, the Convention does
mandate that no research be permitted after the fourteenth day of
development. '14
Lastly, the parties to the Convention shall provide judicial
protection that is appropriate to prevent any unlawful infringement on the
principles and rights set forth in the Convention.'49 Furthermore, the
parties are to elicit public debate over the medical, social, economic,
ethical, and legal issues that are relevant to these types of research.
Nations may organize appropriate methods for encouraging public
awareness of the fundamental questions raised.'-
B. Individual European Countries
1. Germany
In what seems to be an effort to exorcize past atrocities, Germany
has taken a hard line approach towards the issues of cloning and genetic
experimentation. Under the German Constitution, an embryo does have
the right to life, and causing the destruction of a human life, even if in the
form of a nonviable fetus, is punishable by law.'" Going farther than any
other country in the prohibition against genetic technologies, Germany
passed the Embryo Protection Law in 1990. Among the most specific
legislation passed by any country, this law prohibits activities ranging from
the cloning of humans and embryo research to improper uses of
reproductive technologies. As was stated to the German Parliament by
Friedrich-Adolf Jahn, the parliamentary state secretary in the justice
ministry, "Because man is not the creator, he must content himself with
being part of creation. Thus not all that is technically feasible is
146. Id. at 822, Art. 16.
147. Id. at 823, Art. 18.
148. Lenoir, supra note 106, at 1260.
149. Convention on Human Rights, supra note 138, at 823, Art. 23.
150. Id. at 824, Art. 28.
151. Elizabeth Ann Pitrolo, Comment, The Birds, the Bees, and the Deep Freeze: Is There
International Consensus in the Debate over Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 19 HOUS. J.
INT'L L. 147, 188 (1996).
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allowed."' Violations of prohibited activities can vary from three to five
years in prison and/or fines.
Specifically, one of the law's prohibitions goes directly at the issue
of cloning human beings and imposes up to five years imprisonment, or a
fine, for any person who artificially causes a human embryo to develop
with the same genetic information as another embryo, fetus, or living or
deceased person.'"3 Other prohibitions aim at the manipulation of human
genes by offering the same punishment to any person artificially altering
the genetic information of a human geriline cell, creating chimeras or
hybrids, and artificially selecting the sex of an offspring, except in cases of
serious gender linked diseases.'5 Research involving the artificial
modification of the genetic information of a germline cell situated outside
the body is allowed if there is no possibility of its being used for
fertilization.-,
In response to the research conducted in the United States and the
development of Dolly in Scotland, Germany has called for international
ban on all efforts to clone human beings. Subsequent to the human embryo
splitting completed at George Washington University, Germany publicly
denounced the experimentation and expressed great concern that these
events should not be repeaied in Europe.' 5 Remembering the atrocities
that resulted during the Nazi regime, Germany has been outspoken against
any manipulation of human embryos. After the results in Scotland were
made public, Germany again expressed dismay over the events and called
for the prohibition against applying cloning technologies to humans.' In
order to express the significance of banning this type of research, Germany
has refused to sign any declaration or convention that does not include an
unambiguous condemnation of human cloning. '5
152. Rolf Soderlind, Germany Passes Law Against Surrogate Mothers and Human Cloning,
REUTER NEWS SERVICE - W. EUR., Oct 24, 1990.
153. Embryo Protection Law of 13 Dec. 1990, ch. 6 § 1(BGBI. I, 19 Dec. 1990, at 2746-
2748), reprinted in 42 INT'L DIG. OF HEALTH LEGIS. 60, 62 (1991).
154. Id. ch. 5 S1, ch. 7, ch. 3
155. Id. at 62, ch. 5 54.
156. Call to Halt Human Cloning, PRESS ASS'N NEWSFILE, Oct. 26, 1993, at 000.
157. German Scientists Join in Call for International Ban on Human Cloning, THE WEEK IN
GERMANY, May 9, 1997.
158. Id.; See also supra note 150. Germany abstained from voting on the Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine for reasons including lack of protection for the handicapped.
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2. France
Being a country who believes in advancing the progress of
biotechnology in order to cure disease and disabilities, France has taken a
somewhat different approach towards legislating scientific and medical
research. Under the French Constitution, the rights of the individual
extends not only to privacy and individual freedom, but also to an
individual's right of access to social advantages."" On the other hand, the
Constitution also justifies the state intervening into the affairs of science
and medicine, through the regulation of medical practices and of gaining
access to the biotechnological advances.' ° Therefore, the legislation that
emerges from France expresses both the notions of individual liberty and
freedom of research and that science must advance.161
In creating a bioethics bill, French legislators looked to satisfy both
scientists and ethicists in limiting the areas that human embryo research
may be conducted. The bill expresses regulations concerning the
protection and respect of the human body, utilization of cells, organs and
tissues, and research agenda. To begin with, the integrity of the human
body may only be violated in the event of a therapeutic necessity of the
person involved, although the genetic study of an individual's
characteristics may be undertaken for scientific or medical purposes.'6
Any attempt to perform a eugenic procedure aimed at organizing the
selection of persons or any alteration made to the genetic characteristics
with a view towards modifying a person's lineal descent is subject to
receiving a penalty of up to twenty years imprisonment. Among the
procedures also prohibited by the bill and for the protection of the human
embryo are using-human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes
and performing in vitro fertilization of human embryos for research or
experimental purposes. 1"
Concern over the bioethics bill has emerged from both scientists
and ethicists, stating that the language expressed in the bill does not give
researchers clear guidance about what they can and cannot do.'" Issues of
preimplantation diagnosis and cloning still seem to be unresolved and
under certain circumstances may still be allowed. To gain a clearer
159. Lenoir, supra note 106, at 1250.
160. Id. at 1252.
161. Id.
162. Law No. 94-653 of July 29, 1994, J.O., July 30, 1994, No. 175, at 11056-11059, Art.
16(3), (10), reprinted in 45 INT'L DIG. OF HEALTH LEGIS. 453, 498 (1994).
163. Id. Div. 3 Art. 511-17, 511-18.
164. Axel Kahn, Researchers Nervous About Bioethics Bill; France, 263 AM. ASS'N FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE 463 (1994) (statement by geneticist Axel Kahn).
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understanding on what exactly is prohibited, the language used in French
legislation needs to be more specific in order to prevent misuses and
abuses of biotechnological advances.
3. Spain
Spain has enacted legislation aimed specifically at regulating
assisted reproduction procedures and the use of human embryos in research
in two laws passed in late 1988. Among the procedures expressly
forbidden were the creation of human beings by cloning or other
procedures directed to the selection of traits or the creation of human
beings by cloning in any of its variants, or any other procedure capable of
yielding several identical humans.1'6 Creating pre-embryos from persons of
the same sex, creating an individualized human in a laboratory, and
employing genetic manipulation for military or any other purposes, in
order to produce biological weapons are also specifically prohibited and
considered very serious offenses.'" The law does permit embryo research
to be performed as long as it is focused on enhancing the embryo's
viability or detecting hereditary diseases. Authorization for research on
pre-embryos in vitro is permitted in situations where the research has a
diagnostic, therapeutic or prophylactic purpose.167 There are exceptions to
these goals, including when the pre-embryo involved is non-viable or
research can not be scientifically performed on animals.1'6
In the second law, passed in 1988, governing the issues of
donation and use of human embryos. Research in genetic technologies
using human genetic material may be performed for diagnostic purposes in
respect of genetic or hereditary diseases, for therapeutic purposes mainly
concerning sex selection in the event of sex-linked diseases, and for
research purposes in which the study of DNA sequences of the human
genome, their location and functions, as well as other research takes
place.'6 Research is also permitted in the area of industrial purpose, which
entail a preventive, diagnostic, or therapeutic characteristic. 70 Moreover,
165. Law No. 35/1988 of Nov. 22, 1988 on Assisted Reproduction Procedures, B.O.E.,
1988, 282, ch. 6 § 20(k), (1), reprinted in 40 INT'L DIG. OF HEALTH LEGIS. 1, 82 (1994). Seems
to imply a prohibition of both twinning and nuclear substitution.
166. Id. ch. 6 § 20(o), (s), (v).
167. Id. ch. 4 § 15(2).
168. Id. ch. 4 § 15(3).
169. Law No. 42/1988 of Dec. 28, 1988 on the Donation and Use of Human Embryos and
fetuses or their cells, tissues, or organs, B.O.E., 1988, 314, ch. 3 § 8, reprinted in 42 INT'L
DIG. OF HEALTH LEGIS. 1, 66 (1989)
170. Id.
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utilization of human gametes and of fertilized and developed ovules is
permitted until the fourteenth day following fertilization."'
4. Switzerland
While there are currently no laws specifically prohibiting the use
of cloning technology on human beings, Switzerland has taken steps to
restrict the field of embryo research and infertility procedures. Dating
back to 1987, the Swiss Health Council has set forth guidelines prohibiting
any research to be conducted on human embryos and has restricted the
storage of embryos for the duration of an individual in vitro fertilization
procedure.72 Also in 1987, any interventions on the genetic material of
human cells was banned by law. 73 Furthermore, the misuse of and trade in
embryos for pharmaceutical purposes has been prohibited. 174
5. Norway
According to Norwegian legislation, any research on human
embryos is strictly banned and criminal sanctions for research on fertilized
eggs are available. 7 - Although domestic research is banned, the use of
embryo research, including cloning, conducted outside the country and
brought into Norway for clinical use may not be necessarily prohibited.' 7
6. Sweden
Unlike other countries in Northern Europe, Sweden's current
legislation would seem to allow research on embryos. This includes either
those embryos left over from infertility treatments or ones created for
research purposes. '" Sweden prohibits the implantation of an egg fertilized
outside the woman's body, unless, among other conditions, the egg is the
woman's own and has been fertilized with her husband's or cohabitant's
sperm.'7  No other domestic legislation involves embryonic procedures,
thus the language of Law no. 711 leaves open the possibility that research
171. Id. at 68.
172. Stuart Homett, Embryos and Europe: Wat Prospects for Harmonization, 141 NEw L.
J. 713, 715 (1991).
-173. Directive of Feb. 2, 1987 on in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer for the treatment
of human fertility, 39 INT'L DIG. OF HEALTH LEGIS. 1, 82 (1988).
174. Id.
175. Hornett, supra note 172, at 715.
176. Id.
177. id.
178. Law No. 711 of June 14, 1988 on fertilization outside the human body, 40 INT'L DIG.
OF HEALTH LEGIS. 1, 93 (1989).
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on human embryos, as well as cloning, is permissible. Nonetheless, those
who breach this law, through habitual offenses or seeking commercial
gain, shall be liable to a fine or a minimal prison sentence. 9
7. Denmark
While there is no specific legislation covering genetic procedures
such as cloning, Denmark has established a biomedical research ethics
council which does have an underlying philosophy that human life begins
at fertilization. 11 Under this authority's recommendation, harmful embryo
research should be prohibited and embryos should not be created for
research purposes only. 8' Until the creation of specific legislation, the
ethics council has imposed a moratorium on embryo research.'1 Denmark
does permit fertilized human oocyte research to be performed as long as it
is accordance with the established guidelines. 83
8. Other European Countries
Other individual countries have passed some types of legislation
with regard to new genetic engineering procedures, but in most cases they
are recommendations set forth by ethical and medical organizations and
government-sponsored councils. In Greece, legislation has been passed in
which in vitro fertilization and embryo freezing has been banned.'
Recommendations suggested in Italy proposes that all embryo research be
subject to criminal penalties.' 5 Lastly, in the Netherlands proposals
permitting embryo research in limited circumstances have been suggested.
Following the recommendations handed down by the Council of Europe's
Commission of Experts on Progress in the Biomedical Sciences, the
creation of embryos for research purposes should be banned and allowing
research on surplus embryos only in limited situations.,,
179. Id.
180. Hornett, supra note 172, at 714.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Pitrolo, supra note 151, at 186.
184. Hornett, supra note 172, at 714.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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C. Commonwealth Countries
1. Great Britain
The creation of Dolly, achieved by scientists in Scotland, exposes
the significance of how important unambiguous and detailed legislation is
to protect against abuses of genetic technology. It can also be said that the
success in Scotland is another example of howquickly science can progress
and how difficult it is for the legislature to keep up. Legislation in Great
Britain prior to Dolly, while quite liberal in many respects, was thought to
prevent against the cloning of human beings. But if success in cloning
humans was achieved by utilizing the same techniques as those used in
Scotland, it would not be considered to fall under current legislation.
Legislation concerning research on embryos and the subsequent
development of them is focused in the Human Fertilization and
Embryology (HFE) Act of 1990. The Act establishes the HFE Authority
in order to regulate infertility treatments and to grant licenses to conduct
embryo research.- Under the law, an embryo is not treated as having a
right to life and is not afforded the same status as a human being."4
Therefore, the Authority is permitted to grant licenses that allows for
research to be conducted on human embryos. '8 For example, a person is
prohibited from creating an embryo for research, except if in pursuance of
a license."9 Other activities which are permitted are the destructive
research on surplus embryos and those created specifically for research, 9'
destruction of embryos which are kept in storage in excess of statutory
limits," and the screening out of defective embryos prior to implantation
in a woman.' 93 There are situations in which the Authority is not permitted
to issue a license, including keeping or using an embryo after the
appearance of the primitive streak,"14 or altering the genetic structure of any
cell while it forms part of an embryo, except in situations in which it is
187. Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 1990, § 5, 11 (UK).
188. Pitrolo, supra note 151, at 172.
189. Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, supra note 187, § 11, 12.
190. Id. § 3(1)(a).
191. Id. Sched. 2 § 3.
192. Id. § 14(1)(c). Current statutory storage period for embryos is 5 years.
193. Id. Sched. 2 § 1(d).
194. id. § 3(3)(a) - According to the HFE Act., section 3(4), the primitive streak is to be
taken to have appeared in an embryo not later than the end of the period of 14 days beginning
with the day when the gametes are mixed, not counting any time during which the embryo is
stored.
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permitted.'" Another prohibited activity, and one which has caused the
greatest concern over insufficient legislation, is the replacing of a nucleus
of a cell of an embryo with a nucleus taken from the cell of any person,
embryo, or subsequent development of an embryo.'" An embryo is
defined by the Act as a live human embryo where fertilization is complete
and references to an embryo include an egg in the process of fertilization.',
Thus, the legislation is seems to suggest that cloning by nuclear
substitution is prohibited and cloning by embryo splitting is permitted with
a license from the HFE Authority.
The creation of Dolly consisted of fusing an adult sheep fetal cell
with an enucleated egg cell and implanting the egg into a third ewe. Thus,
it was not an embryo in the true biological sense and would not be
considered an embryo under the definition set forth in the Act.
Furthermore, the development of the artificially created cell did not consist
of a gamete, an egg or sperm, nor did it undergo fertilization, fusion of an
egg and sperm, allowing it to escape the definitions of the Act.'" Based on
this, the application of this technique to clone human beings would not be
prohibited by the cloning provisions currently in place. This same
technique may also elude the prohibition against the altering of the genetic
structure of a cell while it forms part of an embryo, because the cells
utilized by the researchers in Scotland would not fall within the definition
of an embryo defined in the Act.'"
As is shown by the events in Scotland, legislatures in every
country must be particularly specific when drawing up appropriate
legislation. With the ever increasing pace of discovery in the field of
genetic research, laws banning potentially detrimental activities must be
able to encompass not only what is currently feasible, but also what will be
feasible in the future. In Great Britain, a rewording of the definition of an
embryo and the adding of prohibitions against the techniques utilized in
Scotland is necessary to prevent unwanted abuses. An example of a
possible embryo definition would be one which reads "embryo means a
live human embryo where fertilization is complete or where a cell has been
modified, created, or altered such that it has the potential to develop into
an embryo or foetus.,,
195. Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, supra note 187, Sched. 2 §§ 3,4.
196. Id. § 3(3)(d).
197. Id. § l(1)(a), (b).
198. Sharon Korek, Following Dolly, 147 NEw L. J. 428, 429 (1997).
199. Id.
200. Id.
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2. Australia
Because of the lack of constitutional power in the federal
government to intervene in reproductive technologies, individual
Australian states are free to enact their own legislation.20 ' Thus, achieving
uniform regulations remains a primary goal in Australia, in order to
prevent border hopping from occurring. Currently, human cloning is only
prohibited in Victoria and Western Australia, while in the other states the
issue remains unclear. In these two states, an embryo receives a status,
while not that of personhood, in which it deserves more respect than an
entity created solely for research purposes.= The remaining states follow
the guidelines set forth by the National Health and Medical Research
Council, which technically allows cloning, but recommends that it is
ethically unacceptable. "°'
The Human Reproductive Technology Act of Western Australia
considers the only justification for fertility procedures, to be conducted
outside the woman's womb, is for assisting the couple who donated the
genetic materials to have children.- While recognizing that certain
experimentation and research is not harmful and in some cases may be
allowable, fertilizing an egg for other than implantation purposes is not
approved.2
Victoria has enacted specific legislation directed at cloning and
embryo research. Under the Infertility Treatment Act of 1995, it is
Parliament's intention that human life should be preserved and protected
and the welfare of any person born as a result of fertility procedure is
paramount.m In response to this intention, Victoria has banned outright,
certain procedures such as, cloning, using embryos or zygotes removed
from the body,2 ' and mixing gametes, zygotes, or embryos from more than
one person.20 Furthermore, many provisions of the Act place restrictions
on attempts to conduct embryo research when performed outside the
woman's body. Among the initial restrictions are approval of a licensing
201. Judy Friend & Richard Ogier, Gap in Australian Laws on Cloning, (visited
Sept.25,1997) <http://www.ozemail.com.au/search/283U2.html>.
202. Pitrolo, supra note 151, at 176. (Waller Committee recommendations).
203. Friend, supra note 201.
204. Human Reproductive Technology Act, 1991, (Austl.).
205. Id.
206. Infertility Treatment Act, 1995, § 5(1)(a), (b) (Austi.).
207. Id. § 47.
208. Id. § 44.
209. Id. § 46.
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authority on the research to be performed and a following of the
regulations that they provide. 20 Research aimed developing an embryo to
syngamy and destructive research are not to be approved by the
Authority.2 11 Moreover, research involving embryos is not permitted for
embryos that are unfit for implantation or if the embryo is transferable,
research is not permitted if the particular research would deem the embryo
untransferable or harm the embryo.2 12
Legislation in Victoria also restricts certain procedures with regard
to genetic manipulation and offers penal provisions for performing
prohibited experimentation. Alteration of the genetic constitution of a
gamete used to form an embryo or zygote or to be used in a fertility
procedure is prohibited, as well as, altering the genetic, nuclear, or pro-
nuclear constitution of an embryo or zygote. '3 Exceptions do exist should
the alteration of somatic cells be necessary for therapeutic purposes. 24
Lastly, alteration to select the sex of a child is prohibited except in
situations where it is necessary to avoid the risk of transmission of a
genetic abnormality or disease to the resulting child.21 5
3. New Zealand
Although there has been no reports of any activity in the area of
cloning, New Zealand has begun to address this issue as well as others
concerning genetic engineering. Currently, the only regulation on the
matter is that any new medical procedure must gain approval before an
ethics committee.2 16  Admittedly behind other commonwealth countries,
such as Australia and Great Britain, proposed legislation is seeking to ban
certain unethical practices including, human cloning, commercial
surrogacy, and the sale of embryos and gametes.2 1 1
210. Id. § 22, Part 8
211. Infertility Treatment Act, 1995, §§ 25, 26 (Austl.).
212. Id. § 24.
213. Id. § 39.
214. Id.
215. Id. § 50.
216. Helen Bain, New Bill to Ban Cloning of Humans, THE DOMINION (WELL.), Mar. 14,
1997, at 2.
217. Id.
[Vol. 4:697
Corsover
D. North America
1. United States
Any effort to condemn the cloning or genetic manipulation of
human beings on a world wide basis is meaningless unless the United
States agrees to abide by the legislation. The United States has taken a
leading role in the exploitation of genetic technology, being the initiator of
the Human Genome Project and spending an unprecedented amount of
money funding research.2 1' But, because of limitations encountered within
the United States Constitution, scientists conducting genetic research have
less governmental intrusion, then would be encountered in other countries.
The lack of federal regulations concerning privately funded institutions,
because of the absence of constitutional power to govern assisted
reproductive technologies,19 has enabled private institutions to remain
unconstrained when initiating research. Currently, the United States does
not have any laws prohibiting cloning procedures, although some state and
federal laws and policies, discussed later, may have some application. The
constitutional and legal arguments, as well as the moral and ethical issues,
that are in some respects unique to American society and thus constrain
legislative efforts, will also be discussed more completely under their
respective headings.
The lack of federal regulation over genetic technology first came to
the public's attention when in 1993, researchers at George Washington
University successfully split a human embryo and allowed partial
development to occur. Negative reaction condemning the experiment
was expressed from scientists, ethicists, and the general public from the
United States, as well as around the world. No legislation was passed in
response to the success, and research resumed at its normal pace, without
interference. With the announcement of the creation of Dolly in 1997,
issues of cloning and genetic research once again came to forefront of
public debate.
President Clinton, in response to news from Scotland, announced
that effective March 4, 1997, no federal agency may support, fund, or
218. Smith, supra note 96, at 3. An estimated $3 billion will be spent on the Human
Genome Project.
219. Pitrolo, supra note 151, at 201. Overshadowed by constitutional protections,
jurisdiction regarding assisted reproductive technologies falls within the realm of state
governments.
220. See discussion infra Part II Advancements in Cloning Technology.
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undertake cloning activities."' While previously only funding aimed at
research on human embryos was federally restricted, loopholes became
apparent and President Clinton's announcement further restricted federal
funds from being used in any way towards research into the cloning of
human beings.mn Describing the issue as one which is not only a matter of
scientific inquiry, but of morality and spirituality as well, the President
urged a voluntary moratorium to the entire scientific and medical
community, every foundation and university, and every industry that
supports work in this area, to follow the federal government's example. 3
The moratorium would consist of abandoning all research concerning the
cloning of humans until an appointed National Bioethics Advisory
Commission and the nation as a whole, has had a chance to debate the all
the possible implications.'
In June of 1997, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
(NBAC) published their report and recommendations on the issue of
cloning human beings. Within the report, the NBAC acknowledges the
fact that regulations concerning private institutions is basically nonexistent.
In effect, only those institutions who conduct research with the aid of
federal funding or who have executed multiple assurance agreements with
the federal government are subject to the regulatory provisions.2 As such,
it is only these institutions which must adhere to the prohibition against the
cloning of humans, as well as the restrictions governing the use of human
subjects in research.227 The report also explores the potential benefits that
may be derived from acquiring cloning technology, such as in the areas of
medical research and agriculture, but because of their potential use in
humans, these activities must be currently restricted.
Among the recommendations handed down by the NBAC are that
the current moratorium on the use of federal funding to support cloning
activities be continued and that private institutions should voluntarily
adhere to the moratorium because at this time, an attempt to clone a human
221. Remarks By President Clinton Announcing the Prohibition on Federal Funding for
Cloning of Human Beings, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 4, 1997, at White House Briefing
[Hereinafter Remarks by President Clinton].
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Report and Recommendations of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (final
draft June 6, 1997) <http://www.washington-fax.comlpassldoc-setslbioethicslnbacindex-nbac-
rep0697.shtml > [hereinafter NBAC Report).
226. Executive Summary, NBAC Report (visited Sept. 25, 1997) <http://www.washington-
fax.com/pass/doc-sets/bioethics/nbac/nbac-repO697-0-05.shtml >.
227. Id.
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being would be irresponsible, unethical, and unprofessional.m Therefore,
the cloning of a human being, no matter the reasons for or the source of
funding, should at this time be prevented and prohibited. Further
recommendations call for a sunset clause to be inserted in any proposed
federal or state legislation that would provide for review period after three
to five years in order to reexamine whether a further prohibition is
necessary.?9  If a legislative ban is not enacted, or once enacted is
subsequently lifted, all efforts to utilize somatic cell nuclear transfer to
create a child should be preceded by controlled research governed by
independent review and standards relating to the protection of human
subjects m
According to the NBAC, the language incorporated into any
legislation or regulatory action must be carefully chosen in order to protect
against interference with permitted areas of scientific research. ''
Regulations must not impede upon the areas of animal cloning, cloning
DNA sequences and cell lines, and those fields of research which have
already provided important scientific and biomedical advances. 2 The
NBAC further recommends that the United States should cooperate with
the international community to enforce those aspects which are common to
their respective cloning policies. 31 An example of this was accomplished
at the G7 Summit of Economic Countries in June of 1997, in which the
heads of states from member countries endorsed a worldwide ban on
cloning humans.-
Federal legislation has been proposed in Congress which place
restrictions on the use of federal funds for research into human cloning
technology. The Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, which
proposes to deny the use of any federal funds to conduct or support any
research that involves producing a human clone through the use of a
human somatic cell, was introduced to the House of Representatives.35 A
similar bill was submitted in the Senate, which seeks the same ban on the
use of federal funds and goes on to further define the prohibition on
228. Recommendations, NBAC Report (visited Sept. 25, 1997) <http://www.washington-
fax.com/pass/doc-sets/bioethics/nbac/nbac-repO697-O-06.shtml >.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Hearings, supra note 20 (G7 member countries - U.S., Japan, Germany, England,
France, Italy, and Canada).
235. Id.
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cloning as the "replication of a human individual by the taking of a cell
with genetic material and the cultivation of the cell through the egg,
embryo, fetal, and newborn stages into a new human individual. "2
Legislation related to genetic and fertility research, previously
enacted, may have some application to the prohibition on human cloning.
The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 requires
that clinics using assisted reproduction techniques be federally monitored.2 37
This act is designed to cover all laboratories and treatments that involve the
manipulation of human eggs and embryos.Y' During the 1980's,
fertilization clinics became quite successful in the absence of any federal
regulation. Currently, at least ten fertility clinics located in the United
States have the technology to conduct somatic cell nuclear transfer
experimentation.' 9 According to reports, a Wisconsin company, ABS
Global, has already claimed to have improved upon the techniques used in
Scotland, by creating cow embryos from the skin, bladder, and udder cells
of an adult cow.20 To further increase the concern over fertility clinics, no
professional society in the infertility field has publicly expressed agreement
to the proposed moratorium against cloning technology, unlike the
American Medical Association and other organizations in the medical
field.2"
Another area of related federal legislation is concentrated in the
field of patents. According to the Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act
of 1988, human beings are not included in patentable subject matter. 2 2
Unfortunately, no definition is included in the Act and problems may occur
in determining what genetic material is considered to constitute a human
being.24'3 One year earlier, non-naturally occurring nonhuman multi-
cellular living organisms, including animals, was determined by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office to be subject matter that is
patentable.2" This, as expected, created an uproar among theologians and
236. Proposed Legislation, § 368, NBAC Report (visited Sept. 25, 1997)
< http://www.washington-fax.com/pass/doc-sets/bioethics/nbac/nbac-repO697-5-
12.shtml>.
237. Executive Summary, supra note 226.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Wills, supra note 43.
241. NBAC Report, supra note 2265.
242. George P. Smith, II, Toward an International Standard of Scientific Inquiry, 2
HEALTH MATRIX 167, 180 (1992).
243. Id.
244. Id.
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critics, who claimed that animals and other heavenly created creatures will
be equated as products manufactured for the marketplace, and not as
sentimental beings.241
Individual states have also begun to propose legislation concerning
cloning and related technologies. Alabama has taken the largest step,
proposing legislation that bans the use of governmental funds for any
research using cloned cells or tissues.2 Missouri and Maryland have
introduced bills seeking to ban the use of governmental funds for cloning
an entire individual .20 Bills that prohibit the cloning of an entire
individual, regardless of the funding source have proposed in some states
including, Alabama, California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, and West Virginia.m Florida and California have bills
proposed that explicitly ban any research using cloned cells or tissues. 2 9
Lastly, bills that might unintentionally ban research using cloned cells or
tissues have been introduced in South Carolina and New York.2
2. Canada
Canada has taken broad steps through recommendations and
criminal sanctions in order to restrict the permissible circumstances in
which certain genetic technologies may be used. As early as 1993,
recommendations were set forth that banned any research utilizing human
embryos that were focused on cloning technology, pre-natal sex
determination for other than therapeutic reasons, and for establishing a
commission to oversee fertility laboratories and other clinics involved in
fertility research.2'
In 1995, Health Canada expressed additional recommendations
regarding genetic technologies. According to these newer
recommendations, human embryo research should only be allowed when
approved by a National Regulatory Body. This does allow many
procedures to still be undertaken and does not specifically prevent any
procedure from being performed. Among the guidelines presented for the
regulatory body to follow in selecting which experiments may be
performed on human embryos are that it is necessary for the improvement
of the human condition, inquiry into using animal or non-human models
245. Id.
246. Proposed Legislation, supra note 236.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id
250. Id
251. Pitrolo, supra note 151, at 182.
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has been exhausted, and the research is of the highest scientific quality. 2
Viable human embryos may be used but only when a compelling case is
made that non-viable embryos cannot be successfully employed.353 Any
research that is permitted on human embryos may not be performed ex
utero later than fourteen days after fertilization.- The regulatory body
may also consider permitting the fertilization of human ova for research
purposes only, should the potential benefits to society or future offspring
require that the experimentations occur.21' Human cloning, chimeras, as
well other forms of experimentation are prohibited without the regulatory
body's explicit approval, and in the case that a regulatory body is not
formed, these types of experiments are specifically banned.2m
In 1996, Canada introduced criminal sanctions in order to prevent
many of the new genetic technologies from being performed. Under the
Human Reproductive and Genetics Technologies Act, penalties of
performing these outlawed practices will range from prison terms of up to
ten years and/or fines to a maximum of $500,00 Canadian.- Among the
areas of research to be criminalized are; human embryo cloning, germline
alteration, research involving maturation of sperm or eggs outside the
human body, the creation of embryos for research purposes only, and any
research conducted on embryos later than fourteen days after
fertilization.
E. Asia and Japan
1. Japan
Currently, Japan does not have any specific legislation regarding
cloning or the manipulation of human embryos. Scientists proceed on the
basis of their own conscience and set of morals.' Guidelines concerning
252. Final Report of the Multidisciplinary Discussion Group on Embryo Research assembled
by Health Canada in 1995, 48 INT'L DIG. OF HEALTH LEGIS. 131, 229, (1997).
253. Id. at rec.4.
254. Id. at rec.3. Follows internationally accepted standards.
255. d. at rec. 10.
256. Id. at rec. 11, 12. Among the research prohibited in the absence of a regulatory body
are; human cloning, chimeras, production of interspecies embryos, and transgenic human
embryos.
257. Wayne Kondro, Canada gets tough with Reproductive Technologies, THE LANCET,
June 22, 1996 (discussing the June 14, 1996 Human Reproductive and Genetics Technologies
Act).
258. Id.
259. Analysis: Cloning Reports, Reactions Ripple Back to Japan, ASIA PULSE, Mar. 7,
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the manipulation of human embryos have been released by the Japan
Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology, but the research conducted in
government-funded and private sector laboratories are still without any
clear cut regulations.260
Although the Education Ministry has decided, for the present time,
not to allocate funding towards research on cloning human beings through
the use of human tissues because of ethical issues, knowledge concerning
the legal responsibilities of cloning research are still unknown.26' No laws,
regulations, moratoriums, or other restrictive measures regarding the
research of cloning human beings are currently being considered by the
Education Ministry.2" In the area of animal cloning, Japan is highly
advanced and the Education Ministry does plan to continue the funding this
type of research. Utilizing embryo splitting techniques, universities in
Japan has been successful in the cloning of farm animals and mice, but
currently, they have not achieved any success in the cloning mammals.w
2. Hong Kong
Scientific research in cloning is basically a self regulating
technology with no prohibitions and the subject has not been addressed in
the country's courts or legislature.?" Public concern, in respect to cloning
technology, is focused on the well-being of the resulting children and the
effects on family relationships.- In 1992, the Committee on Scientifically
Assisted Human Reproduction published recommendations, attempting to
answer these concerns, with some focused on research in this area."
Among the recommendations are that guidelines should be constructed
concerning what is allowable in embryo research.2 6 7 Included in these
guidelines should be a prohibition that no embryo should be created
deliberately for research and that no research should be allowed following
the fourteenth day after fertilization.26 Furthermore, standards regarding
260. Id.
261. Ministry Decides not to Fund R&D on Cloning Humans, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE,
Mar. 7, 1997,
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storage of gametes and embryos need to be set forth and any commercial
surrogacy should be prohibited.m
3. China
Unlike most other countries, China has taken a very conservative
approach on the issue of cloning humans, as well as cloning all other life
forms. The Chinese Academy of Science has banned human cloning and
recommended that guidelines regulating animal cloning be established and
the responsibilities and rights of scientists be set forth.270 Evaluation of the
legal and ethical concerns of animal cloning should be accomplished by a
newly created national body.2' 1 .The Academy of Science believes that
danger to the environment and ecological hazards may occur through any
application of cloning technologies to any living species.27 Traditional
societal beliefs still exhibit a reluctance to accept children born through
artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization procedures."'
4. Malaysia
Believing that it would against God's plan to have multiple clones
of an individual existing at the same time, Malaysia has officially
prohibited the cloning of human beings." Although the cloning of humans
is banned, the government will allow the cloning of certain animals to
continue under conditions such as, reproducing quality livestock or saving
an endangered species.
F. Middle East
Islamic religious experts and scholars at a meeting of the Islamic
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization has recommended a
prohibition of cloning research on human beings, but have accepted the
cloning of animals and plants."7 Although these recommendations are not
a final fatwa, religious ruling, and until the Sharia, Islamic law, allows the
technology of cloning humans to be explored, Muslim countries are urged
269. Id.
270. China Bans Human Cloning, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, May 13, 1997.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Pitrolo, supra note 151, at 184.
274. Malaysia Bans Human Cloning, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Mar. 18, 1997.
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276. Islamic Organization Recommends Human Cloning Ban (visited Sept. 23,1997)
<http://www.d-b.net/dti/970618casablanca.txt >.
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to adhere to the ban.z" In anticipation of foreign intrusion into Islamic
countries, recommendations emerged that call for governments to enact the
necessary legislation to prohibit foreign involvement in human cloning
researchY' The Organization based their recommendations on the belief
that the direction that this technology is headed is unsafe and has immoral
objectives.Y
Other countries in this region have expressed opinions regarding
embryo research and cloning technology. Israeli law may allow research
on human embryos, but have stated that they are against cloning
procedures.= Liberally minded in the area of fertility treatment, in vitro
procedures for infertile couples are permitted and encouraged and because
embryos are not considered living human beings until being born, under
Rabbinic law, they are considered only as property.2' In an opposite
direction, the pro-Iranian Hezbollah faction has expressed an acceptance
of cloning procedures. According to Sheikh Mohammed Hussien
Fadallah, the spiritual guide of the Hezbollah, these scientific procedures
have been discovered because God has allowed it to happen, and should
therefore not be seen as an attempt to intervene in divine creation.2m
Furthermore, the Ayatollah Nasser Makarem-Shirazi, a major figure in the
ultra-strict Islamic clergy of Iran, believes that human cloning will happen
and that the clergy should begin studying the technology in order to be
better suited to cope with the potential problems that may occur.=
G. South America
Argentina is one of the few South American countries that have
entered into the bioethical debate of genetic technologies. While they
currently do not address the cloning issue, recommendations have been
presented that prohibits experimentation on embryos and genetic
manipulation is allowed only for therapeutic reasons.2 Sex selection in
embryos is also prohibited except in situations where genetic disorders may
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Hezbollah Mentor Says "God Allowed" Cloning, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Mar.
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281. Pitrolo, supra note 151, at 195.
282. Hezbollah, supra note 280.
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be prevented.' 5 The Senate Commission has also expressed that fertility
procedures should only be allowed for infertility problems and not as an
alternative means for achieving a pregnancy.2"
H. World Organizations
1. The Vatican
From as early as 1987, the Vatican has publicly expressed concern
and condemnation towards any technology aimed at assisted fertilization
and cloning procedures. The belief that any non-therapeutic
experimentation and freezing of embryos offends the dignity of fetal human
life, the Vatican has urged countries to ban these procedures. 2" Reports of
the experimentation conducted at George Washington University, prompted
the Vatican to publicly condemn the scientists and conclude that the
research was not justified and defied all legal barriers., "  While
understanding the importance of the genetic research, concern that a lack
of respect for human dignity and the potential treatment of children as
products of technology is overriding in their disapproval of genetic
experimentation. 9  Upon learning of the success of researchers in
Scotland, the Vatican has again become outspoken, calling for all efforts to
clone human beings to be banned. The Church has expressed concern that
psychologically cloned humans would be harmed by being constantly
aware of a "real" or even "virtual" presence of his other(s). 29°
2. World Health Organization
The World Health Organization (WHO) is a multinational
organization charged with addressing national and international disparities
in health standards.?"1 In considering the ethical implications of cloning and
genetic technology, the Organization has recently held that, because of
285. Id.
286. Id. at 181.
287. Vatican Condenms American Cloning of Human Embryo, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Oct. 25, 1993.
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respect for human dignity, the application of cloning research for the
replication of humans is ethically unacceptable.2m While the group realizes
that there is a freedom to access the benefits of ethically accepted scientific
progresses, necessary guidelines and safeguards must be put forth in
national and international legislation. Among the forms of experimentation
that are regarded as ethically unacceptable are; human cloning, alteration
of the germ-cell genome, interspecies fertilization, and the creation of
chimeras. 291 The WHO's resolution is not intended to prohibit all forms of
cloning and some applications are acceptable.29 The recommendations of
the WHO are to be used as a starting point for an international public
debate and individual countries are urged to enact conforming legislation
on the domestic level.2 95
During the 50th World Health Assembly meeting in Geneva,
delegates adopted a resolution affirming the views of the WHO and
declaring that the cloning of human beings is ethically unacceptable and
c6ntrary to human morality and dignity.2" Because of unprecedented
ethical implications that cloning and the more extreme forms of genetic
experimentation possess, development in genetic research must be carefully
monitored.2 'q Further assessment of international reactions to the legal
aspects involved with cloning are to be discussed at the 1998 World Health
Assembly.2
VI. DEBATE: MEDICAL ISSUES
The benefits that can be potentially achieved through cloning and
genetic research, medically speaking, are significant and could produce an
overall healthier society. In the fight against serious genetic diseases,
these technologies could prove pivotal in their prevention and possible
extinction. Areas of research, including disability prevention, organ
transplant, infertility, and aging, can all be aided by knowledge in these
292. WHO Director-General Condemns Human Cloning, (visited Sept. 26, 1997)
< http://www.who.ch/press/1997/pr97-20.html >. Human reproduction should not be confused
with human replication.
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fields. In order to accommodate both the proponents and critics of genetic
research, a balancing must occur between the goals of achieving an
improved and healthier society and the protection of an indeterminable
amount of embryos that will be destroyed through experimentation.
Many of the arguments supporting the continuation of cloning
research come from those in the infertility field. Through cloning
technology, couples who before had to rely on sperm or egg donors, can
now use their own DNA for the offspring. For couples who are no longer
fertile, they may wish to clone the DNA of a previous child or should a
child die prematurely, their DNA can be replicated to give birth to another
child. With the process of blastomere separation, a woman going through
an in vitro fertilization procedure can elect to split the embryo and
cyropreserve those embryos not necessary for achieving pregnancy. This
will protect the woman from having to repeat potentially harmful
fertilization treatment. Furthermore, regulations regarding cloning
technology may in effect restrict otherwise legitimate genetic testing. For
example, embryos used in IVF procedures that are determined to be
carriers of certain diseases, such as cystic fibrosis, may be disregard in
order to implant healthy and viable embryos. 2"
The search for treatments with brain and nervous system damage
can also be aided by research using human embryos. Embryonic stem
cells, because they are undifferentiated and can develop into almost any
type of cell in the body, could be used to replace the damaged cells.30 This
undifferentiated status, along with their fast development, enables these
stem cells to evade an attack by a person's immune system. 10' The large
amount of these cells that would be needed to repair damage would most
likely make cloning a necessity. Another area for a potentially beneficial
use of genetic technology is in the field of cancer research. Because
cancer cells develop at approximately the same rate as embryonic cells,
scientists, through embryo research, may be able to slow down or even
prevent the spread of cancer.-
Bone marrow transplants and skin graphs could each be performed
easier with the help of cloning technology. A cryopreserved embryo can
be implanted and allowed to develop in order to procure transferable
matter. 03 With improved technology, an embryo may not even have to be
299. Shari Roan, In Our Own Image, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1997, at A13.
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brought to full term in order to be useful.", Lastly, the prevention of
miscarriages due to chromosomal imbalances may also be improved.205
Current figures estimate that over fifty percent of miscarriages occur from
these imbalances and through genetic screening and experimentation,
avoidance of this trauma may be possible.30
For those individuals that are against permitting cloning and other
genetic technologies to be researched, equally persuasive arguments are
expressed. First, there is not much justification in permitting thousands of
embryos to be manipulated through experimentation and ultimately
destroyed for the benefit of producing a single cloned person.3w While the
embryo is not afforded protection equal to that of an adult human, many
people feel that it should still receive a special status. An unsettling feeling
emerges from the knowledge that a significant number of embryos, that
have the potential to achieve life, will be sacrificed in the pursuit of
science. Critics further argue that the increase in the rate of achieving a
successful pregnancy by splitting embryos during an IVF procedure is a
misleading figure and is due to the genetic heterogeneity of the transferred
embryos and not to increased amounts.-
Fear of eugenic procedures and memories of past horrors entails
another reason to prohibit such research from being conducted. The ability
to manipulate the genetic foundation of man and to literally control
creation is a power which if misapplied could result in the loss of freedom,
individuality, and human dignity, for the present, as well as future
generations. Logic dictates that if the ability to control genetic
characteristics is developed, a so-called positive eugenic program will
emerge. Positive eugenics selects those traits which are most beneficial
and encourages those with the finest genetic profiles to breed. A
predictable outcome of this would entail the increased selection of
particular traits and thus, a large scale effort to produce similar or identical
types of humans. Nature's process of natural selection is suspended and
the reality of a "Brave New World" is upon us.
The pivotal questions posed to protect against abuses is therefore,
who will control the process, and how will the selection of genetic
characteristics be chosen. The answers are potentially as disturbing as the
questions asked. Under governmental control, fears of a manufactured
304. Id.
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society, much like "A Brave New World,"- are imagined. A world of
humans with pre-determined characteristics and capabilities could benefit
the efficiency, productivity, and manageability of society as a whole.
Other governmental fears include, new forms of biological warfare, armies
of soldier clones, and the extinction of those found unacceptable to society.
Private control over these processes does not erase the fear of abuses. One
can imagine menus offering a price list of particularly desirable traits,
checklists for couples who would like to opt for specific genetic packages.
For the right price, one may have the option to purchase the DNA of a
world class athlete, award winning actor, or a beautiful supermodel. As
was stated by George Annas, a medical ethicist at Boston University,
"Maybe if this were Nazi Germany, we would worry more about the
government, but we're in America, where we have the private market.
We don't need the government to make the nightmare scenario come
true."3 '0 Fortunately, time is on the side of reason and technology has not
progressed to the point where many of the fears expressed will become
reality.
Opponents to cloning and other forms of genetic engineering also
rely on currently inconclusive information on the long term effects of
implanting an adult's DNA into a new being. Fear that the DNA may have
mutated to the effect of causing damage to the recipient is one frequently
made argument. "' The recipient may experience rapid aging or suffer
more degenerative disease than normal . 2  Other arguments against these
procedures are what legal and societal rights are to be afforded to the
clone, and a fear that man might insinuate that cloning their own DNA
might in turn allow them the opportunity to live forever.
VII. DEBATE: LEGAL ISSUES
With the United States being so heavily involved in the efforts of
the Human Genome Project and many other genetic research projects, the
legal freedoms guaranteed by the United States Constitution become
pivotal issues in the debates over legislation. Legislation enacted
throughout the world may prohibit particular areas of research, but if the
United States does not agree to accommodate those restrictions, any
legislation is virtually meaningless. Traditionally, scientists in the United
States assume that, absent a specific and justifiable prohibition, there is
309. See generally ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (HarperPerennial 1946)(1932).
310. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 9.
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freedom to act. '3" This implied freedom, combined with arguments limiting
governmental intrusion into fundamental liberties, opens the door to highly
complicated debate. With a population consisting of individuals from a
multitude of different backgrounds, religions, races, economic status, etc.,
the difficulty in achieving a consensus opinion on any issue is enormous.
Add in personal emotions and moral values, and the debate becomes that
much more diluted and difficult to define. Although there are opinions
which are not common to all Americans, the collective force of strong
objections to the use of cloning on human beings makes a case that it
should be against the public policy to conduct this type of research.'
In the United States, the amount of governmental intrusion that is
permissible on an individual's liberty is dependant upon the classification
of the liberty at issue. In the case of ordinary liberties, such as to drive a
car, most any reason will be sufficient for government restrictions. For an
intrusion upon a fundamental right, those rights mentioned in the
Constitution or necessary for a system of ordered liberty, strict scrutiny
analysis is performed and a compelling reason is needed for an
infringement. Fundamental rights have been defined by the Supreme
Court to be those rights so deeply rooted in our culture and history as to be
assumed by the public as being beyond casual governmental interference.'"
If a right is not determined to be fundamental, only a rational basis test is
utilized before the state may interfere with it.
According to the Supreme Court, Americans have the
constitutional right to procreative freedom. The Court found in, Eisenstadt
v. Baird, that in matters so fundamentally affecting an individual, such as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child, it is the right of the person to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion.1" Inferences are made
based on this holding, that included in the right to have a child is the right
to avoid carrying the child to term either through the use of abortion or
contraceptives.117 The dilemma then becomes whether the fundamental
right to either give birth or abort a child implies the right to deny life based
upon undesirable genetic characteristics or to create life through cloning
procedures.
In order to determine whether cloning a human would be protected
as a fundamental procreative liberty, the question that must be answered is
whether cloning is considered as a form of reproduction or as only
313. Executive Summary, NBAC Report, supra note 226.
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replication. With reference to Skinner v. Oklahoma, where according to
dicta, coital reproduction is considered a fundamental right, non-
compelling state interference with infertility procedures should also be
invalidated in the case where the treatment is necessary to allow coitally
infertile couples to reproduce. 18 In previous cases discussing procreative
liberties, procreation has been assumed to involve interdependent
reproductive cooperation between a man and a woman, at least on a
biological level. 3'9  Furthermore, it has been assumed that a vertical
transmission of genes, between parent and child, would occur, but through
cloning by somatic transfer, genes may be transmitted within a
generation. 32 Through the use of embryo splitting, a couple undergoing an
infertility procedure may wish to produce more than one child with a
particular genome. This may fall within the definition of procreation
because the genome that is cloned is from the persons themselves or from
an embryo or child that was created from their gametes. 32' Without the use
of the person's own genes or gametes, the resulting offspring would be
product of replication and not reproduction. Although to some this may be
considered to be reproduction, because the process is so deviant from the
commonly understood definition, it may not be treated as representing the
same fundamental rights.2 Should the creation of an offspring through
cloning technology be regarded as reproduction and protected as a
fundamental right, the government must set forth compelling reasons in
order validate their infringement. Among the various reasons to prohibit
cloning are that through the use of this technology human identity would
become predictable and be inconsistent with the maintenance of free will.3 23
This is speculated to lead to a weakening of the traditional social constructs
found within the family unit and the diminution of the political institutions
that focus on restricting coercive manipulation of individuals and fostering
individual autonomy.2 Opponents counter this argument by eliciting the
fact that the government has a compelling interest to minimize human
suffering and maximize the social good that be achieved through cloning
technology. Along with the dilemma that cloning poses to procreative
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liberty, the pre-birth control over genetic characteristics also comes into
the debate. To some, logic dictates that if a woman has the right to avoid
birth for any reason, she should be entitled to avoidance for a particular
reason.31 Going a step further, a woman should have the right to
reproduce under the circumstances in which she is confident that her child
will have particular genetic traits.312 With the advancements of genetic
research, the pre-birth ability to detect genes that are susceptible to disease
is improving and is already routinely in use in some situations.32' Through
the continued research in projects, such as the Human Genome Project, the
number of diseases that can be detected prior to birth will increase.
Interference with one's procreative freedom will occur through the denial
of information that may be given to the parents that would effect their
decision of whether to reproduce.12
If pre-birth selection is determined to be included as a fundamental
right, the state must have a compelling reason in order to impede upon that
right and a showing of tangible harm to others would probably be
necessary. Anything less may not be enough to overcome, at least, the
potential pre-birth screening capabilities associated with genetic research.
Utilizing an objective test, the materiality of a gene's characteristics to
procreative decisions should determine the amount reason necessary to
interfere legislatively. Thus, genes which identify serious disease would
probably elicit the strict scrutiny test in order to impede, while genes used
for nontherapeutic enhancement, intentional diminishment, or cloning
would require only a rational basis. 29
VIII. DEBATE: ETHICAL ISSUES
A. Moral Status of the Embryo
Any discussion or legislation on the topics of cloning and human
embryo research must necessarily entail the moral status afforded to the
embryo. Countries, and people alike, have opposing views on whether, or
under what conditions, research on human embryos may be pursued.
There are generally three viewpoints that emerge on the status, or
325. Robertson, supra note 94, at 427.
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protection, that an embryo is given.3 Under the first, an embryo is
afforded the same protections as any other human being from the moment
the egg is fertilized, thus granting the right of an opportunity for life.",
The second view equates the embryo with any other human tissue,
allowing research prior to its viability and with proper consent.12 The final
and majority viewpoint does not equate the status of an embryo with that of
a person, but due to the potential for life, more respect is granted than that
of ordinary tissue or animal embryos." Proponents of this view allow
embryo research to be conducted until the fourteenth day after
development began or until the time the embryo can experience brain
activity and pain, prior to the appearance of the primitive streak. The
majority of countries and international organizations that permit human
embryo research to be conducted follow the third viewpoint, with most
European nations following the fourteen day limitation. M
Constitutional power to regulate these areas of research, along with
controlling so-called procreative liberties, varies among the countries of
the world, and in most situations the third viewpoint implies a compromise
between the first two opposing views. In direct connection with the
dilemma that surrounds the abortion debate, individual viewpoints, apart
from their government's desired ideology, are deeply entrenched in their
own personal beliefs and opposition is not readily accepted. With
abortion, some feel that an embryo has the right to life, while others do not
afford the embryo such a right. Many believe that it is each individual's
choice on whether to partake in an abortion, while others feel that the
potential for life creates the obligation to provide the embryo with at least
the opportunity for life. Simply put, it is an issue concerning the life or
death of the individual embryo, or embryos, involved. What distinguishes
the status issue with cloning and genetic technologies from abortion is that
the issue is not life or death, but the potential genetic manipulation of
future generations and the creation of life when there was none.
B. Individuality and Human Dignity
Critics claim that by cloning humans, children will receive
treatment equal to that of a commodity and human dignity and individuality
will be diminished. Utilization of splitting techniques to create multiple
330. See generally Coleman, supra note 41, at 1340.
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clones of a particular embryo will install a feeling of lessened self-worth in
the resulting clones because of the association with being artificially
manufactured and the knowledge that, not only are you a copy of another,
but that there are multiple copies of you.
The lack of harm resulting from the existence of naturally
occurring identical twins is often argued as a reason for allowing the use of
cloned embryos.335  Opponents counter this argument by claiming that
significant differences between the two make the analogy inappropriate. 3'
Initially, while there is a naturally occurring limitation in the number of
identical twins born during one birth, usually two or three, with cloning,
an infinite amount of embryos can theoretically be produced." Another
distinction is that with natural identical twins, birth occurs within a limited
time frame, usually moments from each other, but with cloning, birth can
occur years apart and with different mothers.3 8
This second distinction brings about an interesting dilemma that
has the potential to occur. A child may be faced with a devalued self-
worth in light of an identical twin or multiple twins being developed many
years subsequent to his or her own birth. This original child may be
attached to the notion that he or she is a unique individual and can thus be
harmed by some potential future circumstance.3 9  This situation also
touches on the issue of whether an embryo or a child has the right to
individuality and protection against the copying of their genetic
composition. While under current conditions it is the rights of the parents
which determines what procedures will be accomplished, the existing child
is a human being and deserves the same rights as any adult human being,
in determining the exploitation of their own unique genetic make-up.
IX. DEBATE: RELIGIOUS ISSUES
Religion vs. Science
The delicate balance that has been created between the
advancement of science and the maintenance of fundamental religious
beliefs is being threatened by the achievements that have been produced in
the area of genetic engineering. Confrontation on issues, such as creation
and evolution, have come center stage in the wake of the potential
opportunities that are presented as a result of recent advancements. Man,
335. Amer, supra note 12, at 1683.
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through science, is on the threshold of discovering procedures which will
allow the manipulation and control over processes that until now, have
only been known to nature and God. The gap that exists between what can
be explained by analytical science' and that which is answerable through
religious faith is shrinking in the favor of science. But for science to
achieve beneficial results for all of humanity, religion must have its place
in the debate. The moral and spiritual ideals represented by religion must
not be discarded for the sake of scientific progress.
In the new world of genetic engineering, religion's role in society
must be re-evaluated in order to help define the most beneficial route to
improving life through technology. Fundamental religious teachings on the
God-like ability to create life is being tested by potential achievements in
genetic manipulation. Opposing views between the many religions further
complicates issues on, among other things, the amount of protection given
to, or the potential for, human life and permitable areas of genetic
research. For example, the Vatican, in condemning attempts to clone
humans, warned that because only God can create the spiritual soul,
resulting clones will be psychically damaged.30 With an opposite view, the
spiritual guide for the Moslem Hezbollah, Sheikh Mohammed Hussein,
claims that because God has allowed science to progress, research into
cloning should continue.3" Lesser debated issues concerning genetic
technologies also may encompass opposing religious views. One example
is that increased screening for genetic-based diseases will lead to a greater
amount of abortions for genetically damaged embryos or fetuses. This
situation presents a dilemma for those religions who regard the moment of
conception, as when the obligation to protect life begins. The question
becomes whether the benefits of providing an improved life to many
individuals outweighs the effect of denying life to those who may be
genetically handicapped.
The pursuit of scientific achievement must balance its efforts with
the moral and spiritual principles expressed in religion. While it is of little
doubt that the benefits of cleansing mankind of the burdens of disease and
improving overall health is of significant importance and should be
continued to be researched, experimentation must proceed within
reasonable bounds and protect the cherished notions of birth, dignity, and
individuality. Genetic engineering must be used for the greatest societal
good and minimize human suffering in order to preserve the integrity of
creation and evolution. Memories of the past atrocities that occurred with
the Nazis and fear of what can be envisioned should genetic manipulation
340. Vatican, supra note 287.
341. Hezbollah, supra note 280.
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be used for unsavory purposes, must be combined with moral and spiritual
ideals to prevent any misapplication against societal good in these areas of
research.
X. DEBATE: THEOLOGICAL ISSUES
Related to the religious issues, theologians have expressed their
views on the potential to clone humans and manipulate their genetic
constitution. As a fundamental belief, human life is sacred and liberty is a
basic right granted to man out of respect for their autonomous and free
nature?'2 From there, differing views are formed on how man should
handle the knowledge to manipulate creation and control the genetic
development of their own species. Some are based on the principle that
this science dehumanizes and objectifies the individual by defining the
individual's spirit as a mere product of his or her genome.343 Others take a
more consequentialist approach, focusing on whether the results are
beneficial given a particular situation. 3" Understanding the importance of
the potential benefits that may be achieved, the Roman Catholic Church
has even expressed a willingness to condone some circumstances of genetic
therapy in conditions of therpeutic necessity. 3'5 However, any attempt to
modify the human genome in a eugenic fashion is strictly against the
dignity and identity of man?"
Proceeding with caution in the area of genetic engineering, because
of a respect for the human spirit, is the basis of thought under the
deontological approach. 7 As free and truth seeking individuals, humans
can not be the subject of genetic or scientific determination and science
must be prohibited from progressing at the expense of the human spirit.-
If it can be reasonably predicted that no grave harm will be done to the
subject and its purpose is to alleviate suffering, genetic therapy may be
permissible 49  Theological beliefs expressed under the consequential
theory takes a more fatalistic approach leaning, towards man's inherent
nature to manipulate their existence. Justification is realized when the act
of manipulation, and the means used to achieve the act, exhibits the
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greatest societal good for the greatest number of people.?0 Simply put,
"[t]he concept of autonomy in bioethics, as well as the individual as a free
spirit in theology, is obliterated for the sake of the utility driven social
order.""'
These arguments, as well as those in the religious area, have a
basis in the moral and spiritual foundation that society is built upon.
Before proceeding with genetic research, scientists must understand what is
at stake through the methods utilized and the results that are to be
achieved. The moral quality of experimentation is dependant upon the
nature of the parties engaging in the procedure, the actual and intended
results on the whole human being, and the technological methods
employed.
XI. A LOOK TOWARDS THE FUTURE
In the absence of a world wide consensus on the limitations
regarding cloning and other genetic technologies, those countries
permitting less regulated research will be seeking to cash in on the rapidly
expanding biotechnology industry. Some estimates value the market for
genetic products and services at over $100 billion, and with the rapid
progression of discovery, these estimates are probably conservative.3"2
Corporations, and countries alike, are currently in a spirited race to
surpass recent advancements, and discover new and profitable techniques
in the areas of animal cloning, disease prevention, and gene identification.
With the enormous amount of potential profit, pressure to permit continued
research, ir areas which may be soon prohibited due to overbroad and
rushed through legislation, is coming in from scientists and lobbyists in
almost every area of genetic research.
A. Government and Corporate Interaction
An enlightened look into the future of partnerships between
countries and corporations is occurring in the present time. The first
example is centered in Iceland, where with the aid of private United States'
investments and the cooperation of the Icelandic public and the
government, a genomic company deCode has ventured into twenty-first
century research. Utilizing a positional cloning technique, deCode
identifies disease-causing genes by looking at the physical characteristics of
350. Id. at 448.
351. Id.
352. Looking for Financing, Equity, and Debt: TELECLONE INC., FIRST LIST: SEEKING
ACQuISITIONS, Nov. 1, 1997.
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a disease and working back to its genetic basis. "3 Through this process,
researchers have had successful progress in the areas of familial essential
tremor and multiple sclerosis."m A priority in the project was locating a
genetically ideal population base and with the approval of the government
and the subject population, Iceland is the perfect fit. With its genetic
homogeneity, descended almost exclusively from Norwegian nobles and
extensive genealogical records dating back more than two hundred years,
the Icelandic people are the ideal model group to research. 3-1 Add in a top-
notch national health care system and a large tissue bank and a virtual
Eden is established for the goals of the project.3 '
Claiming to be one of the most technologically advanced
companies in the world, deCode reports to be able to map up to twelve
complex diseases per year through sequencing operations which are able to
generate 300,000 genotypes per month.3 7  Subject to governmental
approval, deCode plans to establish a database, called GGPR, containing
the genotypes, genealogy, and phenotypes of the Icelandic population.151
This will allow the identification of diseases which occur in specific
families and determine its genetic basis through generational inheritance of
the disease.
An opposite situation has occurred in Manilla, where in an effort
to combat bio-piracy, the government has attempted to prevent foreign
corporations from patenting genetic material found in their territory. As of
September 1, 1997, the government has voided any agreement with
multinationals granting the right to isolate and patent genetic material from
flora and fauna located in the Philippines. 3' Any bio-prospecting must be
accomplished with a government license and the consent of the community
involved. 36 Similar concerns have been raised in Indonesia and other
countries, but lack of adequate enforcement allows illegal exporting to be
done. 361
353. deCode Genetics puts Iceland on the Map, MARKETLETrER, OCT. 13, 1997.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Choong Tet Sieu & Keith Loveard, Biotech: Magic Genes, ASIAWEEK, Sept. 5, 1997.
360. Id.
361. Id.
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B. Recent Progress
To illustrate how quick progress is being achieved, since the time I
began research on this topic, the technology used to create Dolly the sheep
has already been reported to be improved upon. According to officials at
ABS Global Inc., located in Wisconsin, three genetically identical calves
have been produced from a single fetal calf tissue and ten cows are
currently impregnated with clones from a single adult bull cell.3'6 Rather
than starving the cells of growth factors and nutrients like researchers in
Scotland, ABS advanced the process by creating stem cells by using a
special formula of growth hormones to modify specialized cells.63
Through the successful use of this new procedure, ABS claims that safety
concerns are minimized, and cloning a human, should that route be taken,
would become a much technically safer process.3"
Recent corporate influence in cloning technology has also begun to
produce therapeutic benefits for man through efforts in animal cloning,
Two companies, Genzyme Transgenics Corporation and Advanced Cell
Technology Inc. have joined efforts to clone transgenic cattle which
produce milk laced with human therapeutic proteins.'0 Advanced Cell
utilizes a proprietary method of cloning, in which they introduce a gene
into fetal fibroblast cells in culture and then transfer the nuclei of those
cells into enucleated egg cells.3" The resulting embryos, all female, are
implanted into surrogate mothers, thus creating a herd in one generation. 6 7
Genzyme Transgenics, on the other hand, has previously produced
transgenic goats capable of producing Antithrombin III, a human protein,
in their milk.316 Together, they aim to produce cattle containing human
serum albumin, a market currently valued at $1.5 billion. 69 Human serum
albumin is used to regulate the balance of protein and fluids in the blood of
patients who are undergoing major surgery or suffering from bums, shock,
or malnutrition.70 This is only one example of a recent advancement in
362. Wisconsin Researchers Clone Three Genetically Identical Calves, TRANSPLANT NEWS,
Aug. 31, 1997.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Lisa Seachrist, Genzyme Transgenics, Advanced Cell Clone Cows to Produce Human
Albumin, 8 BIOWORLD TODAY 196, Oct. 9, 1997.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
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genetic engineering and new discoveries are being reported in newspapers
and trade magazines everyday.
C. The Future?
If the technologies associated with cloning are allowed to progress,
what will the future of child birth look like? Will corporations begin
soliciting customers by offering menus of genetic characteristics for one to
choose from? How about those opportunistic businessmen who compile
licensing agreements from world-class athletes, famous actors, and
beautiful supermodels, to sell cloned DNA to the highest bidders? The
possibilities and the horrors seem endless when considering the effect the
free market will have on profiting from these potential procedures.
One such entrepreneur took the initiative and began a business
called Geneti-Pet, where pet owners can one day receive a clone of their
beloved deceased pet. For a minimal fee of only $75, a blood retrieving
kit is sent to you, for a veterinarian to take a blood sample."' With an
additional cost of $200 per year, your pet's genetic composition is
cryogenically frozen until technology becomes available to replicate the
DNA 37 2
For those seeking to invest their money into the potential of
cloning, opportunities exist to invest in genetic research corporations.
Besides previously established companies, which are privately financed or
located on the many stock markets, companies are now soliciting investors
in trade magazines and on the Internet. One such company is Teleclone
Inc., who hopes to generate enough capital to maintain genetic laboratories
to clone genes and provide genetic services and products.37  Another
potential investment is in the Raelian Movement, a religious organization
claiming that life on earth was scientifically created in laboratories. 74 The
organization is seeking to establish a laboratory in a country allowing
cloning to be achieved and to sponsor private American laboratories that
no longer receive funding due to the federal ban. Looking to charge
upwards of $200,000 to clone an embryo, the Raelians will also provide an
insurance service to provide storage of a child's DNA in order to clone a
prematurely deceased child . 73  For a final look at a potential future
371. Sean Griffin, A Bowser in a Bottle, THE NEWS TRIB. (TACOMA, WA.), Feb. 1, 1994,
at Al.
372. Id.
373. Looking for Financing, supra note 352.
374. Rael Creates the First Human Cloning Company (visited Sept. 25, 1997)
<http://rael.org/English/pressreleases/clone.html >.
375. Id.
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situation, Dream Tech International, an Internet site, offers a sampling of
hypothetical order forms and company benefits that encompass a futuristic
human cloning company.7 6
XII. CONCLUSION
As the world is on the threshold of entering a new millennium, the
ability to manipulate the existence of humanity in a way never before
experienced is presented before us. Potential advancements in genetic
engineering technology offers man the power to create and control the
future development of life on earth and the ability to alter nature in a truly
God-like manner. The awesome responsibilities and implications derived
from these advancements must not be taken lightly and the principles of
human dignity and individuality should not be forsaken. The ramifications
implicit in modifying the genetic composition of man will affect all
individuals, no matter their location or status in society. The positive
benefits to the overall health and improvement of the human species must
be balanced by the effects research will have on potential life and the loss
of individual freedoms which may ensue. In simple terms, the path in
which science chooses to progress will have the effect of altering not only
present society, but all future generations of offspring.
An international consensus is an absolute in issues of this
magnitude. With the potential for enormous profits, anything less than a
world wide agreement, in either direction, is necessary to protect against
procreative tourism and corporate influence in these areas. While that
notion is admirable, in today's society economy-driven legislation and
corporate lobbying are major influences in dictating the course of
regulations. In this matter, the decision must be one which is beneficial to
all of man, and not to those who stand to profit off of this technology.
Positive arguments in favor of conducting research in these areas
of science are very convincing and the potential medical and social benefits
to society are inspiring. The prevention or extinction of serious disease
and the reduction of overall human suffering are admirable goals and
should be pursued with the utmost effort. Proponents of cloning research
also point to other areas of research including psychology, sociology, and
anthropology, that support the view that the environment which one
develops from and the experiences one encounters, along with genetic
composition, determine the actual identity of an individual. Therefore,
attempts at cloning would not be detrimental to the principles of human
376. Dream Tech International (visited Sept. 25, 1997) <http://www.d-
b.net/dti/about.html >.
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dignity and individuality and should thus be research in order to achieve
the potential benefits to society, as a whole.
Although the proponents have convincing views, so do the critics
of these procedures. With the lack of any conclusive information on the
implications that cloning and genetic manipulation would cause on
humanity, opponents are reluctant to accept any research that may be
abused with such disastrous consequences. The risks involved, not only to
personal freedoms, but to the subjects involved in any experimentation, are
not justified by the possibilities that have the potential to be achieved.
Basic religious and personal beliefs are at stake, and many people are not
willing to reject long-standing ideals for the benefit of science.
Favorable public reaction to these new biotechnologies is
consequential to their gaining approval to be researched and so far the
response has not been positive. According to a Time/CNN poll conducted
in 1993, three out of four Americans found the idea of cloning humans to
be deeply troubling and forty percent would put a temporary halt on any
research.'" Regarding moral and religious issues, sixty-three percent of
those polled believed cloning was against God's will and fifty-eight percent
thought that cloning was morally wrong. 78 Furthermore, forty-six percent
of Americans were favorable towards imposing criminal sanctions for
attempting to clone a human being.179
At the outset of researching these issues it was my opinion that any
attempt at cloning or genetically manipulating an individual was wrong, as
it was against my own personal beliefs and moral foundation. During my
research, my opinion varied on an almost daily basis, depending on whose
views I was reading and the benefits and risks that were involved. Now at
the conclusion of writing this paper, confusion exists and although I still
believe it is wrong, I am hesitant in discounting all the potential benefits to
society that may be achieved through continued research. In my life, I
have not experienced the untimely death of a young child or have child
who is seriously affected by a genetic disease. I do not understand the
grief that a parent must feel in the loss of a child, or the mindset of those
who would want to replace a deceased child with a cloned copy. As a
single man, without any attempts at conceiving a child, I also do not
understand the pain of infertility for myself, or that of a spouse.
The reason I say these things is because I do understand that these
issues must be debated by all of mankind and views from those who have
experienced many of the issues involved must be heard, thus allowing
377. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 9.
378. Id.
379. Id.
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everyone to realize the true implications that are involved. As a member
of the human race, my opinion, as well as others must be considered by
governments in deciding what direction to proceed in and what will be
most beneficial to man.
At the present time and with so much still to learn, any attempt to
clone a human being or modify the genetic composition of an individual,
which would have the effect of alter future generations, should be
prohibited. Until such time that the public is favorable towards these
procedures and information is offered which is convincing in eliminating
the fear of abuses, science must not proceed in this direction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, individuals living in the United States have
exported various supplies to people in third world countries. In particular,
many goods have been exported to Latin American countries, including
Cuba. The large influx of American made products that have been
Garcia
transported into these countries has given rise to the issue of liability of the
American manufacturers concerning injuries to third party recipients. The
area of tort law that has received great attention is the practice of products
liability. Products liability law has served an instrumental part in
protecting, warning, and enforcing the liability between manufacturer,
consumer, and user.
Problems arise when the user, who usually is an indigent
individual, suffers great injury yet does not have easy access to the
American courts. In order to protect both manufacturers and users, the
legislature has enacted laws that deter or eliminate the exportation of goods
from the United States into these third world countries.
This article will address the issues that surround the products
liability field concerning American manufacturers and international users.
Specifically, this article will focus on the relations between the United
States and Latin American countries. A discussion of Cuban law and
liability will also be addressed in consideration of the Helms-Burton Law.
A comprehensive study composed of the American manufacturers along
with the remedies and protections that international users are entitled to,
will encompass this analysis. Also, the issues of jurisdiction and user
limitations concerning bringing an action against an American
manufacturer will be discussed.
II. A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CUBA'S LEGAL SYSTEM
A. The American Influence
Cuba attained liberation after the Spanish-American War in 1898
leading to a new regime that led to the creation of the Cuban legal system.I
The involvement of America in the War led to the adoption of many
American legal concepts that were inculcated by Cuba's emerging
government. 2 Among the many legal concepts that were adopted from the
American government was the idea of the separation of powers . 3 From the
Spanish, Cuba accepted many of the concepts concerning the civil law. 4
1. Eugene Whitlock, Revolution in the Balance: Law and Society in Contemporary Cuba,
93 MICH. L. REv. 1835 (May 1995) (book review).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1836.
4. Id. at 1835.
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After the defeat of Batista by Fidel Castro in 1959, Castro took control of
Cuba and molded it to create a socialist democracy.5
B. The Infiltration of Castro's Socialist Regime
Fidel Castro's control dramatically changed the Cuban legal
system. Castro wished to mold this tiny island into a socialist democracy. 6
His goal was to follow the political and legal philosophies of other
successful socialist countries such as the Soviet Union.7 The ideological
theory of the socialist legality is a set of laws that every socialist
government follows.8 By studying other successful socialist countries, the
legal system is created and followed in order to attain a similar legal
system. 9
Seventeen years after Fidel Castro overtook the Cuban
government, the first socialist constitution was adopted. 10 In 1979, the
socialist constitution expressed the limitations on the citizens of Cuba
concerning many areas including free speech." The socialist theory gives
the countries' citizens the illusion of equality and freedom. 12 Through this
socialist regime, Castro has taken away a citizen's rights and replaced it
with an illusion of freedom. Among many of the freedoms and inhumane
treatment suffered by the Cuban citizens is the quarantine of HIV positive
patients. 13  As stated by Debra Evenson, this quarantine follows the
socialist governmental view that the masses are more important to protect
than the individuals.14
C. Cuba's Current Legal System
The legal system in Cuba presents opposing parties working
together to reach a common goal. 15 The judicial system was reformed
following the Castro regime. 16 The reason for the reform of the judiciary
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1836.
7. Whitlock, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1837.
12. Id.
13. Whitlock, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1837.
16. Id. at 1839.
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system was to punish those individuals who did not comport with the
ideology of the current regime."' Nevertheless, corruption among officials
still exists due to their immense political involvement. 18  Contrary to
belief, the judges are not forced to be members of the Communist Party.1
The need for currency has forced the Cuban government to adjust
the economic policy in order to foster a successful government.2" The
business opportunities created with foreign parties has created many joint
ventures in the hope of fostering a profitable government. 21 In order to
achieve this goal, the Cuban government has reformed the economic policy
in order to promote the business relationship with foreign investors.22
II. CONFLICTS OF LAW
A. Establishing Jurisdiction Against Foreign Defendants
It is important to choose the best forum in which to bring a lawsuit
in order to further and protect the international relations between the
United States and the Latin American countries.2 3 This may lead to forum
shopping either by the plaintiff or the defendant.24  Courts usually
determine the proper forum by balancing the interests and policy of the two
countries.2 5  The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue
concerning choice of law on numerous occasions.2 6 In a recent decision, it
was held that personal jurisdiction could be exercised against a foreign
defendant who is present within the state. 27 The courts have held that the
plaintiff can bring the lawsuit into the forum that offers the best choice of
17. Id.
18. Whitlock, supra note 1, at 1837.
19. Id. at 1839.
20. Id. at 1837.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Linda Silberman, Trial Evidence, Civil Practice, and Effective Litigation Techniques in
Federal and State Courts, C607 A.L.I. 775, 777 (1991).
24. Id. at 778.
25. Id.
26. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 U.S. 1274 (1990) (Plaintiffs bringing suit in a
forum that allows the party to have and maintain a satisfactory choice of law even when the case
is removed to federal court).
27. See Adolf v. A.P.I., 737 F. Supp. 1087 (D.N.D. 1990) (Canadian defendant sued for
damages arising out of a conspiracy to hide the health hazards of asbestos. The court held that
the plaintiffs established jurisdiction against all defendants as co-conspirators).
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law. 28  The negative repercussion to these decisions is that this promotes
forum shopping. 29
It is still required that the defendants have minimum contacts with
the forum state before the jurisdiction can be decided.30  The purpose of
the minimum contacts requirement is to enhance the jurisdictional
requirements. 31 Among factors to consider for jurisdiction is the
foreseeability of the product's use in that forum. 32  American
manufacturers may have the knowledge that international users will use the
product they are creating.33  In this situation the manufacturer has placed
themselves within the reach of the jurisdictional statute.34 This would offer
sufficient intention for minimum contacts.3 5  Therefore, an international
plaintiff could seek federal jurisdiction within the state in which the
product was manufactured.36  The jurisdictional state is determined by
where the manufacturers' headquarters are located.3 7 Where the item is
manufactured is usually and where other business dealing occur are
considered the manufacturers headquarters.3 8  In the event that the
American manufacturer participated in a conspiracy, as to their knowledge
of the defective product, jurisdiction will be granted against the members
of the conspiracy. 9 As to product liability insurers, jurisdiction will be
subject to the forum in which the insured manufacturer conducted
business. 0
28. Silberman, supra note 23, at 778.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 783.
31. Id.
32. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
33. Silberman, supra note 23, at 792.
34. Id. at 782.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 235.
39. Id. at 782.
40. Eli Lilly v. Home Insurance Co., 794 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Insurer was subject
to jurisdiction when the company they insured was in the forum in which they did business. See
also Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Portage La Prairie Mutual Insurance. Co., 907 F.2d 911
(9th Cir. 1990).
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B. The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine
The desire to limit forum shopping has led to many decisions
restricting the plaintiffs from bringing suit against defendants. 4'1  As in
Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, the Supreme Court held forum non conveniens in
order to maintain the convenient method of law. 2 The application of
American law was the best alternative as a convenient method for the
defendant. The Supreme Court believed that had the forum non
conveniens doctrine not been applied, international plaintiffs would have a
legal basis to sue American defendants in United States courts for accidents
that occurred in international countries.4 3 The application of this doctrine
has been diverse." If it is believed that a party would lose the benefit of a
choice of law, the courts will refuse to discharge the lawsuit based on the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 4' When courts are aware that conflicts
of law exist that may hinder a plaintiff's case, the forum will be
maintained.4 6 There is a good faith need to offer an innocent plaintiff the
best law applicable. Lawsuits brought by international plaintiffs still meet
diverse application of jurisdictional law. 7
C. Choice of Law Applied In Products Liability Cases
Concerning the jurisdictional law to be applied in products liability
cases, courts follow the law of the state in which the manufacturer's
headquarters are located.4 8  Factors including where the item is
manufactured, the regulations that are followed, and the distribution, all
contribute to the applicable choice of law that the court will apply.4 9 The
choice of law in the jurisdiction may also affect the barring of the lawsuit
based on differing statutes of limitations and repose in each state.50 Courts
offer diverse rulings in this area, but usually apply the statute of limitations
41. Winton D. Woods, Suits by Foreign Plaintiffs: Keeping the Doors of American Courts
Open, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 75, 81 (1991).
42. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 235.
43. Silberman, supra note 23, at 784.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 796.
46. Id. at 797.
47. Id. at 783.
48. Russell J. Weintraub, A Proposed Choice of Law Standard for International Product
Liability Disputes, 16 BROOK J. INT'L L. 225, 228 (1990).
49. Silberman, supra note 23, at 792.
50. Id.
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that pertains to the manufacturer's state. 51 Application of extended statute
of limitations may be done to benefit a plaintiff that would otherwise lose a
claim. 52 Usually it is a resident plaintiff who is receiving the benefit of the
extended statute of limitations. 53 Courts that apply the public policy
rationale and dismiss a barred claim based on the running of the statute of
limitations, have an interest in punishing the manufacturer whose principal
place of business is where the plaintiff brought suit. 5  A transferred case
that is moved to another federal court is required to impose the statute of
limitations that the transferor courts would have to apply.15
IV. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
A. Application to Commercial Activity
Jurisdiction over foreign states can be provided in the United States
through the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA) .56 The FSIA allows the United States to obtain subject matter
jurisdiction over the foreign states in both the federal and state courts.57
Any public or commercial activity that places the foreign states in contact
with the United States gives rise to jurisdiction in the United States under
the FSIA. 8 Many courts have held that when a foreign state enters into a
contract, it waives the sovereign immunity and assumes the laws of the
States.59 Immunity of foreign tortfeasors is addressed in two situations
concerning the restrictive theory, which extends to public activities
conducted by foreigners. 5
If the foreign tortfeasor is joined with another defendant, the
United States dismisses the action based on the immunity clause of the
51. See Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1981).
52. See Dent v. Cunningham, 786 F.2d 173 (3rd Cir. 1986).
53. Id.
54. See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
55. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Defendant motioned for court to
apply the statute of limitations that would have been applied by the court that transferred the case
to the Supreme Court.
56. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611 (1988 & Supp. 111990).
57. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
58. J. Thompson Thorton & Aurora A. Ares, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976: Misjoinder, Nonjoinder, and Collusive Joinder, 58 J. AIR. L. & COM. 703,704 (Spring
1993) citing, H.R.REP. No. 94-1487 94th CONG., 2d Sess 32 (1976).
59. See Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Comm'n, 604 F. Supp. 703 (D.D.C. 1988).
60. H.R.REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 58, at 6613.
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FSIA.' 1 The exceptions provided to the foreign sovereign immunity that
fall under the category of public or commercial activity are described in
the FSIA.6 2 If the foreign state regularly conducts commercial activity in
the state, the activity will be analyzed to determine if it is considered a
regular course of conduct within the state that serves as an exception to the
immunity. 63  If the foreign corporation conducts activities within the
"regular course of commercial conduct" such as state trading, then it will
be considered a commercial activity, which does not qualify for the
immunity. 64 If profit is earned through the trading, it is certain to be
classified as a commercial activity.6 5  This analysis is similar to the
minimum contacts rationale in determining intrastate jurisdiction.
Consideration must be given to whether the activity is public or private in
nature also .6 This issue was discussed in Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's
Medical Center v. Hellenic Republic, where a Greek national contracted
with the American hospital for a kidney transplant.6 7 In deciding whether
the foreign contract was commercial or sovereign, it was determined that
any private person would enter into a contract in a similar situation. 6
Medical services are customarily entered into for the benefit of private
parties.6 9
A commercial contact requires that the foreign state have
substantial contact with the state.7 ° The language of the act has been
considered broad. The broadness of the act has resulted in its failure to
provide adequate recourse to those injured by foreign states.7 ' If an
American plaintiff is affected by a foreign sovereign owned corporation
that has no connection with the United States, the action is barred in the
United States.72 Numerous cases have established that a "nexus" is
required between the commercial activity in the United States and the
61. See America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1989).
62. 28 U.S.C. §1603(d) (1990).
63. Id.
64. H.R.REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 58, at 6614-15.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 6615.
67. American West, 877 F.2d at 574.
68. H.R.REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 58, at 6615.
69. America West, 877 F.2d at 581.
70. 28 U.S.C. §1603(e) (1988).
71. Ares, supra note 58, at 708 citing, 16 Av.Cas. (CCH) 17, 880 (D.D.C. 1981).
72. Ares, supra note 58, at 707.
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foreign country in order for any personal injury claim to be recoverable.73
The nexus test is applied when a claim is brought concerning a sovereign
and commercial element. 7  Many of these cases have involved air craft
accidents and American plaintiffs." Factors that are considered as creating
a nexus include purchasing the product in the United States. 6 Products
that are bound for the United States are also considered to have a sufficient
nexus to create a commercial activity that will allow an exception to the
immunity. 7 Courts have also applied the commercial activity exception to
situations that include loss of product use. 78 If the item affected interferes
with an important function of commercial conduct that is regularly
conducted by a state, the immunity is assumed not to exist.79 This analysis
goes to the doing business test for commercial activity that also denies
immunity.80 If a country regularly conducts business with the United
States and the accident arose within the activity, the immunity does not
apply.81
B. The United States and Extraterritorial Power
When the United States involves itself with commercial activity in
a foreign state the exception to the immunity will also apply.8 2  The
involvement of the United States in the commercial activity of the foreign
state that results in monetary enrichment by the foreign state is sufficient to
satisfy the exception of the immunity. 3  Yet, the misconduct of the
commercial activity must have occurred in the United States." If the
negligent act occurs in the foreign state, no cause of action can be brought
73. See Gemini Shipping Inc. v. Foreign Trade Org. for Chem & Foodstuffs, 647 F.2d
317 (2d Cir. 1981); Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980); America West
Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1989).
74. Id.
75. See Santos v. Comagnie Nationale Air France, 934 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1991); America
West Airlines., Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793 (9thCir. 1989).
76. Ares, supra note 58, at 711.
77. Id.
78. Ministry of Supply, Cairo v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 708 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1983).
79. Id. at 84.
80. Ares, supra note 58, at 712.
81. Id.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1990).
83. Ares, supra note 58 at 713.
84. See Harris v. Vao Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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based on the immunity.85 No exception will apply when the occurrence
resulted outside the United States territory.
86
Another situation in which the commercial activity exception to the
immunity applies is when the activity that is conducted in the foreign state
directly effects the United States." Usually personal injuries are
nonrecoverable under this situation even if loss will have an effect on the
United States. The exception will apply as in the case involving a
collision between two vessels in international waters. 9 When the activity
effects the income that directly leads to the United States, the immunity
exception will extend to the United States. 90
The FSIA does not allow the application of the immunity
concerning counterclaims or cross claims against the foreign state. 91 When
the counterclaim involves the same "transaction" in which the original
claim arose, the sovereign immunity will not apply.9 2 The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 13 is applicable in situations involving counterclaims
and cross-claims. 93
V. JOINDER OF PARTIES
The ability to bring in a foreign state into a lawsuit is provided for
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20. 94 The Federal Rule provides
that any defendant may be "jointly, severally, or in the alternative" be
joined in order for the plaintiff to seek relief.95 The occurrence must have
arisen in the same situation amongst all the defendants in order for there to
be proper joinder of parties. 96
A defendant may also bring a third party claim against a foreign
state only under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 14. 91 In order to
85. Id. at 1061.
86. Id.
87. See In re Rio Grande Transport, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1155, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
88. See Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp., 264, 266 (D.D.C. 1978). The court held
that no direct effect could be found when Americans sued the country of Iran when the roof of an
airport terminal collapsed killing several Americans.
89. Rio Grande, 516 F. Supp. at 1163.
90. Id.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1988).
92. See In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 491 F. Supp. 161, 161 (N.D. Il1. 1979).
93. Id. at 168.
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
95. Id.
96. d.
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
1998] 769
770 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
properly bring a third party claim the third party plaintiff must have a
claim for contribution or indemnity and must involve one of the foreign
sovereign immunities enumerated in the FSIA. 98 Establishing these two
elements allows a third party plaintiff to implead a foreign state properly
into the United States for litigation in the lawsuit. 99 If the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are not properly followed the claims may be dismissed. 100
VI. NONJOINDER OF PARTIES
A. Dismissal of Lawsuits Based on Application of FSIA
The enactment of the FSIA has led to the dismissal of many cases
being removed from state to federal courts. 0° In this instance, the foreign
state defendant can seek a dismissal based on forum non conveniens.' °0
This is an option that is not available in a select number of state courts.
The removal based on forum non conveniens has led to the nonjoinder of
otherwise liable foreign state defendants.103 The FSIA's statute concerning
the removal of lawsuits are allowed when requested by third party
defendants of foreign states. °'4 The purpose of the statute was to enhance
the uniformity of federal courts involving foreign state parties. When no
foreign defendant is involved in lawsuits, the dismissal is permitted under
the theory of forum non conveniens.1°5
B. The Removal Statute of the FSIA
1. A goal for uniformity
In order to achieve the goal of uniformity amongst the federal
courts, the removal statute of the FSIA eliminated a right for trial with a
jury, it also eliminated a jurisdictional amount, and included a removal
authority. 0 6 Exercising federal court jurisdiction over foreign defendants is
98. Ares, supra note 58, at 718.
99. See In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 491 F. Supp. 161, 168 (N.D.ILL. 1979).
100. Ares, supra note 58, at 718.
101. Kathleen M. Keith, Note, Removal Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 868, 868 (1992).
102. Nolan v. Boeing Co. 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1990).
103. Ares, supra note 58, at 719.
104. Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1061.
105. Ares, supra note 58, at 720.
106. Id.
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addressed in the provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 1441 (d). x'1 That section
states that "any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state"
is allowed removal to another district court where the lawsuit has been
brought 1  The request for removal of an action removes the entire suit,
including those involving multi-party defendants who wish to keep the
lawsuit in the state court."°' The drafters intended the foreign defendants to
have the opportunity to remove in order to promote uniform law in
conformity with the other states. °10 The primary purpose is to develop
consistent laws and results concerning lawsuits that involve foreign states
and the United States."' This expansive interpretation of laws has led to
the placement of powers upon the federal courts in reaching consistent laws
that will not conflict with state law.
The removal of claims to federal court is interrelated with pendent
party jurisdiction. 1 2  The FSIA has been affirmed to authorize pendent
party jurisdictions in order to reach their intended purpose of uniformity
even when only minimal diversity would exist. 3
The relaxed standards applied by the FSIA removal statute that has
also been applied when a foreign plaintiff is involved, has led to the parties
using "non" good faith methods of keeping a claim in state court."4
Certain methods used have involved the joinder of nondiverse parties in
order to prevent removal based on diversity.- Foreign states that are
liable have also been left out of lawsuits in order to prevent removal
pursuant to the FSIA."6
2. Fraudulent joinder of parties
Fraudulent joinder of parties is addressed when a party improperly
seeks to defeat the existence of federal jurisdiction. 117 The FSIA removal
statute does not involve this issue which pertains to the removal concerning
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988).
108. Id.
109. H.R.REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 58, at 6611-12.
110. Id.
111. See Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1983).
112. See Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1376 (5' Cir. 1980).
113. Id.
114. Ares, supra note 58, at 726. See also, Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 498 U.S.
* 1024, 1024 (1991); Houston v. Caldwell, 359 So. 2d 858, 859 (Fla. 1979).
115. Ares, supra note 58, at 726.
116. Id.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(b) (1988).
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diversity situations.", The invalid creation of jurisdiction in order to
remove a case to federal court is regarded as collusive joinder, which
eliminates federal jurisdiction when joinder is improper. 119 The most
common example when improper jurisdiction through collusive joinder
exists is when a party names a beneficiary from the state to handle the
action and creates jurisdiction. 12' The reason for the appointment must be
determined in order to establish whether diversity has been improperly
granted.12' The federal courts require that the moving party claiming
collusive joinder provide evidence showing that removal of jurisdiction has
been improperly provided. 12 2
3. Benefits received by foreign defendants
The involvement of a foreign state in tort litigation within the
United States greatly affects the way a lawsuit is challenged.'1' The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act allows plaintiff's the ability to bring in
a foreign tortfeasor through it's exceptions and limits. Yet, once the
foreign state defendant is within the United States boundaries, the foreigner
is given many opportunities to remove to federal court and reach a more
relaxed federal court system.'12 The ability to remove gives the defendant
an easier opportunity to defensive actions that will either reduce their
liability or eliminate the claim brought against them.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Maintaining Uniformity in Law between the Countries
Constitutional issues relating to the rights of international plaintiffs
and defendants extend to these parties through application of United States
constitutional law. '1' In order for a state to apply their local law in
international matters, the law must not violate any public international
law. 12 This theory is applied in order to prevent conflicting laws between
118. Verlinden, 461 U.S. 480 at 491-93.
119. See Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (1lth Cir. 1989).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1983).
121. See O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1969).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1983).
123. Ares, supra note 58, at 742.
124. Id.
125. Mark B. Rockwell, Choice of Law in International Products Liability:
"Internationalizing" the Choice, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 69 (Fall 1992) citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101 (1986).
126. Id. §9.
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the United States and foreign countries. Uniformity of law is the primary
concern of the United States in overseeing proper application of law.' 7
The choice of law in the states has been addressed in the Second
Restatement.'- The Second Restatement has stated that "a court may not
apply the local law of its own state to determine a particular issue unless
such application of this law would be reasonable in the light of the
relationship of the state and of the other states to the person, thing, or
occurrence involved". 129 In products liability cases, a state applying its
own damages and liability laws may be forced to forfeit their jurisdictional
requirements in order to maintain uniformity in the international law
realm. '3
B. Constitutional Protection for International Parties
Further, the constitutional protections will be extended to
international parties when challenged. When international parties have
argued jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
has been regarded. 1 3' Courts have held that due process is extended to any
foreign defendant as it would be to any American defendant. 32
VIII. THE HELMS-BURTON ACT
A. An Act to Promote Democracy in Cuba
One way that the United States has attempted to apply
constitutional issues to international incidences is regarded in the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996. 33  Also known as the
Helms-Burton Act, the United States has attempted to provide for
extraterritorial control of foreign countries. ' The primary goal in enacting
the Helms-Burton Act was to prevent the investment of business in Cuba
127. Id. ; cf. Earl M. Maltz, Visions of Fairnes - The Relationship Between Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 751, 759 (1988).
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supra note 125.
129. Id.
130. Mark B. Rockwell, Choice of Law in International Products Liability:
"Internationalizing' the Choice. 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.REV. 69, 90 (1972).
131. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
132. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1984). The Court held that the
international defendant had due process rights that were equal to those of any American citizen.
133. Act of Mar. 12, 1996, Pub.L.No. 104-114, § 1 et seq., 110 Stat. 785.
134. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541-1543.
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and stop foreign trade. " The United States has sought to liberate the
Cuban people through promoting a democratic change in Cuba. The
supporters of the Act hope that through the prevention of investment and
trade with Cuba, the repercussions will affect the government leading to
the downfall of the Castro regime. 36
A controversial battle was waged before the signing of this Act on
March 12, 1996.1'7 What prompted President Clinton to sign the Act into
law was the killing of four individuals, two Americans and two Cubans
over international waters by the Cuban military. 1
38
B. The Protection of United States Nationals
The Helms-Burton Act attempts to enforce their goals of protection
and change through restricting trade thereby affecting the Cuban
economy.139 Through the "Protection of Property Rights of United States
Nationals", the Helms-Burton Act states that any violation within the
provisions of the Act will lead to civil liability.' ° Liability will be imposed
when a commercial activity is conducted affecting property that Castro
obtained from Cuban-American citizens during the revolution.'- This
provision offers a private right of action that can be enforced by any
American national against foreign investors and businesses.'4 2  Regular
commercial activity by any foreign corporations or individual is subject to
liability based on their investments within Cuba. 4 3 Extraterritorial powers
are given to the United States through the application of this provision.'"
135. See Department of Justice Summary of the Provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,955 (1996).
136. See id.
137. Bret A. Sumner, Due Process and True Conflicts: The Constitutional Limits on
Extraterritorial federal Legislation and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 46 CATH. U.L. REV. 907, 917 (Spring 1997), citing, President Signs
Cuba Sanctions Bill After It Passes House by Big Margin, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 11,
at 421-23 (Mar. 13, 1996).
138. On February 23, 1996 four men were killed while flying over international waters.
They were on a mission for Hermanos Al Rescate when Cuban missiles were shot hitting the two
planes. Two were Cuban Americans and two were Cuban immigrants. It has been proven that
the two planes were not flying in Cuban territory.
139. H.R. REP. No. 104-468, at 43 (1996).
140. See § 301-306, 110 Stat. at 814-22.
141. See § 302(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 815.
142. See § 302, 110 Stat. at 815-17.
143. Department of State, Guidelines Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,655-56 (1996).
144. See id.
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If a foreign entity or individual is found to be "trafficking" business
involving property confiscated from American nationals within Cuba, they
will be liable."15  This involves innocent parties as well.1'4 Concerning
money made from a business venture in Cuba; the bank that holds the
money may be liable under the provision.147 Any company may be liable
under Article III even when their involvement is slight and indirect.'4'
C. Constitutional Issues Arising From the Enactment
When the Act was enacted, many opponents argued that it violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment towards
international defendants."19  The Due Process Clause is meant to protect
foreign defendants from any jurisdictional applications that may be
regarded as unjust and unequal.In1 The broad language of the provision has
stimulated the due process argument.' 5 In particular, Article III, regarding
the implication of civil liability, was suspended because of the possible
violation of the Due Process Clause.' 2 President Clinton chose to suspend
the enforcement of Article III based on the application of civil liability to
all foreign parties outside of the United States jurisdiction.' 3  This
American made law was forcing an entire world to be subject to liability if
they violated the provisions. Through the enforcement of Article III, the
United States would be extending their powers beyond their limit.' 1
Due Process challenges by foreign defendants arise in matters
concerning personal jurisdiction.I' The application of the Due Process
145. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L
L. 419, 425 (1996).
146. Department of State, Guidelines Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,655-56 (1996).
147. Sumner, supra note 137, at 920, citing, Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Why Lawyers Love
the Cuba Bill, J. COMM., Mar. 18, 1996, at 6A.
148. Department of State, Guidelines Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,655-56 (1996).
149. Bret A. Sumner, Comment, Due Process and True Conflicts: The Constitutional
Limits on Extraterritorial Federal Legislation and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 46 CATH. U.L. REV. 907 (Spring 1997).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
151. Sumner, supra note 149, at 944.
152. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 224 (1991); United States v. Thomas,
893 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1990); and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
153. Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Suspends Provisions of Law That Target Cuba; Move
Defuses Spat with Major U.S. Allies, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1997, at Al.
154. Sumner, supra note 149, at 914.
155. Id. at 923.
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Clause restricts Article III of the Helms-Burton Act regarding the
extraterritorial policies against foreign defendants.-' Certain countries
have responded to the United States extraterritorial policies by enacting
laws that prevent the United States from forcing their discovery and
enforcement laws.'17  Such blocking statutes protect the citizens of the
country from United States enforcement orders and judgment.'"8 The
Supreme Court has held that blocking statutes do not bar the United States
from enforcing foreign citizens from supplying information that is
requested concerning extraterritorial cases.' 9 Although a foreign citizen
will face liability in their home country, the United States is still entitled to
enforcement of their orders and judgments."6
D. Blocking Statutes: Methods to Deter the Act
Mexico along with Cuba and other nations has created blocking
statutes in order to defer the Helms-Burton Provision of Article 111.161 The
effect of these blocking statutes will definitely prevent the Helms-Burton
Act from achieving its goals.1 62  In particular, Canada revised their
blocking statute when the Helms-Burton Act was enacted.' The Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Order (FEMO) bans any Canadian individual or
corporation from adhering to the Helms-Burton Act.'" The FEMO
interprets any legislation by the United States that interferes with the "trade
or commerce between Canada and Cuba" to be extraterritorial.'1" The
application of this statute severely limits the United States' extraterritorial
power.
156. Id. at 944.
157. R. Edward Price, Foreign Blocking Statutes and the GAT: State Sovereignty and the
Enforcement of U.S. Economic Laws Abroad, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 315, 325-26(1995).
158. Sumner, supra note 137, at 933, citing, GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 367-73 (2d ed. 1992).
159. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 543-46 & n.29 (1987). A French blocking statute was
brought before the Supreme Court which held that it did not affect the United States order to
present evidence in a case involving international parties.
160. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 158.
161. Jorge A. Vargas, Mexico: Act to Protect Trade and Investment from Foreign Norms
that Contravene International Law, 36 I.L.M. 133, 134-43 (1997).
162. Sumner, supra note 149, at 958.
163. Sumner, supra note 137, at 955, citing, EU Approves Blocking Legislation in Reaction
to Helms-Burton Act, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 13, 1243 (July 31, 1996).
164. R.S.C. ch. F29 §§3-6, at 612-13.
165. Id. at 612.
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E. Extraterritorial Control: Jurisdiction Over Foreigners
As a federal law, the Helms-Burton Act is entitled to subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign countries.16 The Act's intent is clearly stated
through congressional notes as being extraterritorial.167 Due process is still
applied in order to prevent unreasonable application of jurisdiction.,"
Subject matter jurisdiction is determined by measuring the minimum
contacts of the foreign defendant with the United States. 69 In order to
establish minimum contact, the contact between the foreign defendant and
the United States must be reasonable and the relationship of the action that
has arisen must be sufficiently related to the contacts.170 A defendant who
is brought into the lawsuit for indirect association with the Helms-Burton
violation can argue lack of personal jurisdiction based on the lack of
sufficient and reasonable contact.-'  This argument will prevent the
application of personal jurisdiction based on the lack of minimum contacts
between the defendant and the United States. 172
The long and powerful hand that the United States seeks to extend
over foreign nations will have to be routinely examined in order to
maintain harmonious foreign policy. Through the Helms-Burton Act, the
United States is exercising a power that is not welcomed and will be
regarded with animosity. The Helms-Burton Act allows any foreign
manufacturer that has dealt with Cuba to be liable to any plaintiff who has
been injured. ' Based on their violation any plaintiff may bring suit
against a defendant supplying them with subject matter jurisdiction and
being reassured that personal jurisdiction will be met through the minimum
contacts analysis. '74 Although reaching the defendant may be a struggle if
blocking statutes exist, the courts will certainly find a way to reach an
international tortfeasor pursuant to the Act. "
166. Sumner, supra note 149, at 947.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
170. Id. at 319.
171. See §302(a), 110 Stat. 814.
172. Id.
173. Sumner, supra note 149, at 934.
174. Id. at 172.
175. Id. at 159.
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IX. WHAT TIME LIMITATIONS APPLY?
A. Promoting Effective and Speedy Claims
Statutes of limitations and repose were designed in order to protect
defendants from claims that no longer exist. 176 If a claim has outlived the
necessary time, the plaintiff no longer has a basis to bring the suit.'" The
purpose of enforcing statute of limitations is to protect the availability of
evidence, and prevent the loss and contamination of witnesses." 8 A
plaintiff is not left unjustly without recourse if he or she is unable to timely
bring about the cause of action.7 9 The statute of limitations will be tolled
in the event that a good faith reason exists for the inability to bring suit.'1°
In this situation the statute of limitations is suspended until the plaintiff is
fully capable of bringing suit.'8'
B. Service of Process to Foreign Defendants
Service of process can significantly affect the statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations is suspended when the defendant who is an
individual is out of the state.1 12  In the event that the defendant is a
corporation who is unable to be served either through mail or an agent the
statute of limitations does not toll. 183 The Hague Convention on Service
Abroad has prevented service of process through mail for certain
countries. 84
1. The impact of the Hague Convention
The Hague Convention on Service Abroad gives countries the
option to protest service of process by mail.' 5 The foreign corporations
176. Leslie Blankenship, Comment, For Whom the Statute Tolls-The Statute of Limitations
as Applied to Foreign Defendants in Countries which do not Permit Service by Mail, 27 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 765 (Fall 1987).
177. Id.
178. R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
179. Blankenship, supra note 176, at 766.
180. Id. at 765.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 766.
183. Id.
184. CAL. CORP. CODE § 351 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
185. Leslie Blankenship, For Whom the Statute Tolls - The Statute of Limitations as
Applied to Foreign Defendants in Countries Which do not Permit Service by Mail, 27 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 765-771 (Fall 1987), citing, The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents; Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, pt. VII, 1 (1985).
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within the countries that object to the service of process by mail take the
position of the objecting country.'TM If the foreign corporation cannot be
served by mail no other statutory service is available. 187
2. Tolling Statutes: Non-Hague Convention Countries
Countries that do not follow the Hague Convention on Service
Abroad are subject to different tolling requirements.M As stated in Coons
v. American Honda Motor Co. of Japan, when a foreign corporation does
not have an agent to accept service of process within the United States and
does not have a business within the state, the statute of limitations is
indefinitely suspended.1 9 This products liability case was brought against
the American Honda Company and the Honda Company of Japan.M
Because the American Honda Company had business within the state, the
statute did not toll, yet the Honda Company of Japan did not satisfy the
dismissal requirements based on the tolling of the statute of limitations.19
It has continuously been held that a foreign company that has no agent to
accept service of process and does not accept service of process by mail
will be subject to suit indefinitely. 9,
C. Tolling Avoidance: Appointment of Agent
A foreign corporation can avoid the indefinite possibility of a
lawsuit by appointing an agent within the state. 193 As in California, if a
foreign corporation files with the Secretary of State providing an agent
who can accept service of process the indefinite liability no longer exists . 9
In order for service of process to be effective, compliance with the Hague
Convention on Service of Process Abroad and non-residency of the foreign
corporation is required. '" This statute concerning the service of process
protects both the plaintiff and any foreign defendant.19 As in California,
186. Id.
187. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2105, 2110, 2111 (West 1975).
188. Blankenship, supra note 176, at 774.
189. 176 N.J. Super. 575, 424 A.2d 446 (1980). The Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that since the company had not assigned an agent and did not have a place of business within the
United States, the statute of limitations was tolled indefinitely.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Blankenship, supra note 176, at 774.
193. Id. at 781.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 780.
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the appointment of an agent would promote the reputation of the foreign
corporation as dependable and trustworthy.'" The foreign corporation
appointment represents care regarding their responsibilities and service to
their customers. '"
X. ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO TRIAL
The influx of lawsuits has led to the flooding of cases that appear
before the court system. With this increase in lawsuits, judges, lawyers,
and clients have sought to find an easier method of resolving disputes in an
economically sound way both in time and money. Going to trial is not
always the most beneficial means of resolving a dispute. If both parties
wish to lessen the publicity and reach an adequate and timely settlement
concerning the dispute, alternatives are available that will be in the best
interest of both parties. An analysis of alternative methods to resolution
can be chosen by the parties or ordered by the court in the hopes of
reaching a resolution without going to court.
A. An Analysis of Japan's Alternative Dispute Methods
One foreign country that has developed alternative methods of
dispute resolution is Japan.'" Among the alternative methods are
reconcilement, chotei, and conciliation.m
1. Reconcilement
Reconcilement requires that both parties contemplate their situation
in the relationship along with their goals.20' This method compulses the
parties to attend negotiations in order to achieve satisfactory resolutions
that will benefit both parties.2 The resolution guarantees that both parties
will mutually meet an end result.20 This extrajudicial action promotes a
solution that is in the best interest of the parties.-
197. Id. at 786.
198. Blankenship, supra note 176, at 774.
199. Wendy A. Green, Comment, Japan's New Product Liability Law: Making Strides or
Business as Usual?, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 543, 579 (Fall 1996).
200. Id.
201. Marcy Scheinwold, Comment, International Products Liability Law, 1 TOuRO J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 258 (1988).
202. Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt by Association in United States Products Liability Cases: Are
the European Community and Japan Likely to Develop Similar Cause-in-Fact Approaches to
Defendant Identification?, 15 LOY. L.A. INT'L& COMP. L.J. 629, 659-60 (1993).
203. Scheinwold, supra note 201, at 279.
204. Id.
[Vol. 4:759
Garcia
2. Chotei
Chotei places the parties before a committee that is designated to
attend to the dispute.201 The committee promotes a compromising
agreement that will deter litigation.- Once an agreement is met, it is
placed in writing, which will result in a final judgement.2 The parties
themselves solicit a committee, but one may be appointed by the courts.2
If the parties fail to reach a settlement, the dispute fails and is sent to the
court system.20 Once the dispute returns to the court system the committee
can make suggestions that will help in reaching a just settlement.210
,3. Conciliation
The alternative dispufte resolution method of conciliation provides a
non-judicial approach to settling common claims.2" Disputes are resolved
by both parties reaching a unanimous solution.21 2 This method of dispute
resolution is the most common and the most economic.?13 Usually the
parties seek conciliation before litigation begins, but it may also be
requested by the court in order to promote a settlement."14  Conciliation
most resembles the arbitration and mediation methods of resolution.2 15
Through the adoption of alternative resolution disputes, Japan has
promoted opposing parties to come together and reach a settlement. These
alternative dispute resolutions work best in disputes involving domestic and
employment issues .216 The use of these methods have been incorporated
between corporations and injured plaintiffs in products liability claims, yet
205. Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt by Association in United States Products Liability Cases: Are
the European Comnunity and Japan Likely to Develop Similar Cause-in-Fact Approaches to
Defendant Identification?, 15 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 29, 42 (April 1993), citing,
Younghee Jin Ottley & Bruce L. Ottley, Product Liability in Japan: An Introduction to a
Developing Area of Law, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29, 42 (1984).
206. Scheinwold, supra note 201, at 279.
207. Id.
208. Ponte, supra note 205, citing, Younghee Jin Ottloy & Bruce Ottley, Product Liability
in Japan: An Introduction to a Developing Area of Law, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29,42
(1984).
209. Green, supra note 199, at 581.
210. Scheinwold, supra note 201, at 279.
211. See supra note 205.
212. Id.
213. Green, supra note 199, at 581.
214. Id.
215. Scheinwold, supra note 201, at 279.
216. Id. at 280.
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they are less efficient based on the unequal bargaining power of large
corporation and the powerless plaintiff.217
B. Benefits of Adopting Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution in
Latin American Countries
Through the adoption of these alternative methods of dispute
resolutions, Latin American countries would also be able to promote
settlements between tortfeasors and plaintiffs without saturating the courts.
Claims involving products liability would be more efficiently resolved with
less time and money expounded by both parties. The corporation will be
absolved of liability quickly with little damage to their reputation and the
plaintiff will receive their settlement in less time if these alternatives were
implemented.28 Adoption of these methods would certainly be a benefit to
all the parties involved from the plaintiff and defendant to the court
system.
XI. CONCLUSION
Claims brought on behalf of American plaintiffs require
compliance of many conditions. Laws and statutes such as the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act and the Helms-Burton Act place many
provisions upon both American parties as well as foreign defendants. In
order to maintain a harmonious foreign relationship between the United
States and foreign countries, issues concerning the constitutionality and
fairness of these Acts must be considered. The United States often finds
itself torn between seeking to protect its citizens from foreign tortfeasors
and maintaining a stable relationship with international corporations.
Consequently with the desire of promoting international harmony
comes the determination of which choice of law is best applied to the
situation. Choosing the best forum in which to bring the lawsuit will aid in
protecting the relations between the United States and the foreign country
that is brought on the products liability charge. The primary goal of
preventing forum shopping is a consideration that must be deterred by the
judicial system through legislation. By balancing the interests of both
countries a proper forum can be attained.
Products liability law is an area of law that is constantly changing.
With change comes knowledge and the need to attain a fair and equitable
means for plaintiffs to achieve just resolution while maintaining a
defendant's opportunity to receive a fair trial. As lawyers, judges, and
217. Id.
218. Id.
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students of law, it is up to these individuals to learn and apply knowledge
that will meet the best interests of everyone involved.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of privacy and the legal rights it implicates have
historically proved difficult to define. In 1888, an English judge named
Cooley coined one of the broadest yet most commonly used phrases to
describe the right to privacy. He called it "the right to be let alone." 1
* Candidate for J.D., Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, 1998.
B.A. with honors, Florida Atlantic University, 1995.
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890) reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed.
1984).
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France has adopted a similarly broad definition by which privacy is the
"antithesis of everything that is public: hence everything concerning an
individual's home, family, religion, health, sexuality, personal legal, and
personal financial affairs" is private.2 In the United States, the United
States Supreme Court found a right to privacy to exist in a penumbra
which emanated from the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.
3
The right to make intimate decisions regarding contraceptives 4 and the
right choose whether to have an abortion5 have both been held to be
aspects of the right to privacy. Though seemingly quite diverse, each of
these elements does have something in common. They protect autonomy,
liberty and human dignity. Justice Douglas captured this idea when he
stated that one aspect of privacy is "the autonomous control over the
development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes and
personality. "
6
This article will concentrate on the aspect of the right to privacy
Alan Westin defined as "the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others." 7 The press often usurps that authority
when, for example, it publishes personal information about public figures.
Specifically, I will address the question whether there is or should be
privacy protection from the kind of personally invasive publications
commonly found in tabloids, and from the often invasive newsgathering
techniques employed to gain access to the information published. In
particular, I will examine the absence of this kind of privacy protection in
England and explore whether International Human Rights law offers any
protection which English law does not.
Because England has no privacy law, it is helpful to look first at
American privacy law. I do this primarily for convenience, so that I may
borrow American terminology to label the kinds of privacy protections
England lacks. Beyond that, this paper is not intended as a comparison of
English and American privacy law. Next, I will demonstrate the need for
a right to privacy, especially in light of modern technology. In Section IV,
I will provide an overview of Parliament's refusal to legislatively create a
2. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS (Chairman: David
Calcutt QC 1990).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
4. Id.
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1979) (Douglas, J., concurring).
7. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
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right of privacy. This will include a discussion about the Press Complaints
Commission, the private organization whom Parliament has chosen to
defer claims of invasions of privacy by the press. In the two following
sections, I will examine the treatment of the right to privacy by the English
judiciary and by the European Court of Human Rights, and the competing
interest of freedom of the press.8 Section VII will be dedicated exclusively
to the historic Human Rights Bill now pending in Parliament. 9 The Human
Rights Bill, if passed, would incorporate the European Convention on
Human Rights into domestic law and thereby preempt the inaction of both
Parliament and the English judiciary in the area of privacy. So, before
turning to a more in-depth discussion of the right to privacy in England, I
begin now with a brief overview of the origins and subsequent
development of the right to privacy in the United States.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to privacy has not enjoyed a long tradition in the United
States. It was not until 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
wrote their famous Harvard Law Review article, that the "right to be let
alone"10 was recognized at all. Seventy years after the Warren and
Brandeis article, William Prosser divided the right to be let alone into four
distinct torts: 1) intrusion into an individual's seclusion or into his private
affairs; 2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; 3) publicity
which causes an individual to be seen in a false light; and 4) appropriation
of an individual's name or likeness for the defendant's advantage."
Most states now follow a similar scheme. As first noted by Dean
Prosser, 12 there are two primary differences between these torts. Whereas
the first requires no actual publication or intent to publish for an invasion
of privacy to be actionable, 13 the others do. This article is concerned with
8. While freedom of speech is an important concern and might better be considered
earlier, I have chosen to delay the discussion until the issue of Article 10 under the European
Convention arises because England, having no written constitution, does not possess the
equivalent of a First Amendment. Free speech rights in England derive from the common law.
9. The Human Rights Bill was introduced in the House of Lords on Oct. 23, 1997. The
text of the Bill, as yet unavailable through Her Majesty's Stationery Shop, is available at
Parliament's web-site on the Internet at (visited Nov. 20, 1997) <http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199798/Idbills/038/97038-a.htm >.
10. Brandeis, supra note 1.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
12. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1979), reprinted in PHILOSPHICAL
DIMENSIONS IN PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 104 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed. 1984).
13. Intrusion into seclusion consists of an intentional interference with an individual's
interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of
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the right of privacy as encompassed by intrusion into seclusion (as when
the press stalks public figures from place to place) and public disclosure of
private facts (as when, for example, personal information about the lives of
public figures is published in the tabloids).
Since the Warren and Brandeis article, much has been written in an
attempt to further define the right now embodied in the United States by
various state statutes and a confusing body of case law. Despite one
hundred years of development, there is still uncertainty regarding the scope
of the right in the United States today.
14
England's development of the right to privacy has fared far worse.
Although Warren and Brandeis based many of their privacy ideas on
English cases," England does not explicitly provide a right to privacy at
all. 6  That two western nations, both of which are thought to be highly
developed in the area of human rights law, could differ so radically
regarding the notion of privacy makes one wonder whether the right to
privacy is really all that important. If England has no explicit right of
privacy, what form of regulation, if any, is there on intrusion into
seclusion, a privacy right recognized and protected as a civil tort in the
United States? Is there a similar right encompassed in international human
rights law under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights?
Is the right to be let alone one of those fundamental human rights that both
deserves and is afforded protection under customary international law? If
so, how broad or narrow is the international understanding of the right?
a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable man. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at §
652B cmt.a.
14. For example, the Supreme Court, in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), held
that a newspaper who printed the name of a rape victim was not liable under a statute which
forbade the publication. Some suggest that this case has effectively precluded any future tort
actions involving the publication of true information, regardless of how private the information
or outrageous or embarrassing its dissemination. See Andrew J. McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law
Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C.L. REV.
989, 1076-78 (1995); see also Mary Ellen Hockwalt, Bad News: Privacy Ruling to Increase
Press Litigation. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 23 AKRON L. REV. 561 (1990). However, it is my
contention that because the name of the victim was a matter of public record, and therefore in the
public domain, these authors are wrong. An action could still lie for publication of similar
information not already in the public domain.
15. One such English privacy case involved an injunction awarded to Prince Albert against
the publication of pictures he had drawn of himself and Queen Victoria. Though decided on
grounds of breach of confidence, Warren and Brandeis interpreted it as an early right to privacy
case. Brandeis, supra note 1, at 83. See also Eric Barendt, End this Intrusion Now, Eric
Barendt Says It's Closing Time at the Last Chance Saloon, and the Press Needs to be Curbed
with a Law which will Punish Unwarranted Intrusion, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 24, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 2403252.
16. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Autonomy, Community, and Traditions of Liberty: The
Contrast of British and American Privacy Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1398, 1403 (1991).
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Will the death of Diana have any real impact on privacy protection in
England? It is these questions that this paper will address.
III. PRIVACY As ESSENTIAL To HUMAN DIGNITY
It has been argued by some that Warren and Brandeis gave birth to
a trivial tort.17 However, their description of the societal ills symptomatic
of a breach of the right to be let alone, astoundingly contemporary and
even prophetic for the time, belies its triviality:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer
the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become
a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as
effrontery. To satisfy the prurient taste the details of
sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the
daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon
column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be
procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. The
intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the
world, and man, under the refining influence of culture,
has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual; but
modem enterprise and invention have, through invasion on
his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury."
Today, the right to privacy is more essential to the preservation of
human dignity than ever before. Technological advances far beyond the
imaginations of Warren and Brandeis have emerged which make finding
Browning's "obscure nook" virtually impossible.19 The video camera and
17. See Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy In Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966). See also Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and
the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional As Well?, in
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 47 (1976).
18. Brandeis, supra note 1.
19. Referring to Robert Browning, Paracelsus, in 1 THE POEMS 118, 127 (J. Pettigrew ed.
1981) which reads:
I give the fight up: let there be an end,
A privacy, an obscure nook for me.
I want to be forgotten even by God.
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telephoto lens, for example, have intruded upon our everyday lives in vast
numbers of ways. Granted, there are many privacy invasions utilizing
these technologies which are in fact quite innocent, even laudable. Video
surveillance, for example, is most often concerned with the community's
need to know about the conduct of others in order to protect society.
Banks, for example, are videotaping transactions at automated teller
machines; employers are videotaping employees in the workplace;
department stores are videotaping dressing rooms and bathrooms; parents
are video-taping nannies while they care for their children. But there are an
equal number of invasions that could be characterized as nefarious which,
without an action for invasion of privacy, will go without redress.
Since there is no law in England specifically directed at protecting
rights of privacy, plaintiffs must resort to other areas of the law for
protection. Unfortunately, the protections afforded privacy via these
alternative actions often prove inadequate. A good example is the
infamous case where a man, for his personal amusement, bugged the
bedroom of a neighbor.2° The defendant was found liable for civil trespass
and fined a mere fifty-two pounds. The size of the award demonstrates the
inability of alternative causes of action to adequately protect privacy
interests. Civil trespass is intended to protect the enjoyment of the
occupation of land.2' As to this interest, the intrusion was minimal - only
a small unobtrusive device was placed in the neighbor's bedroom. But the
intrusion on the neighbor's right to privacy was much greater. Had it been
the aim of the action to consider the neighbor's privacy interest, the
amount of damages awarded would have been proportionately higher, as
would the effectiveness of the deterrent.
To further demonstrate the ineffectiveness of alternative causes of
action to protect privacy, let us consider a hypothetical provided in a recent
law review article. "A takes his video camcorder to the beach. He records
B who is sunbathing. A's purpose if filming B is to use the videotape for
sexual gratification, which he later does."" Under alternative English
The reference is made all -the more appropriate here because this work was cited both by the
Calcutt Committee in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at ii, and also by
Krotoszynski,. supra note 16.
20. Alasdair Palmer, Someone Is Always Watching You. Britain May Soon Acquire a Law
Protecting Privacy, But Will it Help Any But the Rich and Famous - and Will it Really Stop the
Snoopers?, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2331908.
21. REPORT OFTHE COMMITTEE, supra note 2, para. 6.13.
22. McClurg posed this hypothetical to demonstrate that motive should be a factor when
considering whether an invasion of privacy which occurs in a public place should be actionable in
the United States. McClurg, supra note 14, at 1076-78. I offer it here for an entirely different
purpose.
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criminal and tort remedies, B will be left unprotected all together. Briefly,
here is how the various alternative actions fail. First, there is no action for
trespass since this incident occurs at a public beach. 3 Nor is there an
action for breach of confidence because, under these circumstances, it
can't be said that A owed B a duty of confidentiality?' Finally, there is no
action for criminal harassment 2l or nuisance26 if A merely videotaped B
without incident.
Now, let's change the above scenario somewhat. Suppose A is
actually a member of the press and B is a public figure sunbathing topless
on a private beach. A's motive is to broadcast the images on the Nightly
Mirror Tabloid Television Show. The above shortcomings in the law
apply here as well, but there are a few others worth mentioning. Now that
B is on private property, trespass would seem to be implicated. However,
since trespass is directed at protecting an individual's enjoyment and
occupation of land,17 not at protecting privacy, there will be no action for
trespass unless B's enjoyment of her occupation of the land had been
directly interfered with. If in this instance, as is true in most, B took the
video from an adjacent property using a telephoto lens, B may not have
been aware of A's activity at all. Therefore, no interference could possibly
have occurred. Now, suppose B is a member of Parliament and the images
"tend to lower [her] in the estimation of right-thinking members of society
generally. "I Though, by that definition, the images may be defamatory,
no action for .defamation or libel exists because the event depicted was
true.2 9 Again, England's method of protecting privacy by bootstrapping it
onto other already existing causes of action is ineffective.3°
23. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 2, para. 6.12.
24. Id. para. 8.1.
25. Sections 4 and 5 of the Public Order Act make it an offense to use "threatening
abusive or insulting words or behaviour", with intent to cause fear of or provoke immediate
violence or to use such words "within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused
harassment or harm." The offense may be committed on public or private property. Id. para.
6.3.
26. Id. para. 6.12.
27. Id.
28. Id. para. 7.3.
29. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 2, para. 7.3, 7.9.
30. There has been much scholarly discussion regarding England's hit and miss approach
to the protection of privacy rights. See WALTER F. PRATT, PRIVACY IN BRITAIN 38-59 (1979).
See also RAYMOND WACKS, PERSONAL INFORMATION: PRIVACY AND THE LAW 42-134 (1989).
For a convenient overview of the various civil and criminal remedies available, see REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE, supra note 2, para. 6.1-12.37. For a detailed and comprehensive argument
about similar failings in Ireland, many of which are analogous to England, see Eoin O'Dell,
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Without a law specifically directed at maintaining privacy, we will
continue to see scenarios like these played out over and over again in the
press: Princess Diana kissing Dodi Al Fayed on his private yacht3 or
exercising in her Isleworth gym; 32 the Duchess of York sunbathing topless
in the company of man not her husband;"3 Hugh Grant arguing with
Elizabeth Hurley in the garden of her West Country home.2' Should there
be no action for any of these intrusions? For many, the answer has been
no. One reason is that privacy intrusions often involve public figures who
are said to have given up all claims to privacy when they entered public
life. But this logic is faulty. First, it is far too broad an assumption.
While public figures indeed have a lesser expectation of privacy regarding
some matters, they are nonetheless entitled to retain a privacy interest in
matters outside the legitimate public concern. Surely, the sexual conduct
of an actor is of no legitimate concern to the public. Personal information
in that regard merely serves to satisfy public curiosity.' Second, this logic
fails to recognize that privacy is a fundamental right that, without more,
should not be held inapplicable to some people. Justice Brandeis rightfully
pointed out that privacy is integral to the pursuit of happiness:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feeling, and of his intellect. . . . They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred as against the
government, the right to be let alone - the most
When Two Tribes Go to War, reprinted in LAW AND THE MEDIA 181, 184-237 (Marie
McGonagle ed. 1997).
31. Andrew Culf, Diana: Tormentors Pay Their Respects But Counsel Against Assigning
Blame, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2399179.
32. Roy Greenslade, Checking the Code. Would the Proposed New Editors' Code have
Prevented Some of the Most Infamous Cases if Intrusion in Recent Years?, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Sept. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2402984.
33. Frances Gibb, If MPs Do Not Create Privacy Law, Judges Will, TIMES (London),
Sept. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9226436.
34. Culf, supra note 31.
35. I concede that in some cases the public interest in a public figure may outweigh the
right to privacy. Especially in matters implicating a public official's fitness for office, society's
right to know can trump a public official's right to privacy. However, in the examples under
consideration here, no such interest is implicated.
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comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. 6
Because privacy is so fundamental and so highly valued, an implied
contract that would completely disavow a person's right to it is
unconscionable.
Another reason privacy rights are too quickly denied is that the
seriousness of the intrusion is often mistakenly based on the value of the
information revealed. Even though, practically speaking, the issue
revolves around a photograph of someone kissing, exercising, sunbathing
or arguing, this is the revelation, not the intrusion. The intrusion is upon a
person's ability to control what kind and how much information about him
is revealed to others. Controlling the information known about us is the
way we as individuals define ourselves. It is also the way that each of us
remains able to redefine ourselves, free from the indefinite stigma
associated with permanent records which can, and often do, reappear to
haunt and undermine all our future endeavors. The intrusion, then, is upon
a person's dignity. It should not be minimized because, at first glance,
what seems to be at issue is merely a true record (photograph, videotape,
audio tape, etc.) about oneself made public.
Finally, because of present technology, these kinds of privacy
intrusions have spread so far as to include everyone, not just movie actors
whose interests tend to be minimized by courts, or public officials whose
otherwise private activities may implicate a genuine public interest. It is
no longer true that only limited numbers of people, namely the press,
control what information is disseminated to the public. Now, via the
Internet, virtually everyone has access to the media. It has been said that
the video Camera is the great equalizer which has democratiz[ed]
technology3 - that because of the new video vigilantism, the general
public is able to expose violations and effect changes in society more
efficiently than it ever has before.
I suggest that it is the Internet, not the video camera, which more
properly deserves to be called the great equalizer. Just like photographs
before the advent of the video camera, and sketches before the advent of
the camera, images captured through surreptitious video taping were only
made public when an editor decided they had commercial value. But now,
the Internet has provided the masses with unlimited free access to a
medium capable of instantaneously broadcasting private images to a global
36. EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 40 (1978) citing Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
37. McClurg, supra note 14, at 1022.
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audience. The Internet has replaced the editor, who sometimes, though all
too infrequently, refused to publish information in poor taste or that was
violative of privacy rights. A prime example is the set of photographs that
were taken of Diana as she lay dying in that Paris tunnel. Editors all over
the world announced that they would not publish the photographs., In
spite of the self-restraint of editors, the photographs appeared on the
Internet. 9
There are numerous other paparazzi Internet sites available where
photographs of various celebrities can be viewed free of charge.4 Surely
pay-per-view Internet sites, such as those now widely available for viewing
other types of prurient material," are on the horizon. One particular
incident comes to mind. Many years ago, a photographer snapped a
photograph of the Queen just as a gust of wind blew her dress over her
head. 42 The photograph was never published, owing to a greater self-
restraint by the press than exists today.'3  The Internet provides a
marketplace for photographs like this despite editors' efforts to minimize
intrusions. There is no question that a photograph of the Queen in her
skivvies on a pay-per-view Internet site would be enormously profitable.
Because England fails to recognize a specific right to privacy, publication
by the press or a member of the public on the Internet would not be
actionable."
38. See Karen Lowe, Hollywood Joins Outcry Over Paparazzi Following Diana Death,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 1, 1997 available in 1997 WL 13386914.
39. Joan Smith, They'd Gawped For Years. Why Would They Stop Now?, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 21, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12347916.
40. See, for example <http://www.dkiproductions.com/madonnal.html> where
paparazzo Dave Kotinsky has posted exclusive photos of Madonna "caught leaving her
Manhattan apartment for a night on the town," among others.
41. One such pay per view site offers nude photographs for $29.95 for 30-day unlimited
access or $39.95 for ninety days, payable by credit card. See<http://www.netnudes.com.>
Another site, (visited Nov. 20, 1997) <http://www.barely18live.com. > charges $9.90 to view
especially young-looking models for ten minutes.
42. A member of the press, in an interview for Frontline, Princess and the Press, PBS,
broadcast on Nov. 18, 1997, told of how he photographed the incident as Queen Elizabeth was
boarding a plane. He delivered the photo to the Windsors for their disposal and they were never
published. A transcript of the interview is temporarily available on the internet at (visited Nov.
20, 1997) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/royals/interviews>.
43. Id.
44. In the United States, a similar photograph was held to be an invasion of the right to
privacy. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964), where a woman's
dress blew over her head while in a carnival Fun House. A photographer was there and snapped
the photo as part of a public scene at the carnival. It was subsequently published on the front
page of his newspaper. The case has been cited as one of those rare instances where a United
States court recognized a right to privacy in a public place. See McClurg, supra note 14, at 1022.
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Such Internet sites needn't be limited to the exploitation of
celebrity photographs. Private figures are also at risk. As evidenced by
programs like America's Funniest Home Videos, the public also has an
appetite for viewing private figures in a variety of embarrassing private
situations. The Internet provides another as yet unexploited market for
similar programs. The public could, for example, submit intrusive videos
to a public-made Internet video show modeled after "America's Funniest
Home Videos." Such submissions might include a male youth with a
spontaneous erection, a woman temporarily deprived of her swimsuit after
a dive into the ocean, or a couple making love in their back yard
swimming pool. As was the case with B, the sunbather discussed earlier,
these invasions would likewise go unprotected under England's current
system.
The Warren and Brandeis right to be let alone is far from trivial,
especially in light of modern technology. Without legally enforceable
privacy rights, the Internet has the potential to become "the greatest leveler
of human privacy ever known. "4 It implicates a human right necessary to
every person's dignity and pursuit of happiness. Unless England
recognizes a general and independent right of privacy, public and private
figures alike will be faced with the untenable choice of remaining prisoners
in their homes or sacrificing an important human right.
IV. PARLIAMENT'S REJECTION OF THE RIGHT To PRIVACY
Parliament has considered creating a statutory right of privacy on
numerous occasions over the past fifty years. 46 Unfortunately, all attempts
to statutorily create a right to privacy have failed. In 1969, a general right
to privacy bill was introduced in Parliament which not only addressed
intrusions by publication, but also addressed intrusions into seclusion
through "spying, prying, watching or besetting" and "unauthorized
overhearing or recording" of both spoken words and visual images. 47 The
Bill was withdrawn on the grounds that the right was not well enough
defined. It was feared that without a clearer definition, court discretion
45. McClurg, supra note 14, at 1022, quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756
(1971) (Justice Douglas, dissenting).
46. One of the early calls for Parliament to create a right of privacy occurred in 1938, in a
letter to the editor by a member of Parliament. See PRATr, supra note 30, at 82. For
information regarding a right to privacy bill introduced in the House of Lords in 1961, see
WACKS, supra note 30, at 40 n.38.
47. WACKS, supra note 30, at 40.
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would be too broad, and that citizens, who might interpret the right too
broadly, would flood the courts with unwarranted litigation. 48
In 1970, Parliament appointed a Committee on Privacy, chaired by
Kenneth Younger, to determine whether a right of privacy enforceable
against individuals and organizations was needed.49  The Younger
Committee conceded that privacy is "a basic need, essential to the
development and maintenance of a free society and of a mature and stable
individual personality." 50  However, it was reluctant to endorse the
creation of a general right to privacy, echoing Parliament's concerns that
the scope of a general right would be too uncertain. 51 The Committee
nevertheless recommended the statutory creation of both a new crime and a
new tort of unlawful surveillance.52 Though Parliament agreed with the
Committee regarding the importance of the right of privacy, it still refused
to provide even narrow protection against unwarranted surveillance.
In 1987, another right of privacy bill was before Parliament. That
Bill defined the right of privacy as:
[t]he right of any person to be protected from intrusion
upon himself, his home, his family, his relationships and
communications with others, his property and his business
affairs, including intrusion by: 1) spying, prying,
watching or besetting; 2) the unauthorized overhearing or
recording of spoken words; 3) the unauthorized making of
visual images . . ..
Like its 1969 predecessor, the 1987 bill would have created a general right
of privacy. Practically speaking, it would have made actionable invasions
of privacy which do not contain the incident of publication. Though the
bill was given a second reading and completed its Committee stages in the
House of Commons, it was not passed.
In the 1988-89 Parliamentary session, Parliament again rejected an
opportunity to create a right of privacy.5 This time, a bill was introduced
which would create a tort action and a right of reply against members of
48. Id. at 41.
49. Id.
50. Id., citing REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY (chairman: Kenneth Younger)
Cmnd. 5012, para. 113 (1972).
51. Id.
52. Id. para. 560-65.
53. Right of Privacy Bill 1987, reprinted as Appendix J in the REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 107.
54. Krotoszynski, supra note 16, at 1406.
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the press, but only for "public use or public disclosure of private
information. 55 The 1989 bill was narrower than its predecessors because it
required publication or the intent to publish. The bill failed to address
invasions of privacy by physical intrusion. Despite this apparent
narrowing, competing concerns regarding press freedoms ultimately caused
the Bill to be defeated.
56
In response to the introduction of the 1987 and 1989 bills and
surrounding public concern about invasions of privacy by the press,
Parliament formed yet another committee. The Committee on Privacy and
Related Matters, chaired by Sir David Calcutt (Calcutt Committee), was
given the task of "consider[ing] what measures (whether legislative or
otherwise) are needed to give further protection to individual privacy from
the activities of the press and improve recourse against the press for the
individual citizen, . . . and to make recommendations." 57  The Calcutt
Committee concluded that there was no need for a privacy tort.58 As an
alternative to legislative protections, the Calcutt Committee recommended
that complaints regarding invasions of the press handle privacy themselves
through a self-regulatory agency created for that purpose. 59 Should this
self-regulatory agency fail, the Calcutt Committee recommended
Parliament create "a statutory system for handling complaints. "6
Self-regulation was no stranger to the press and had already been
deemed a failure when Calcutt's new self-regulating agency was formed.61
In 1953, the self-regulatory agency known as the Press Council had been
created to promote ethical journalistic practices. 62 Almost forty years
later, in response to the Calcutt Committee's recommendations, the Press
Complaints Commission (PCC) replaced the failed Press Council. Unlike
its predecessor, the majority of the PCC's sixteen members have no
connection with the press. But this is not to suggest that the fox is no
55. Protection of Privacy Bill 1989, reprinted as Appendix K in the REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 108. See also id.
56. Krotoszynski, supra note 16, at 1406.
57. Taken from a statement published by the Press Complaints Commission, Origins of the
Commission, (visited Nov. 3, 1997) <http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/origins.htm>.
58. REPORT OF THE COMMiTTEE, supra note 2, at x, 46. See also Krotoszynski, supra
note 16, at 1406.
59. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 65.
60. Id. at xi, 73. See also Press Complaints Commission, Scrutiny of Press Self-
Regulation, (visited Nov. 3, 1997) <http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/scrutiny.htm>.
61. See Press Complaints Commission, Origins of the Commission, (visited Nov. 3, 1997)
< http://www.pec.org.uk/about/default.htm >.
62. Id.
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longer watching the hen house. Currently, seven of the PCC's sixteen
members are highly esteemed officials of the publishing industry. 63 There
is also a great deal of political power among its members. The Right
Honorable Lord Wakeham is Chairman. 64 Other Public Members include
Lord Tordoff, who served in the House of Lords from 1988-94, and the
Right Reverend John Waine, Bishop of Chelmsford from 1986-96.6 The
requirement that the majority of the PCC members be selected from
outside the publishing industry and the addition of politically persuasive
Public Members has not made a difference in the PCC's effectiveness.
Parliament, by having delegated its responsibility to a private agency,
seems to be more concerned with creating an organization that appears to
be powerful and unbiased than with effectively protecting privacy rights.
In 1993, Sir David Calcutt, in his second report on press self-
regulation, recommended abolition of the PCC.6 Calcutt concluded, as
had his predecessors, that the PCC was "flawed in its procedures and not
sufficiently independent of the press." 67 Calcutt also recommended that the
government proceed with the introduction of new criminal offenses on
physical intrusion and that it create a statutory tort for infringement of
privacy." The government's response was disappointing. While it accepted
Calcutt's findings regarding the ineffectiveness of the PCC, the
government nevertheless urged, for the third time, a strengthening of the
procedures for self-regulation. 69 Again postponing its duty to provide a
right of privacy, Parliament merely "reaffirmed its commitment to
consider introducing new criminal offenses on physical intrusion and said
63. The seven members of the press currently on the Commission are Iris Burton, Editor
in Chief, Women's Realm and Woman's Weekly; Jim Cassidy, Editor, The Sporting Life; Tom
Clarke, Editor, The Sporting Life; Graham Collier, Editor, Surrey Advertiser; Sir David English,
Chairman and Editor in Chief, Associated Newspapers; John Griffith, Editor, Liverpool Echo;
John Witherow, Editor, The Sunday Times. The full list of Commission members is available at
< http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/members.htm >.
64. Lord Wakeham has enjoyed a distinguished political career, having served as Lord
Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Lords from 1992-94; Secretary of State for Energy from
1989-92; Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons 1988-89; Lord
Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons from 1987-88 and Government Chief Whip
from 1983-87. Id.
65. Id.
66. Taken from a statement by the Press Complaints Commission, Scrutiny of Press Self-
Regulation, (visited Nov. 3, 1997) <http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/scrutiny.htm>.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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that it would give consideration to the merits of a new civil tort of
privacy."70
Two months after Sir David Calcutt's call for statutory protections,
the National Heritage Select Committee on Privacy and Media Intrusion
also urged the Government to protect privacy rights.7' In their March
1993 report, the Committee recommended the creation of a yet another
new self-regulatory agency that would be overseen by a statutorily created
Press Ombudsman. 72 Under their proposal, the Press Ombudsman would
be empowered by statute to impose large fines." This proposal is
interesting because it maintained the idea of self-regulation but, because it
gave government authority to an overseer, the agency's decisions would
have had the force of law. The Heritage Select Committee also
recommended a criminal offense for physical intrusion and a civil tort for
infringement of privacy be established.74 Parliament responded much as it
had before, by giving a lip service promise to consider the merits of the
Committee's recommendations. 5
In light of the utter failure of the PCC and its predecessor to
protect privacy through self-regulation, it is inconceivable that Parliament
could continue to delegate its duty to provide citizens effective remedies
for invasions of privacy to this ineffective private body. But that is exactly
what it did. Then came the tragedy of September 1997, when Princess
Diana was killed during a paparazzi motorcycle chase. Though Diana's
death occurred in Paris,76 and was further complicated by the intoxication
of her driver, the appalling newsgathering tactics which attended the
tragedy again brought the issue of invasions of privacy by the press to the
forefront. Earl Spencer, Diana's brother, who publicly proclaimed that
every newspaper editor who had ever published intrusive photographs of
70. Id.
71. Press Complaints Commission, (visited Nov. 3, 1997)
< http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/scrutiny.Htm >.
72. Id.
73. Andrew Culf, The Death of Diana: Press Chances in on Privacy Media Watchdog's
Intervention Highlights Problems in Halting Harassment and Hounding, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Sept. 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2399175.
74. Press Complaints Commission, supra note 66.
75. Id.
76. Members of the press who are against the creation of a privacy law in England have
argued that since stringent French privacy laws failed to save Diana, privacy laws simply do not
work. See Anthony Bevins, Diana 1961-1997: The Tributes - Blood on Their Hands, Says
Brother,THE INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12343550.
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Diana had her blood on his hands, 77 appealed to Parliament for the creation
of a privacy law. But his appeal fell on deaf ears. Tony Blair, England's
Prime Minister, stated that he's "never been convinced about privacy
laws" 78, and his position that questions of privacy are best left to self-
regulation by the newspaper industry remains unshaken. 79 Astonishingly,
even in the wake of the Diana tragedy and the public support of privacy
laws which attended it, Parliament steadfastly maintained that privacy
issues were best resolved by the PCC.80
Unless Parliament creates a right of privacy, either by specific
legislation recognizing the right or by incorporation of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 81 the PCC will continue to be the sole
arbiter of invasions of privacy by the press. In light of that prospect, Lord
Wakeham has called for strong reform of the Commission's Code of
Practice. The current Code has very little to say about intrusion.82 While a
broad interpretation of the Code would prohibit a great many of the
77. Id.
78. Phillip Johnston, Earl Asks Blair for Privacy Law, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
Sept. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2337288.
79. Bevins, supra note 76.
80. Earl Spencer had received 27,000 letters in support of his criticism of press
newsgathering tactics by the time he spoke with the Prime Minister urging privacy law reform.
See Johnston, supra note 78.
81. The European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Bill are discussed
herein at sections V and VI, respectively.
82. There are two articles from the Code which pertain to the right to be let alone and
intrusion into seclusion:
Article 4. Privacy. i) Intrusions and enquiries into an individual's private life without
his or her consent, including the use of long-lens photography to take pictures of
people on private property without their consent, are only acceptable when it can be
shown that these are, or are reasonably believed to be, in the public interest. ii)
Publication of material obtained under i) above is only justified when the facts show
that the public interest is served. Note - Private property is defined as i) any private
residence, together with its garden and outbuildings, but excluding any adjacent fields
or parkland and the surrounding parts of the property within the unaided view of
passers-by, ii) hotel bedrooms (but no other areas in a hotel) and iii) those parts of a
hospital or nursing home where patients are treated or accommodated. . . . Article 8.
Harassment. i) Journalists should neither obtain nor seek to obtain information or
pictures through intimidation or harassment. i) Unless their enquiries are in the public
interest, journalists should not photograph individuals on private property (as defined
in the note to Clause 4) without their consent; should not persist in telephoning or
questioning individuals after having been asked to desist; should not remain on their
property after having been asked to leave and should not follow them. iii) It is the
responsibility of editors to ensure that these requirements are carried out."
Press Complaints Commission, Code of Practice, (visited Nov. 3, 1997)
< http://www.pcc.org.uk/complain/code .htm. >
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unsavory activities of the press, it appears to have been applied quite
narrowly. The PCC adjudicates very few violations involving public
figures and only one in eight complaints involves privacy. 83 When asked
why so few complaints of this nature were brought to the PCC, a
spokesman conceded that the difficulty in proving a breach of the Code
was a contributing factor. s4 Several of Lord Wakeham's proposed reforms
address some of the problems. For instance, Wakeham proposes to deal
with harassment by prohibiting the publication of photos obtained through
persistent pursuit, including those obtained by photographers "[w]ho stalk
their prey."85
Despite these reforms, the biggest problem with the resolution of
privacy violations through the PCC still remains. The PCC is a private
body with no authority to impose sanctions other than those agreed to by
its members. At present, the only available sanction is that the offending
publication print the Commission's findings "in full and with due
prominence."1' The PCC has been aptly described as a fraud because it
can impose no real sanctions and cannot compensate victims?' Even if
victim compensation were made available, some members of the press
would likely perceive fines of that sort as a necessary cost of doing
business. Fines would have to be quite sizeable to be an effective
deterrent, and it is unlikely that the PCC would agree to them if they
were." However, it must be conceded that even if effective economic
sanctions did exist, the PCC reaches only those editors willing to submit.
To date, not all members of the press submit to the PCC, and if legitimate
sanctions were to become a part of the ante, they likely never would.
83. Culf, supra note 73. For a compilation of complaints and adjudications, see The Press
Complaints Commission (visited Nov. 3, 1997) < http://www.pcc.org.uk/ajud.htm >.
84. E-mail from Tim Toulmin, Press Complaints Commission, to Laura Mall (Nov. 6,
1997) (on file with author).
85. Taken from a speech made by the Right Honorable Lord Wakehamn at a press
conference in Parliament Chamber, Crown Office Row, Temple on Sept. 25, 1997, (visited Nov.
3, 1997) <http://www.pcc.org.uk/adjud/pr250997.htm>.
86. Press Complaints Commission, Preamble to the Code of Practice, available at Press
Complaints Commission (visited Nov. 3, 1997) < http://www.pcc.org.uk/complain/code.htm >.
87. Allison Daniels, Guardian Debate: Press has Nothing to Fear from Privacy Law, QC
Argues ,THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14737744.
88. Apparently, the profits involved in checkbook journalism are quite staggering. For
example, THE MIRROR paid 250,000 pounds for the photograph of Diana and Dodi Al Fayed
kissing in St. Tropez. Culf, supra note 31.
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V. JUDICIAL REJECTION OF A COMMON LAW RIGHT To PRIVACY
The courts of England have done little for those in need of privacy
protection. British judges believe that the creation of a new right rests with
the legislature and, in light of Parliament's refusal to create one, have been
hesitant to act. The judiciary's refusal to recognize a right of privacy
where it does not legislatively exist was apparent in a case involving
British-comedy star Gordon Kaye. 9
In 1990, Mr. Kaye, star of the British comedy Allo, Allo, was in
the hospital recuperating from brain surgery when a photographer from
Sunday Sport violated the sanctity of his hospital room. 90 The journalist
asked him questions and took photographs without his permission (medical
evidence proved Mr. Kaye's condition was such that he was incapable of
giving informed consent)'91 Precisely because there is no privacy right in
England, nor any other effective alternative action, Mr. Kaye was unable
to prevent the printing of the photographs.Y Despite this complete lack for
a remedy, the court refused to create a common law right to privacy.
Court of Appeals judge Lord Justice Glidewell deferred to Parliament,
concluding that "[t]he facts of the present case are a graphic illustration of
the desirability of Parliament considering whether and in what
circumstances statutory provision can be made to protect the privacy of
individuals."93 In a concurring opinion, Lord Justice Leggett echoed that
the right to privacy "has so long been disregarded here that it can be
recognized now only by the Legislature."'
Kaye is not the only example of the judiciary's deference to
Parliament regarding the right to privacy. Malone v. Metropolitan Police
Commissioner also demonstrates the judiciary's reluctance to step on the
toes of Parliament:
No new right in the law, fully-fledged with all appropriate
safeguards, can spring from the head of a judge deciding a
particular case: only Parliament can create such a right...
One of the factors that must be relevant in such a case is
the degree of particularity in the right that is claimed. The
89. Kaye v. Andrew Robertson and Sport Newspapers Ltd., 1990, appended to REPORT
OF THE COMMITrEE ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS, supra note 2, at 98.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 99.
92. Four alternative rights of action were pursued but failed. These were libel, malicious
falsehood, trespass to the person, and passing off. Id. at 100.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 104.
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wider and more indefinite the right claimed, the greater the
undesirability of holding that such a right exists. 9
Malone has been cited as having essentially foreclosed any future attempts
at a judicial creation of a common law right to privacy.96 But I disagree.
While a broad and general right of privacy may not spring from the head
of a judge, other language in the decision suggests that more limited
equitable remedies for specific invasions of privacy may still be available
under the common law. The Court limits its decision to the tapping of
telephone lines in which the police have just cause or excuse, stating it
"decide[s] nothing on tapping elected for other purposes, or by other
persons, or by other means."' The Malone case, then, has not necessarily
foreclosed all common law creation of a right to privacy.
Malone is significant for another reason. The Malone judiciary
rebuffed arguments that a right to privacy had been created in England by
the European Convention on Human Rights. As regards the European
Convention, the Court noted that:
The United Kingdom, as a High Contracting Party that
ratified the Convention on March 8, 1951, has thus long
been under an obligation to secure these rights and
freedoms to everyone. That obligation, however, is an
obligation under a treaty which is not justiciable in the
courts of this country. Whether that obligation has been
carried out is not for me to say ... All that I do is to hold
that the Convention does not, as a matter of English law,
confer any direct rights on the plaintiff that he can enforce
in English courts."
The Malone Court correctly recognized that it was the obligation of the
State, as a High Contracting Party, and not the province of the courts, to
implement legislation which would give effect to the Convention. Since
Parliament had neither created a statutory right to privacy, nor passed
legislation giving effect to the European Convention on Human Rights, the
Court ultimately concluded that it could "find nothing in the authorities or
contentions . . . to support the plaintiffs claim based on the right of
95. Krotoszynski, supra note 16, at 1412, citing Malone, wherein the Malone case is cited
as having foreclosed the creation of a common law right to privacy.
96. Id.
97. Malone v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, 67 I.L.R. 345 (1979).
98. Id. at 339-40.
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privacy. "9 Malone appealed the decision directly to the European
Commission of Human Rights.' °° It was Malone's hope that a right to
privacy would be found to exist under international law. If so, the United
Kingdom, in violation of its treaty obligations under the European
Convention on Human Rights, would be required to provide a remedy. I
turn now to a discussion of privacy as addressed by the European
Convention on Human Rights.
VI. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the
Convention), to which the United Kingdom has been a signatory since
1951, provides that "[Elveryone shall have the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence. "1' As this is
written quite broadly (just as most human rights documents are), it is
uncertain from its face whether the right would encompass invasions of
privacy by the media. Though the European Court of Human Rights has
considered over sixty cases in which Article 8 was at issue,' °0 none has
squarely put before it the question of an individual's right to be let alone
versus the media's right to gather news. Notwithstanding the inherent
difficulties in balancing of the right to privacy against freedom of the
press, there are two additional obstacles that must be overcome if the
European Convention is to provide the protection England lacks.
The first regards whether the Convention would apply to the press
as a private actor at all. Traditionally, international law applies only to
government action. The government has pledged that it will not violate, by
its own actions, the rights named within the treaty. But the Convention has
99. Id. at 336.
100 In order for a case to be accepted by the European Commission of Human Rights, and
ultimately referred to the European Court of Human Rights, Article 26 of the Convention
requires that an individual must first have exhausted all domestic remedies available. Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]. Without a cause of action in England
for invasions of privacy, no further remedy was available, Malone was found to have exhausted
all available remedies and his individual petition was accepted then referred to the Court.
Ultimately, the Court found a violation of Article 8's guarantee of a right to privacy, but it was
only because the United Kingdom had failed to provide adequate safeguards against the abuse of
wire-tapping by the police. There was no finding that the United Kingdom was in derogation
because it lacks a privacy law. Malone v. United Kingdom, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36-37
(1984).
101. ECHR, supra note 100.
102. For a convenient listing of European Court of Human Rights cases, see the
Department of International Law at the University of Salzburg where Christian Campbell
maintains a list of cases according to Convention article available in (visited Nov. 10, 1997)
<http://www.sbg.acat/var/ docs/egmr/ echrhome.htm>. http://www.sbg.ac.at/
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imposed upon States the positive obligation to uphold the rights embodied
in the Convention.' 3 This means that a State can violate the terms of the
treaty for doing nothing. By failing to provide redress to its citizens for
rights violations by private actors, for example, a State fails to uphold its
positive obligations under the treaty. The European Court of Human
Rights has specifically held that a State is under a positive obligation under
Article 8 to respect family life.'0 ' While it seems likely, it is nevertheless
uncertain whether the Court in Strasbourg would extend positive
obligations on a State to curb privacy intrusions by the media.
The second obstacle is whether the right to privacy as framed in
Article 8 can be understood to include a general right to be let alone, one
that is broad enough to encompass intrusion into seclusion, and the
publication of private facts. If the application of Article 8 turns solely on
the original intent of the Convention's framers and on the definition of the
right as historically interpreted by the members of the European Union,
protection against intrusion and publication of private facts is likely to be
found lacking. It must be remembered that the original purpose of the
Convention was to combat totalitarian governments in the wake of World
War II. Article 8 was framed in response to the invasions of homes by
Nazi troops, not intrusions into private affairs by the news media.'1'
Furthermore, European union member states have not traditionally granted
a broad right of privacy. As we have already seen, Parliament has
consistently refused to create any general right to be let alone. France,
often cited as the European nation with the most stringent privacy laws, did
not develop a common law right to privacy until the 1960's, and they did
not codify the right until 1970.106 The most substantial protections for this
aspect of privacy, then, did not exist in Europe until more than twenty-five
years after the Convention was put into effect. While other privacy rights
unrelated to Article 8's original purpose have fallen within its scope, a
common understanding among the High Contracting Parties is still often
103. Article 13 states that "[elveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
Krotoszynski, supra note 56. See also Campbell & Cosons v. UK, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) 17
(1982), where the Court defines the word respect used in Article 2 of the Convention to imply
that a State is under a positive obligation to act. Article 8 uses the word respect when defining
State obligations regarding the right to privacy. ECHR, supra note 100, art. 8.
104. See Gaskin, 160 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. (ser. A.) at 15, 17-20 (1989) where the Court
held that the Government violated its positive obligations under Article 8 by failing to provide a
system whereby Gaskin could retrieve a Government file relating to his care when he was a ward
of the State.
105. PRATT, supra note 30, at 86-87.
106. REPORT OF THE COMMrITEE, supra note 2, at 14.
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necessary. For example, the Court held that a United Kingdom law
criminalizing homosexual conduct to be a violation of a homosexual's right
to respect for his privacy and family life in part because of the modem day
acceptance for this kind of lifestyle among other Member States, even if
not in Ireland.'° If there is no common European understanding that the
Article 8 right to privacy encompasses even a minimum of protection for
the kinds of invasions at issue here, and I submit that there is none, any
claim to the right under the Convention may fail.
Only when an applicant has overcome both the obstacles discussed
above will the issue turn on a balancing of the interests between an
individual's right to privacy and society's right to know. Of course, the
right to know is part of the guarantee of freedom of expression as
embodied in Article 10 of the European Convention. I turn now to a
discussion of that competing interest.
A. Freedom of Expression under the European Convention on
Human Rights
The right to privacy cannot be considered alone. It must be
considered in tandem with the competing right of freedom of expression.
Article 10 of the European Convention protects freedom of expression,
including the right to receive and impart information without government
interference. ' 3 There is no question that freedom of the press is necessary
to a democratic society, and I can add nothing to the debate that has
already clearly established its high value. But, freedom of speech and of
the press has never been regarded as absolute. Freedom of the press should
not, and need not, be maintained at the expense of other important rights.
Article 10 recognizes the necessity for limits to be placed on freedom of
expression and of the press:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be. subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society . . . for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary.' °0
107. Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1981).
108. ECHR, supra note 100.
109. Id. art.10, § 2.
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Thus, Article 10 expressly recognizes boundaries regarding the publication
of information in breach of confidence and which are libelous. But the
phrase that refers to the rights of others indicates that this list is not meant
to be exhaustive. 'o While these rights might refer narrowly to the specific
human rights as enumerated in Article I of the Convention, the preceding
phrase, as are prescribed by law suggests an even broader reference. The
rights of others is more likely meant to include domestically created rights
as well as international human rights. Either way, the language of Article
10 leaves the door open for a privacy limitation on freedom of expression
to be recognized.
The Strasbourg Court has yet to deal with any case that pits the
rights of a free press against the privacy rights of an individual. However,
the Court has dealt with privacy and free press issues separately. If
anything may be gleaned from an overview of the two bodies of case law,
it is that the right of a free press is broad and well defined, and the right to
privacy is less so. This does not bode well for advocates of the right to
privacy.
Though the Strasbourg Court has not yet dealt with any case
concerning the intrusion of the media into the privacy of an individual,
such as was the issue in Kaye,"' the Court has dealt with cases that are
somewhat analogous. One such case involved the libelous publication of
five articles about the private lives of certain Antwerp Magistrates."12 The
articles severely criticized the Magistrates for having granted child custody
to a father accused of sexually abusing the children, and concluded that the
Magistrates based their decision on bias, cronyism and in misplaced right-
wing politics. The judgement of the domestic courts against the newspaper
were based on violations of domestic law which prohibits publication of
"ill-considered accusations without sufficient evidence;" that "employs
gratuitously offensive terms or exaggerated expression;" or that "fails to
respect private life or the individual's privacy."'"3 According to the
Brussels tribunal, the journalists were liable for defamation for having
"besmirched the honor of the magistrates without being in possession of all
110. Id.
111. Ben Emmerson, Newspapers Fear that Incorporating the European Convention on
Human Rights into UK Law will Restrict Investigative Reporting, THE GUARDIAN (London),
Nov. 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14739002.
112. Haes & Gijsels v. Belgium, (7/19961626/809) Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997) publication
pending, but currently available at the European Court of Human Rights (visited Nov. 5, 1997)
< http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/eng/DEHAES.html >.
113. Id. para. 26.
1998] 807
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
the necessary information. "1" The courts also held that in doing so, the
newspaper had invaded the privacy of the Magistrates:
In the instant case the appellants dared to go one step
further by maintaining, without a shred of evidence, that
they were entitled to infer the alleged bias from the very
personalities of the judges and the Advocate-General and
thus interfere with private life, which is without any doubt
unlawful. 1-
The European Court disagreed. It held that the government had not
violated Article 8.116 First, the Court noted that the applicants had not
"cast doubt on the information published regarding the fate of the X
children. "1" That being the case, the inferences which the newspaper drew
from their correct knowledge of the record of the case were value
judgments, which the Court held distinguishable from facts. '  Also
important to the Court's judgment was the idea that the issue at hand,
regarding the impartiality of the judiciary, was of such significant public
interest that the government was unjustified in its interference with
freedom of expression.19
There was one notable exception. The Court found that the
journalists had invaded the privacy of the Magistrates for making reference
to the activities of the family of one of the magistrates:
One of the allusions to the alleged political sympathies was
inadmissible - the one concerning the past history of the
father of one of the judges criticized . . . It is unacceptable
that someone should be exposed to opprobrium because of
matters concerning a member of his family. A penalty was
justifiable on account of that allusion by itself.
It was, however, only one of the elements in this case.
The applicants were convicted for the totality of the
114. Id. para. 27.
115. Id. para. 41.
116. Id. para. 49.
117. Haes & Gijsels v. Belgium, (71199616261809) Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 40 (1997).
118. Id. para. 42.
119. Id. para. 37.
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accusations of bias they made against the three judges and
the Advocate-General in question.'"
It is interesting that the Court found conclusions drawn from true facts
regarding a public official's family violated Article 8 when similar
conclusions drawn from other true facts did not. Was it the publication of
private information about the family, or the "allusion" that the apple had
not fallen far from the tree that the Court held objectionable? The
distinction is critical. Action for the first is an invasion of privacy for
publication of true embarrassing facts, while the other is for defamation.
Each implicates Article 10's right to free speech, but only the former
would implicate Article 8. It appears, by the use of the word "allusions"
and "opprobrium" that what the Court found actionable was defamation,
not invasion of privacy. Regretfully, the Court failed to make the
distinction clear.
Notwithstanding that one small concession, the Court appears to be
highly deferential to Article 10. Most notably, the Court virtually
disregarded two arguments put forth by the government: first, that the
Magistrates are different from most public officials, because owing to
ethical constraints which prevent them from commenting about cases, they
cannot respond to criticism about their decisions; and second, that the
government's interest in preserving the public confidence in its judiciary
justifies its protection against unfounded attacks. 121 This second
justification appears to be specifically allowed under Article 10 to maintain
"the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."'22  While the Court is
often generous in providing a wide margin of appreciation to the
government for its determination of what is "necessary in a democratic
society . . . for the prevention of disorder or crime . . . or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others,' 23 it is apparently less
willing to do so when freedom of expression is implicated.
Another case involved a libel action over a book published about
the private life of the applicant. ' The United Kingdom provided a remedy
for information published that was false, but offered no remedy where the
120. Id. para. 45. The newspaper had made reference to the fact that the father of one of
the judges was "a big-wig in the gendarmerie who was convicted in 1948 of collaboration: he
had, in close collaboration with the 'Feldgendarmerie', restructured the Belgian gendarmerie
along Nazi lines. [YB] is no less controversial as a magistrat." Id. para. 19.
121. Id. para. 14.
122. ECHR, supra note 100.
123. 1d.
124. Emmerson, supra note 111.
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information published was true.' The applicant claimed that true
information published about his private life was an invasion of his
privacy. 126 The European Commission on Human Rights held that the
remedies provided by the United Kingdom under defamation and breach of
confidence were sufficient, and so the United Kingdom was not held to
have violated Article 8. '2 This suggests that the Commission is unwilling
to find a State in violation of its positive obligations when it offers some,
even if insufficient, remedy. From this we might infer that where the State
offers no remedy at all, as was illustrated in Kaye, the Commission would
hold a State in violation. This precise question, whether other remedies
such as trespass, defamation, and breach of confidence, or even those
offered by the quasi-public PCC, are sufficient in their incidental
protection of privacy, is precisely the one that Parliament has been faced
with for quite some time. Parliament's response has been that those
remedies do adequately protect privacy rights, even though cases like Kaye
clearly belie that proposition. The Strasbourg Court may offer a wide
margin of appreciation to the United Kingdom for their view that incidental
protections to the right of privacy are enough. If they do, future holdings
of the Strasbourg Court may closely resemble the deferential treatment
English judges have paid to Parliament.
B. Potential Effect of a Violation of the European Convention
Article 1 of the Convention confers upon its signatories the
obligation to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section I.",u Further, Article 53 obligates contracting
parties to "abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are
parties.' 29 Should a violation be found, the Court would issue a judgment
so stating, and award a specific remedy, such as damages and costs, to the
injured party.,". While the judgment of the Court does require that the
State come into compliance with its Convention obligations, the Court is
not empowered to dictate exactly how it should do so. The Court has
confirmed that "the Contracting States remain free to choose the measures
which they consider appropriate."13 '
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. ECHR, supra note 100.
129. Id.
130. Damages are permitted under Article 50. Id.
131. The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 38 (1979).
[Vol. 4:785
1998]
In any case involving a State's positive obligations, there are
difficulties regarding compliance that do not necessarily occur in negative
obligation cases. In the latter, a State is directed to discontinue a specific
practice. Assuming full compliance, the practical result for citizens is that
the practice will no longer occur. In the former, there is the potential that
a State will enact measures that only partially or otherwise unsatisfactorily
protect the citizen against future violations. This is especially likely, as
here, when the State has demonstrated reluctance to provide the
protections. Furthermore, the Court has indicated that exceptions to
freedom of expression must be narrowly interpreted. In the Thalidomide
Case, the United Kingdom had issued an injunction against the publication
of an article regarding the negligence of a company that manufactured and
marketed a drug to pregnant women that subsequently caused severe birth
defects. 32 Civil cases against the company were at various stages of action
and the government's injunction was intended to prevent trial by
newspaper.", An Article 10 violation was found despite the express
provision allowing exceptions for "maintaining . . . impartiality of the
judiciary." The injunction was held to be an unnecessary infringement on
freedom of expression under the specific facts of the case.1"4 The
Thalidomide Case, then, demonstrates how the Court might be inclined to
apply narrowly any restrictions placed on freedom of expression.
So, given a State's freedom to prescribe for itself how it chooses to
comply with a violation of the European Convention, Parliament's
potential reluctance to implement broad privacy measures, and the Court's
instruction that restrictions on freedom of expression should be narrowly
applied, a violation of Article 8 may do little to impact privacy rights in
England. Despite this pessimism, incorporation of the European
Convention on Human Rights into domestic law may still provide for a
general right of privacy.
VII. THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL
Although the United Kingdom played a major part in drafting the
Convention and was the first to ratify it in 1951, it has never incorporated
the Convention into domestic law.1 5 As we have already seen, the result is
that British citizens cannot enforce Article 8's privacy right's in British
courts. Instead, they must appeal to the European Commission of Human
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 42.
135. Rachael Donnelly, Labour Unveils Bill to Improve Protection of Basic Human Rights,
THE IRISH TIMES, Oct. 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12032014.
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Rights who may, if the case meets certain criteria, refer the case to the
European Court of Human Rights."' On average, the process takes
approximately five years to complete and will cost the petitioner
approximately thirty thousand pounds. 3 ' Practically speaking, such a
costly and time-consuming process does not afford an effective remedy to
the majority of British citizens. The better solution would be for the
United Kingdom to finally incorporate the European Convention on Human
Rights into domestic law. And this is exactly what is being considered.
On October 24, 1997, the British Government published a White
Paper announcing the Government's intention to bring UK law in line with
the European Convention on Human Rights.'38 If passed, the Human
Rights Bill now pending before Parliament would incorporate the European
Convention on Human Rights into domestic law. This would enable
British citizens to enforce a right of privacy in domestic courts, making it
unnecessary for Parliament to create a general right of privacy or enact
specific privacy tort legislation.
While this seems like an ideal solution, whether any meaningful
right to privacy will emerge will ultimately depend on how it is balanced
against the rights of a free press. Lord Bingham, Britain's highest-ranking
judge, pointed out that "what is going to have to be confronted is the
demarcation of the boundary between privacy and free speech. I think this
is difficult and debatable territory. In deciding whether publication would
infringe the right of privacy, the obvious criterion for judges to use would
be 'public interest'."'39 The problem with using a public interest criterion
is that the term is subject to differing interpretations. The press, on the
one hand, would argue for the narrowest possible definition. To them,
anything that sells newspapers might be considered to be in the public
interest. In the words of Sir John Donaldson, the press is "peculiarly
vulnerable to the error of confusing public interest with their own
136. The Commission acts as a screening body to individuals, who may not directly appeal
to the European Court of Human Rights. The Commission determines whether a case should go
before the European Court of Human Rights. ECHR, supra note 100, art. 25-27.
137. Alan Travis, Judges Win Power in Historic Bill - Courts to Rule on Privacy, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 25, 1997 available in 1997 WL 14737335. See also Donald
McIntyre, Can We Trust the Judges to Make Our Laws?, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 19,
1997, available in 1997 WL 12347212.
138. The Human Rights Bill was introduced in the House of Lords on Oct. 23, 1997. The
text of the Bill, as yet unavailable through Her Majesty's Stationery Shop, is available at
Parliament's Internet web-site (visited Nov. 20, 1997) <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld199798/ ldbills/038/97038-a.htm>.
139. Clare Dyer, Courts May Rule on Privacy Rights - Judge Says New Law Unnecessary,
THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14734021.
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interest." '4 It is unlikely, however, that the term is susceptible to a
definition that would include information that merely serves to satisfy
public curiosity. The distinction between what satisfies prurient curiosity
and what is in the public interest most often arises in the context of a
public official. Those in favor of a broad interpretation would argue that
the morals of a public official, as evidenced by his sex life and other
private activity, directly relates to his fitness for public office. Those in
favor of a narrower interpretation, however, would argue that only when
there is a more direct interference with an official's ability to properly
carry out his duties is private information in the public interest. Eric
Barendt, Goodman Professor of Media Law at University College in
London, put it this way:
Even public figures are entitled to privacy. There is no
public interest justification for publishing details of a
politician's sex life, unless that interferes with the
discharge of his duties. The argument that the public has a
right to know the truth about every aspect of his private
life is particularly shabby. Taken seriously, this claim
would empty the privacy right of all content."",
While it remains to be seen how the courts will answer the
question of what is in the public interest, any definition narrower than that
which has been employed by the press will be a great victory for advocates
of privacy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The video camera, the telephoto lens and the Internet are just a few
of the advances that necessitate a broader reading of the right of privacy in
England and the international human rights community. Lord Wakeham
recognized that there is little one country can do to solve the problems
created by paparazzi operating in a global market. 42 But while Lord
Wakeham may be congratulated for making a heroic attempt to make a
difference within the narrow scope of his authority, Parliament cannot. By
deferring protection of the right of privacy to the PCC, Parliament failed to
provide its citizenry effective redress for privacy violations by the press.
Even if the PCC, under its revised Code, is successful in blocking the sale
of ill-gotten paparazzo photographs, the day is gone when the press are the
140. REPORT OF THE COMMITEE ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS, supra note 2, at
para. 3.20.
141. Barendt, supra note 15.
142. Speech by the Rt. Hon. Lord Wakeham, supra note 85.
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singular masters of mass media. Any boycott the PCC calls regarding
photographs of a particular incident will only serve to stimulate market
demand. Because this may in fact prove to be even more profitable for the
paparazzi and individual violators, it could have the adverse effect of
increasing privacy violations.
It will be up to the judiciary to create a right to privacy in
England. Last year, Lord Bingham, the British equivalent to the United
States Supreme Court's Chief Justice, was said to have forewarned
Parliament that if it failed to protect personal privacy, "the judges
would." 143 It appears that Lord Bingham will soon have the opportunity to
realize his threat. The seemingly inevitable incorporation of the European
Convention of Human Rights into UK law' 44 will place the future of the
right to privacy, not in the hands of the European Court of Human Rights,
but in the hands of the English judiciary. Because Article 8's right to
privacy as it relates to intrusions by the press has not been well defined by
the Court in Strasbourg, it will remain necessary for British judges to
determine its scope. The title and content of the White Paper itself makes
this suggestion. "Rights Brought Home points out [that] British judges will
have more, not less, impact on European Human Rights jurisprudence. "145
Lord Bingham's remark also suggests that British judges, after
years of frustration over the lack of authority to provide just remedies, are
quite eager to protect privacy rights. It also appears likely that public
sentiment since the death of Diana has provided yet another impetus to act.
Continued denial of the right now, perhaps more than ever before, may
serve to seriously undermine public confidence in the judiciary. So,
despite their prior track record, British judges may well create a broader
right than would have been defined by the European Court of Human
Rights in the full course of time -- given the Court's limitation to define the
right according to a common understanding within the European
Community.
Prior to the drafting of the Human Rights Bill, it was the hope of
privacy rights advocates that the Strasbourg Court would provide English
citizens the privacy protection they lacked. Ironically, it now appears that
143. Robert Rice, Top Judge Says Privacy Law Will Not be Needed, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), Oct. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14785012.
144. Most commentators note little opposition to the Human Rights Bill. I have found only
one reference in the U.K. press which suggests that the Tories may be unhappy with the Bill.
Michael Streeter, Human Rights: Bill Leaves Unanswered Questions, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Oct. 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 15213387.
145. A Milestone for Human Rights - But Keep Judges from Privacy, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Oct. 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14737350.
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England, heretofore one of the few countries in the European Union with
no right of privacy at all, may assist the Court in Strasbourg to define the
right more broadly. Long overdue, the right to privacy is finally ripe for
broad recognition in England and in Europe.
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cruel as to allow them to live in pain, in hopelessness, in living death,
without moving a muscle to help them."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Individuals should have the right to end their life with dignity at
the time of their own choosing, but this right must be carefully balanced
with the idea of a right to life. Thus, seeking a balance between the two
rights is the crux of the problem and the corresponding solution. Modem
medicine has the ability to prolong life far beyond what was once
conceived. The question now becomes one of an individual's right to self-
determination versus society's interest in prolonging life. In ancient
China, family members would take elderly, senile people into the woods
with a basket of food. After saying their farewells, the elderly people
would be left behind, in order for nature to take its course and allow them
to die in peace.2 Today's society might find this behavior cruel, but where
should the line be drawn?
The first part of this Note will discuss recent developments in the
law of the United States and the impact on physician assisted suicide
controversy. The second part will explain important case and statutory law
in the British Isles and Australia. Next, this work will discuss international
law as it relates to the law of the aforementioned countries and to the
overall issue of death with dignity and the right to life. Finally, the Note
will conclude that the global community must take an active role in
promoting individual sovereignty and criminal immunity by allowing a
terminally ill individual a right to a dignified death, with the help of a
physician.
II. BASIC FRAMEWORK
A. Definitions
There are many terms to describe the current controversy over
assisted suicide. Often the term euthanasia is used as a synonym.
Euthanasia is the intentional act of causing another's death.3 There are a
1. DONALD W. COX, HEMLOCK'S CUP 92 (Prometheus Books 1993) (quoting Isaac
Asimov).
2. Id. at 19.
3. Alison C. Hall, To Die with Dignity: Comparing Physician Assisted Suicide in the
United States, Japan and the Netherlands, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 803, 803 n.3 (1996). Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary defines euthanasia as "the act or practice of killing individuals ...
that are hopelessly sick or injured for reasons of mercy." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 287 (7th ed. 1967).
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few sub-categories: passive and active, voluntary and involuntary.
Active, which is also referred to as positive or direct, euthanasia is where
death is produced deliberately and actively by positive means.4  Passive,
also referred to as negative or indirect, euthanasia is where death is
deliberately produced by withholding or withdrawing ordinary means of
nutrition or treatment.' In the case of voluntary euthanasia, a terminally ill
patient, of competent mind, can request an administered death.6  In
involuntary euthanasia, a physician ends the life of a terminally ill patient,
without the express request from the patient.' Physician assisted suicide
occurs where a patient is given medication or other assistance to end the
patient's life.8
The right to die does not refer to a constitutionally imposed
fundamental right, but rather the right of the patient to request help from a
doctor to assist in a dignified death, without the possibility of criminal
penalties applying to the physician's actions. Thus, the idea that people
have a right to end their lives is often confused with the idea that man is
free to end his life when he so chooses, but that does not translate to an
inherent right. What terminally ill people should have is a choice to have a
physician help them to die in a dignified manner, and not to have the
doctor criminally liable for such action.
B. Slippery Slope Argument
The opponents to any reform in the current assisted suicide battle,
often point to disastrous results that will occur if the law is relaxed and
criminal sanctions for assisting physicians are eliminated. This is referred
to as the "slippery slope." 9 According to this theory, once the door is
opened to some medically assisted suicide patients, there will be an
increase in "killing" that will extend to other groups in a compulsory,
coercive manner. The experience of Nazi Germany is often cited as proof
of this argument's validity. The basis of the argument is that the total
annihilation of groups of people started with the idea that it was acceptable
to allow chronically sick people to die. The idea gradually moved to
include the socially unproductive and ended with the destruction of all
4. Dr. John Wilkinson, The Ethics of Euthanasia, 6 J.L. SOC'Y SCOT. 243 (1990).
5. Id.
6. Hall, supra note 3, at 803.
7. J. K. MASON & R. A. MCCALL SMITH, LAW AND MEDICAL ETHICS 231
(Butterworths 1987).
8. Id.
9. GERALD A. LARUE, PLAYING GOD 21 (Moyer Bell 1996).
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Jews, homosexuals, and non-Germans.'0 However, this argument falls
short, because the concept of voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide was
never implemented in Nazi Germany. Additionally, the proposed changes
in the current law that include eliminating the criminal penalties for doctors
to help a patient to die, are presented in the confines of a democracy, not a
dictatorship. Further, the existence of the legislature, as well as the
courts, provide checks on the potential for abuse. Any human endeavor or
system has the potential for misuse or abuse, but that is not a powerful
reason to deny human autonomy and the need for terminally ill people to
be able to eliminate their own suffering.
III. THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
A. 1997 Supreme Court Decisions
On June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court, in an unanimous decision,
held that terminally ill people do not have a constitutional right to
physician assisted death. In Washington v. Glucksberg, Chief Justice
Rehnquist delivered the opinion, which held that the right to physician
assisted suicide was not a fundamental right protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court further held that the
state of Washington's ban on physician assisted suicide was rationally
related to the government interests of preservation of life, maintaining
integrity in the medical profession, and protecting terminally ill people
who might be pressured into rash decisions about ending their life.' 2
Despite this ruling, the court did not preclude any rulings by states to
legalize such assisted suicide. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing the
majority opinion, conceded that an "earnest and profound debate" should
ensue on the issue of physician assisted suicide."
Similarly, the Supreme Court also held that there is no
fundamental right to die in a case challenging New York's law prohibiting
physician assisted suicide. '4 The Vacco case was based on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The petitioners said that
the equal protection argument applied because the law discriminates against
those terminally ill patients who were not on life support. The patients on
10. Id. at 25 (citing Dr. Leo Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 39 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 46 (1949)).
11. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2275.
14. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
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life support were able to hasten their deaths, while those not hooked up to
any life sustaining machines were not given the same opportunity. The
Equal Protection argument failed because the Court said that if the facial
value of either the assisted suicide ban or the law permitting patients to
refuse medical treatment is considered, neither treats anyone differently.
Everyone is entitled, if competent, to refuse medical life-sustaining
treatment. Additionally, no one is permitted to assist in a requested
suicide.
The recent Supreme Court rulings found that the group of mentally
competent, terminally ill patients was not a suspect class," so the scrutiny
level could not be increased. As in the Glucksberg case, the rational basis
test applied, and the Court found that the state interests of preserving life
and prohibiting intentional killing, were legitimate interests.
The Vacco Court did clarify and strengthen the right to refuse
medical treatment. In addition, the Court took the cause farther when it
said that a doctor may provide palliative, or pain easing care, even if this
case might hasten the patient's death.1 6 The Court looked to the intent of
the physician. As long as the doctor's intent was not specifically to kill the
patient, the aggressive attack to decrease pain was acceptable.
The "pain easing" argument rests on a tenuous base at best. If a
physician's purpose is to ease a patient's pain, then aggressive palliative
care may be given. Thus, the physician can escape the box by merely
restating the intention as one of relief and not death. Under such rationale,
a physician may administer several prescriptions or injections that would
not individually cause death, but in the aggregate will make death certain.
As long as the physician says the medication is intended to alleviate
suffering, the lethal dosage is permitted.
It was only seven years ago, that the Court permitted the patient's
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.' 7  Justice O'Connor, in a
concurring opinion, recognized that allowing a patient to endure unwanted
medical assistance was an intrusion of personal liberty and dignity.,8
However, in the recent Supreme Court cases, the Court found a substantial
difference between "letting a patient die and making a patient die." 19 The
15. Id. at 2297.
16. Id. at 2298.
17. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The
United States Supreme Court recognized that the right to refuse unwanted medical care is a
liberty interest, and is subject to Constitutional protection. Id.
18. Id. at 288.
19. All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, June 26, 1997) (transcript #97062611-
212).
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Court relied on the principals of causation and intent. Thus, when medical
treatment is withdrawn, the patient dies from the underlying condition.
Whereas with physician assisted suicide, the patient is actually "killed" by
the medication.
Lawrence Tribe, a Harvard Law Professor, who represents
patients wishing to utilize physicians' assistance to end their life, feels the
recent decisions amount to a victory. Although, the recent decisions do
not preclude a federal Constitutional claim, the issue is now left primarily
to the states. Tribe feels that a dying patient might have a better chance of
relief in the lower courts.20
B. Other Federal Court Rulings
Previous rulings in the federal appeals courts, in both the Second
and Ninth Circuits have presented favorable outcomes for proponents of
physician assisted dying. In Compassion in Dying v. Washington,2 1 the
Court held that physician assisted suicide is an intimate personal decision
that is protected by the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court
recognized a liberty interest in choosing the time and manner of one's own
death. Judge Reinhardt stated that it was a personal choice and those
people who chose not to implement the choice were free to do so, but they
were "not free, however, to force their views, their religious convictions,
or their philosophies on all the other members of a democratic society."22
Similarly, the Second Circuit struck down New York's law
banning assisted suicide, but this time an equal protection argument was
used.23  Thus, there was no rational basis for distinguishing between
unwanted medical treatment and assisted suicide.
The United States was founded on the idea that individual liberty
and autonomy are integral to the strength of the nation. Justice William
Brennan said, "Our Constitution is a charter of human rights, dignity and
self-determination."24 In 1976, the courts took the right of self-
determination into the privacy spectrum.Y In this case the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that when an individual has a terminal illness that is
20. Id.
21. Compasssion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
22. Id. at 839.
23. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
24. William J. Brennan, Jr., What the Constitution Requires, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1996,
§ 4, at 13.
25. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
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medically impossible to reverse, that person has a right to die.0
Additionally, the New Jersey Court held that criminal law could not punish
the doctor for the free exercise of the right to privacy."
The irony of criminal sanctions for physicians assisting in a
patient's death, is that often there is very little probability that doctors will
actually be prosecuted. In 1990, Dr. Jack Kevorkian assisted his first
patient, Janet Adkins in allowing her to self administer a lethal dose of
drugs. Dr. Kervorkian was subsequently charged with first-degree
murder. However, the charges were dropped because Michigan did not
have a law prohibiting assisted suicide. 's Despite many subsequent
lawsuits, no court to date, has been able to successfully prosecute Dr.
Kevorkian.
C. Legislative Decisions
The courts are not the only branch of government prone to
apparent contradiction. President Clinton recently signed into law a
federal ban on money for physician assisted suicide.29 In April, 1996, the
White House issued a statement where the President expressed his
opposition to assisted suicide. 30 Additionally, in 1992, President Clinton
spoke out against doctor-assisted suicide. At a town.meeting he said, "I
don't support it. I just don't agree with it."' However, President and Mrs.
Clinton have each signed living wills.
The language of the Cruzan case in the United States, which stated
that "although a patient had a Constitutional right to refuse medical care, a
state could require clear and convincing evidence"12 that the patient wished
to terminate their life. A living will would satisfy that prong of the
requirement. By mid-1992, forty-nine states passed some kind of Living
Will legislation. Currently, all fifty states now have provisions for
advance medical directives or living wills.3
26. Id. The Supreme Court of New Jersey developed a widespread definition of a
permanent vegetative state: "if there is no reasonable possibility of [a person] ever emerging
from [a] comatose condition, to a cognitive, sapient state, life-preserving systems may be
withdrawn." Id. at 671.
27. Id.
28. Hall, supra note 3, at 818 n.85.
29. Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act, Pub. L. No. 105-12, 111 Stat. 23 (1997)
(codified and amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14401 (1997)).
30. Morning Addition (NPR Radio Broadcast, Oct. 30, 1996) (Transcript # 1988-9).
31. Id.
32. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
33. Cox, supra note 1, at 141.
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Federal law has recently expanded the power of a living will. The
Patient's Self-Determination Act (PSDA) passed the United States
legislature in November 1990.' The act requires that all federally funded
health care institutions inform patients of their right to prepare a Living
Will, and compels the hospitals to respect the patient's wishes. The
passage of the PSDA, means that there is a federal law allowing Living
Wills to be considered as "evidence" in order to pass the Cruzan test.
In addition to the courts, various State legislatures have attempted
to pass assisted suicide laws. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act was the
first law of its kind in the United States . On November 5, 1997, for the
second time in three years, the citizens of Oregon voted in favor of doctor-
assisted death?8 The legislation requires that many steps be followed before
allowing anyone to receive medical assistance to allow individuals to end
their life. Among the controls are the requirements that a second
physician's opinion would be required; a full psychiatric examination; and
documentation showing the patient is not being coerced.37
IV. THE LAW IN THE BRITISH ISLES
A. ENGLAND
In the United Kingdom, voluntary assisted suicide is treated
somewhat differently than in the United States. The Courts in England
look to common law for precedent. In an early case, a doctor was
acquitted of murder charges after he injected a massive dose of
phenobarbitone into a patient with inoperable lung cancer.38 The doctor
wished to ease the patient's pain. Thus, the law looks to the intention of
the physician, not his motive in terminating a patient's life. "If a doctor
intends to kill, he is as liable to prosecution as is the layman."3 9 The High
Court, in an October 1997 hearing, held that Annie Linsell will be able to
34. Patient Self-Determination Act Provision in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) [hereinafter PSDA].
35. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (1995) [hereinafter Measure 16]. In a case filed
subsequent to Measure 16, the district court enjoined the statute from enforcement and declared it
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or.
1995). But in February 1997, a three judge panel (3-0), in the Ninth Circuit, found that plaintiffs
did not have standing to challenge the Act. The Court did riot consider the Constitutional merits
of the case. Lee v. State of Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).
36. Ellen Goodman, Oregon Casts Ballots for Dispensing Death, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 8,
1997, at 14.
37. Measure 16, supra note 35.
38. R v. Carr-Briant [19431 2 All E.R. 156.
39. SMITH, supra note 7, at 232.
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receive diamorphine to achieve a pain-free death, once she reaches the
point where she is unable to swallow. Even though the diamorphine would
inevitably shorten her life, Annie's doctor will not be prosecuted for her
death because the drug was mainly to relieve her pain.4 The idea of
looking to the intention of the physician is comparable to the recent United
States Supreme Court rationale where palliative care could be withdrawn if
it would ease the patient's suffering.
Public opinion seems to be moving towards the idea that assistance
is oftentimes acceptable in the case of terminally ill patients. A 1986
survey of the British public reported that seventy-five percent of the public
agreed, that the law should allow adults to receive help towards an
immediate and peaceful death, if they were terminally ill.' 1 Even though
the tide seems to be in favor of relaxed assisted suicide laws, the House of
Lord Select Committee on Medical Ethics reported in 1994, that they
opposed any change in the law.42
The first monumental right to die case in the United Kingdom was
that of Airedale Health Authority v. Bland.43  After a stadium disaster,
Tony Bland was left in a "persistent vegetative state."" United States
Supreme Court Chief Justice Rehnquist defined persistent vegetative state
as a condition "in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no
indications of significant cognitive function."4  The Bland case set out a
number of tests to be applied in right to die cases. First, the requirement
that those who are seeking to have treatment terminated need to apply to
the court for a declaration. Secondly, the applications must be preceded by
a full investigation where independent medical opinions are sought and
explored. "No one, including the court, is entitled to consent to, or refuse,
medical treatment on behalf of mentally incompetent patients."" The
courts then, act as a check because physicians must come to court before
40. World News Bulletins, (Oct. 1 to 31, 1997) <http://www.rights.org/-deathnet/
Wnews current.html >.
41. SMITH, supra note 7, at 233.
42. Tim Helme & Nicola Padfield, Lord Walton's Sandcastle, 144 NEW L.J. 1521 (1994).
43. Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, [1993] 1 All E. R. 821.
44. Id.
45. Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 226 (1990). In the 5-4
decision, the court, for the first time, endorsed the idea that the 14th Amendment guarantees the
right to avoid unwanted medical treatment. The court applied this idea to all patients providing
they had made their wishes known. The ruling was similar to Supreme Court decisions in the
1997 term, as it basically passed the decision to end life back to the States because the States
could allow removal of life-sustaining mechanisms.
46. Julie Stone, Withholding life-sustaining treatment: The Ultimate Decision, 144 NEW
L.J. 205 (1994).
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initiating any death actions, in order to prevent doctors from making life
ending decisions arbitrarily.
While the Bland case was not decided on the basis of a written
constitution, there are still elements from common law that can be
extracted that are similar to a right to self-determination and bodily
integrity. The right to "self determination" was recognized by Lord
Scarman in 1985." The case involved a patient's right to be informed of
inherent risks in recommended surgery. While English law did not
recognize the doctrine of informed consent, the Court acknowledged the
right of the patient to make her own mind based on relevant facts. 4
The Bland case closely parallels the American case of Nancy
Cruzan, a road accident victim. Nancy Cruzan was a thirty-two year old
woman who was comatose for seven years after a car accident.' 9 Cruzan's
parents provided the United States Supreme Court with evidence that
passed the "clear and convincing" test; showing that Nancy would not
want to live by artificial means. The Supreme Court ruled that Nancy,
who was in a permanent vegetative state, could be removed from all
feeding and hydration pumps.
The first English case to interpret the holding in Bland was
Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v. S.10 The Court of Appeal held that it
would be lawful for doctors to refuse to reinsert a feeding tube into a
patient who had suffered acute brain damage. After the request of the
patient's mother, the tube was not reinserted and S died shortly after the
Court of Appeal Hearing of January 14, 1994.1' The Court used the "best
interests" test, to decide what treatment if any, was best for the patient.
This case differs from Bland because it was presented as an emergency,
and therefore, was not subject to the required court approved authorization
to have life sustaining mechanisms removed.
B. Scotland
Janet Johnstone, who entered a permanent vegetative state after an
unsuccessful bid with suicide, became one of the most famous "right to
die" cases in Scotland. 2 The Court set up a determinative balancing test to
47. Sidaway v. Bethlem Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All E.R. 643 (Lord Scarman,
dissenting).
48. Id.
49. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
50. Frenchay Healthcare Nat'l Health Serv. Trust v. S, [1994] 2 All E.R. 403.
51. Stone, supra note 46, at 205.
52. Law Hospital NHS trust v. Lord Advocate [1996] 2 L.R. 403 (Far. 1996).
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finalize a decision to discontinue medical treatment. 3 The test is to decide
whether it is in the patient's best interests that any medical treatment be
discontinued. The Court held that after weighing the physicians diagnoses
and the fact that Ms. Johnstone had been in a vegetative state for over four
years with no hope of recovery, it would not be unlawful to remove the
feeding apparatus. The rationale the Court used was similar to the
Frenchay case, as the best interests test was applied to determine the
outcome.
C. The Republic of Ireland
Often the argument against physician assisted right to die claims is
that euthanasia is an easy way out of a bad situation. An Irish case
portrays a different view of the issue. A mother who requested her
daughter's right to die with dignity, while watching hopelessly as her
daughter remained comatose for twenty three years, was certainly not
looking for an easy way out. Thus, In re Ward of Court, the Irish
Supreme Court looked at the right to die issue of the forty-five year old
woman, whose condition remained unchanged for twenty three years.5
The woman was kept alive by a naso-gastric feeding tube. The Irish
Supreme Court upheld the cessation of treatment for the woman, after her
parents petitioned the court. Although it was reported that the woman
could track things with her eyes, her mother said, "In 23 years of constant
and regular visiting, I got no response from her."- The Irish Court, in
contrast to the English Bland decision, had to consider the requirements of
the Irish Constitution, and not just common law.
The Irish Constitution sets out several provisions that are
applicable to the right to die cases. Some of those, but not limited to, are
53. Id.
54. In re A Ward of Court [19951 2 I.L.R.M. 401.
55. After a long battle with both the hospitals and the courts, the woman's mother was
allowed to bring her daughter home to die. "Once we had my daughter in my house it seemed as
though a great calm descended on us. There was great sadness too but it was accompanied by
peace we felt that, at last, we were in control." Her mother also stated that, "I can say, without
fear of contradiction, that her eight days of dying were more peaceful than the previous 23 years
of so called living." The Mother of the Worn[en in the 'Right to Die' case Tells Her Story, THE
IRISH TIMES, Feb. 24, 1996, at 10. Similarly, the husband of a woman who remained in a
permanent vegetative state for over four years in Scotland, battled for the right to allow his wife
to die in peace. "It has been very hard for everyone over the past four years. It's better for me
now to remember the past, not the present. I didn't want Janet to die, but her life ended more
than four years ago." Stuart McCartney, Family's Tears for Brave Gran Janet, SCOT. SUNDAY
MAIL, June 2, 1996, at 2.
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the right to life, the right to bodily integrity and the right to equality.? In
Re a Ward of Court, Chief Justice Hamilton says, "As the process of dying
is part, and an ultimate consequence of life, the right to life necessarily
implies the right to have nature take its course and to die a natural death. "7
V. THE LAW IN AUSTRALIA
Both in Australia and the United States, suicide itself is not a
criminal act, yet physicians who assist a suicide can often be prosecuted
and/or lose their licenses. In 1961, England decriminalized suicide and
attempted suicide, but left assisted suicide a crime punishable by fourteen
years in prison."
The laws affecting physician assisted suicide differ from State to
State in Australia. Similarly, criminal law is mainly administered by the
States and Territories, rather then the Commonwealth. In 1995,
Australia's Northern Territory became the first legislature in the post-war
world to legalize a choice for terminally ill patients to have a physician
assist them in their death. In 1995 the Legislative Assembly of the
Northern Territory passed the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995
(ROTTI)."
56. BUNREACHT NA HEIREANN [Constitution] art. 40, § 3, cl. 2 (It.). "The State shall, in
particular by its laws protect the best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done,
vindicate the life.. .of every citizen." Additionally, the Constitution appears to guaranty a degree
of personal bodily integrity. "The State guarantees in its law to respect, and, as far as practical,
by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen." Id. art. 40, § 3, cl 1.
Lastly, the Constitution sets forth a right to equality. " All citizens shall, as human persons, be
held equal before the law. This shall not be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments
have due regard to the differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function." Id.
art. 40, § 1.
57. In reA Ward of Court , 2 I.L.R.M. at 426.
58. Cox, supra note 1 at 62.
59. Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (NT), No. 12 (1995) (Austl.) [hereinafter ROTH].
The provisions of the Act relating to the assistance in terminating a person's life are : "[a]
patient who, in the course of a terminal illness, is experiencing pain, suffering and /or distress to
an extent unacceptable to the patient, may request the patient's medical practitioner to assist the
patient to terminate the patient's life." See id. § 4. Further, terminal illness is defined as "an
illness which, in reasonable medical judgment will, in the normal course, without the application
of extraordinary measures or of treatment unacceptable to the patient, result in the death of the
patient." See id. § 3. There are considerable standards that must be met before a physician can
assist a patient. Some of the conditions include:
(a) the patient has attained the age of 18 years;
(b) the medical practitioner is satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that -
(i) the patient is suffering from an illness that will, in the
normal course and without the application of extraordinary
measures, result in the death of the patient;
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The legality of the Act was challenged in Wake and Gondarra v.
The Northern Territory of Australia.6 The Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the Act.6 1 The plaintiffs challenged the Act arguing that the
Northern Territory's legislative power is subject to a fundamental principle
underlying the common law that there is an undeniable right to life, and
thus, the "fundamental right" of a patient would be denied. No member of
the Court wanted to state specifically that there was a principle of law in
Australia that supported an inalienable right to lifeY Justice Angel said he
did not believe there was a 'right' to life. "It seems to me to speak of a
'right' to life is essentially meaningless if by that expression is meant a
legal right. "63
The Federal Government in Australia has the Constitutional power
to override laws of Australian Territories, much as the system in the
United States where the Supremacy Clause" of the United States
Constitution grants the federal government authority to trump individual
States' legislation. In an effort to repeal the ROTTI Act, Federal Liberal
MP Kevin Andrews introduced A Private Member's Bill(PMB) into the
(ii) in reasonable medical judgment, there is no medical measure
acceptable to the patient that can reasonably be undertaken in the
hope of effecting a cure; and
(iii) any medical treatment reasonably available to the patient is
confined to the relief of pain, suffering and/or distress with the
object of allowing the patient to die a comfortable death;
(c) two other persons, neither of whom is a relative or employee of,
or a member of the same medical practice as, the first medical practitioner
or each other -
(i) one of whom is a medical practitioner who holds prescribed
qualifications, or has
(ii) prescribed experience, in the treatment of the terminal illness
from which the patient is suffering; and
(iii) the other who is a qualified psychiatrist, have examined the
patient...
(iv) in the case of the qualified psychiatrist referred to in subpar
(ii) - that the patient is not suffering from a treatable clinical
depression in respect of the illness; ...
(f) the medical practitioner is satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that
the patient is of sound mind and that the patient's decision to end his or her
life has been made freely, voluntarily and after due consideration.
60. Wake and Gondarra v. N. Terr. of Austl. (1996) No. 112 (N. Terr. Sup. Ct.).
61. Id.
62. Australasian Legal Information Institute, Euthanasia (visited Nov. 20, 1997)
<www.austlii.edu.au>.
63. Wake, No 112, slip op. at 62.
64. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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House of Representatives. The Bill passed both the House, by a vote of 88
to 35, and the Senate by a vote of 38 to 33.65 The effect of this law is that
the ROTTI Act is overruled.
As an illustration of how quickly the world is changing, books that
explained options about euthanasia were banned in Australia just a few
years ago. Derek Humphry, founder of the Hemlock Society, and author
of Final Exit, had his book banned. However, by August 1992, the
Euthanasia Society in Australia made a plea to the government and in less
than a year, the ban was lifted."
VI. INTERNATIONAL LAW
Human rights and self-determination have been established as
important goals in international law. These principles have been
established by the Charter of the United Nations.67  Additionally,
international treaties and customary law acknowledge universal respect for
life which is coupled with regard for individual autonomy.
A. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
is an international treaty, that was adopted by the UN General Assembly in
1966." Australia ratified the ICCPR on August 13, 1980. Both Great
Britain and the United States are also parties to the treaty. The ICCPR is
binding on all those countries that have been a party to it. The ICCPR
requires State parties to adopt legislative or other measures to support the
rights recognized in the treaty. The Australian Parliament has not enacted
the ICCPR as part of Australian law. However, the ICCPR is attached as
a schedule to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act
1986.69
Article 1 provides that "all peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
65. Queensland Right to Life, Overview of Law in Australian States and Territories
(visited Oct. 20, 1997) <www.qrtl.org.au/news/index.htm>.
66. Id. at 42.
67. "With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples...." U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
68. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res.2200A (XXI), Dec. 16,
1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into
force March 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR].
69. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986, Austl. Act 125. The
Act asserts the university of human rights and "every person is free and equal in dignity and
rights." See id. § ii.
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status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."°0
It is not clear if the provision advocates a blanket right to self-
determination in every area of life or if it is limited to political, economic
and social arenas. Even if self-determination was so limited, certainly
making provisions for one's own death would fall into one, if not all, of
the above categories. Additionally, the use of the term "self-
determination" followed by a period to end the sentence, indicates a lack
of restrictions on free choice in personal matters. Thus, the second
sentence in Article 1 does not provide a finite list, but rather gives
examples of ways in which individuals are free to make determinations for
themselves.
The right to self-determination is often balanced with a right to
life. Article 6 provides: "[e]very human being has the inherent right to
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life. "7 Even if the right to life is an inherent right, it may
be possible to waive this right. Thus, as with other rights, an individual
may decide that there is an appropriate time not to assert the right, and to
choose a peaceful death.
The final sentence of Article 6 limits the scope of the right. The
use of the word "arbitrary" is crucial to the analysis of the scope as only
deprivations that are "arbitrary" are in violation. The right to life is
apparently not absolute. A number of delegates to the Human Rights
Commission suggested that arbitrarily was equivalent to an Anglo-
American phrase, such as "without due process of law."2 Due Process
implies a right of the person affected to be heard and to be able to make an
informed choice. At a minimum then, passive euthanasia would appear to
be permissible under the treaty, because legal controls are currently
recognized to allow refusal of medical treatment.
B. Universial Declaration of Human Rights
The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and
proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 19,
1948."1 The Universal Declaration is not absolutely binding on United
Nation members, but its provisions have been accepted all over the world.
Article 3 provides that "[e]veryone has a right to life, liberty and security
70. ICCPR, supra note 68, art. 1.
71. Id. art. 6.
72. Australasian Legal Information Institute, supra note 62, at 8.
73. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(II), U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., art. 26. U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) Ihereinafter Universal Declaration].
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of person." 4 The application of Article 3 of the Universal Declaration's
right to life protection is not clear in the realm of assisted suicide. As in
other treaties, it is possible that a victim's consent may negate any illegal
implications of the Universal Declaration. Additionally, Article 5 protects
persons from inhuman and degrading treatment," and so one can make an
argument that the quality of life is relevant. Thus, assisted suicide does
not per se conflict with the Universal Declaration. The protection of life
should be considered in light of the provisions protecting degrading
actions. An individual who experiences a debilitating medical illness
should not only be able to refuse additional medical treatment, but should
also be granted permission to end their life when further treatment is both
futile and debasing.
C. Universal Ethical and Philosophical Principles
Perhaps the best way to synthesize principles in international law
with the concepts in Anglo-American law is to consider universal ethics.
The ethical principle of double effect is relevant to the discussion on
physician assisted death. This principle was formulated in western thought
in the 17th Century by Roman Catholic theologians.16 Double effect set out
a test in which the good effect must be greater than the bad effect,
provided the intention behind the action was a good one. If a proposed
action satisfied the test, then it was ethically permissible." Both the British
custom of looking to the intention of the physician, as well as United States
Supreme court test where the physician's intent is considered, support the
concept ot double effect.
In addition to the "double effect" principle, John Stuart Mill's
concept of individual sovereignty 8 points to the answer in the physician
assisted dying debate. The idea that man is the supreme decision maker
for himself supports an individual's power to terminate their life, should
they choose to do so. Thus, as long as man's decision is made in an
uncoerced manner, and the physician's intent was to help the patient, then
the greater good of the individual's free choice, outweighs the bad effect of
the death.
74. Id. art. 3.
75. "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." Id. art. 5.
76. Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 245.
77. Id.
78. "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITING 13 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
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International societies express an interest in the sanctity of life. In
Anglo-American law, murder is proscribed, and abortion is available with
limited application. Ironically, the United States still imposes the death
penalty as a criminal sanction. The death penalty in Great Britain is
accepted, but only in extreme situations. Australia has formally abolished
the death penalty. The sanctity of life; therefore, has an exception in many
countries. If a state or government can make the decision to end a
person's life, then an individual should also be granted control over the
decision to end his own life in exigent circumstances.
VII. CONCLUSION
Australia, Great Britain, Ireland and the United States recognize a
common law right of individuals to refuse medical treatment.
Additionally, the right to self-determination extends to members of each of
these nations through national, as well as international law. If members of
these societies that are physically well are to benefit from these concepts, it
follows that the rights extend to those who are terminally ill or unable to
speak for themselves.
Just as Australian Courts have found no fundamental right to life,
American courts have held there is no fundamental right to die.79
International law consistently recognizes a right to life balanced with an
individual's sovereignty over personal decisions. Even though there is no
right to die in the United States Constitution, the states or individual
countries could create such a, right, just as the Australian Northern
Territory did. The international community should follow Australia's lead
in formulating strict guidelines to accommodate an individual's choice to
die with dignity.
The advances in medical technology give the physician great
opportunities to share in the decision making process to aid a terminally ill
patient in a dignified death. However, without a legal framework and with
fears that such a decision could result in criminal sanctions, these decisions
are made behind closed doors, where neither the patient or the physician's
rights are protected.
Legislation such as the Australian Act and laws upheld by
American, Irish and English Courts, show that the world is ready for
change. Although change ebbs and flows, it is nevertheless evident that
society is on the brink of a major move toward respecting the autonomy of
79. In an address to Catholic University's School of Philosophy, Justice Scalia said it is
absolutely plain that there is no right to die. There were laws against suicide" in the states at
the time the Constitution was enacted. Scalia's Right to Die Remarks Criticized, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1996, at 15.
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the individual in matters of intimate concern. While the idea of a blanket
approval of assisted suicide is not advocated, assisted suicide carried out
within strict guidelines must become a right that every human being is
granted.
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ARGENTINA
Judiciary
Federal courts include the Supreme Court, 17 appellate courts, and
district and territorial courts on the local levels. The provincial court
systems are similarly organized, comprising supreme, appellate, and
lower courts.
Magistratura
Las cortes federales incluyen la Corte Suprema, 17 cortes de apelaci6n,
y cortes de distrito y territoriales en los niveles locales. Los sistemas
judiciales provincianos son similarmente organizados, comprendiendo
supremo, apelaci6n, y las cortes mds bajas.
